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Abstract 
The object of this thesis is to inquire into some major aspects of the 
historiographical writing of war in France and Burgundy, from Henry V's invasion of 
France in 1415 to the first wars of Italy. A comparative methodology is used to study 
the emergence and establishment, in Burgundy, then in France, of an official and 
semi-official writing of the prince's wars; these authoritative accounts are contrasted 
with independent versions. The thesis demonstrates that the writing of war promoted 
by the Dukes of Burgundy greatly influenced French chronicles, although the 
specific, national features of the early Renaissance French writing of war are also 
exemplified. 
The evolution of the writing of war is examined through the analysis of the 
treatment, by contemporaries, of selected episodes of French and Burgundian history, 
ranging chronologically from 1415 to 1500. Two themes are considered: the ideology 
of the prince's wars, and the representation of the prince's soldiers. The two are 
connected, for the prince's interest was that his agents in his wars - mainly, the 
nobility - should accept, and be flattered by, their representation in accounts of the 
prince's deeds. The development of a propagandist discourse in the official 
historiography of Burgundy and France is delineated; particular attention is given to 
the concept of the guerre de magnificence, which is seen, as far as Burgundy is 
concerned, in the context of Philip the Good's crusading endeavours. The crisis 
experienced in Burgundy, with the practical failure of the Dukes' guerres de 
magnificence, contrasts with the French propagandist discourse, which appears 
increasingly confident as France emerged victoriously from the trauma of the 
Hundred Years War and became, through the wars of Italy, a fearsome conquering 
nation. The evolution, in French historiography, of the Joan of Arc epic demonstrates 
more precisely the shaping of the discourse on defensive war, while the treatment of 
offensive war is seen through accounts of Charles VIII's descent into Italy. 
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Introduction 
Per que-m plai ben dels reis auzir la bomba, 
Que n'aion ops paisson, cordas e porn, 
E-n sion trap tendut per forsjazer, 
E-nz encontrem a milliers et a cens, 
Si c'apres nos en chant hom puois de gesta. 
Aussi, j'aime bien entendre le tumulte des rois, et 
que leur servent pieux, cordes et pommes, et que 
soient dressees les tenses pour permettre de toucher 
dehors et que nous nous rencontrions par milliers, 
par centaines, de Sorte qu'apres nous la posterite 
chante sur noire geste. 
Bertran de Born, `Non puosc mudar mon chantar 
non esparga" 
Our fantasy of the Middle Ages resounds with the din of trumpets, the clash 
of armour and the neighing of horses. However romantic or dramatic this image may 
be, it is quite hyperbolic: Philippe Contamine, the acknowledged French expert in 
medieval warfare, recently stressed that the Middles Ages were `une periode 
faussement militaire', concluding with the words: `Le Moyen Age a aussi connu les 
paix, la paix'2. But Contamine also acknowledged that, even in times of peace, war 
was an element of medieval man's usual horizon; the imposing presence of 
fortresses, for instance, was a constant reminder that war could always break out. 
War was seen as a predestined ingredient of life; this is expressed, for instance, in the 
opening lines of Jean de Bueil's Jouvencel, a 15th century manual for candidates for a 
military career, as the author explained: `Au, commencement de ce monde, apres que 
1 L'amour et la guerre: I'auvre de Bertran de Born, ed. and transl. G. GOUIRAN, 2 vol., Aix en 
Provence / Marseille, Universite de Provence / Lafitte, 1985,11,576, v. 4-8 (trans]. p. 577). 2 Cf. `Le Moyen Age, une periode faussement militaire', interview with P. CONTAMINE, in L'art de la 
guerre au Moyen Age, Historia Special, 55 (September / October 1998), 110-116 (p. 116). 
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Dieu eut cree l'homme et la femme et qu'il eut produit toutes choses pour servir ä 
l'homme [... ], ne fut pas longuement la terre en paix'. Envy was the source of the 
first ever conflict, when Cain slew his brother Abel; shooting forth from the seeds of 
discord, war soon spread its branches over the whole world3. 
Jean de Bueil's metaphoric comments and biblical references were, however, 
greatly simplifying the issue. The modern historian R. A. Brown forcefully illustrated 
how crucial the political aspect of conflicts was to the understanding of medieval and 
early modem warfare, stating: `The origins of Europe were hammered out on the 
anvil of war'4. In the late Middle Ages, the period in which we shall interest 
ourselves, war was more than ever before the business of states - one can already talk 
of nation-states in many instances - struggling to assert their sovereignty, extend their 
dominions, or simply survive. At the same time, the fear or love of war was deeply 
rooted in contemporary society: war was mainly the instrument for the making of 
nation-states, but it also pre-existed the state in people's minds. This applies in 
particular to the aristocracy, the land-owning caste, whose very function was to fight 
for those who worked, or prayed, for the community. As Contamine has rightly 
emphasized: `la particularite de la guerre medievale est d'etre, comme la chasse, un 
mode de vie en dehors des structures etatiques. Elle surgit de la base; eile echappe 
aux `decideurs' - les lieutenants du roi ou le roi lui-meme'5. In the late Middle Ages, 
rulers were striving to channel and exploit these warlike impulses for their own 
profit. The story of the exploitation, by the Dukes of Burgundy and the Kings of 
France, of the nobility's martial drives and ideals will be one of the main themes of 
this thesis. 
Perhaps more than any other contemporary artistic representation of war, the 
late medieval writing of warfare exposes the dichotomy between war as instrument of 
the state, and war as a natural and human force, differently apprehended by different 
members of medieval society. The historiography of the times is a particularly 
' JEAN DE BUEIL, Le Jouvencel, ed. C. FAVRE and L. LECESTRE for the SHF, 2 vol., Paris, 
Renouard, 1887-1889,1,13. 
4 Quotation found in M. HOWARD, War in European History, London / Oxford / NewYork, Oxford 
University Press, 1976, p. 1. 
S Cf. `Le Moyen Age, une periode faussement militaire', p. 112. 
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interesting field of study, because it is primarily concerned with wars, the latter being 
the most dramatic events that disrupted ordinary life; from reading medieval 
chronicles, we do feel as if the stuff of history was basically warfare, however 
exaggerated this idea may be. All chroniclers wrote mainly of wars, whether they 
glorified or deplored them; many explicitly devoted their works to the recording of 
military deeds. Thus, the writing of war in the Middle Ages coincides to a great 
extent with the writing of history. It happens that the 15th century is a strikingly rich 
period as regards historiography, at least for France and its powerful, ambitious 
vassal region, the Duchy of Burgundy. Educated contemporaries seem to have been 
seized with a feverish urge to immortalize the remarkable events of their age in 
writing, and rulers were quick to promote official writings of their reign, to produce 
definitive versions of their deeds. War naturally figured in the forefront of these 
histories, either by choice or by virtue of its immediacy. Moreover, the period is 
particularly interesting with regard to warfare: from the renewal of the Hundred 
Years War, to the French adventures in Italy, the century saw countless dramatic 
events which greatly modified contemporary geopolitics. In addition, it was a period 
when warfare was evolving with sensational and disturbing momentum: the slaughter 
of the French chivalry by the English archers at Agincourt, that of the Burgundian 
nobility by the Swiss pikemen at Morat, or the successes achieved by Charles VIII 
against the Italians, thanks notably to his impressive artillery train, demonstrate how 
rapidly tactics and techniques evolved during the century. Last but not least, the mid- 
15`h century saw the birth of the French standing army, a crucial event with great 
consequences in the social, political and, naturally, military domains, in France and 
in other European states, as the latter were inspired by France's example. 
In this thesis, I propose to consider the history of the writing of warfare in 15`h 
century France and in her powerful, culturally active vassal territory, the Duchy of 
Burgundy. This study will further our understanding of the `cultura della guerra' - 
the culture of war, the words Franco Cardini used to describe the impact of warfare 
on ways of thinking, art, literature, and the whole European civilization, from the 
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early Middle Ages to the French Revolution - and provide more information on a 
particular stage of its evolution, during a period often described as the pre- 
Renaissance7, when Northern Europe was still medieval in most respects, yet 
entering the Renaissance through various aspects of its civilization. The culture of 
war of the pre-Renaissance period is a vast field to explore; modern historians have 
already settled down to the task, seeking the clues that explained it in all of the 
constituents of contemporary European civilization: letters and edicts, artistic 
representations, literature and historiography. Particular attention has been paid to the 
concept of chivalry, because of its importance in the military, political, and social 
affairs of the 15`h century8. Chivalry will of course be one of the main themes of my 
study: whether extolled or demystified, it was an unavoidable element of the writing 
of war. As regards my sources, I have chosen to concentrate exclusively on 
historiography, with the design of analysing the various trends of recording of wars 
that existed in Burgundy and France, and their evolution. 
Over the last thirty years, there has been a remarkable rise of interest in the 
chroniclers of the 15`h century, especially the rhetoriqueurs of Burgundy. Modern 
scholars have shown that the rhetoriqueurs' bombastic and mannered language, as 
well as their propagandistic stance, did not necessarily make their discourse banal or 
flat9, especially in the case of works as ideologically rich as Georges Chastelain's 
chronicle. Most of the major rhetoriqueurs or other French and Burgundian 
chroniclers of the period now each have their recognized modem specialist. Jean 
Dufournet and Jean-Claude Delclos have enlightened us respectively on Philippe de 
Commynes' Memoires1 ° and Georges Chastelain's Chroniquel1; very recently, Jean 
Devaux and Mark Spencer have established themselves as the experts respectively on 
6 Cf. F. CARDINI, La culture de la guerre, XeXVII/e siecle, transl. A. LEVI, Paris, Gallimard, 1992 
(first published in Florence, 1982, as Quell'Antica Festa Crudele, Guerra et cultura delta guerra 
dall'etafeudale alle Grande Rivoluzione). 
7 See for instance C. MOSSE, Les Histoires de 1'Histoire, vol. 2: La Pre-Renaissance, Paris, Acropole, 
1982. 
8 See Chapter 1, note 7 for a list of modern sources on late medieval chivalry. 
9 The works of Paul Zumthor initiated the rehabilitation of the Burgundian rhetoriqueurs and of their 
later French homonyms. See especially his book Le masque et la lumiere. La poetique des grands 
rhetoriqueurs, Paris, Seuil, 1978. 
10 See Jean Dufournet's collection of his best articles on Commynes: J. DUFOURNET, Philippe de 
Commynes. Un historien a l'aube des temps modernes, Brussels, De Boeck-Wesmael, 1994. 
11 Cf. Delclos' thesis on Chastelain: J. -C. DELCLOS, Le temoignage de Georges Chastellain, 
historiographe de Philippe le Bon et de Charles le Temeraire, Geneva, Droz, 1980. 
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Jean Molinet and Thomas Basin, thanks to their much needed monographs 12. These 
modern scholars, and others, have naturally examined in some detail the views on 
war in general, or on particular wars, professed by the author they studied. 
Chastelain, Molinet or Commynes' thoughts on war will of course be examined and 
contrasted in this thesis, yet I also intend to analyse the testimony of other 
historiographers who have been somewhat neglected by modern critics, such as 
Gilles Le Bouvier, Pierre Cochon, Jean de Wavrin and Jean d'Auton. 
In an illuminating article, Jean-Claude Delclos contrasted Commynes' 
pragmatic and realistic recording of wars with the chivalrous and exalted accounts of 
military deeds found in the early part of Chastelain's chronicle 13. The critic 
concluded his piece by stating that his comments were only a starting-point: to 
understand the reason for the two authors' differing views of war, one needed to 
consider their writings in the broader context of the whole 15th century 
historiographical scene, and to seek the causes of their particular visions in their own 
experiences. Extending Delclos' analysis to the whole of the century's 
historiographical writing of warfare, I have tried to further his observations, to show 
the different existing traditions, the developing schools, emphasize the various trends 
of writing of war and the idiosyncrasies of certain authors. Also, I have tried to 
answer the questions that he raised, applying them not simply to Chastelain and 
Commynes, but to other authors, by examining each chronicler's contribution to the 
writing of war in the historical, political and literary context of the times - an external 
factor of considerable importance for us if we want to understand why authors wrote 
warfare the way they did, and less likely to be influenced by our subjectivity than a 
study of the chroniclers' psychology. 
12 Cf. J. DEVAUX, Jean Molinet, indiciaire bourguignon, Paris, Honor6 Champion, 1996 
(Bibliotheque du Xis siecle, LV); M. SPENCER, Thomas Basin (1412-1490). The History of Charles 
VI! and Louis X1, Nieuwkoop, De Graaf, 1997. 
13 J. -C. DELCLOS, `Les rayons et les ombres de la guerre ä la fin du Moyen Age: Georges Chastellain 
et Philippe de Commynes', in La bataille, 1'armee, la gloire. 1745-1871. Actes du colloque 
international de Clermont-Ferrand, ed. P. VIABLANEIX and J. EURARD, Clermont-Ferrand, 
Association des publications de la faculte de lettres et sciences humaines de Clermont-Ferrand, 1985, 
t. 1, p. 21-34. 
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The primary theme of my study is the shaping of an official, propagandist 
writing of the prince's wars, in Burgundy, then in France, following the Burgundian 
example. Official accounts of the princes' wars will be contrasted with other, 
independent versions. We shall see how the Dukes of Burgundy promoted a 
chivalrous, heroic and partisan recording of their wars; the genre then established 
itself in France - with, however, some important national peculiarities - to the 
detriment of an old, once well-established type of historiography, which I have 
termed the `clerical' chronicle. Philippe de Commynes' Memoires then introduced a 
new writing of war which stands out as the alternative genre at the end of the 15`h 
century; its triumph, however, would only happen in the next century. 
The writing of war by the French and Burgundian official, semi-official and 
independent historiographers will be analysed and contrasted through the study of 
their treatment of two main topics: the ideology of the prince's wars, and the 
depiction of the prince's soldiers - mainly, the knights. These are closely connected, 
for the princes' interest was that the historiography of their states should reflect the 
image of the soldier they wanted to promote, and that the noblesse d'epee should 
accept, as well as be flattered by, this representation. My second theme, which is 
more straightforwardly ideological, will be the cause of the princes' wars. The sheer 
variety of the military conflicts that took place in France and Burgundy in the 15th 
century, and the length of the span of time I have chosen to study - which seemed 
necessary, to bring out a manifest pattern of evolution - made it impossible for me to 
consider every different kind of conflict. Instead, I have picked out some of the most 
dramatic events of the century: mainly, the renewal of the Hundred Years War, and, 
at the other end of the century, France's spectacular offensive in Italy. I also consider 
one episode which, considering its poor results, may appear inconsequential, but 
which, ideologically, seems to me very important: the crusading actions and 
endeavours of Philip the Good of Burgundy, from 1444 to 1463. We shall see how 
France, emerging as a victor from the traumatic Hundred Years War conflict, became 
increasingly self-confident and triumphant in her historiographical discourse about 
her wars, drawing inspiration from the Burgundian chroniclers' writing of their 
Dukes' wars. Particular attention will be paid to a concept developed by the 
chroniclers of Burgundy, the guerre d'honneur et de magnificence. When, at the 
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dawn of the 16`h century, the Kings of France embark on their impressive wars of 
conquest in Italy, their official writers will exploit the theme of the guerre de 
magnificence to present, extol and excuse their patron's aggressive and ambitious 
Italian adventures. 
The reader will soon note that I have made little use of the methodology of 
modern literary criticism, though I have not altogether ignored it. This is partly due to 
the fact that my sources, as my conclusions, are primarily of a historical nature. 
Naturally, the literary aspect of the sources has not been neglected: quite the contrary, 
since one of the concerns of the Burgundian and French official chroniclers was the 
development of an artistic discourse, with an emphasis on form. However, to modern 
criticism, I have preferred a comparative methodology, which the sheer variety of my 
sources seemed to favour. Arguing from analogy and contrast between French, 
Burgundian and, accessorily, foreign sources, I have endeavoured to define the 
affinities between the various 15`" century testimonies on war, and their differences, 
as well as to bring out patterns of development both in sources and themes. 
A long introductory chapter will present a panorama of the recording of the 
`war of the knights' as it developed in France and Burgundy from approximately 
1415 to 1460. We shall see how Philip the Good soon established in Burgundy a 
distinguished official writing of war which glorified the `war of the knights', 
flattering the nobility by exploiting the ideals of chivalry which the Dukes of 
Burgundy had themselves embraced. Two different genres of recording wars existed 
in France, the clerical and the chivalrous; the chivalrous chronicle, more sober and 
pragmatic than its Burgundian homonym, and already patriotic, would become 
France's first official historiography. The second chapter will deal with the shaping, 
in France, from 1429 to the early 16`" century, of a propagandist official discourse 
about God's support for the King of France's wars, through the study of the treatment 
of the episode of Joan of Arc. In the two following chapters, we shall return to 
Burgundy, and examine Philip the Good's crusading endeavours, from 1444 to 1463. 
The Burgundian accounts of Philip's crusading efforts will allow a definition of the 
guerre d'honneur et de magnificence, a magnanimous action performed by the prince 
to acquire renown and increase his state's prestige. I shall expose, however, the 
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ambiguity in Burgundian accounts of Philip's guerre de magnificence, and contrast it 
with France's triumphant narratives of Charles VIII's descent into Italy, also 
implicitly presented by the French official chroniclers of the early Renaissance as a 
guerre de magnificence, despite the failure of Charles' crusading ambitions (Chapter 
5). These boastful, chivalrous French accounts of the first war of Italy will be 
contrasted with the lucid and moralizing version of Philippe de Commynes, which 
appears as the only alternative to the partisan discourse (Chapter 6). Finally, I shall 
return to the issue of the representation of the soldier, this time in the official 
historiography of France at the dawn of the 16th century (Chapter 7); we shall see 
how the early Renaissance French chroniclers modelled their representation of the 
actors of Charles VIII and Louis XII's guerres de magnificence upon the heroic 
pattern of the Valois Dukes of Burgundy's historiography, yet presented a more 
modern, pragmatic and militant image of the French soldier, and of the French army, 
reflecting in particular the new bonds that effectively united the Kings of France to 
their agents in their wars. 
* 
** 
Enguerran de Monstrelet, Jean Lefevre de Saint-Remy, Jean de Wavrin, 
Georges Chastelain, Olivier de La Marche, Jean Molinet, Philippe de Commynes and 
Jean d'Auton are the primary sources in several volumes that I have used most, and 
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Chapter 1: When France was a battlefield (1415-c. 1430). The `war 
of the knights' in French and Burgundian accounts of the English 
invasion 
Car le sauvement de vos ames 
Ferez, et sera mencion 
A tousjours de voz belles armes ; 
De revenchier l'extorcion 
Et d'estre la deffension 
De femmes vesves et pucelles ; 
Si en arez salvacion 
Et honneur en toutes querelles. 
Christine de Pisan, Ballade' 
" Introduction 
Chivalry is such a central notion in the ideology of medieval and Renaissance 
warfare, that it seems natural to open a study of the writing of warfare in 15th century 
French and Burgundian historiography with an analysis of the depiction of the `war 
of the knights', in the chronicles of the Kingdom of France and the Duchy of 
Burgundy, towards the beginning of the century. Amongst all the representatives of 
medieval society, the knight was a predominant figure. His familiar silhouette, 
complete with armour and horse, appears regularly in paintings, inside churches, and 
in manuscript illuminations. By the beginning of the 15th century, the knight was 
slowly losing his tactical importance on the battlefield; as early as 1346, Edward III 
had destroyed the chivalry of France by forcing his knights to dismount and fight 
alongside the infantry, thus offering his archers an important role, rather than an 
' CEuvres poetiques de Christine de Pisan, ed. M. ROY, Paris, Firmin Didot, 1886-1896,1,211, v. 9- 
16. 
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auxiliary one. And the English archers would again slay the nobility of France at 
Agincourt in 1415. However, in France and Burgundy notably, knights still 
considered themselves as the pre-eminent force of the army. Indeed, knighthood, 
service for the suzerain in his wars, on horseback and clad in armour, primarily 
concerned the aristocracy, the land-owning class, those who dominated their world 
both politically and socially. Knights were regarded as the military elite from the 
beginning of the feudal era, at the dawn of the 10th century, when the heavy cavalry, 
which would for a long time remain the most powerful tactical element of an army, 
started to monopolize battlefields2. Traditionally, the aristocracy's role was to protect 
the clergy and the labourers, and the obligations a land-owner owed to his lord 
included a regular military service. The army was mostly a business for the nobility. 
By the 14th and 15th centuries, however, things were beginning to evolve. Rulers were 
increasingly aware of the tactical worth of the infantry. The sons of rich burgesses 
were often attracted by the prospects of a military career. And the Hundred Years 
War had brought forth a swarm of routiers, some of these bands being led by men of 
low social origin, who sought fortune through the exercise of arms. As a result, there 
were comparatively more prospects of a military career for the people3. 
By the 15th century, an entire mythology had grown around the figure of the 
knight. The role of chivalry was thus greatly embellished, partly for the aristocracy's 
own pleasure, and partly as a result of the knights' wish to differentiate themselves 
from the rest of medieval society, a need more acutely felt as knights were losing 
their tactical importance. Throughout the Middle Ages, poets and romance authors 
provided knights with heroes whom they could take as models. The Chanson de 
Roland, composed during the 11th century, promoted, through the figures of Roland 
and Olivier, the ideal of valiant knights, loyal to their lords, fighting to protect the 
faith. In the 12th century, Chretien de Troyes and the circle of Marie de France 
introduced, with the heroes of King Arthur's court, the figure of the courteous knight, 
whose deeds are inspired by the love of a lady. In the 14`" century, Froissart 
transformed the actors of the Hundred Years War into romance heroes. In his 
2 On the tactical importance of the heavy cavalry during the feudal era see P. CONTAMINE, La guerre 
au Moyen Age, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1980, p. 132,153-155,316-317. 
3 On knighthood and the evolution of warfare during the Middle Ages see ibid., p. 232-306,390-405, 
and HOWARD, p. 1-19. 
25 
Chroniques, knights act according to a well-defined code of chivalry: they must be 
brave and fierce on the battlefield but also courteous with each other, respecting their 
enemies who belong to the same social class and acknowledge the same ideals, 
whilst behaving gallantly with the ladies at court. With Froissart, chivalry appears as 
an international brotherhood. At the same time, amongst a constantly developing 
literature on war and the conduct of warfare, treatises on chivalry, from Ramon 
Llull's Le libre del orde de cavalleria (end of 13th century) to Geoffroy de Charni's 
Livre de chevalerie (before 1356), were multiplying. These treatises were defining 
the code of chivalry which differentiated the knight from an ordinary soldier. Apart 
from some very innovative works such as Jean de Bueil's celebrated Jouvencel - 
which in France would herald the age of the professional soldier - most of these 
treatises on chivalry appear very conservative in their conception of knighthood. The 
Livre de chevalerie of Geoffroi de Charny is in this respect very typical: written in a 
time of crisis after the resounding defeats of Sluys (1340) and Crecy (1346), and with 
the intention of responding to a need for reforms, it could only offer as a solution a 
return to the honoured values of chivalry4. Chief amongst them featured `proesce', 
the martial virtue par excellence, the ability and will to perform great deeds of arms. 
Charny explained that the `haute honnour de proesce' was to be the object of a 
personal quest for all those who wanted to distinguish themselves in the practice of 
arms. The `preus', those who did possess this virtue of `proesce', started very young, 
by listening to the advice and tales of `faiz d'armes' of great knights. Their dearest 
wish was to `monter a cheval et [... ] eulx armer'. Many of these men started their 
career by winning fame in tourneys, but all eventually realized that `les bonnes gens 
d'armes pour les guerres sont plus prisiez et honorez que nul des autres gens d'armes 
qui soient'. Having entered the `mestier d'armes de guerre', they spent their time 
enquiring `ou il fait le plus honorable', and, having gone there, strove to gain 
renown. 
Seductive as the ideals of chivalry may have been, the knights' behaviour was 
often far from being virtuous and irreproachable. Froissart himself, who insisted on 
4 On the Livre de chevalerie and treatises on chivalry see Richard Kaeuper and Elspeth Kennedy's 
excellent introduction in GEOFFROI DE CHARNY, The Book of Chivalry, ed. and trans!. R. W. 
KAEUPER and E. KENNEDY, Philadelphia, University of Pensylvania Press, 1996, p. 3-83. 
5 Cf. GEOFFROI DE CHARNY, p. 100-102. 
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telling the truth at all times, often had to depict the knights of his time in a light 
which was quite contradictory to their high ideals. The methods employed by rulers 
and knights for waging war were usually ugly, bloody, and devastating. During 
Froissart's lifetime, one method was especially popular amongst knights : the 
chevauchee. This consisted in crossing a whole territory with a group of soldiers, 
devastating the crops, burning and looting villages in order to weaken the enemy's 
economic resources, and returning home as safely as possible. During the 15th 
century, this particularly destructive way of waging war became less common, but it 
was never abandoned and war was still, in any case, a sinister business. Until the 
ordonnances of 1444-1445, the King of France could not pay his troops regularly; 
very often he could not pay them at all. As a result, knights and soldiers lived on the 
country, forcing the inhabitants of the villages surrounding a garrison to pay a levy 
called appatis. The system of the appatis was basically a protection racket. 
Sometimes the villagers had to pay the appatis of two or three different garrisons of 
routiers. Even chivalrous chroniclers who were earning their living from praising the 
ruling class, and who extolled the great deeds of the knights of the Kingdom of 
France or the Duchy of Burgundy, related much perfidy, cruelty and baseness, if only 
in order to expose the vices of a personal enemy of their patron. Quite recently, 
modern historians have singled out, with much cynicism, greed as a dominant vice 
amongst the chivalric class. Thus Nicholas Wright, for example, has shown how, in 
the Demandes of Geoffroi de Charny -a record of the questions and answers asked 
and given during an assembly of the Order of the Star held on 15 August 1352- most 
members were primarily concerned with questions of booty and ransoms6. As one 
can see, the major preoccupation of most knights was rather different from those 
promoted by Charny in his Livre de chevalerie : prowess, piety, the love of a lady in 
order to inspire great deeds, and courtesy7. 
6 N. A. R. WRIGHT, `The Tree of Battles of Honord Bouvet and the Laws of War', in War, Literature 
and Politics in the Late Middle Ages, ed. C. T. ALLMAND, Liverpool, University Press, 1976, p. 12- 
31 (p. 21). 
On the ideals of chivalry, as promoted notably by the literature of the times, and on the realities of 
the war of the knights, see amongst a whole corpus of modem studies: K. FOWLER, The Age of 
Plantagenet and Valois, London, Ferndale, 1980, p. 140-181 ('Chivalry, War and Society') ; M. H. 
KEEN, `Chivalry, Nobility and the Man-at-arms', in War, Literature..., p. 32-45 ; C. T. ALLMAND, 
`Changing Views of the Soldier in Late Medieval France', in Guerre et societe en France, en 
Angleterre et en Bourgogne, 14e-15e siecle, ed. P CONTAMINE, C. GIRY-DELOISON, M. H. KEEN, 
Villeneuve d'Ascq, Presses de l'Universitd Charles de Gaulle (Lille III), 1991, p. 171-188 ; M. VALE, 
War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of 
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In this first chapter, I propose to analyse the depiction of the `war of the 
knights'8 in Burgundian and French chronicles respectively, in the context of the 
relation, by contemporaries, of the English invasion which started with the taking of 
Harfleur by Henry V, and the battle of Agincourt. The period is particularly 
favourable for a study of the treatment, by historiographers, of the `war of the 
knights', as it is, in many respects, still truly `medieval': it was a period of anarchy in 
the Kingdom of France, where the power of the country's monarch was at one of its 
lowest points in history, Charles VI being insane, and Charles VII his disputed 
successor, ruling only south of the Loire, with a very weak hand. Taking advantage of 
the weakness of the French King's power, the princes of royal blood, and chief 
amongst them Philip the Good of Burgundy, increased their dominance over their 
vassals, their prestige and their influence. Marie-Therese Caron has shown how the 
traditional values of chivalry were deemed very profitable by the princes of royal 
blood, especially in Burgundy, in order to seduce, attract and control the aristocracy9. 
It was also a period of continuous warfare, where knights were still - in France and 
Burgundy at least -- the masters of the battlefields, despite a few important 
phenomena heralding modern warfare, the most obvious being the defeat of the 
French heavy cavalry by the English infantry at Agincourt. On a different register, it 
was also a particularly dark and dramatic period, where one could have found 
immense swathes of land laid waste in the Kingdom of France: according to the 
Bourgeois de Paris, the Kingdom was, in these troubled days, comparable to the 
`Terre Deserte' or `Terre Gaste', the desolate land mentioned in Celtic romances'° 
Many of the authors I have used belong to this period, but I have also called upon 
chroniclers who were only born during this span of time and who wrote their 
narrations towards the middle of the century: this will enable us to discern some 
the Middle Ages, London, Gerald Duckworth, 1981 ; M. MOLLAT DU JOURDIN, La guerre de Cent 
Ans vue par ceux qui Pont vecue, Paris, Seuil, 1992, p. 111-131. 
8I have borrowed this expression from HOWARD, p. 1; an expression such as `chivalrous warfare' 
would have implied that the war waged by knights was always in accordance with the ideals of 
chivalry. 
9 Cf. M. T. CARON, Noblesse et pouvoir royal en France, 13e-16e siecle, Paris, Armand Colin, 1994, 
p. 141-205. 
10 Cf. the Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris, 1405-1449, ed. A. TUETEY for the Societe de l'liistoire de 
Paris, Paris, Honord Champion, 1881, p. 113 ; Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris de 1405 a 1449, ed. C. 
BEAUNE, Paris, Librairie Generale Francaise (Le Livre de Poche, collection Lettres Gothiques), 1990, 
n. 206 p. 131. 
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important trends of the evolution of the discourse about warfare, in Burgundian and 
in French historiography, throughout the first half of the century. 
A. The `chivalrous' chronicle in Burgundy or the development of a genre 
1. The heritage of Froissart 
As Elisabeth Gaucher, the expert on chivalrous biography, once expressed it, 
the 15th century man was prompted by a strong will to achieve immortality". The 
most effective way to achieve it was to enter History by attaining virtue. For the 
nobility, the pursuit of virtue was, if not exclusively, at least pre-eminently linked to 
the exercise of arms, for the traditional role of the aristocracy was to protect the other 
Estates, the labourers and those who prayed for the country. In the late 15th century, 
as he was writing against the establishment of a permanent army which would be 
paid by regularly collected taxes, Bishop Thomas Basin of Lisieux's main argument 
was that the King of France already had at his disposal, `par la nature meme des 
choses', a potential army of 50,000 men who were bound to fight for him whenever 
needed : the nobility of France' 2. The `chivalrous' chronicle had developed as a genre 
intended to record the great actions of outstanding warriors, not only to immortalize 
them, but also to present them as an example be followed by young knights in search 
of glory. Chief amongst the virtues of a worthy knight featured prowess, bravery, the 
ability to perform those `beaux faits d'armes' which would delight an aristocratic 
readership. In his Livre de chevalerie, Geoffroi de Charny showed that `proesce' was 
so intrinsically splendid, that it could virtually excuse anything. Thus, Charny 
explained that those who were brave but too eager for plunder, or those who had 
11 E. GAUCHER, `Entre I'histoire et le roman: la biographie chevaleresque', in Ecrire 1'histoire ä la fin 
du Moyen Age, Revue des Langues Romanes, 97 (1993), 15-29 (p. 15). 
12 See Chapter 5 (Book 4) and especially Chapter 6 of THOMAS BASIN, Histoire de Charles VII, ed. 
and trans]. C. SAMARAN, 2 vol., Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1964-1965 (2nd ed., 1st ed. 1933-1944), II, 
25-47. 
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courage and skill but were thoughtless, prizing their own honour more highly than 
the army's good or their friend's safety, could do better, but were still worthy of 
praise, for prowess was always laudable in itself13. Charny's Livre de Chevalerie was 
not a fictional work, but a didactic work, intended to be practical and to offer some 
solutions to the crisis through which the chivalry of France was passing since the 
defeats of Sluys and Crecy. And yet, it is easy to see that Charny could not detach 
himself from an ideal of chivalry which could often be detrimental to strategy. 
It was the great poet Jean Froissart, writing in the second part of the 14ch 
century, who had given the chivalrous chronicle its fully developed character. The 
pattern laid by Froissart was to remain a model for a great number of chroniclers well 
into the 15th century. Few would equal his literary skill, and those who did, like 
Chastelain, were to detach themselves from the model offered by Froissart and write 
a more personal kind of historiography. It is true that Froissart had made an extensive 
use of the chronicle of Jean le Bel, but this does not challenge the importance of his 
work. Froissart clearly saw how the magic of his writing could transform the wars of 
his time, the Hundred Years War, into an epic, for the delight of his noble readers. 
He knew how to present the great knights who had fought for Edward III or Charles 
V, Bertrand du Guesclin, the Black Prince, John Chandos, as heroes to be imitated. 
Froissart made the noble exercise of arms in the wars of his days the gateway to 
fame, which would be achieved thanks to the recording, by the chronicler, of 
outstanding feats of arms. And the traditional chivalric virtues would be the 
parameters against which the worth of a contemporary could be measured14. It should 
be noted that much of the flavour of Froissart's writing of warfare came from the fact 
13 GEOFFROI DE CLIARNY, p. 98,150. 
14 On Froissart, doyen of the chivalrous chroniclers cf. F. S. SHEARS, Froissart : Chronicler and Poet, 
London, Routledge, 1930, p. 72-87,128-157; P. F. AINSWORTIH, Jean Froissart and the Fabric of 
History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the Chroniques, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 76-85 ; P. 
CONTAMINE, `Froissart: Art militaire, pratique et conception de la guerre', in Froissart, historian, 
ed. J. J. N. PALMER, Woodbridge (Suffolk), Boydell Press, 1981, p. 132-144. In a very innovative 
work, George Diller has shown that Froissart was not as naive as he appears to be. According to Diller, 
the last version that Froissart wrote of his first book (JEAN FROISSART, Chroniques. Derniere 
redaction du premier livre. Edition du manuscrit de Rome Reg. lat. 869, ed. G. T. DILLER , Paris / 
Geneva, Droz, 1972) is apparently much shrewder in its understanding of politics and warfare than the 
earlier texts. It is also well known that reality sometimes imposed on Froissart a revision of his ideals : 
thus in the second book of his Chroniques, Froissart had to admit that Charles V had achieved many 
laudable military successes, without leaving his palace. Such ambiguities make Froissart's Chroniques 
great literature. Cf. G. T. DILLER, Attitudes chevaleresques et realites politiques chez Froissart, 
Genese, Droz, 1984. 
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that, unlike most earlier chroniclers who had been focusing on particular wars, such 
as Villehardouin, Robert de Clari, Joinville or Jean le Bel, Froissart did not have any 
direct experience of warfare. Thus he saw war through the eyes of an artist, with the 
ingenuousness of a man who had not experienced the great hardships that soldiers 
had to suffer during a campaign. Because of this distance between Froissart and 
warfare, he presented the waging of war in a very flattering light15. At the same time, 
Froissart insisted on being particularly well informed about the campaigns he related, 
but his intention to appear scrupulously exact concerned mainly one important issue: 
the behaviour of men in wars, especially knights, since they were the ones who really 
mattered. Like a journalist, Froissart would inquire into who had distinguished 
himself during a battle, an assault, or the defence of a fortress. The chronicler trusted 
his own purveyors of information: knights who had participated in particular actions, 
and, of course, heralds. The latter were a typical product of the chivalrous society; 
their very existence was intimately linked to the concept of chivalry. Heralds were 
considered as doctors of knighthood, experts in the code of chivalry, they knew all 
the ceremonials traditionally associated with the waging of a battle, or tournaments. 
And of course, heralds were the ideal witnesses for Froissart to consult: more than 
anyone else, they knew how to recognise particularly valiant conduct on the 
battlefield. 
The prologue of Froissart's Chroniques has very often been excerpted as it 
has the character of a manifesto. In his prologue, Jean Froissart defines in forthright 
terms the role of the chronicler as a consummate dedication to the duty of recording 
all acts of `proece' for posterity. Immortalizing the memory of the deeds achieved by 
the `preus' becomes a kind of religious mission: 
j'ai ce livre [Jean le Bel's chronicle] hystoriiet et augmente ä la 
mienne, [... ] sans faire fait, ne porter partie, ne coulourer plus Fun que 
l'autre, fors tant que li biens fais des bons, de quel pays qu'il soient, 
qui par proece l'ont acquis, y est plainnement veus et cogneus, car de 
l'oubliier ou esconser, ce seroit pechies et cose mal apertenans, car 
esploit d'armes sont si chierement comparet et achetet, the scevent 
chil qui y traveillent, que on n'en doit nullement mentir pour 
15 Cf. CONTAMINE, `Froissart: Art militaire... ', p. 134-138. 
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complaire ä autrui, [... ] et donner ä chiaus qui Wen sont mies digne16. 
The `chivalrous' chronicle imagined by Froissart, a chronicle which aimed at 
commemorating the great deeds performed by the chivalric class in wars of a 
European dimension, secular, dynastic wars between European states, such as the 
Hundred Years War, was to have an impressively vast progeny. In the 15th century, a 
large number of chroniclers were to take Froissart's Chroniques as a model. All of 
these chivalrous chroniclers would formulate, in their prologues, the same goal as 
that expressed by the chronicler of Valenciennes, a dedication to the recording of the 
`proeces' of the great warriors of the time, mainly from the chivalric class. Enguerran 
de Monstrelet, who presented himself as the continuator of Froissart, referred, in his 
second book's prologue, to the example of the Romans, who had recorded in writing 
all their `vertueuses entreprinses et hardiesses d'armes', in order to immortalize the 
`grant renommee et inextimable louenge' they had achieved through these deeds. 
Indeed, as Vegetius had pointed out, `vaillance et prudence de chevalerie', as well as 
`1'exercite des armes et la continuacion de batailler' could be the cause of a people 
dominating most of the world, as the Romans had done (IV, 125-126). Monstrelet 
modelled his idea of Roman historiography on the concept of the chivalrous 
chronicle, of which Froissart was the true exponent: he presented Roman history as a 
series of valiant military deeds, and reduced the work of the legions and their 
commanders to `vaillance et prudence de chevalerie'. As one can see, the chronicler 
was not truly inspired by classical historiography, and his mention of Vegetius, a 
Roman writer on the art of war who enjoyed great popularity in the Middle Ages, 
appears as mere window-dressing. Monstrelet subsequently explains that modern 
times did not have anything to envy ancient times with regard to the `haultes et 
excellentes vaillances'. He then presents the setting of his Chroniques, the dramatic 
times of the early 15`" century. The actors of his narration are the `vaillans et prudens 
hommes' who fought, suffered, and often perished in all these wars of terrible 
intensity. Finally, the chronicler proposes to reward them for their tribulation `en 
racomptant leurs vaillances, bonnes renommees et noble fais, quand pour eulx et 
leurs successeurs, est et doit estre denonce par les vivans, ä durable memoire' (IV, 
16 JEAN FROISSART, Chroniques, ed. S. LUCE for the SHF, 11 vol., Paris, V` Renouard, 1869-1899, 
1,2. 
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127-128). Similarly, Jean de Wavrin opens his work by explaining how the Kingdom 
of England `a este tousjours bien garny de noble chevalerie qui en leur temps ont 
entreprins et acheve maintes haultes besongnes par leurs grans proesses'. He marvels 
at the fact that nobody has yet recorded the `haulx fais' of the Kings of England and 
their `noble chevalerie', `fors seulement en aulcuns petis livres de chascun roy a par 
soy', and proposes to fill this gap in the historiography of the great people of the 
world (I, 2-3). One could multiply these examples taken from the prologues of 
Froissart's heirs. Everywhere the same dedication to the recording of the `proesses' 
and `vaillances' of the chivalric caste appears17. 
When one enters upon the reading of the considerable corpus of 15th century 
historiographical literature, one soon realizes that it was in Burgundy, more than 
anywhere else in the Kingdom of France, that the genre of the chivalrous chronicle 
inaugurated by Froissart had flourished and matured. The chief exponents of the 
genre under Philip the Good's rule are Enguerran de Monstrelet, Jean Lefevre de 
Saint-Remy, Jean de Wavrin, and Georges Chastelain. Their chronicles have a 
distinctive `chivalrous' flavour, and this character appears specifically Burgundian. 
One could argue that the great similarity of complexion that these four authors share 
between them is simply due to the fact that Saint-Remy, Wavrin, and Chastelain all 
made an extensive use of Monstrelet's narration of the years 1400-1444, which he 
presented to Philip the Good of Burgundy in 1447. However, both Wavrin and Saint- 
Remy's chronicles, begun respectively in 1455 and 1460, include some original 
material which, apart from offering additional information, is often typical of the 
chivalrous ideology, sometimes more than Monstrelet's narration. Also, because they 
were more experienced in war than Monstrelet, Wavrin being a soldier, and Saint- 
Remy a herald, their chronicles offer interesting variations of Monstrelet's work, as 
they give us a valuable insight into the mentality of a knight of the first half of the 
15`" century. As for Chastelain, who began writing in 1455, as he became Burgundy's 
first official and remunerated historiographer, his chronicle expands the original 
work of Monstrelet to such an extent, that the two works eventually seem very 
different. With Chastelain's narration, the chivalrous chronicle has reached its fully- 
17 For a short repertoire of quotations from the prologues of Monstrelet, Jean Chartier, Mathieu 
d'Escouchy and Molinet, see the opening pages of DELCLOS, `Les rayons et les ombres... '. 
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fledged form. Having introduced our authors, and the nature of the tradition of 
historiography that they follow, it is now possible to examine in detail their depiction 
of the war of the knights. 
2. The war of the knights is a `noble' war 
The acute difference that the aristocracy perceived between the noble and 
`vulgar' ways of fighting is best exemplified in two episodes which occurred at the 
very end of our period: the famous duel which, in 1455, opposed two burgesses of 
Valenciennes, Jacotin Plouvier and Mahuot, and the wars of Ghent of 1453, a crucial 
event in the understanding of the ideology of 15th century chivalrous warfare, as it 
saw the clash of the flower of Burgundian chivalry with the burgesses of Ghent. The 
great historian Johan Huizinga saw well the symbolic importance of the judicial duel 
between Jacotin Plouvier and Mahuot, staged in Valenciennes in 1455 on Duke 
Philip's order'8. This fight was related by some of the best exponents of the 
chivalrous chronicle: Georges Chastelain, Olivier de la Marche, and Mathieu 
d'Escouchy. It reveals perfectly the huge gap which separated the knight's way of 
fighting from that of the `vulgus'. Chastelain depicts Mahuot opening the fight by 
throwing some sand in Jacotin's eyes with his shield. He then describes the furious 
clash that followed, closer to a cock-fight than to a proper judicial duel. The fight 
ends with Jacotin sitting on Mahuot's back, jumping on it to break it, and thrusting 
his thumbs into Mahuot's eyes, while the latter is unsuccessfully crying out to Duke 
Philip and begging for mercy. Olivier de la Marche concludes his narration by 
explaining how mortified the Burgundian nobility felt for having watched this 
dreadful fight. Yet, there was a strong element of social conditioning which 
explained the nature of this fight, and it was clear that, from the beginning, Philip the 
Good did not expect, nor want, the two burgesses to fight in a `noble' way: Jacotin 
and Mahuot had been armed with clubs, smeared with grease, and were carrying their 
shields upside down19. Admittedly they did not know how to fight with swords, but 
18 Cf. J. HUIZINGA, L'automne du Moyen Age, transl. J. BASTIN, Paris, Payot, 1989 (31d Payot ed.; 1St 
published in Harlem, 1919 as Herfsty der Middeleeuwen), p. 103-104. 19 Cf. GEORGES CHASTELAIN, 111,3849; OLIVIER DE LA MARCHE, 11,400 ff.; MATHIEU 
D'ESCOUCHY, Chronique, ed. G. DU FRESNE DE BEAUCOURT for the SHF, 3 vol., Paris, V` 
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surely the result could never have been a `beautiful' combat. 
Fighting was the business of the aristocracy; aesthetically and morally the 
sight of commoners arming themselves to engage in hostilities, without being led, as 
proper, by members of the chivalric caste - as occurred in the wars of Ghent - was 
very awkward to the chivalrous chroniclers. When wars of this kind did happen, they 
saw the victory of the knights as only justice. Jacques Du Clercq was not the most 
typical Burgundian chivalrous chronicler; very often his comments reveal a mentality 
similar to that of a `Bourgeois', who does not fear to castigate the aristocracy, and 
even, occasionally, the princes themselves. Yet he was strongly influenced by the 
chivalrous chronicle; in form, at least, his Memoires are quite typical of the genre, 
with three parts devoted to the wars which happened in France, Burgundy, and 
England. And, although he exposed many of the atrocities and lootings committed by 
Burgundian knights during the wars against Ghent, Du Clercq explicitly showed that 
he strongly disagreed with the concept of the common people arming themselves. As 
he describes the Duke's army, Du Clercq cannot conceal his admiration for this host 
which, unlike the forces of Ghent, is composed only of men whose trade is to wage 
war, and who, moreover, all come from the Kingdom of France, the cradle of 
chivalry: 
Pour brief dire, estoit belle chose ä veoir toute l'armee du duc, car 
c'estoit pour la plupart touts gens de guerre et bien en poinct, et qui 
avoient accoustume d'aller en guerre. Et n'y avoit nuls Hollandois, et 
touts les gentilshommes de Franche de 1'armee estoient avec le duc20. 
Chivalrous chroniclers seemed to despise the common soldier in any case, even if he 
was, in fact, a tactical element of the army under the command of knights. Thus 
Monstrelet and Wavrin understood the decision of the Duke of Clarence, Henry V's 
brother, who lost a battle and his life at Beauge in 1421: having heard that the enemy 
was approaching, Clarence chose his best men, `et par especial ä peu pros tous ses 
capitaines', that is to say knights only, and darted at the French. Monstrelet refers to 
Renouard, 1863-1864, II, 300 if. 
20 JACQUES DU CLERCQ, Memoires, 4 vol., in Chroniques d'Enguerrand de Monsirelet, t. 12-15, in 
Collection des chroniques nationales francaises, vol. 37-40, ed. J. A. C. BUC}ION, Paris, VerdiPre, 
1826-1827, XII, 99. 
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Clarence's archers who had been deliberately left behind, and were striving to follow 
him, as `toute la grant tourbe de son ost', a rather derogatory expression. Wavrin tells 
us how, during the battle that followed, `il of mainte apartise d'armes faite', but as 
the proverb goes, `la force vainct': Clarence `et generalement la fleurs de escurye et 
chevallerie dudit duc' were annihilated21. On the same register, Georges Chastelain 
explained how, before the fight of Mons-en-Vimeu (1421), Philip the Good had 
consented to let the crossbowmen and communes of the towns of Picardy follow the 
mounted men-at-arms; but for himself, the Duke principally relied on his noble 
chivalry, of whom he took the lead (I, 255). Saint-Remy, who had for a long time 
followed the English in their wars, was more aware of the worth of the infantry: he 
recalled how, at Agincourt, the French knights had relegated the archers to the back 
of their battle formation, `pour la place qui estoit si estroicte qu'il n'y avoit place fors 
pour les hommes d'armes' (I, 253). The outcome of the battle is well known. 
The hall of fame created by chivalrous chroniclers was not, as one might 
imagine from reading their lavish praises of the noble chivalry of Burgundy and 
France, exclusively reserved for the aristocracy. Froissart himself had announced, in 
his chronicle, that the saving grace of the virtue of `proece' was such, that it 
overcame `linage'; it would bring fame and fortune to all its disciples22. Similarly, 
Monstrelet promised to record the deeds of all the valiant and prudent men of his 
time, `tant nobles comme aultres' (IV, 128). Perhaps their decision arose from the 
fact that they were not nobles themselves. Not all chivalrous chroniclers appear so 
generous: Huizinga has pointed out that Chastelain, who never missed an opportunity 
to extol the deeds of the great knight Jacques de Lalaing during the war against 
Ghent, only mentioned very coldly the courage of a young insurgent, who attacked 
Lalaing on his own. Similarly, Chastelain did not deem it necessary to list the names 
of the burgesses who had died during the fight against the Burgundian forces23. What 
Huizinga, however, did not emphasize, was that Chastelain could never have praised 
an act of rebellion against his Duke, whether courageous or not. On the other hand, 
one can find the same Chastelain forever praising one Jehan Vilain, who, at the fight 
of Mons-en-Vimeu against the Dauphinist forces in 1421, astonished his enemies by 
21 ENGUERRAN DE MONSTRELET, IV, 38 ; JEAN DE WAVRIN, II, 358-359. 
22 JEAN FROISSART, ed. LUCE, I, 3. 
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the lethal strength of his blows. Admittedly, Jehan Vilain was a noble, as the 
chronicler himself pointed out. Still, one cannot help wondering whether this Vilain, 
who had been knighted on the day of the engagement, had always been a noble, since 
even his name certainly does not sound aristocratic. Moreover, Jehan Vilain does not 
appear at all like the typical nobleman in the description that Chastelain made of him: 
`gros, et avec ce, membreux', the knight's appearance was particularly frightening ; 
Vilain was mounting a `haut et puissant destrier merveilleusement gros et courageux, 
comme il luy faisoit bien besoin, car il portoit de fais assez pour deux', and was 
fighting more like a lumberer than like a knight : `ruant et ramonant devant luy' with 
a double-handed axe, Vilain would brain the Duke's adversaries `comme bouchers 
font les be ufs' (I, 268-269). Chastelain was not reluctant to alter, or `modernize', the 
stereotypical image of the knight, by portraying a member of the prestigious caste 
who looked more like the evil giants whom Yvain had to fight in Chretien de Troyes' 
story than like Yvain himself, because in his opinion, Jehan Vilain had earned the 
status of knight, and his deeds only proved it. Indeed, not only was he a `preu', but he 
was also loyal to his suzerain, unlike some other knights who had fled and left their 
Duke in danger, unlike also the burgesses of Ghent who had rebelled against their 
legitimate prince. Thus, in two ways at least, Vilain was fighting like a true knight. 
Duke Philip had recognized his worth by granting him the title of knight, and 
Chastelain was ready to extol his deeds, even if they did not quite match the usual 
`pattern'. It is now time to describe more precisely and exhaustively the `war of the 
knights', this `noble' way of fighting, as portrayed in Burgundian chivalrous 
chronicles. 
3. Ideals and illusions 
In his Livre de chevalerie, Geoffroi de Charny devoted some crucial pages to 
the knighting ceremony, and offered the clues to understand the rich symbolism 
which allegedly clothed this complex event, the first in the new life of a knight24. On 
23 GEORGES CHASTELAIN, II, 259,345; HUIZINGA, p. 63,109. 
24 According to Philippe Contamine, the elaborate ritual described by Charny became outdated by the 
15`h century. Cf. P. CONTAMINE, `Points de vue sur la chevalerie en France A la fin du Moyen Age', 
in his work La France au XIV et XIS siecle. Hommes, mentalites, guerre et paix, London, Variorum 
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the eve of his dubbing, the aspirant for knighting had to enter a bath and meditate 
there for a long time: this symbolized the need to cleanse his body from the impurity 
of sin. He then had to sleep in a bed with clean white sheets, before waking up the 
following morning, ready for his dubbing. The night spent in the clean bed stood for 
the need to rise from virtue, as a new man. The aspirant was then clothed in brand 
new linen, another symbol of the new life which awaited him. And the first piece of 
clothing which the intending knight had to wear was a red tunic, which signified that 
the knight was pledged to shed his blood in the defence of Christ and the Holy 
Church25. Thus the defence of the Church figured as a priority, if not the priority, in 
the knight's duties. 
Our Burgundian chivalrous chroniclers do not forget to mention this prime 
necessity, which sometimes appears unexpectedly in the course of their narratives of 
the Hundred Years War. They show that the wish to go on a crusade with all their 
nobility was always in the back of the princes' minds, though it might only come to 
the fore in special circumstances. Thus Monstrelet, in the famous episode of the 
pious death of Henry V, pictured the expiring prince ordering the clergymen, who 
were reciting the seven penitential psalms at his death bed, to stop as they had 
reached the words muri Jherusalem in the psalm Benigne fac, Domine. The King 
then announced in a loud voice `que, sur la mort qu'il actendoit, il avoit entencion 
que apres qu'il avoit mis le royaume de France en paix d'aller conquerre Jherusalem, 
se ce eust este le plaisir de Dieu son createur de le laisser vivre son aage' (IV, 112). 
Georges Chastelain, who knew that going on a crusade was, in those times already, 
Duke Philip's dearest wish, makes the young prince a party to the English king's 
plans, and shows that Philip took his promise very seriously indeed26: 
[Henry V] avoit une fin derniere resolue en bien, et pour icelle 
accomplir s'associa au jeune duc de Bourgongne, parce que en luy 
veoit matiere semblable ä la sienne: c'estoit du voyage en la Sainte- 
Terre par chrestien effort, que ambedeux en firent promesse l'un ä 
l'autre devant Melun, jä-soit-ce-que Dieu ne le souffrist point en tost 
mourant, et lequel toutes-voies s'en mit en grand devoir, car en fit 
reprints, 1981, item XI. Still, the ideals which the ceremony was supposed to symbolize died hard. 
25 GEOFFROI DE CHARNY, p. 166-168. 
26 On the treatment of Duke Philip's crusading endeavours in Burgundian historiography see Chapter 3 
of the present work. 
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visiter tous les ports de Levant pour y prendre adresse (I, 334). 
Defending the Church was not only the responsibility of the princes. Nigel 
Saul has recently emphasized that every knight could, and sometimes would, 
personally take the cross in order to perform his duty, out of piety, and also in order 
to acquire renown27. Monstrelet contributed to the renown of some of these knights, 
as he mentioned the names of three Burgundian noblemen who were assisting, with 
many other Occidental knights, the Christian King of Cyprus in the defence of his 
realm against the Mamelukes, an episode which he covered in the course of his 
narration of the English invasion of France. These Burgundian aristocrats had the 
privilege of being knighted during an action at sea, when the fleets of Rhodes and 
Cyprus were facing the Mameluke fleet (IV, 265-266). 
When a knight was the author of a chronicle, as was Jean de Wavrin, who was 
mainly a compiler, but also liked to develop the histories he was using, and when this 
knight had taken part in a crusade, we get some very interesting comments about the 
way those late medieval crusades were conducted, and about the mentality of the 
crusaders28. It happens that Jean de Wavrin and Lefevre de Saint-Remy had 
participated in a crusade declared by Pope Martin V against the Hussites in 1420. 
This crusade was recounted by Monstrelet in his Chronique, and the two knights 
added some interesting comments and memories to Monstrelet's account. They 
recount with horrifying ingenuousness how Bohemia was rich and beautiful, and how 
they proceeded, with the other crusaders, to destroy everything `par feu et par espee, 
hommes, femmes, et enfans sans en prendre quelque mercy'. After all, the Hussites 
were heretics, and they had to be eradicated, as their example could be dangerous: 
around 1340, Robert Holcot, an English Dominican, had compared crusading 
activities to the work of a doctor, cutting off a gangrenous foot which could not heal 
so that the illness would not spread, thus reviving an ancient political metaphor29. 
But the practice of crusading had changed since its heyday. Monstrelet explains that 
27 N. SAUL, `The Vanishing Vision: Late Medieval Crusading', in History Today, 47 (June 1997), 23- 
28. 
28 On this subject see my fourth chapter, which is devoted to Wavrin's narrative of a crusade against 
the Turks, in which his nephew Walleran had taken part. 
29 Cf. N. HOUSLEY, The Later Crusades, 1274-1580. From Lyons to Alcarar, Oxford, University 
Press, 1992, p. 382. 
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many crusaders were so disgusted by the greed of their commanders that they decided 
to return home. Wavrin gives us another reason, perhaps more convincing, for the 
disbanding of this `belle armee': the Holy Roman emperor Sigismund of 
Luxembourg had informed the crusaders `que ce n'estoit pas bien son plaisir qu'ilz 
estoient lä ainsi venus', and had ordered them to leave. In fact, the emperor was 
probably greatly displeased by the ravages committed by the crusaders on his 
territory. Wavrin acknowledges and blames, however, the fact that the commanders 
were indeed greedy, and that they were moreover unable to understand one another. 
This made Wavrin resentful, as it made him feel that he had travelled all the way to 
Bohemia for nothing. Saint-Remy recalls how an English prelate had boasted that, 
should he have 10,000 English archers at his disposal, he would have enjoyed 
destroying the whole crusading army, and concludes, with a few pithy sentences: 
`Laquelle chose est veritable; car Fun n'atendoit l'autre [... ]. A tant, vous lairay ä 
parler de ceste matiere, car le peu parler en est bon'30 
Another well-known priority of the knight was the duty to defend `femmes 
vesves et pucelles', in the words of Christine de Pisan, quoted at the start of this 
chapter, and more generally, the non-fighting part of the population: women, 
children, clerics, peasants and burgesses. Our Burgundian chivalrous chroniclers do 
not omit to extol this very noble task of knights. Thus Chastelain explains, after the 
engagement of Mons-en-Vimeu where Philip the Good had been knighted and fought 
honourably for the first time, how the people of Burgundy rejoiced greatly and 
exclaimed: `Bien nous ya pourvu Dieu, que loud en soit-il! [... ] Ce nous sera l'escu 
qui nous sera necessaire, escu de protection et arche de salut en qui nul ne pourra 
mordre; mesmes se fera espouvanter en son glaive' (I, 276). Here the role of the 
prince, but also of the knight - for it is a significant fact that Philip had just been 
knighted and shown a promising courage in war - as the shield of the labourers, is 
very well defined. Yet, it is perhaps quite telling that praises of knights as the 
protectors of the people, while appearing occasionally, do not abound in our 
chivalrous chronicles. The extent of the ravages wrought by soldiers - and knights as 
much as the others - in this particularly dark period of continuous warfare, civil war, 
30 ENGUERRAN DE MONSTRELET, III, 408; JEAN LEFEVRE DE SAINT-REMY, II, 14; JEAN DE 
WAVRIN, II, 324-325. 
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invasion and relative anarchy, made it somewhat difficult for our chivalrous 
chroniclers to insist upon the role of the knight as the defender of widows and 
orphans. Sometimes the chroniclers, who were after all sincerely sorrowful over the 
state of the Kingdom of France, acknowledge the damage done even by their own 
side. This did not, however, impair for them the high standing of the office of knight. 
Thus Monstrelet did not see any apparent contradiction in extolling the beauty and 
nobility of the army of John the Fearless in battle formation before Pontoise, before 
admitting the havoc that they caused in the countryside: `lä prenoient et ramenoient it 
leur ost chevaulx, vaches, brebis, pourceaulx et tous autres biens portatifz, dont le 
povre peuple et le pays estoit fort traveille' (III, 217). Obviously our Burgundian 
chroniclers did not dare to explicitly blame the Dukes of Burgundy for the want of 
discipline in their host and for neglecting to pay their soldiers on a regular basis. The 
chroniclers also seem to have viewed the exactions of soldiers as a trouble inherent to 
the conduct of war, which could never be solved and had to be patiently endured. 
Georges Chastelain, for example, recounts how, after the victory of Mons-en-Vimeu, 
the knights of Burgundy, who had not seen their lord for a long time, decided to go to 
Picardy to congratulate him and bring him back to Burgundy. Chastelain praises the 
affection that they entertained for their Duke, but also narrates how they devastated 
the countries that they crossed on their way, and Picardy itself for a rather long time, 
as they were living on the country while waiting for their Duke to accompany them. 
There is an element of blame in his narration, but it is very much weakened by other 
considerations, such as the good will of the knights who had come out of affection 
for Philip. Also, the chronicler explains that the Burgundians held a grudge against 
the Picards, for they had likewise wasted the lands of Burgundy the last time that they 
had crossed them. And after all, he wrote, every people had its qualities and vices: 
the Burgundians and the Picards were `gens non tractables et bien doux tous deux, lä 
oü ils sont forts'; these were military virtues, and they made the two nations good 
soldiers. Chastelain shows that Duke Philip did not worry much about the exactions 
committed by his soldiers, considering them in a way as a natural necessity: the 
noblemen and prelates of Picardy had reported to Philip the complaints of their 
people, but `sa bonte et promesse de temprement les emmener avec luy en 
Bourgongne, leur en fit souffrir encores un petit et cesser de plus en douloir' (I, 288- 
290). 
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Finally, there were again more particular considerations which could make the 
chivalrous chroniclers lenient towards the damage done by knights to the common 
people. Thus Monstrelet and Wavrin explain that the Earl of Salisbury was `tres 
renomme en armes, expert et subtil', before relating, immediately following these 
flattering comments, that he was responsible for an atrocious massacre of civilians at 
Sezanne (1424), where the unfortunate inhabitants were `cruellement occis, [... ] et les 
autres furent prisonniers, et avec ce tous leurs biens furent ravis et pillies, les femmes 
violees et ladicte forteresse demolie'. Monstrelet and Wavrin then tell us that the lord 
of Chastillon had been knighted by `le preu conte de Salsebery' before the assault, 
inside the very mine which had granted access to the fortress 31. The change of 
register does not seem to trouble our chroniclers. There is an element of blame in 
their narration, but it hardly seems to challenge Salisbury's reputation: the fortress 
had been taken by assault, and in those days the customary laws of war did not insure 
the garrison and inhabitants of a town taken by assault against violent death. 
Moreover, Salisbury was known for being very ruthless at times, but was also 
admired as an excellent commander; in the eyes of many pro-English 
contemporaries, his efficiency at war excused his cruelty, especially because this 
ruthlessness was one of Salisbury's methods for obtaining good results in war. Thus 
many considerations - in this case a tactical consideration - contributed to undermine 
the ideal of the knight as defender of the weak, even though the chroniclers did not 
make this explicit: in his eulogy of Salisbury, Wavrin praised the English knight for 
being `piteux et misericord [... ] auz humbles, mais auz orguilleux fier comme lyon ou 
tygre' (III, 247-248). The garrison and inhabitants of Sezanne were probably included 
among the `orguilleux', since they had refused to surrender immediately. In the end, 
the civilians killed and raped were just another casualty of war. 
One old ideal of chivalry was acquiring an essential importance: that of loyal 
service to the suzerain. In her study of the relations between the nobility of France 
and the Kings from the 13th to the 16th century, Marie-Therese Caron has emphasized 
how, from the death of Charles V to the consolidation of Charles VII's power and the 
reign of Louis XI, the great princes of royal blood were taking advantage of the 
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weakness of their Kings in order to increase their own power. The most obvious 
method was to attract the nobility of France by using, amongst other things, the age- 
long institution of vassalage. The fidelity and service a vassal owed to his lord was, 
of course, a chivalric obligation; and the Dukes of Burgundy deemed it particularly 
profitable in their securing of the obedience of those who fell under their 
jurisdiction 32. Chastelain defines very well this obligation of the vassal to his 
suzerain as he blames Jacques de Harcourt for having armed himself against his 
Duke in favour of the Dauphin, 
que faire ne devoit toutes-voies, attendu que nourriture de prince est 
occasion ä tousjours de maintenir sa querelle envers tous autres quels 
qu'ils soient, et donne la nourriture dispense et support ä tout vassal en 
tous autres devoirs de nature (I, 231-232). 
One can see how the ideal of loyalty to the lord is made paramount over all other 
chivalric duties. Monstrelet and the chroniclers who used his narration show the 
progressive seizure by the Dukes of Burgundy of the allegiance of their subjects, the 
aim being exclusivity of control over their territories' nobility, to the detriment of the 
King of France. The efforts made by Duke John the Fearless in order to keep his 
knights on his side are particularly apparent in Monstrelet's narrative of the 
organization of France's defence in 1415. Charles VI and the Duke of Aquitaine had 
ordered `que tous nobles hommes accoustumez ä porter armes, voulans acquerre 
honneur, allassent nuit et jour devers le connestable, ou qu'il fust'. Those who would 
not obey would run the risk of falling from grace with the King. However, John the 
Fearless had already commanded `par escript et ä tous ses subgetz, qu'ilz feussent 
prestz pour aler avecques lui quant il les manderoit, et n'alassent ä nul mandement de 
quelque autre seigneur, quel qu'il feust'. At the same time, he was promising the 
King that he would come `en propre personne avec tous ceulx de ses pays servir le 
Roy'. Monstrelet shows how strongly Burgundian knights still felt their bonds to the 
King of France, as he explains that, though the Duke himself did not appear, `grant 
partie de ses gens se mirent sus et y alerent'. Duke John had expressly forbidden his 
son to answer the King's call. Yet, `la plus grant partie des gens de son [the young 
31 ENGUERRAN DE MONSTRELET, IV, 185 ; JEAN DE WAVRIN, II, 98. 
32 Cf. CARON, Noblesse et pouvoir..., p. 151-157. 
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Philip's] hostel, qui sentoient les besongnes approucher, se partirent secretement sans 
son sceu, et s'en alerent avec lesdiz Francois pour combatre lesdiz Anglois'. They 
did not fear to leave the young heir alone with his inflexible guardians, and all in 
distress, because he wanted so much to fight the English (III, 90,93,98-100). 
When Philip succeeded his father, the loyalty of his knights was already much 
more secure, thanks notably to the murder of John the Fearless by the Armagnacs. 
This was the greatest mistake the Dauphinists could make, as it exacerbated the 
hatred that the Burgundians felt for them, and greatly increased their allegiance to the 
young Duke, which had already been reinforced by the fact that the King was now in 
Burgundian hands, and apparently favouring their party. It would only be 
strengthened with the Treaty of Troyes, which proclaimed the Dauphin as 
illegitimate. When Chastelain wrote his chronicle, in the 1450s, he could make 
loyalty to Duke Philip the paramount virtue of a Burgundian knight. Loyalty to the 
young Duke is extolled in the speeches with which Chastelain credits some of the 
characters of his Chronique: thus Jean de Luxembourg explains to his knights before 
heading towards Roye to besiege the town that they form the first army of the young 
Duke, and so must inaugurate a series of glorious deeds; he then urges them to make 
Philip's quarrel theirs: `vengeons sa honte aujourd'huy a nos pouvoirs et entamons 
ceste guerre par entree de bel exploit'. Similarly, Chastelain pictures the knight Jean 
de Rosimbos overwhelmed by a feeling of shame as he is fleeing the battlefield of 
Mons-en-Vimeu, and declaring to the knights around him: `ca, ca, rallions-nous, au 
nom de Dieu ! monstrons-nous estre gentilshommes, et servons nostre prince, car 
mieux vaut mourir en honneur avec luy que vivre reproches' (I, 93,263). However, 
Chastelain also extols loyalty to one's lord in the speeches delivered by French 
knights, the best example being the superb discourse which Poton de Saintrailles 
addresses to the Duke's warriors from the walls of Royes, a speech supposedly 
attended by `grand nombre de haute chevalerie', and which was undoubtedly far too 
sophisticated to have been actually pronounced by a man of action such as 
Saintrailles: 
Et besongne bien ä nostre maistre monseigneur le dauphin d'avoir 
aigres et diligens champions pour defendre son droit; car vous, 
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messeigneurs, estes fiers et enfellis durement, et venez ä grand effort 
sur nous menasser ce jeusne heritier de la couronne que nous 
defendons ä nos povoirs, comme loyaux subjets. 
Poton subsequently absolves his knights from the murder of John the Fearless with a 
clever and diplomatic sentence: `Si rien est advenu, c'est hors de nostre pouvoir et 
savoir. Nous ne sommes pas du conseil de cour; nous sommes de 1'exploit des 
champs qui, querans teile fois donner les horions, nous les y recevons nous mesmes' 
(I, 110-111). I see three main reasons why Chastelain inserted this speech praising 
the loyalty of the Dauphinists. Firstly, one should not forget that Chastelain, who had 
stayed at length at the court of Charles VII, felt strongly attached to France, and 
longed to see a sincere understanding between the two states, with the rulers of 
Burgundy remaining aware that they were the vassals of the French Kings, and the 
latter respecting the freedom of action of the great Dukes of Occident. Moreover, 
with this speech, Chastelain defines the chivalric virtue of loyalty to the suzerain, a 
common priority which linked the knights of all states, something which was not the 
self-seeking calculation of the courtier, but the affectionate zeal with which a knight 
should feel naturally inclined to serve his lord. Finally, by illustrating the Dauphinist 
knights' loyalty, Chastelain places the allegiance which bonds Burgundian knights to 
their Duke on a more or less equal footing with the loyalty owed by the French to 
their King. The knights of Burgundy would have recognized and understood the 
motivation of the Dauphinists as one similar to the devotion that they felt for their 
Duke. 
These great ideals were not the only thing which differentiated the war of the 
knights from vulgar warfare. Indeed, knights had developed a host of `chivalric 
virtues' which further embellished and distinguished their way of waging war. 
4. The code of chivalry :a recognition sign amongst knights 
The code of chivalry was an old-established institution, which had slowly 
developed throughout the centuries as a way of characterizing the chivalric way of 
waging war. Our chroniclers illustrate very well how the knights of France, England 
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and Burgundy alike respected the same chivalric virtues. This helped to present 
chivalry as an international brotherhood, with some specific recognition signs. 
Showing that the knights of Burgundy respected and praised the same chivalric 
virtues would place them on an equal footing with those of the older kingdoms, 
notably France and England. 
We have already seen the importance of the concept of loyalty to the suzerain, 
through the study of the ideal of the knights' faithful service to their lord. Honour 
was another primordial element of the code of chivalry, and its importance is well 
exemplified in our Burgundian chivalrous chronicles. Johan Huizinga, drawing on 
Burckhardt, has accurately described honour as the exacerbated pride of the nobility, 
a sort of arrogance which still could push men who possessed it into achieving great 
things33. But honour also had to be preserved, and it could not suffer the slightest 
harm. Any damage received demanded reparation. The pride of the knights required 
that one of the conflicting parties should submit to the other, and in Chastelain's 
chronicle every deed of the enemies is seen as an offence to the honour of the 
Burgundian chivalry. As he depicted the Duke moving against the Dauphinists before 
the fight of Mons-en-Vimeu, Chastelain emphasized that Philip `savoit bien que par 
bataille falloit estre abattu 1'orgueil de l'un ou de l'autre' (I, 255). The concept of 
vengeance, despite being contrary to the precepts of Christ, played a vital role in the 
ideology of knights. Monstrelet showed well that knights were certainly not in the 
habit of turning the other cheek - as Christ had famously advised his disciples 34 _ as 
he related how, during a service celebrated in Arras for the soul of the recently 
murdered John the Fearless, the preacher had caused a great murmur by advising the 
Duke not to wreak his vengeance on his father's murderers, but to let God do justice 
to those responsible for the deed: `Pour lequel propos et desonortement, aucuns lä 
estans avecques ledit duc ne furent pas bien contens dudit prescheur' (III, 361-362). It 
should be noted that our chroniclers make all the hostilities between France and 
Burgundy after Philip's accession to the throne rest solely upon a question of honour: 
the young Duke would not find any rest until his father's murder had been avenged. 
And all the knights of Burgundy accepted his shame as their own. Thus Chastelain 
33 HUIZINGA, p. 70-71. 
34 Luke, 6.29. 
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depicted Jean de Luxembourg setting his knights against the Dauphinists who had 
just taken Roye by referring to the death of John the Fearless as an insult which still 
needed reparation: `voyant peut-estre que noun dormons longuement en nostre revue 
injure, et pensans que nous ayons tout oublye, nous viennent resveiller par nouvelle 
hautaine, afin de nous avoir comme ils desirent devant leurs glaives tranchans' (I, 
92). 
`Proece', the notion so dear to Jean Froissart and Geoffroi de Chamy, was 
another element of primordial importance in the code of chivalry. Jean Froissart had 
expressed in an eloquent sentence how eminent the virtue of prowess had to be 
amongst the priorities of a young knight in search of fame: 
Li nom de preu est si haus et si nobles et la vertu si clere et si belle que 
eile resplendist en ces sales et en ces places oü il a assamblee et fuison 
de grans signeurs, et se remonstre dessus tous les autres, et 
1'ensengn'on au doi et dist on: `Veld cesti qui mist ceste cevaucie ou 
ceste armee sus, et qui ordonna ceste bataille si faiticement et le 
gouverna si sagement, et qui jousta de fier de glave si radement, [... ] et 
qui fu trouves entre les mors et les blecies navres moult durement, et 
ne daigna onques fuir en place oü il se trouvast3s 
Prowess was basically courage, with a large admixture of initiative - often to the 
detriment of strategy - and technical skill. It was prowess which made these `belles 
appartises d'armes' of which the narration would delight the aristocracy's ears. 
Battles were, of course, particularly favourable events for these feats of arms for 
which heralds and chroniclers were on the look-out. We find some particularly 
striking deeds in the accounts Monstrelet, Wavrin and Lefevre de Saint-Remy left us 
of the battle of Agincourt. Wavrin and Saint-Remy's narratives are especially 
interesting because both knights had been present at the famous battle, Saint-Remy 
being on the English side, and Wavrin fighting on the French side. In the relations of 
our three Burgundian chroniclers, the splendid feats of arms performed by the French 
during the battle have a very special overtone. Our chroniclers knew that these noble 
deeds had done nothing to change the course of the fight, and were aware that the 
flower of French chivalry had been slain by some commoners armed only with bows, 
35 JEAN FROISSART, ed. LUCE, 1,3-4. 
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hatchets and mallets. Thus their mention of some of the French knights' best deeds 
gives a truly tragic, and very moving flavour to their narration. Saint-Remy recounts, 
for instance, how Duke Antoine de Brabant had arrived at the battle `ä peu de 
compaignie', because he was so impatient to take part in the fight that most of his 
knights had been unable to keep pace with him. Without halting to wait for them, the 
Duke `print une des bannieres de ses trompettes et y fist ung pertuis par le milieu, 
dont il fist cotte d'armes. Jä si tost n'y fut descendus que tantost et incontinent par les 
Anglois fut mis ä mort' (I, 256). Knights especially enjoyed performing particular 
ceremonials which could embellish their deeds, such as oaths. Saint-Remy relates 
how eighteen French noblemen had solemnly sworn to do their best to knock King 
Henry's crown off his head, `ou ilz moroient tous'. None of them were to survive. 
Yet, one knight managed to get so close to King Henry that he knocked down `un des 
flourons de sa couronne, comme 1'en disoit'. Had all the knights of France acted as 
these eighteen knights, Saint-Remy concluded, the outcome of the battle could well 
have changed (I, 250). Francoise Autrand has emphasized that most contemporaries, 
whether noble or not, commenting on a great defeat, such as that of Poitiers in 1356, 
would attribute the debacle mainly to a want of bravery amongst the knights, giving 
priority to this explanation, or others of a similar, moral kind, over more tactical 
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Yet, because it encouraged personal initiative, and because it stemmed from 
the desire to distinguish oneself and acquire some personal glory, the display of 
prowess could often be detrimental to tactics. We saw how Clarence had met his 
death at Beauge (1421) and caused the first English defeat since the taking of 
Harfleur by dashing to meet the Dauphinists without bothering to wait for his archers. 
Sometimes the prince himself could set a bad example: the young and proud Duke 
Philip often illustrated this at the start of his military career, but seems to have been 
protected by an unbelievable good luck. The victory of Mons-en-Vimeu, which, as 
Monstrelet pointed out, was more an encounter than a battle, but which was blown up 
to epic proportions by Wavrin and Chastelain especially, could well have ended in a 
much less fortunate way. Indeed, Chastelain explains without a hint of blame how 
36 F. AUTRAND, `La deconfiture. La bataille de Poitiers (1356) ä travers quelques textes francais des 
14` et 15` siecles', in Guerre et societe..., p. 93-121 (p. 101-102). 
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Philip 
ne tint [... ] en celuy jour oncques, ni route, ni ordonnance, et ne 
regardoit, ni qui fut pres ni loin de sa personne, mais tousjours mains 
et bras en besongne sur les sallades et visieres, hurtoit et chocquoit sur 
les uns et sur les autres. Toutes presses lui estoient bonnes et toutes 
places visitees (I, 266). 
Wavrin seems, however, to have felt a retrospective shiver down his back as he 
recalled that the young Duke had chased the Dauphinists down to the river `ä petite 
compaignie, et en la fin se trouva seul excepte ung gentilhomme [... ] qui le fist 
retourner hastivement, car il estoit achemine vers une petite montaignette sur laquelle 
estoient aulcuns daulphinois [... ] cuidant que ce feussent de ses gens' (II, 378). 
But, of course, in the eyes of our chivalrous chroniclers, nothing could be 
worse for a knight than being guilty of cowardice, and fleeing a battlefield. 
Monstrelet relates how those who had left the Duke exposed at Mons-en-Vimeu, and 
fled for their lives, completely fell out of grace with Philip, who thereafter banished 
them from his court, when told about their despicable action (IV, 64). There were, 
however, `peu [... ] de gens de nom' amongst the culprits. Chastelain, with his literary 
gift for elaboration, gives us more details and explains that some of these knights, 
whom Philip trusted since they belonged to the nobility and had a reputation for 
being valiant warriors in the time of John the Fearless, died before the Duke would 
pardon them. Others departed and went on what could almost be described as a 
penitential pilgrimage: `Aucuns en eslonge de leur pays se disposerent ä loingtains 
voyages qui en effacerent et amoindrirent la memoire' (I, 273). Fleeing when all was 
evidently lost often was the only sensible alternative, but our chivalrous chroniclers 
would much prefer to see the whole chivalry of a prince exterminated, rather than 
turning tail. This attitude was shared by the non-noble part of the population - after 
all, the duty of the nobility was to sacrifice their lives for the good of those who did 
not fight. Thus the Bourgeois de Paris would report about the battle of Agincourt: `et 
disoit-on communement que ceulx qui prins estoient n'avoient pas este bons ne 
37 loyaulx ä ceulx qui moururent en bataille'. Jean de Wavrin superbly shows how 
37 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 66. 
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embarrassed he felt for having fled, with his captain the famous English knight 
Falstoff, the battlefield of Patay (1429) - where Joan of Arc was present - as the 
English saw that the battle was irremediably lost. Wavrin tries to justify the conduct 
of Falstoff, which was after all very sensible, considering that it was better to save 
what remained of the English army than to sacrifice it to the wrath of the French: 
Adont messire Jehan Fastre voiant le dangier de la fuite, congnoissant 
tout tres mal aller, eut Conseil de soy sauver, et luy fut dit, moy acteur 
estant present, qu'il prensist garde ä sa personne, car la bataille estoit 
perdue pour eulz. 
Wavrin takes care to explain that there was no hope, at this stage, of a reverse of 
fortune in favour of the English. At the same time, he stresses that Falstoff himself 
never wanted to flee, `disant que mieulz amoit estre mors ou prins que honteusement 
fuyr et ainsi ses gens habandonner'. Falstoff only agreed to follow the advice given as 
he saw that there definitely was no hope of saving anyone, except his few troops by 
taking to flight. He then proceeded to turn back on his tracks, `demenant le plus grant 
duel que jamais veisse faire a un homme, et pour verite se feust reboutte en la bataille 
se n'eussent este ceulz quy avec luy estoient'. As for himself, Wavrin explains that 
there was no other alternative than following Falstoff, since he was under his orders: 
`moy je le sievis comme mon capittaine, auquel le due de Bethfort m'avoit 
commande obeyr et mesmes servir sa personne' (III, 303-304). This time discipline 
and sense prevailed. Yet, as is well known, Falstoff had to go through great troubles 
in order to justify his conduct to the Duke of Bedford, and was, for a while, deprived 
of the Order of the Garter. Wavrin sides with him, explaining that his excuses were 
in any case `raisonnables', and that they were eventually `tres bien approuvees' (III, 
306). 
Another chivalrous virtue was that of courtesy. Knights of different 
allegiances may have waged war against one another, but our Burgundian chroniclers 
show that they shared a mutual respect between members of the same caste. Philip 
the Good was obviously moved by the wish to appear magnificent as he decided to 
set free two noblemen who had been captured at the battle of Mons-en-Vimeu: 
Lefevre de Saint-Remy recounts how Philip graciously offered them `cheval et 
j e-ý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harnas; et avec ce, leur donna ä chascun V° pieces d'or' (II, 43). However, this 
magnanimous gesture towards two enemies also stemmed from a particular attitude, 
that of courtesy between knights and respect for a worthy enemy of the same 
chivalric class. As Chastelain expressed it, `il falloit que les rayes de sa [Duke 
Philip's] noblesse resplendissent en ses adversaires qui valeureusement s'estoient 
pones encontre luy'. The chronicler adds `moult certes prisoit les vaillances d'aucuns 
de eux, car les avoit mesmes bien assayes' (I, 284). The acknowledgement of the 
worth of a brave enemy from the chivalrous class, and the respectful and sympathetic 
attitude that was supposed to follow, were a sign of nobility. Thus the war of the 
knights could be distinguished from the war of the commoners by a sort of politeness 
between aristocratic fighters, which made the waging of war appear very civilized. 
Moreover, knights would usually avoid killing each other in action; they would rather 
take their noble enemies prisoner, in order to ransom them. The chivalrous 
chroniclers do not hide this practice of ransoming aristocratic prisoners - more 
seldom do they point out another, rather common, practice, that of ransoming 
civilians, though they do occasionally mention it38 - but make it more acceptable by 
covering it up with the lustre of courtesy. Accounts of discussions entertained by 
great knights and their aristocratic hostages, or of the apparent liberality with which 
these knights would treat prestigious prisoners, are famously impressive; they have 
contributed to our general understanding of the `noble' code of conduct. 
Jean de Wavrin, for instance, relates how, after the battle of Verneuil (1424), 
the Duke of Bedford brought with him to Rouen his very aristocratic prisoner, the 
Duke of Alencon. Upon meeting his wife on the threshold of his hostel, he 
introduced the French Duke: `Mamie, veez cy vostre cousin d'Alenchon, nostre 
prisonnier'. The chronicler relates how Bedford's spouse, Anne de Bourgogne, `lui 
respondy que bien feust il venu, si 1'embracha et le baisa' (III, 122). Alencon seems 
to have been treated as a distinguished visitor. Wavrin explains that he apparently 
stayed for a few days in Bedford's hostel as his host, before being transferred to the 
38 See for example ENGUERRAN DE MONSTRELET, IV, 49, where the author narrates how Poton de 
Saintrailles and Jacques de Harcourt `ardirent et abatirent [... ] une tres belle eglise, dedens laquelle 
s'estoient retrais avecques aucuns de leurs biens les habitans d'icelle ville [Conchy-sur-Canche], 
lesquelz furent tous ou en la plus grant partie emmenez prisonniers comme chetifz audit lieu de Saint- 
Riquier'. However, since Saintrailles and Harcourt were Dauphinists, Monstrelet was quite likely to 
mention their exactions. 
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castle of Crotoy. When reading accounts of polite conversations between a knight 
and his prisoner, we tend to forget the strong element of material interest that lay 
behind such courteous behaviour. Modern historians have pointed out with much 
cynicism that high-ranking prisoners were treated with much consideration because 
the ransom expected from them could be considerable, and that courtesy only 
appeared at war between members of the same privileged, aristocratic caste. Still, as 
Franco Cardini has rightly emphasized, however hypocritical the code of chivalry 
may appear to us, it was a respectable effort to limit the barbarity of warfare, thus 
differentiating war from the antiquefuror39. 
Loyalty, honour, `proece', and courtesy were some of the main chivalrous 
virtues. There were others, most notably that of being trustworthy. Our Burgundian 
chroniclers often demonstrate that a true Burgundian knight was a man of his word. 
Jean de Wavrin severely reproached some Norman knights from the Pays de Caux for 
having changed sides on the eve of the battle of Verneuil, calling them `lasces 
chevaliers et escuyers de Northmandie [... ] quy autreffoys avoient fait serment de 
loyaulte et fidelite audit duc de Bethfort regent' (III, 120-121). They deserved very 
well the ill luck which had befallen them, the Duke of Bedford having won the day. 
The bonds created by an oath of allegiance did not allow knights any change of 
convictions. 
The last chivalric virtue which emerges - albeit seldom - from our chronicles 
is that of dedication to the love of a lady. Geoffroi de Charny had given this 
traditional virtue, extolled in romance literature from Chretien de Troyes onwards, a 
pre-eminent position in his Livre de chevalerie, as he declared about young knights 
eager to gain glory and renown: `Si doivent icelles gens vivre loiaument et liement, 
entre les autres choses amer par amours honorablement, que c'est le droit estat de 
ceulx qui celi honour veulent acquerir'. Charny also emphasized that the beloved 
lady's reward would be the assurance that she had inspired the great deeds of a 
valiant knight, while no woman would ever feel proud in being loved by a `chaitif 
maleureux'40. In the chronicles of our chivalrous historiographers, women do not 
39 Cf. CARDINI, p. 323-324. 
40 GEOFFROI DE CIIARNY, p. 118-122. 
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often appear. Their works are primarily concerned with wars, and thus the world 
which they present is predominantly masculine. Occasionally, however, one can 
observe that the honour of ladies was still considered as a convenient traditional 
pretext for fighting: Chastelain, for instance, explains that as Duke Philip's host was 
passing before Saint-Riquier, `six gentilshommes, par l'agrement de leur prince, 
tramirent un poursuivant en ladite ville, requerir et semondre autres six 
gentilshommes, quels qu'ils fussent, pour rompre lances en l'honneur de leurs dames 
encontre eux' (I, 245-246). It seems, however, that things had slightly changed since 
the days of Froissart and Charny, for Chastelain informs us that 
combien qu'il y pouvoit avoir de vertes testes, pour mettre leurs vies 
sur le coup d'un hasart, aussi bien que ä l'autre lez, n'y eut celuy 
toutes-voies qui en fust cru, ni qui pust obtenir conge de leur capitaine 
de le faire prestement. 
As one can see, the captains in charge of the army were rather reluctant to let any of 
their men put their life into jeopardy without a serious excuse. Still, six men 
answered the challenge, and the tournament was staged with much ceremony - after 
many precautions had been taken to avoid any accident or treachery. 
As one studies the treatment of the chivalric virtues in the works of our 
chroniclers, one can already perceive the general trends which would progressively 
shape Renaissance chivalry: while the virtue of loyalty to the suzerain was becoming 
increasingly predominant, individualistic customs such as answering a challenge for 
the honour of a lady during a campaign were beginning to be discouraged. The ideal 
of knighthood was slowly evolving, producing new generations of knights which 
would be totally devoted to their prince, and disciplined. The old ideals of the knight- 
errant did not really suit the Renaissance princes' interests, at least in their `authentic' 
form. But let us now consider a final point, which further helps to define the attitude 
of knights with regard to warfare. 
5. Aesthetics of the war of the knights 
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It was not only the code of chivalry which distinguished knights from 
ordinary fighters: their whole outlook on the waging of war was different. War 
seemed beautiful to them, not only in the physical, but also in the moral sense. In fact 
the two aspects went hand in hand. In a revealing passage of his work, Monstrelet 
marvels at the spectacle offered by the army of John the Fearless drawn up in battle 
formation between Pontoise and Melun. He describes the forces of Duke John, made 
up of `grant nombre de gens moult bien habillez et desirans de le servir contre tous 
ses ennemis'. He stands in awe of this powerful host where one could see so many 
noblemen `de diverses nacions, qui en moult belle ordonnance avecques toutes leurs 
gens furent bien ilec par 1'espace de deux heures', and relates how John the Fearless 
rode with some of his greatest vassals `tout au long des batailles pour les veoir, 
faisant ä iceulx [the knights of his host] tres grans honneurs et inclinacions et ainsi 
les remerciant du bon service qu'ilz lui faisoient'. Monstrelet then concludes: `pour 
dire verite c'estoit belle chose de les veoir tant y avoit de notables hommes et fleur de 
gens d'armes bien habillez' (III, 214-215). Throughout his description, the 
historiographer mingles terms praising the knights' appearance, the beauty of their 
garments, and words extolling their moral virtues. One could see from the richness of 
the knights' trappings that they were nobles, and as such, their souls must have been 
as fair as their appearance. 
When confronted with the army of Henry V, as it appeared on the battlefield 
of Agincourt, our chivalrous chroniclers seem completely bewildered. There was 
nothing noble about the look of King Henry's archers, described at length by 
Monstrelet and Saint-Remy: `la plus grant partie estoient sans armeures, en leurs 
pourpoins, leurs chausses avalees soubz le genoil, et ayant hachetes ou espees 
pendues ä leurs ceintures. Et si en avoit plusieurs tous nudz piez et sans chaperon'41. 
The Burgundian chroniclers were used to the impressive appearance of the Dukes' 
chivalry. What was more astonishing, and moreover an exemplary lesson of humility, 
was that this army of va-nu-pieds would utterly destroy the proud heavy cavalry of 
France. Monstrelet and Wavrin were similarly taken aback by the appearance of King 
Henry's 8,000 Irish soldiers, who ravaged the countryside during the terrible siege of 
41 ENGUERRAN DE MONSTRELET, 111,106; JEAN LEFEVRE DE SAINT-REMY, I, 254. Quotation 
from Monstrelet. 
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Rouen (1418): `la plus grant partie alloit de pie, ung pie chausse et l'autre nu, sans 
braies et povrement habillez, aians chascun une targete [... ] avec gros couteaulx 
d'estrange facon'. The chroniclers were shocked by their behaviour in the war waged 
by Henry V, behaviour which coincided with their appearance: `lesdiz Yrlandois [... ] 
prenoient petis enfans en leurs berceaulx et autres bagues, ä tous lesquelz montoient 
sur vaches, portant lesdiz petis enfans et bagues devant eulx sur lesdictes vaches, et 
furent par plusieurs foiz trouvez des Francois en cel estat'42. 
In war, above all, knights enjoyed the `belles apartises d'armes' and `hauts 
faits d'armes' which were the physical manifestation of the virtue of `proece'. The 
`faits d'armes' stemmed solely from courage, strength and virtue, and connoisseurs 
watched them, or heard them recounted, with the greatest delight. Many `patterns' of 
feats of arms were identified; some seem to have particularly fired the imagination of 
our chivalrous chroniclers, and their readership. One markedly popular `fait d'armes' 
seems to have been the fight inside one of the mines and counter-mines which were 
often dug under the walls of besieged fortresses. Aristocratic readers certainly found 
the dramatic idea of fighting underground, in a dark and restricted space, particularly 
exciting. The chroniclers always mention when one or many knights had the honour 
of being dubbed inside a mine, before a combat43. Another glorious kind of feat of 
arms which especially enthralled the noble readership was when a knight had the 
honour of fighting at length against a king or a prince, by accident, for instance 
during an assault. Thus it should not come as a surprise to see Chastelain resorting to 
all the treasures of rhetoric as he describes the momentous fight which Henry V and 
Philip the Good had against Barbasan, the captain of Melun, and one Ovide 
Bourgeois, who might not have been a knight, but certainly earned the title after this 
combat, on either side of a barricade which had been erected inside a mine reached 
by a counter-mine, under the walls of Melun. Chastelain extols the glory acquired by 
the two Dauphinists after this prodigious action: `dont leur gloire nest a taire d'avoir 
maintenu estour [combat] contre deux si hautement vaillans et esprouves hommes de 
leur temps, sans blasmer nul du nombre des meilleurs' (I, 157). This episode is of 
course reminiscent of the famous event recounted by Froissart, where Eustache de 
42 Quotation from ENGUERRAN DE MONSTRELET, III, 284-285; see also JEAN DE WAVRIN, 11, 
249. 
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Ribeumont fought against Edward III without recognizing him, only this time not 
underground but on the walls of Calais, during an assault44. Such feats of arms may 
have been impressive and enjoyable to hear recounted, but they were more often than 
not useless and of no tactical importance. Jean de Wavrin, who, unlike Chastelain or 
Monstrelet, was a knight, knew this only too well. To the narrative which Monstrelet 
had made of the courageous `fait d'armes' performed by the bastard of Any under the 
walls of Rouen - challenged by one Jean le Blanc, the bastard of Any had accepted 
the fight and mortally wounded his opponent - Wavrin, while admiring the deed 
performed, added the bitter comment: `mais au vray dire, peu povoient valloir telz 
apartises d'armes ne pourfitter auz assegies et assegans, sinon pour renom de 
valleureuse noblesse' (II, 250). 
However, one event in the waging of war was especially favoured and 
privileged by knights, because it was loaded with significance, and particularly 
charged with emotion: the pitched battle. Philippe Contamine has shown how 
important the concept of the pitched battle was in the ideology of medieval warfare45, 
despite the fact that, as experts tend to emphasize more and more today46, battles did 
not happen so often during the Middle Ages, as rulers were not always keen on 
risking most of their military power on a single occasion. Knights considered battles 
as very special, almost sacred events, especially since proper pitched battles only 
seldom happened - almost 10 years elapsed between the major battles of Agincourt 
(1415) and Verneuil (1424). Though the Church disagreed with this opinion, the 
pitched battle was, in the eyes of an overwhelming majority of the population, 
equivalent to an ordeal, the judgement of God. Thus it should not come as a surprise 
if the chivalrous chroniclers devoted many pages, and deployed all their literary 
talents, to describe the most important battles of their time. 
Monstrelet, Wavrin, who had the privilege of participating in the two major 
43 See for instance ENGUERRAN DE MONSTRELET, IV, 185. 
44 Cf. JEAN FROISSART, ed. LUCE, IV, 80. 
asp CONTAMINE, `L'idee de guerre ä la fin du Moyen Age: aspects juridiques et ethiques', in La 
France au XII' et XIS siecle..., item XIII. See especially the first pages on the pitched battle, and the 
Church's stand vis ä vis the conception of the battle as an ordeal. 46 See for instance M. PRESTWICIH, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience, 
New Haven / London, Yale University Press, 1996, p. 186. 
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battles of the first decades of the 15th century, Agincourt and Verneuil, and Lefevre 
de Saint-Remy, who was also present at the battle of Agincourt, but on the English 
side, illustrate perfectly how knights considered battles, especially the particularly 
dramatic and spectacular defeat of Agincourt, as sublime moments. The knights of 
France had gone to the battle of Agincourt with a joyful heart; Saint-Remy explains 
that the number of French casualties could have been even greater than it was, for `ä 
tous costez, gens aplouvoient, comme se ce fast ä aller ä une festes de joustes ou de 
tournoy' (I, 268). This initial delight and exultation at the thought of going to a battle 
made the disaster even more tragic for the French. The chroniclers tell us that many 
princes who had not had the honour of being present at the famous battle would 
regret it all their life. Saint-Remy testifies to having heard Philip the Good, at the age 
of sixty-seven, deploring the fact that he had not fought at Agincourt, `fust pour la 
mort ou pour la vie' (I, 239-240). And the same author discloses that one of the 
reasons why the Duke of Clarence had apparently acted so foolishly at Beauge was 
that the English prince of blood `desiroit la bataille pour ce qu'il n'avoit point este a 
celle d'Agincourt, que jamais n'y cuidoit venir a temps' (II, 36). 
Battles gave rise to some special events, and were usually preceded by 
poignant ceremonials. Lefevre de Saint-Remy recounts how, on the morning of Saint 
Crispin and Crispian's day, the French knights forgave each other's wrongdoings, 
and made their hearts at peace: `Les aucuns s'entrebaisoient et accolloient par paix 
faisant, que pitie estoit ä les veoir. Toutes noyses et discords, qui avoient este entre 
eulx et qu'ilz avoient eu du temps passe, furent lä transmuees en grant amour'. This 
scene is all the more moving since it took place in the general context of the civil 
war. Saint-Remy also shows how an approaching battle was surrounded by a 
religious awe: on the previous day, our author had seen the English, who thought that 
they would have to fight that day, ' en grant devocion, eulx mectant ä genoulx, les 
mains joinctes vers le ciel, faisant leurs oroisons a Dieu qu'il les veusist mectre en sa 
garde' (I, 249,242). 
Jean de Wavrin gives more space to the aesthetics of the battle of Vemeuil 
than that of Agincourt (III, 108-121). He describes at great length the beauty of 
Bedford's army as it was ready to fight, a beauty whose character seems to have been 
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as much physical as moral: `sans faulte moy acteur de ceste euvre n'avoie jamais veu 
plus belle compaignie, ne oü il eust autant de noblesse comme il avoit lä, ne mieulz 
ordonnee ou monstrant greigneur samblant ou voullente de soy combattre'. Another 
impressive aspect of the battle was the `grant noise et grant huee avecques bruit 
tumultueux des trompettes et clarons', which deafened the warriors as they rushed 
against each other. The fight itself is described by Wavrin as `horrible', `moult felle 
et cruelle', anything but beautiful, one might think. The archers were shooting `sy 
cruelement que horreur estoit ä les regarder'. Despite all this, one soon realizes that 
Wavrin considered this horrible violence to be ultimately sublime, since it brought 
out the best qualities in those who were fighting; on such occasions, the author 
eventually explains, `si n'i avoit celluy quy n'esprouvast totalement sa vertu et sa 
force'. It is difficult to believe that Wavrin was sincere as he deplored the `grant 
horreur et pitie irreparable de ainsy veoir Christiennete destruire Fun l'autre': having 
read his praises of the battle, this comment simply sounds as a conventional thing to 
say for a Christian, or a rhetorical device intended to make the report more 
emotional. What is more, it is interesting to note that Wavrin considered the battle of 
Verneuil as a paradigm, a model of a `proper' battle, which went on according to the 
rule book. Indeed, the knight-chronicler explains: 
Je vey l'assemblee d'Azincourt, ou beaucop avoit plus de princes et de 
gens, et aussi celle de Crevant, quy fut une tres belle besongne; mais 
pour certain celle de Verneuil fut du tout plus a redoubter et la mieulz 
combatue. 
As one can see, Wavrin classified the great battles in which he had had the honour of 
taking part according to some very specific criteria: Vemeuil was the most `beautiful' 
of all because it had been fought in the traditional style, unlike Agincourt where the 
French had already lost the battle by the time they had reached the English lines. 
Also, the fight at Verneuil had been particularly physical and fierce, with equal 
chances on both sides. Thus Verneuil ranked higher as a spectacle in Wavrin's 
opinion than Agincourt, despite the fact that the 1415 victory had been much more 
remarkable in the efficiency of the methods employed by the English. 
Some knights, however, were fully aware of the risks run by rulers when 
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letting a pitched battle decide on the fate of their dominion. According to Monstrelet, 
the few knights who worried about fighting the English `en bataille arrestee' at 
Agincourt were `des plus sages' amongst the other French knights (III, 104-105). 
They had not forgotten the lessons taught by Crecy and by the successful campaigns 
led by Charles V through du Guesclin's agency. Still, at Agincourt, Marshal 
Boucicaut and d'Albret, despite apprehending the consequences of a pitched battle 
against the English, could not hope to persuade such a huge and disorganized host, 
composed of knights from diverse origins, not to fight in the manner sanctified by 
tradition47. 
I hope that I have highlighted most of the characteristic features of these Burgundian 
chivalrous chronicles. One should note that, while retaining a very specific character, 
the Burgundian chivalrous genre of historiography was constantly evolving. Thus, the 
chronicles of Saint-Remy and Wavrin appear much more partial than that of 
Monstrelet, despite the fact that both authors used the earlier narration extensively. 
Even more than Monstrelet, they extol the institution of chivalry, of which Duke 
Philip is presented as the champion. But it was the first official historiographer of 
Burgundy Georges Chastelain who was to give its fully-fledged character to the 
Burgundian writing of history, a character which would endure in the chronicle of 
Charles the Bold's official historiographer Jean Molinet; Olivier de la Marche also 
displays the same ideology, though he could not live up to Chastelain's stylistic 
standards. Thanks to his mastery of rhetoric, Chastelain gave a heroic version of the 
early years of Duke Philip, praising his patron and the noble chivalry of Burgundy to 
the sky, as well as the ideals that they revered48. Indeed, Philip the Good had singled 
out chivalry as the line of conduct for his duchy, which still needed to assert its 
power and prestige on the international scene, as a young autonomous principality. 
The prince's ambition was not only to compete with prestigious rivals such as the 
Kingdoms of France and England, but also to attract and secure the allegiance of a 
growing number of knights. For chivalry, despite becoming increasingly obsolete and 
promoting ideals which often were hypocritically ignored, still was the code of 
47 Cf. C. HIBBERT, Agincourt, London, Batsford, 1964, p. 106-107. 
48 On the ideals supported by Chastelain, cf. G. SMALL, Georges Chastelain and the Shaping of 
Valois Burgundy. Political and Historical Culture at Court in the 15'h Century, Woodbridge, Boydell 
Press, 1997, and DELCLOS's excellent work Le temoignage de Georges Chastellain. 
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conduct that the aristocracy would naturally adopt, at least seemingly, in order to 
distinguish itself from the rest of medieval society. 
I shall now contrast the Burgundian chivalrous chronicles with a genre of 
historiography, which seems more specifically French; this genre was still enjoying 
its heyday during the first decades of the 15th century, and had certainly not 
disappeared when Monstrelet started writing his Chronique. I shall refer to this kind 
of historiographical literature as the `clerical' chronicles, because it was written by 
clerics, but it could equally be labelled the `anti-chivalrous' chronicle, for its 
ideology was radically different from that upheld by Wavrin, Saint-Remy and 
Chastelain. 
B. An alternative vision of the war of the knights: the French `clerical' 
chronicle 
1. A more traditional vision of warfare 
The raging civil war between the Burgundians and the Armagnacs, the 
renewal, in 1415, of the hostilities between France and England, and the spectacular 
and dramatic conquests of the English in the Kingdom of France were also recounted 
by many French chroniclers. Among all their accounts, one can clearly identify a 
particular genre of historiography, which had many adepts; I have chosen to refer to 
this genre as the `clerical' chronicle. All the authors who practised this genre were 
clerics; they often wrote in Latin, though apparently, by the 15th century, an 
increasing number of them were composing in the vernacular. The `clerical' 
chronicles which recount the English invasion of France are more contemporary to 
the events they narrate than' the Burgundian `chivalrous' chronicles we have just 
seen; indeed, it seems that by the time Charles VII had reasserted his authority over 
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did not fit that promoted by the King and the ruling class. And yet, the clerical genre 
of historiography had enjoyed a great popularity at least since the mid-14`" century. 
Most of the main characteristics of the genre appear in the chronicle of Jean 
de Venette49, a Carmelite friar who happened to be Froissart's near contemporary. 
Like Froissart, Jean de Venette recounted the wars of his time, notably the disastrous 
defeats of Crecy and Poitiers, but in a manner very different from Froissart's. While 
the latter had glorified the Hundred Years War, Jean de Venette presented it as a 
great calamity, heralded by the appearance of a disturbing comet in the sky. Froissart 
had extolled the main actors of the wars of his time, the knights, but Jean de Venette, 
who belonged to a family of peasants, voiced all the resentment which peasants felt 
against knights during the sad reigns of Philip VI of Valois and John II the Good: 
knights were arrogant, they never agreed with the Clergy and the Third Estate and 
they also failed to oppose the English aggression. And instead of protecting the 
Kingdom of France, as was their function, they would rather `trample it under foot, 
robbing and pillaging the peasants' goods'50. When the peasants' revolt known as the 
Jacquerie broke out, in 1358, Jean de Venette wrote sympathetically about the 
peasants' undertaking, though he did blame them severely for having acted on their 
own initiative, rather than under a lord's authority, and for the many atrocities that 
they committed. 
The main ideas expressed by Jean de Venette in his work appear as the basic 
ingredients of the early 15th century clerical chroniclers. Indeed, in all these works, 
one finds that warfare is presented in a similar, blunt and demystifying light, and the 
same resentment against knights is displayed. In this section, I propose to contrast the 
depiction of the war of the knights by three clerical chroniclers, the famous 
`Bourgeois' de Paris, the monk of Saint-Denis, and Pierre Cochon, to the chivalrous 
vision embodied in the works of Monstrelet, Wavrin, Saint-Remy and Chastelain. 
The Bourgeois de Paris, whose chronicle covers the years 1405-1449, was in fact a 
cleric, most probably from the University of Paris. He was, as is well-known, 
49 I have used an American translation of Jean de Venette's Latin chronicle: cf. JEAN DE VENETTE, 
Chronicle, trans!. J. BIRDSALL, ed. R. A. NEWHALL, New York, Columbia University Press, 1953. 
50 JEAN DE VENETTE, p. 66. 
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Burgundian `dans ses sources comme dans ses opinions'51; he also was a Burgundian 
subject for as long as Paris remained under Burgundian rule (from 1418 to 1436). I 
have still chosen to consider him as a French clerical chronicler, because Paris was 
only Burgundian for a relatively short time, and, more importantly, because his work 
followed the tradition of the French clerical chronicle; its ideology is undoubtedly 
very similar to that of Jean de Venette's work52. It is interesting to note that the monk 
of Saint-Denis, identified as Michel Pintoin, whose chronicle seems very typical of 
the genre, was writing the semi-official historiography of the Kings of France: he was 
continuing the old tradition of Dionysian historiography. Since the beginning of the 
13th century, the monks of Saint-Denis who had been composing the Grandes 
Chroniques de France had regarded themselves as the Kings of France's 
historiographers, even though the latter had never granted them any title. On some 
occasions, however, the Kings had entrusted to a monk of Saint-Denis the mission of 
writing specific historiographical works. Michel Pintoin had been asked by Charles 
VI himself to write the history of his reign, and to the monks of Notre-Dame de Paris 
who stressed that the chronicles of Saint-Denis were simple, unofficial works, the 
monks of Saint-Denis had answered: `Il n'y a eu ne n'a present que ung chroniqueur 
de France'53. Thus the `clerical' chronicle genre had, at the time, a semi-official 
character. The readership of Michel Pintoin's chronicle must have been much wider 
than that of the Bourgeois de Paris, who was writing either for himself, or for the 
restricted circle of his university colleagues, or those of the chapter of Notre Dame 54 
The monk of Saint-Denis recounted the events that occurred in the Kingdom of 
France between 1380 and 142255. The last clerical author I used, Pierre Cochon, was 
a priest from Normandy - he often was in Rouen, which became after its fall the 
capital of English territories in France - and had thus become a subject of the King of 
England after Henry V's spectacular conquest. Cochon was apparently writing for 
himself, or for a very restricted readership, because many of his comments show that, 
51 See Colette Beaune's introduction in the Journal..., ed. BEAUNE, p. 5-26 (quotation p. 16). 
52 I have used, for all quotations, Tuetey's classic edition. 
53 On the Dionysian tradition of historiography see B. GUENEE, Histoire et culture historique dans 
l'occidentmedieval, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1980, p. 399-342 (quotation p. 341). 
54 Journal..., ed. BEAUNE, p. 17-18. 
ss I have used a recent reprint of Louis-Francois Bellaguet's bilingual edition (6 vol., Paris, Crapelet, 
1839-1852): Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le regne de Charles VI, de 1380 a 
1422, ed. and transl. L. -F. BELLAGUET, 3 vol., Paris, Editions du Comite des travaux historiques et 
scientifiques, 1994. 
63 
after the conquest, he was in favour of the Dauphinists - even though he had 
originally been in favour of the Burgundians. Certainly his chronicle, had it been 
publicized, would have been censored by the English authorities. Cochon also was 
the author of a little diary which closes in 1434, entitled, in Charles de Robillard de 
Beaurepaire's edition, Chronique rouennaise. His best and most useful work, the 
Chronique normande, ends abruptly in 1430, though Cochon only died around 
56 1456 
Despite their obvious interest, these `clerical' chronicles seem to have 
attracted far less attention from scholars than the chivalrous chronicles we have just 
seen. Historians have used them for gathering factual information about the Hundred 
Years War, but have not emphasized the fact that they form a genre of 
historiographical literature, with clearly identifiable origins, diametrically opposed to 
the chivalrous writing of history. In his overview of French and Burgundian 
historiography during the Hundred Years War, admittedly a short yet informative 
work, Michel Mollat du Jourdin laid stress on the particularities of Jean de Venette's 
journal, mainly the fact that, unlike the Burgundian chivalrous chroniclers, Jean de 
Venette described at great length the sufferings, and also the occasional feats of arms 
- we owe him the well-known story of `Grand Ferre' - of the peasant class during the 
Hundred Years War57. But Mollat du Jourdin did not highlight the great similarities 
in style and ideology which later clerical chroniclers, such as the Bourgeois or 
Pintoin, share with Jean de Venette. In a very recent work, however, Nicholas Wright 
has pointed out that the contemporaries who described the horrors of the Hundred 
Years War were for the most part clerics, and that their works were strongly 
influenced by the predicatory tradition. These authors usually did not have direct 
experience of warfare, and their works often used the same rhetoric devices in order 
to appeal to the reader's emotions. He also included the clerical chroniclers of the 
late 14`" and early 15`h century in a wider circle of personalities who had their hearts 
set on defending the peasant class; this circle comprised not only chroniclers, but also 
poets such as Eustache Deschamps or Alain Chartier, lawyers such as Honore Bonet, 
56 PIERRE COCHON, Chronique normande (1408-1430), ed. C. DE ROBILLARD DE BEAUREPAIRE 
for the Societd de 1'Histoire de Normandie, Rouen, Le Brument, 1870. For the Chronique rouennaise, 
see p. 316-356. 
57 MOLLAT DU JOURDIN, p. 14,119,133. 
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authors of political tracts like Jean de Montreuil, and preachers like Jean Gerson. 
However, Wright, who is primarily a historian, did not make an attempt at defining in 
detail the characteristics of the clerical chronicle genre, and although he made 
extensive use of Jean de Venette's journal, he did not study the works of de Venette's 
early 15th century heirs: Pintoin, the Bourgeois, or Cochon58. As authors, the clerical 
chroniclers have not received all the attention they deserve. Cochon, for instance, has 
been rather ignored by scholars, despite the obvious interest of his chronicle. And 
only recently has the Bourgeois de Paris benefited from a modem critical study, in 
the form of Colette Beaune's annotation of her modern translation of the Journal, 
despite the fact that this diary of the Hundred Years War has been very popular with 
historians and history enthusiasts alike, at least since the 19th century. But let us now 
turn to the study of the sources. 
2. The demolition of the attractive, traditional image of the knight 
Despite the glorious image presented by chivalrous chronicles, the chronicles 
written to please and extol the aristocracy, most knights were far from behaving like 
saints in wars. Knights were supposed to protect those who did not fight, the clerics 
and the working class, but they committed countless exactions, and civilians, the 
common people, especially the peasant class, were the ones who suffered most from 
their abuses. The knights' exactions bred much popular resentment, and our three 
chroniclers, like Jean de Venette before them, made themselves the vox populi. The 
Bourgeois de Paris, for instance, often expresses in eloquent speeches the despair 
which overcame the poor and the peasants in these troubled times. In a dramatic 
episode, he recounts how, during the conquest of Brie in 1421, the peasants of the 
region had complained to the English and Burgundian lords about the devastation 
wrought in their fields, and how the warlords `ne s'en faisoient que mocquer ou rire'. 
The peasants then decided to leave their wives and children and to become outlaws, 
and the Bourgeois voiced their anger and wretchedness with a moving speech 
inspired by the Danses Macabres of the period: 
58 Cf. N. A. R. WRIGHT, Knights and Peasants. The Hundred Years War in the French Countryside, 
Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 1998. On the authors who describe the horrors of late medieval warfare, 
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Que ferons nous? Mettons tout en la main du deable, ne nous chault 
que nous devenons[... ]. Mieulx nous vaulsist servir les Sarazins que 
les Chrestiens, et pour ce faisons du pis que nous pourrons [... ] car 
par le faulx gouvernement des trestres gouverneurs, il nous fault 
renyer femmes et enfans, et fouir au boys comme bestes esgarees; non 
pas ung an ne deux, mais il a ja xiii ou xv ans que Geste dance 
. doloreuse commenca 
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The Bourgeois de Paris was especially keen to denounce the crimes of the knights, 
and tales of their outrages are common in his diary. In the Bourgeois's work, knights 
and their companies kill civilians, burn villages, loot houses, and ransom the 
burgesses and the peasants, who were in principle protected by the laws of war, as 
Honore Bonet, author of the Arbre des batailles, which was often quoted in legal 
disputes, had insisted60. Thus the Bourgeois recounts, for instance, how in 1417 the 
Armagnac garrison of Paris would often take to the fields to fight the Burgundians. 
On their way back, they would loot and capture civilians, and steal `tout le bestail 
qu'i povoient trouver, comme beufs, vaches, chevaux, asnes, anesses, jumens, pores, 
brebis, moutons, chevres, chevreaulx et toute autre chose dont ilz povoient avoir 
argent'. In churches, the soldiers `prenoient [... ] livres et toute autre chose qu'ilz 
povoient happer'. On their way back to Paris, they were `aussi troussez de biens que 
fait le hericon de pommes'. The Bourgeois concludes: `et quelque personne qui s'en 
plaignoit ä justice ou au connestable, ou aux cappitaines, tout bel luy estoit de se 
taire'61. One might think that it was only the common soldiers who behaved like 
thugs, but most of the Bourgeois' rancour is directed at the knights. Indeed, even in 
those anarchic days, despite the fact that military careers were open to a much wider 
range of medieval society, the knights still always were in the foreground in military 
matters. The captured defenders of Meaux, who were paraded by the English in Paris 
after the fall of the city, `estoient [... ] tous de renon de chevance, mais les laboureurs 
du pals en icellui temps n'avoient nulz pires ennemis, car ilz estoient pires ä leurs 
voisins que n'eussent este les Sarazins'62. Moreover, it is clear that the Bourgeois 
see especially p. 13 and p. 17-18. 
59 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 164. 
60 HONORS BONET, L'Arbre des batailles, ed. E. NYS, Brussels, Muquardt, 1883, p. 140 and 208- 
209. On the Arbre des batailles, see WRIGh T, `The Tree of Battles... ', p. 12-3 1. 
61 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 82-83. 
62 Ibid., p. 170. 
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held the knights responsible for the damage committed by the common soldiers under 
their orders: we have seen how he emphasized the arrogance of the captains' 
reaction, when civilians dared to complain about the behaviour of their troops. 
The Bourgeois' opinion, however, must be analysed with caution, for, as is 
well known, his arguments are very biased. He was an ardent supporter of the 
Burgundians, one of the reasons for this being that John the Fearless' politics had 
been to flatter and seek the support of the Third Estate and the common people. Thus, 
the Bourgeois was always prone to denounce the abuses of the Dauphinists, but did 
not always mention the crimes committed by the Burgundian troops, whose 
behaviour was very similar to that of the French companies. In his chronicle, until the 
Treaty of Arras (1435) which saw the reconciliation of France and Burgundy, a treaty 
which he accepted with bad grace, the Dauphinists - whom he kept referring to as the 
Armagnacs long after the murder of Bernard of Armagnac in 1418 - are constantly 
presented as the sons of the devil. The Bourgeois highlighted every base action 
committed by French troops, while being much more lenient towards Burgundian 
soldiers. How could the Dauphinists ever act virtuously, when they had treacherously 
slaughtered Duke John the Fearless? This crime, in the Bourgeois' opinion, could 
never be expiated enough. Nonetheless, even our hysterically anti-Dauphinist 
chronicler soon had to realize that the Duke of Burgundy's soldiers were far from 
being paragons of virtue. Occasionally, he would give free rein to his anger, and 
during these outbursts of rage and rancour, he would severely castigate the 
Burgundian soldiers. Thus he cursed the 6,000 Picards -a people whom Chastelain 
constantly extols for being fine soldiers, despite the fact that they were quite ill- 
disciplined - who stayed in Paris in 1429 as the Duke of Burgundy's escort, having 
been billeted on the Parisians. He tells us that their presence caused much friction 
between the inhabitants and the soldiers. As they were returning to their territories, 
the Picards `n'encontroient homme qu'ilz ne desrobassent ou batissent'63. Not only 
did they behave as rogues, but they were, according to our chronicler, useless as 
soldiers, and this made their exactions even harder to swallow. In 1430, together with 
some other Burgundian troops, they besieged Compiegne for four months, to no 
avail. The Bourgeois had not forgotten their rowdy conduct in Paris; he explained: 'Si 
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n'estoit nulz plus fors larrons et mocqueurs de gens', stressing that `vraiement III' 
64 Anglois faisoient plus en armes que V° Picquars' 
It is a fact that, when witnessing the shocking state of indiscipline of the 
French army during the troubled reign of the mad King Charles VI, and the unhappy 
early years of Charles VII, our clerical chroniclers often thought that the English 
knights and soldiers were much more admirable than the French ones, and they 
considered it as the height of shame that the soldiers of the `ancien ennemy', the 
King of England, should be more effective as warriors, and better disciplined. Indeed, 
Henry V was a born leader of men, and ruled his knights and soldiers with an iron 
hand; all the more reasons to believe that the English were the scourge of God, sent 
to castigate the French for their sins. This was the opinion of the monk of Saint- 
Denis, who wrote: `Les Francais d'autrefois, qui etaient de vrais catholiques [... ], 
sont remplaces par des fils corrompus, des fils criminels, qui meprisent la foi 
chretienne, et se plongent sans pudeur [... ] dans toutes sortes de vices [... ]. Et le 
Seigneur, justement irrite, leur a retire sa gr5ce'65. When they tell us how the English 
troops behaved better than the French during Henry's conquest, the chroniclers 
reflect the sentiment of a very large proportion of the French population. Thus 
Michel Pintoin explained that, during the Agincourt campaign, the English soldiers 
behaved more virtuously than the French, and were better disciplined; he concluded 
by disclosing how, generally, the people of Normandy preferred them to the French 
soldiers66. And yet, the English did not always go easy on the civilians, but our 
chroniclers were still more disposed to forgive their cruelties than those committed 
by the French, because they had entered the Kingdom as enemies, and were waging 
war in the normal, ancestral way, while the French soldiers were supposed to protect 
the population, and behaved just as if they'also were enemies. Cochon recalled in his 
Chronique rouennaise the depressing sight offered by the state of the country around 
Rouen after the departure of the French soldiers, in 1415, as they had followed Henry 
V on his way to Calais. Throughout the time when the English had been besieging 
Harfleur, the French 
63 Ibid., p. 248. 64 Ibid., p. 256. 
65 Chronique du Religieux..., III (Book XXXVI), 576-577. 
66 Ibid., III (Book XXXVI), 553. 
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essilierent tant le pals, [... ] que hommez, fames, enfanz lessierent leur 
mesnagez. Et les diz gens d'armes prenoient quanque il demouroit es 
maisons, et ardoient les uz et fenestrez; et n'estoit plus de pitie, quant 
ilz se partirent, de veoir les leux oü il avoient habite, comme as 
Amurees, a Saint-Saver, Soteville, et toute la valee jusques 
Mouliniax; et de l'autre coste de Rouen67. 
At this particular time, the reprehensible and ineffective conduct of the French army 
was all the more difficult to stomach, as a heavy tax had been levied on the Clergy 
and the Third Estate, in order to help prepare the realm's defence. The people of 
France, Pintoin bitterly noted, `apprirent bientöt [... ] a leurs depens qu'il n'y avait 
point de difference entre ces gens et les Anglais, ou plutöt que ceux-lä les 
ranconnaient et les pillaient davantage et exerraient des brigandages plus 
intolerables' 68. In this comment, Pintoin seems to indicate that there was nothing to 
choose between all those who were supposed to deal with the Kingdom's defence, 
regardless of whether they were great lords, bureaucrats, knights or common soldiers. 
In the same vein, the Bourgeois de Paris recounts how, instead of opposing Henry 
V's troops who had just taken Harfleur, the French men-at-arms `faisoient autant de 
mal [... ] aux pouvres gens, comme faisoient les Angloys, et nul autre bien n'y 
firent'69. He also narrates how, during the conquest of Normandy, in 1417, some 
Parisian merchants who had been travelling through Normandy and the Ile de France 
had been taken prisoner and ransomed three times, firstly by the English, secondly by 
the Burgundians, and lastly by the French. When they eventually managed to return 
to Paris, these `bons marchans, hommes de honneur' would swear to heaven 
que plus amoureux leur avoient este les Angloys que les 
Bourguignons, et les Bourguignons plus amoureux cent foyz que ceulx 
de Paris, et de pitance et de rancon, et de paine de corps et de prison, 
qui moult leur estoit esbahissant chose, et ä tout bon chrestien doit 
estre70. 
In a later passage, as he was reflecting on the miseries which had befallen the 
Kingdom, the Bourgeois commented on the conduct of the `signeurs de France' - 
67 PIERRE COCIION, Chronique rouennaise, p. 339. 
68 Chronique du Religieux..., III (Book XXXVI), 535-537. 
69 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 62. 
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with more than a hint of rhetorical exaggeration: je croy que les tyrans de Romme, 
comme Neron, Dioclecian, Dacien, et les autres ne firent oncques la tyrannie qu'ilz 
font et ont fait'71. By 1430, however, the Bourgeois was more inclined to think that 
French, English, and Burgundian soldiers were all the same in their behaviour; 
indeed, at that date, the English were less careful to avoid appearing hostile to 
civilians. Thus he wrote, at the time of Joan of Arc and of the reversal of fortune in 
the Hundred Years War: 
n'y a aucun qui soft maintenant aux armes, de quel coste qu'il soit, 
Francois ou Anglois, Arminac ou Bourgoignon ou Picquart, ä qui il 
eschappe rien qu'ilz puissent, s'il n'est trop chault ou trop pesant, 
dont c'est grant pitie et dommaige que les signeurs ne sont d'accort 72. 
During the first two decades of the century, the indignation that the Clergy 
and the Third Estate felt towards the knights of France was particularly acute, not 
only because of all their abuses, but also because the knights could not stand up to 
the powerful English army. The Burgundian chivalrous 'chroniclers recounted the 
battle of Agincourt as a moving tragedy, paying tribute to the courage of the noble 
chivalry of France which had gone light-hearted to the fight, but the clerical 
chroniclers related the battle sharply, or with many angry and mocking comments. 
The monk of Saint-Denis depicts the joy of the knights as they were going into action 
as a sign of arrogance; he explains how the dukes and counts had charged shouting 
cheerfully `Mont joie! Mont joie! ', and adds the caustic remark: 'ils ne pensaient 
guere qu'ä cette joie presomptueuse allaient bientöt succeder le deuil et la tristesse'73. 
The knights of France had contemptuously turned down the 6,000 equipped men 
offered by the burgesses of Paris, under the pretext that the French would be three 
times more numerous than the English, which would make the victory less glorious74. 
According to Pintoin, they were entirely responsible for their subsequent doom, and 
he relates the outcome of the battle without trying to hide his scorn: `Alors la 
noblesse de France fut faite prisonniere et mise ä rancon, comme un vil troupeau 
70 Ibid., p. 83. 
71 Ibid., p. 129. 
72 Ibid., p. 258. 
73 Chronique du Religieux..., III (Book XXXVI), 561-563. 
74 Ibid., III (Book XXXVI), 549. 
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d'esclaves, ou elle perit sous les coups d'une obscure soldatesque'75. Pierre Cochon 
relates the battle very dryly, stating that the knights of France had refused the help of 
all fighters who did not belong to the nobility, and concludes: `Et fu la pluz laide 
besongne et plus malvese que, puis mil anz, avenist au roialme de France'76. As one 
can gather from this comment, Cochon did not consider the event with awe as did 
chivalrous chroniclers such as Saint-Remy or Monstrelet; he saw it mainly as a 
deplorable massacre of fools on a large scale, and in his opinion, the tragedy lay 
chiefly in the consequences of the battle: the long enslavement of a large part of 
France. 
Because of their inefficiency, which had been particularly blatant at the time 
of Henry V's first French venture, in 1415, the knights of France had lost, in the eyes 
of our chroniclers, the respect which was naturally their due; being not only useless, 
but also harmful, they were seen as mere parasites. The monk of Saint-Denis 
illustrated perfectly the fact that, already with the fall of Harfleur - despite their 
heroic resistance, the town's garrison and burgesses had been forced to surrender 
after waiting in vain for some assistance - the knights of France had lost all the lustre 
and prestige which their office implied, as he observed: `La chevalerie francaise 
devint, ä cette occasion, la fable et la risee de tous les etrangers; eile fut raillee dans 
des chansons injurieuses'77. Such derogatory remarks are in plenty in his narration of 
Henry V's invasion. After the fall of Rouen, he attributed to the personified city a 
speech which severely castigated the chivalry of France. The city especially lingered 
on the knights' sins, in a vigorous tirade which seems very typical of the predicatory 
genre (one of the most mortal offences that the knights are reproached for being the 
commonplace vice of playing dice! ) : 
Chevaliers sans courage, qui etes si fiers de vos cuirasses et de vos 
casques empanaches, qui mettez toute votre gloire dans le pillage et le 
jeu de des, cette source des parjures et des blasphemes contre Notre- 
Seigneur, vous qui vantiez avec tant d'arrogance les prouesses de vos 
aieux, vous voila maintenant devenus la fable des Anglais et la risee 
de toutes les nations etrangeres78. 
75 Ibid., III (Book XXXVI), 563. 
76 PIERRE COCHON, Chronique normande, p. 275. 77 Chronique du Religieux..., III (Book XXXVI), 543. 
78 Ibid, III (Book XXXIX), 307. 
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The King of France's army no longer was what it used to be. Pintoin explained that 
the King's soldiers slain at Agincourt were essentially `des etrangers, des bätards, des 
hommes sans naissance, des exiles et des proscrits, plus avides de pillage 
qu'accoutumes ä la discipline militaire'79. He could not readily accept the fact that 
the Kings of France were increasingly relying on mercenaries for the defence of their 
realm, and that the office of knight was, in these troubled times, less exclusively 
reserved for the aristocracy. Similar ideas are expressed in Cochon's work: on one 
occasion, he referred to some routiers as `une maniere d'estrangies, Lombards et 
autres, de la compaignie des dits Franchois'80. Both authors were, as one can gather, 
rather conservative in their views about military affairs - though we shall see that 
Pintoin could be more open-minded. 
The knights of France would only start to recover their respectability and 
credibility with the beginning of the re-establishment of France, and the feats of Joan 
of Arc. This does not, however, apply to all authors: in 1429 and 1430, the Bourgeois 
still considered French knights as murderers and rascals, because they did not support 
his party, and because they almost managed to storm Paris, on the 7`h September 
1429, thus causing him a great fright. Even during the later years of his life, after he 
had acknowledged Charles VII as his monarch, the Bourgeois would never trust the 
chivalry of France. The successes achieved in 1429 restored much of Cochon's 
confidence in the worth of French knights, but his respect certainly did not apply to 
the whole of the kingdom's chivalry. Thus he used very strong language to qualify 
the routiers who were, in August 1429, on the rampage in the countryside around 
Aumalle; they had entered Aumalle through the agency of a priest, who, according to 
Cochon's highly-coloured account, `ne fit onques si mauvese journee; et lui vausit 
mieulx, apres ce que il fu baptisie, que sa mere lui eust jete la teste contre la paroy'. 
Cochon describes these routiers as 
une maniere de larons qui apatichoient les villez, et prenoient gens 
prisonniers de tous estas, et les mestoient ä grosses finanches. Et 
s'allerent rendre avec eulx plusieurs gensdu pais de Caux, merdalle et 
791bid., III (Book XXXVI), 547. 
80 PIERRE COCIION, p. 303. 
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truandalle, qui faisoient tant de maulx que c'estoit mervaille [... ]. Et 
couroient celle merdalle-lä jusques empres Rouen 81. 
Many of these routiers were undoubtedly knights, from the aristocracy, for Cochon 
tells us in a later passage that some of the routiers of Etrepaigny who had once sworn 
allegiance to Bedford, and were captured by the English, were beheaded82. The 
chivalrous chroniclers of Burgundy would never use such explicit language to qualify 
the routiers. Cochon, however, understood that the routiers of Aumalle were going 
against Charles VII's orders; indeed, he explains that `le dit Charles, roy de France 
[... ] ne leur avoit abandonne sinon ä prendre les Anglois et les officiers dessoulx eulx 
et ä les pillier, et leur avoit deffendu les bonnes gens du pais' and concludes `mes 
c'estoient les varies au diable: ils faisoient plus que commandement'83. Thus Cochon 
did appreciate Charles VII's early efforts to limit the devastation wreaked by his 
soldiers. In fact, the desire to dissociate the King from the responsibility for the 
abuses performed by the Kingdom's knights, and for their weaknesses on the 
battlefield, is characteristic of the clerical chronicles. Jean de Venette had explained, 
as he was recounting the defeat of Poitiers, that, had all noblemen behaved like King 
John, the battle would not have been lost84. Michel Pintoin pointed out that the 
disgraceful behaviour of French knights in 1415, which led to the fall of Harfleur, 
might rebound on Charles VI, but that he certainly was not responsible for it, `car il 
n'est pas douteux que son courage n'eüt empeche ce malheur, si 1'etat de sa sante le 
lui eüt permis'85. Only the Bourgeois would always hold a grudge against Charles 
VII, although, like most of his contemporaries, he had excused his father for the great 
miseries which had happened during his reign, on account of his illness. 
Thus, the French clerical chroniclers reflect in various manners all the 
animosity that a large part of the French late medieval society felt towards knights, 
despite the prestige which their office traditionally implied. According to Nicholas 
81 Ibid., p. 302. Cochon was particularly infuriated by the behaviour of the routiers of Aumalle 
because his very parish suffered from their abuses: he might have been among the people who, as he 
subsequently relates, had to flee into Rouen, Dieppe or Caudebec. Cf de Robillard de Beaurepaire's 
introduction, p. v. 
82 Ibid., p. 304. Decapitation was a sentence usually reserved for the nobility. 83 Ibid, p. 302-303. 
84 JEAN DE VENETTE, p. 64. 
85 Chronique du Religieux..., III (Book XXXVI), 543. 
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Wright, the formulation of their discourse followed closely the pattern laid by a 
sermon tradition of castigating a cowardly, greedy and arrogant knighthood, and 
speaking in defence of the humble, the poor and the peasants; and indeed, this is very 
likely, for our three authors were clerics, and they share a great many similarities of 
style. Thus we find in the work of Cochon, and especially those of Pintoin and the 
Bourgeois, the same tendency to denounce the proud knights of France, who are, 
amongst all their other crimes, systematically reproached for their vanity - apparent 
in their dress, in times of war and peace alike - and their habit of playing dice, a vice 
which, to us, may not seem the most shocking of all. On the other hand, and this is 
particularly striking in the Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris, the clerical chroniclers 
defend the peasant class in long, vigorous tirades; they often refer to the Old 
Testament or the Psalms whenever they want to give an epic dimension to the 
sufferings of the people - who can only find comfort in religion - or to Roman 
history, when it comes to denouncing the tyranny or the depravity of the nobility. 
Yet, beyond this social clash between the aristocracy on the one hand, and the Clergy, 
the bourgeois and the peasantry on the other, exposed in the works of the clerical 
chroniclers, one finds that the whole attitude of our clerics with regard to warfare, 
and especially that never ending conflict, the Hundred Years War, was very different 
from that of the chivalrous chroniclers. 
3. The absence of `nobility' in the clerical chroniclers' depiction of the Hundred 
Years War 
Michel Pintoin, Cochon and the Bourgeois de Paris present us with a picture 
of the Hundred Years War that has nothing to do with the `chivalrous' depiction of 
the conflict. The heirs of Froissart were aware of the fact that the first decades of the 
century had been particularly sinister times for the Kingdom of France, and deplored 
it. However, we have also seen that they considered the major engagements of the 
war with a sense of awe, that they regarded the figure of the knight, the warrior par 
excellence, with a kind of religious respect, and that they praised many aspects of the 
waging of war according to particular aesthetic and moral parameters. By contrast, 
the clerical chroniclers hardly saw any nobility in the waging of war, at least as far as 
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the Hundred Years War was concerned. They would probably have approved a 
defensive war, a crusade, perhaps even a war of conquest, provided that it was waged 
effectively and successfully by the King of France at the head of an army which 
behaved in an irreproachable manner. But the Hundred Years War was a different 
matter. The conflict seemed endless, and in the 1420s, it had left the Kingdom bled 
white. Apart from those deriving profit from collaboration, or those who favored a 
fight to the death of either party, most French contemporaries were extremely wary of 
it. Moreover, in the 15`h century, the Hundred Years War was partly a civil war, and 
our clerical chroniclers could not see any noble aspect in the fact that the `signeurs de 
France' were tearing each other to pieces, thus causing the ruin of the realm. Finally, 
one should note that civilians were the main victims of the war, and the peasant class 
in particular suffered tremendously from the conflict: peasants had to pay the appatis 
demanded by the garrisons which had settled near their villages, they were exposed to 
the danger of being taken prisoners, and subsequently ransomed; the soldiers would 
often loot their villages, steal or kill their cattle, burn their fields and houses. It was 
quite common at the time for contemporaries to witness the exile of entire villages; 
the inhabitants would flee their devastated region, their parish priests at their head, in 
a desperate attempt to escape famine86. The tribulation of the people of France was 
admirably described by the poet Alain Chartier, who, in his prose work Le 
Quadrilogue invectif (1422), made the allegorical figure `Le Peuple' exclaim, in a fit 
of despair: 
Que appelle je guerre? Ce n'est pas guerre qui en ce royaume se 
mayne, c'est une privee roberie, ung larrecin habandonne, force 
publique soubz umbre d'armes [... ] que faute de justice et de bonne 
ordonnance fait estre loisibles. Les armes sont criees et les estendars 
levez contre les ennemis, mais les esploiz sont contre moy a la 
destruction de ma povre substance et de ma miserable vie [... ]. Je vis 
en mourant, voiant la mort de ma povre femme et de mes petis enfans 
et desirant la mienne. 87 
86 On the ravages of the Hundred Years War see MOLLAT DU JOURDIN, p. 132-152. 
87 ALAIN CHARTIER, Le Quadrilogue invectif, ed. E. DROZ, Paris, Honore Champion, 1950 (2nd ed., 
Ist pub. 1923), p. 21. Alain Chartier, however, does not lay all the blame on the chivalrous class. 
Indeed, the purpose of this very intelligent work, disclosed at the end of the discussion by `France', is 
to give each of the three Estates the right to speak, so that each of them may, through the others, know 
and acknowledge their misdeeds; the mission of the artist is to record it for posterity. On the nature 
and extent of the havoc wreaked by knights in the French countryside during the Hundred Years War 
see MOLLAT DU JOURDIN, p. 133-141. 
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In the works of our clerical chroniclers, war is stripped of all the lustre which 
it possessed in the eyes of the chivalrous viewpoint's exponents; at least until the 
start of the military re-establishment of France, the waging of war is deprived of any 
eminence and dignity. There is a good deal of irreverence in the way the Bourgeois 
relates the misfortune which befell the Dauphinist lord Guy de Nesle as he was 
attempting to bring some reinforcements into the besieged town of Meaux, at night, 
by means of a ladder covered up with white sheets. Georges Chastelain recounted the 
story as a sad misadventure, explaining how Guy de Nesle had fallen through a rotten 
plank into the ditch. Captured by the English, he was brought before King Henry, 
who treated him with respect, jugeant bien et voyant ä l'ceil qu'il estoit homme de 
haut courage et que la prise avoit este belle pour luy' (I, 298). The Bourgeois relates 
this episode in a very different way, which perhaps shows how the common people 
would usually discuss such incidental military events. He explains that as Guy de 
Nesle, preceded by '1111 ou V ribaulx', was climbing up the ladder, one of his soldiers 
accidentally dropped a bag full of herrings on his head, thus hurling him down into 
the ditch. As the Dauphinists were lamenting: `Heias! Monsigneur est cheu! ', the 
English sentries, alerted by these cries, mocked the Dauphinist knight, inquiring in 
their broken French: `Monsigneur, de par le deable, pert vous mors tretous'. The 
Bourgeois concludes by stating that Guy de Roy was eventually captured by one of 
King Henry's cooks. As Colette Beaune rightly pointed out, the chronicler must have 
taken delight in narrating this amusing and disrespectful story of a French knight 
taken prisoner by an English cook. 88 
One could argue that, in this particular episode, the Bourgeois' irreverence is 
due to the fact that the victim was a Dauphinist. However, our author can also be 
hard on his own camp: one just needs to read a particular paragraph of his account of 
the battle of Verneuil - that which relates the actual fight - to understand his 
conception of the war of the knights. This report is the complete antithesis of the 
account that Jean de Wavrin left us of his `favourite' battle. Wavrin stated that the 
fight had offered all those involved the chance to display their virtue and `proesce'. 
By contrast, the Bourgeois - who still was in favour of the Duke of Bedford - depicts 
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it as a particularly ugly and grotesque episode, something which resembled more the 
massacres performed by Frere Jean in Gargantua, than one of the greatest battles of 
the Hundred Years War: 
les deux osts vindrent Fun contre l'autre, et commencerent a frapper 
et mailler l'un sur l'autre de toutes manieres d'armeures de guerre que 
on peust pancer, de traict ou d'autre chose. Lä eussiez ouy tant 
doloreux criz et plaintes, tant hommes cheoir ä terre, que puis n'en 
releverent, l'un chacer, l'autre fouir, l'un mort sus, l'autre gesir ä terre 
gueulle baiee, tant sanc espandu de chrestiens, qui oncques n'avoient 
veu en leur vivant l'un l'autre, et si venoient ainsi tuer l'un l'autre 
pour ung you de pecune qu'ilz en attendoient a avoir89. 
Although the Bourgeois considered that the French defeat was well-deserved, he did 
not make any distinction between the two sides in his description of the actual 
engagement. In his opinion, the battle was simply a deplorable massacre, and he 
refused to see any dignity in the motivations of the fighters: they were simply 
fighting for some money (their pay), not even a large sum. Apparently, the Bourgeois 
did not consider, let alone understand, that some of the French may have been driven 
by a patriotic spirit. 
Our clerical chroniclers often appear insensitive to the `belles appartises 
d'armes' and displays of `proesce' which made war a noble thing in the eyes of the 
chivalrous chroniclers. After all, as Michel Pintoin cynically remarked, at Agincourt, 
those who were considered as the `preus' of the Kingdom, the flower of French 
chivalry, had been decimated by `des gens sans merite et sans naissance', `une 
obscure soldatesque'90. Pintoin, Cochon and the Bourgeois gave much greater 
prominence to another, omnipresent aspect of war: its horrors, and the sufferings of 
the humble. The Bourgeois, in particular, devotes pages and pages of his journal to 
the description, in universally recognizable terms, of the war's most dramatic 
episodes, which form as many moving scenes denouncing the cruelty of war. Thus, 
he pictures the pitiful sight offered by the arrival, as the Parisians were celebrating a 
peace treaty between the English, the Dauphin, and the King of France, of a crowd of 
88 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 166-167; ed. BEAUNE, n. 34 p. 181. 89 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 197. 
90 Chronique du Religieux..., III (Book XXXVI), 563-565. 
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refugees who had escaped from Pontoise: despite the peace treaty, at the break of 
dawn, the town had been stormed by the English. From the walls, the sentries could 
see 
grans tourbes de hommes, femmes et enfens, les ungs navrez, les 
autres despouillez; l'autre portoit deux enfens entre ses bras ou en 
hostes, et estoient les femmes, les unes sans chapperon, les autres en 
ung povre corcet, autres en leur chemise; povres prebstres qui 
n'avoient que leur chemise ou ung seurpeliz vestu, la teste toute 
descouverte91. 
The Bourgeois explains how `aucunes femmes grosses acoucherent en fuite, qui tost 
apres moururent', and records the refugees' lamentation: `Dieu, gardez nous par 
vostre grace de desespoir, car huy au matin estions en nos maisons aises et manans et 
ä medy ensuivant sommes comme gens en exil querans nostre pain'. The Bourgeois 
also recounts how, in 1420, one could see in the streets of Paris `sur les furriers [... ] 
cy dix, cy vingt ou xxx enfans, filz et filles, qui lä mouroient de fain et de froit et 
n'estoit si dur cueur qui par nuyt les ouist crier: "Helas! Je meur de fain! " qui grant 
pitie n'en eust'92. The chivalrous chroniclers also depicted some of the miseries of 
the time, but they did it much more seldom, focusing on the most tragic, outstanding 
events, such as the truly appalling agony suffered by the 12,000 poor men and 
women who had been expelled from Rouen during the dramatic siege of the city: 
Henry V had refused to let them make their way through the English siege, and they 
were left to die in the ditch93. By contrast, the clerical chroniclers are much more 
prolix on the common people's sufferings. It is true that the Bourgeois, for instance, 
was oblivious of the fact that the aristocracy, and particularly the gentry, also had its 
share of suffering94. Michel Mollat du Jourdin has pointed out that the male progeny 
of many aristocratic families had been decimated after many years of service in the 
war; the renewal of the Hundred Years War had caused the ruin of numerous 
91 Journal.., ed. TUETEY, p. 126-127. 
92 Ibid., p. 146. 
93 The Burgundian chivalrous chroniclers seem to have been particularly shocked by this tragic 
episode, and they devoted many lines to its detailed narration. It is quite likely that they highlighted 
this particular story as an emblem of the great miseries of the time. Cf. ENGUERRAN DE 
MONSTRELET, III, 299; JEAN LEFEVRE DE SAINT-REMY, 1,349. 
94 Cf the Journal..., ed. BEAUNE, n. 106 p. 151. 
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families, and many Norman nobles had preferred exile to the English domination95. 
Marie-Therese Caron has emphasized that the gentry was also affected by the 
political crisis: faced with the growing ambition of the princes of royal blood, and the 
foreign invasion, they did not know whom to obey, and did not have the means to 
resist the will of the powerful; they must have felt very disorientated 96. Finally, they 
probably were sensitive to the social crisis, confronted as they were with the 
resentment of the common people. Alain Chartier saw this well, as he made the 
figure of the `Chevalier' reply to `Le Peuple', in his Quadrilogue invectif: 
Nous ne povons pas vivre du vent, ne noz revenues ne nous suffiront a 
soustenir les fraiz de la guerre, et se le prince ne se recueult de son 
peuple dont il nous puisse paier, et en servant la communite nous 
vivons des biens que nous trouvons, a Dieu m'en rapporte d'avoir noz 
consciences excusees97. 
The clerical chroniclers have also been criticized for being too formulaic 98. it 
is true that they tend to overuse rhetoric, and often repeat themselves in their tirades. 
We have seen how many commonplace criticisms, which clearly belong to the 
predicatory tradition, could be identified in their tirades against knights: for example 
as they blamed knights for their clothing extravagance. This is rather obvious in 
Cochon's exasperated description of the clothes which were all the rage among the 
nobility during the 1380s - while the common people were striving to pay heavy 
taxes - as he explains: `et revint une maniere d'estas de vestures pippellotees de 
tantes manierez de desguseeurez qu'il n'est nul qui les peust escripre, avec unez 
grandez manchez pendantez [... ] et y povoit bien mucher pain, cha [chair], chapons 
rostis, et, se mestier estoit, tous larrechinz'99. Cochon's comments are a humorous 
variation on a well-known theme. Jean de Venette had deplored `the luxury and 
dissoluteness of many of the nobles and knights' which was flagrant in the year 1356: 
he had scoffed at the fact that they wore feathers on their hats, adorned themselves 
with precious stones, and spent their time playing real tennis and diceloo When 
developing on the sufferings of the common people during the war, the clerical 
95 MOLLAT DU JOURDIN, p. 141-142. 
96 CARON, Noblesse et pouvoir..., p. 166-167. 
97 ALAIN CHARTIER, p. 33. 
98 WRIGHT, Knights and Peasants, p. 13. 
99 PIERRE COCHON, p. 173. 
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chroniclers could slip into gross exaggeration: this is particularly evident in the 
Bourgeois' horrifying story of the torments which the bastard of Vaurus, a 
Dauphinist captain, allegedly inflicted on a young and pregnant peasant woman. The 
Bourgeois explains at length how the poor woman did all she could in order to find 
the money necessary in order to pay her husband's ransom, only to find out that the 
bastard of Vaurus had already had him hung. Exasperated with her as she had gone 
out of her senses, the Dauphinist captain ordered that the girl should be tied to a tree, 
with the lower part of her body exposed. Her martyrdom only ended when hungry 
wolves eventually devoured the child inside her womb. As Colette Beaune has noted, 
all narrative elements in this appalling story were present in order to shatter the 
reader. It is quite clear that this story had been propagated by the English, so as to 
overshadow the fact that the bastard of Vaurus had been executed without a proper 
triallol However, not all the clerical chroniclers' tales about the horrors of war were 
exaggerated, or simply invented: the suffering of the common people during the 
conflict is an obvious and well-documented fact. Were it not for the clerical 
chroniclers and the other exponents of the predicatory tradition, such as Gerson, 
Bonet or Alain Chartier, our picture of the Hundred Years War would be very one- 
sided; unlike Froissart and his heirs, they have revealed the dark and gruesome aspect 
of the war. 
Set against the backdrop of all the horrors of war, the `faits d'armes' did not 
carry much weight in the eyes of the people. This was well expressed by Alain 
Chartier in his debate, as he made `Le Peuple' declare to `Le Chevalier': 
se je veisse que par chevalereuses hardiesses de la guerre, dont vous 
faictes le bruit, les ennemis sentissent la perte et le dommaige, le mien 
en seroit plus aise ä soustenir, mais tousjours mal souffrir, quant il ne 
redonde a aucun bien, fait le couraige cheoir en desespoir et perdre 
patience entierement102 . 
The clerical chroniclers also indicated that, in this context, they failed to be 
impressed by chivalrous displays of `proesce'. In a striking and crucial passage of his 
loo JEAN DE VENETTE, p. 61-62. 
101 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 170; ed. BEAUNE, n. 65, p. 185. 
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chronicle, which surprisingly seems to have been missed by modem scholars, the 
monk of Saint-Denis literally demolished the foundations of the chivalrous chronicle, 
as Froissart had laid them: 
La plupart des habitants du royaume applaudissaient ä ces atrocites et 
les vantaient ä la facon des herauts d'armes: `En teile rencontre, 
disaient-ils, les Armagnacs ont vaincu les Bourguignons'. Puffs 
venaient d'autres, qui pretendaient que les Armagnacs avaient eu plus 
souvent le dessous, comme si de pareils faits meritaient, ä leurs yeux, 
d'etre consignes par ecrit. Quant a moi, aux yeux de qui toutes ces 
hostilites n'avaient aucun resultat que la desolation du royaume, j'ai 
cru que le recit devait en etre abandonne aux accents de la muse 
tragique, plutöt que retrace par la plume de l'historien103. 
Still, it would be an error to consider the clerical chroniclers as pacifists, at 
least in the modern sense of the word, that is, opposed to the use, by the state, of 
violence as a political resource. They did dislike war, especially when waged 
between Christians. Michel Pintoin praised the decision of John of Cornwall, whose 
son had had his head blown off by a cannonball, to quit the business of war: 
`reflechissant A l'injustice de la guerre et aux graves dangers auxquels eile expose le 
corps et 1'äme, [il] fit vceu des lors de ne plus combattre contre les chretiens, et 
renonca ä porter les armes' 104. However, Cornwall was an English knight, and it 
seems that the story should be seen as a moral tale intended to denounce the English 
aggression. Indeed, on many occasions, Michel Pintoin praised resistance against the 
English'05. The clerical chroniclers knew that war was always accompanied by a trail 
of woes, but they still regarded it as a legitimate means to achieve one's ends, 
provided that the cause was just. Jean de Venette had not been opposed to the 
concept of the Jacquerie, for it had been embarked upon with a zeal for justice, but 
he had condemned the way in which it had been waged: the peasants had not been 
fighting under a lord's authority, and they had committed countless horrible 
crimes'06. The clerical chroniclers supported a swift and efficient way of waging war. 
Indeed, if wars were simply the means to an end, they had to be brief, so as to limit 
103 Chronique du Religieux..., III (Book XL), 399. 
104 Ibid, III (Book XLI), 449. 
105 See for example III (Book XXXVIII), 103, where the monk of Saint-Denis proudly relates how the 
messengers sent by Henry V throughout Normandy in 1417, asking the country to submit, and 
promising the `douceurs du repos et de 1'aisance', met with no success whatsoever. 
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unnecessary misery. 
It seems that the common people reproached knights for waging war in a 
completely opposite manner, for it was commonplace in the literature which reflected 
the ideas of the masses to tax the knights with prolonging the war in order to enrich 
themselves. Thus the anonymous 14th century tract La complainte sur la Bataille de 
Poitiers, written shortly after the disastrous defeat where King John II the Good had 
been captured, had pictured the knights of France realizing that, should a French 
victory bring the war to an end, they would lose their livelihood; the tract 
subsequently accused them of having come to terms with the English: they would not 
kill each other, but rather take each other prisoners, so as to make sure that the war 
would always go on107. The Bourgeois de Paris, who wrote his diary more than half a 
century later, reflects this opinion. He frequently grumbles about a key aspect of the 
war of the knights: the practice of taking noblemen prisoners instead of killing them. 
Thus, after having mentioned that the lord of Guitry and other Dauphinist knights had 
been taken prisoner at the fall of Montereau (1420), the Bourgeois adds the sarcastic 
comment: `lequel fut delivre avec les autres, qui depuis fist tant de tirannye au pals 
de Gastinoys et ailleurs que fist oncques sarazin' 108. Similarly, he explains that the 
Duke of Bedford was deluding himself as he thought that asking the prisoners taken 
at the fall of Meulan (1423) - who were all noblemen - to swear allegiance to him 
would help to advance his conquest of France, for `aussitost qu'ilz porent yssir, ilz ne 
tindrent oncques ne fay ou serment qu'ilz eussent fait, mais firent pis qu'ilz n'avoient 
fait devant' 109 The Bourgeois often appears as an extremist in his views, and it is 
quite clear that he would have preferred that all noble prisoners should be killed. As 
he relates the fall of Gaillon, Sezanne and Nangis (1424), he deplores the fact that, 
having negotiated their surrender, the garrisons were allowed to leave unharmed, 
`senon ceulx de la garnison du chastel de Sedanne [Sezanne, which had been stormed 
as the garrison had refused to surrender], qui furent tous mis ä l'espee, et les autres 
firent pis la moitie qu'ilz n'avoient fait devant'110. Michel Pintoin and Cochon seem 
to have been more moderate in this respect; in any case they hardly make any 
107 Cf. FOWLER, p. 177. 
108 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 141. 
109 Ibid., p. 185. 
110 Ibid., p. 194. 
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comments about the practice of ransoming noblemen instead of killing them. Still, 
the Bourgeois certainly was not alone in having such radical views. In his account of 
the Parisian uprisings of 1418, where hundreds of Armagnacs were massacred by the 
enraged mob, he relates how the people of Paris attacked the Bastille Saint-Antoine 
and seized the distinguished Armagnac nobles who were kept prisoners inside the 
fortress. As the Duke of Burgundy was vainly trying to placate them, they demanded 
that the prisoners should be transferred into the Chätelet, arguing that `ceulx que on 
mettoit oudit chasteau estoient touzjours delivrez par argent, et les boutoit on hors 
par les champs, et faisoient apres plus de maulx que devant'. According to the 
Bourgeois, John the Fearless `bien veoit qu'ilz disoient verite', and agreed to transfer 
the prisoners, under an escort's protection. As the prisoners were approaching the 
Chätelet, they suddenly were faced with hundreds of infuriated Parisians, who slew 
them". On this particular occasion, however, the Bourgeois seems to have been 
shocked by the crowd's behaviour, perhaps because he was uncomfortably near to the 
bloodshed: he relates how the prisoners, who for the most part were close to the king, 
were `tous martirez de plus de cent plaies', and adds that John the Fearless felt 
greatly disturbed about this slaughter. 
The clerical chroniclers clearly were demanding in their views about how 
warfare should be waged, for they expected military undertakings to be, not only 
brisk, but also successful. Needless to say this rarely happened, especially since the 
Dauphin and his council, whose situation had become increasingly worrying ever 
since the Treaty of Troyes (1420), were very circumspect in their planning of military 
operations. It is interesting, however, to contrast the reactions of two of our 
chroniclers when faced with the amazing successes achieved by Joan of Arc in 1429, 
since her methods were in complete accordance with the ones they favoured. Cochon 
was enthralled by her achievements, and he seems to have particularly liked an 
important element of her strategy: the ultimatum. He explains: `Et cregnoit Pen mout 
celle Pucelle, car elle, usoit de somassions, et disoit que, se Pen ne se rendoit, elle 
prendroit d'assault' 112. The Maid of Orleans favoured expeditious methods, and 
preferred taking towns by storm to long sieges; this audacious way of waging war 
"' IbicL, p. 108-109. 
112 PIERRE COCHON, p. 301. 
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tended to scare her adversaries 113. Even as he relates the failed attack on Paris, 
Cochon is filled with admiration: he describes it as 'Si appre et si merveleux que 
ceulx de dens furent tous esbahis, et n'y avoit homme qui se osast descouvrir dessus 
le mur pour le trait de ceulx qui assailloient'. In fact, the Parisian resistance was 
much fiercer than Cochon believed. Cochon blamed Charles VII's counsellor La 
Tremoille for the eventual French failure: the counsellor decided to negotiate with 
Philip the Good, and had the army withdraw 114 By 1430, Joan no longer was in the 
foreground of political and military affairs, and in Cochon's opinion, the war had 
again taken its usual, depressing course; his chronicle closes with the bitter comment: 
`Et recommencherent Anglois tres fort a conquester ce qu'ilz avoient perdu, et 
Francois ä reperdre ce qu'ilz avoient conqueste'lls The Bourgeois de Paris, on the 
other hand, was horrified by Joan's methods. They were in accordance with his 
conception of strategy - on one occasion, he contrasted Salisbury's efficiency, as a 
military commander, with the alleged inertia of Bedford, who `se reposoit es citez de 
France a son aise lui et sa femme qui partout oü il alloit le suivoit'l16 - but Joan was 
fighting for the Armagnacs, the detested adversary. Thus, he presented her habit of 
giving ultimatums as a sign of great arrogance and cruelty, explaining: `qui 
n'obeIssoit aux lettres qu'elle faisoit elle faisoit tantost mourir sans pitie quant eile en 
avoit povoir'117. As one can see, the clerical chroniclers' appreciation of Joan's 
methods thus depended, as one might expect, on party spirit. 
4. The war of the communes: the people's contribution to the defence of the 
Kingdom, or an alternative to the war of the knights? 
Faced with the apparent total inefficiency of the knights - which was flagrant 
in the eyes of the clerical chroniclers, from the fall of Harfleur up to the start of the 
re-establishment of France - our chroniclers had the impression, or even the 
113 On this aspect of Joan's strategy see P. CONTAMINE, `La guerre de siege au temps de Jeanne 
d'Arc', in his work De Jeanne d'Arc aux guerres d'Italie. Figures, images et problemes du XYe siecle, 
Orleans / Caen, Paradigme, 1994, p. 85-95. 
"4 PIERRE COCHON, p. 306-307. 
"s Ibid., p. 315. 
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conviction, in the Bourgeois de Paris' case, that the people of France would defend 
the Kingdom just as well, perhaps even better. At least, without entertaining 
revolutionary thoughts, they could legitimately deplore the fact that the knights did 
not make better use of what already was at their disposal, the armed militias of the 
Kingdom's towns and villages. This was again a traditional theme of this literature 
which reflected the views of the common people. Shortly after the disaster of 
Poitiers, the Complainte sur la bataille de Poitiers had urged the Duke of Normandy, 
who had escaped from the battle, to take up the fight again, in order to avenge King 
John. Only this time, he should not neglect to permit the people of France to 
participate in the fight: 
S'il est bien conseille, il n'obliera mie 
Mener Jaque Bonhomme en sa grant compagnie 
Guerres ne s'enfuira pour ne perdre la viel IS. 
Francoise Autrand has argued that `Jaque Bonhomme' did not refer to the peasants of 
France, but to the burgesses' armed militias sent by the towns of the Kingdom to help 
the King in his wars.. This is probably true de facto - according to Michel Mollat du 
Jourdin, peasants only organized themselves into armed self-defence groups on 
relatively rare occasions (though this did happen sometimes: the example of `Grand 
Ferre' is well-known)119 - but it is worth pointing out that, according to Jean de 
Venette, `Jaque Bonhomme' was the name which knights had derisively given to 
peasants, and originally to those `sent to the wars who bore arms in rustic fashion of 
120 peasants' . 
The Bourgeois de Paris was especially enthusiastic about the communes; to be 
more precise, he unreservedly supported one popular militia: his own, the Parisian 
milice. His account of the `Journee des harengs' (1429) is, in this respect, very 
revealing. The Parisian milice and an English squadron were escorting a convoy of 
supplies - mostly fish as it was Lent - sent by the burgesses of Paris to the English 
18 Quotation from AUTRAND, p. 99. 
119 MOLLAT DU JOURDIN, p. 137-139. 
120 JEAN DE VENETTE, p. 63; in a recent interview, Philippe Contamine asked the question: `Y a-t-il 
vraiment des non-combattants au Moyen Age dans un contexte oü tout adulte, "de 14 ä 70 ans" disent 
certains textes, peut We mobilise en cas de besoin et of chacun a conscience qu'iI doit 6ventuellement 
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army besieging Orleans. As the convoy was approaching Orleans, they were attacked 
by a Dauphinist battalion. Although the Parisian milice probably did not represent 
more than half of the escort, throughout the passage, the Bourgeois refers to the 
defenders as `noz gens', a term he never uses when referring to English, nor even 
Burgundian armies alone. As a result, the Parisian milice seems to take the credit for 
every positive thing the defenders do. The Bourgeois denounces the cruelty of the 
Dauphinists, who reject the English offer to wage a guerre guerrable - where 
prisoners would be taken - and insist on waging a guerre mortelle. Yet we saw how, 
on other occasions, the Bourgeois preferred that no prisoners should be taken. By 
contrast to the enemy, the defenders appear as virtuous and prudent: they humbly 
commend themselves to God, while taking cover behind the wagons. On the whole, 
the Parisian milice takes the credit for having carried the day, and the militiamen are 
praised for using an ingenious defensive technique, which they had in fact learnt 
from the English archers: that of driving in a sharp stake before them before 
shooting. Throughout the passage, they are presented as ideal soldiers, and contrasted 
with professional soldiers, who put their bodies and soul at risk `pour gaigner ung 
you d'argent' 121. As Colette Beaune has remarked, his conception of the soldier 
appears rather outmoded, at a time when standing armies were about to be created, 
and when the Church stated that those who died for their country could gain 
admittance to paradise'22. 
At the time of Henry V's invasion, the Bourgeois presented the Parisian 
milice as being more courageous than the knights. In 1419, he explained: `il sembloit 
proprement que tous s'en fouissent devant les Angloys'. Henry V was approaching 
Paris, and Duke John the Fearless had left the capital defenceless: `en ce temps 
n'avoyt chevalier de renon d'armes ä Paris, ne cappitaine nul, non plus que le prevost 
de Paris et cellui des marchans, qui n'avoient pas acoustume A mener fait de guerre'. 
But as the English arrived before the walls of Paris, they did not dare to storm Paris, 
`pour la commune, qui tantost se misdrent sur les murs pour deffendre la ville'. The 
Bourgeois proudly adds: `et fussent voulentiers ladicte commune aux champs yssue, 
mais les gouverneurs ne voldrent laisser homme yssir. Quant ce virent les Angloys, 
'21 Journal.., ed. TUETEY, p. 230-233. 
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ilz s'en allerent pillant, tuant, robant, prenans gens ä rancon' 123. 
According to the Bourgeois, the war of the commune was very different from 
that of the knights. He contrasted its behaviour in 1418 - the year of the terrible 
uprisings in Paris, a time when the commune felt particularly exalted - with that of 
the Burgundian nobility. Infuriated by the fact that no one could leave Paris, for fear 
of the Armagnacs, who had been enraged by the massacre of their leader and his 
supporters, the Parisian commune had launched an attack on the Armagnac fortress of 
Montlhery. According to the Bourgeois, the militiamen 
eussent gaigne le chastel et les traistres de dedens, se n'eussent este 
aucuns gentilzhommes qui avec eulx estoient, qui les devoient garder 
et mener; mais, quant ilz virent que la commune besongnoit si bien, si 
parlementerent aux Arminalx qui bien veoient qu'ilz ne povoient 
longuement durer contre la commune [... ], et prindrent grant argent 
des Arminaz, par ainsi qu'ilz feroient lever le siege. 
He then explains how the Burgundian knights ordered the commune to raise the 
siege, under the pretext that they had been warned against the coming of Armagnac 
reinforcements 124. As one can see, in the Bourgeois' opinion, the commune's 
conception of war as an efficient cleaning up of the wicked, and that of the knights, 
who fought in order to enrich themselves, were simply irreconcilable. In this passage, 
the Bourgeois gets completely carried away by his faith in the war of the commune. 
He relates how the commune came back to Paris, only to find that the governors of 
Paris would not let them enter the town. The Burgundian noblemen who were in 
charge of the commune had left it alone, for, in his opinion, they were afraid of the 
Armagnacs, but the Bourgeois emphasized that none dared to attack the militiamen; 
in fact, he ingenuously explained, `qui eut laisse faire les communes, il n'y eust 
demoure Arminac en France en mains de deux moys qu'ilz n'eussent mis A fin', 
before adding 
Et pour ce hayoient les gentilzhommes qui ne vouloient que la guerre, 
et ilz la vouloient mettre ä fin. Quant on vit qu'ilz avoient si grant 
voulente d'affiner la guerre, on les laissa entrer dedens Paris, et 
123 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 128-129. 
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allerent faire leur labour; et les Arminalz faisoient du pis qu'ilz 
povoient125. 
In this paragraph, the Bourgeois - ignorant of the fact that, from the moment they had 
been sent to Montlhery, the Parisian militiamen had been manipulated by John the 
Fearless, who simply wanted them out of his way in order to restore order in Paris126 
- shows that he trusted the Parisian commune blindly; in his opinion, the militiamen's 
way of waging war was the ideal one, because they fought with only one aim in 
mind: that of eradicating evil and disturbances, which should be the sole purpose of 
war. Unlike the knights, they did not trouble themselves with irrelevant 
considerations, such as chivalrous ideals or the beauty of war, and they did not earn 
their living from war. They had not made the waging of war their profession - 
indeed, as soon as the war was over, they would return to `leur labour' - thus they 
had nothing to gain by dragging wars out; their interests were identical to those of 
civilians. There is also, in the Bourgeois' assertions that the militiamen hated the 
`gentilzhommes', an explicit indication that the Parisian commune's resentment vis- 
ä-vis the knights had the character of a class struggle. 
The Bourgeois was an extremist; he also had, more than Jean de Venette, a 
rebellious turn of mind. Cochon and Michel Pintoin did not have such draconian 
views. Still, they were very bitter about the fact that the knights, as a rule, had 
nothing but contempt for the communes, the people's contribution to the defence of 
the Kingdom, a force with whom they had far more affinities. Both authors pointed 
out how, at Agincourt, the Kingdom's knights had completely disregarded the 
support offered by the communes. According to the monk of Saint-Denis, the Parisian 
burgesses had offered 6,000 fully equipped militiamen, asking that they should be 
placed in the front line. He picked out the scornful remark passed by Jean de 
Beaumont: `Le roi ne devrait pas accepter le secours de ces artisans; car nous serons 
alors trois fois plus nombreux que les Anglais'. Pintoin thereafter angrily noted - 
showing that he had taken this comment personally: 
Il regardait sans doute comme une indignite qu'on laissät prendre les 
125 Ibid, p. 112. 
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armes aux gens du menu peuple. On en a vu cependant beaucoup qui 
se sont illustres par leur vaillance, et c'est en ne repoussant jamais le 
merite, dans c uelque rang qu'il se trouvdt, que le royaume est devenu 
12 si florissant . 
It was the same arrogance, he added, that had caused the disasters of Courtrai (1302) 
and Poitiers. (1356). In line with these views, Cochon explained that the knights of 
France, seeing themselves so numerous, felt overconfident, `et par orgueul firent crier 
en leur ost que nul n'alast en la bataille, s'i n'estoit noble, et furent tous les gros 
valles boutez ariere, qui estoient assez pour desconfire les Englois'128. Both authors 
considered that the knights had been entirely responsible for their own doom. This 
time, the Bourgeois, who was perhaps better informed on the matter, gave a different 
version of the story: he reveals how, at Agincourt, the toll had been equally heavy for 
the communes; indeed, many of the Kingdom's bailiffs `avoient avecques eulx 
admenez les communes de leurs baillaiges, qui tous furent mis a 1'espee'. His report 
still differed from that of the `chivalrous' chroniclers, as he included in his obituary 
the names of some of the towns whose communes had gone to the battle, under the 
command of their bailiffs, and had been destroyed 129. No doubt the Bourgeois 
intended to pay homage to the common people who had offered their lives for the 
defence of the Kingdom. 
5. The return of confidence in the chivalry of France 
Despite the fact that the clerical chroniclers did not trust the chivalry of 
France, and often castigated it in very forthright terms, the concept of the `good' 
knight was not foreign to the clerical ideology. Towards the end of 1415 and in 1416, 
at a time when France was relatively peaceful, Henry V having returned to England 
in order to prepare his full-scale invasion, Michel Pintoin depicted the French 
constable Bernard VII d'Armagnac as one example of an ideal knight. In his view, 
the `good' knight was one who acted quickly, and achieved clearly visible results. 
Thus he explains that as Bernard d'Armagnac was informed of a chevauchee led in 
127 Chronique du Religieux..., III (Book XXXVI), 549. 
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Normandy by the Earl of Dorset, `l'illustre connetable de France [... ] non moins 
habile que brave et se rappelant que la celerite lui avait reussi dans plus d'une 
occasion' immediately directed his company towards Normandy. Pintoin tells us how 
eloquent Bernard d'Armagnac was, which provides him with the opportunity, in the 
classical style, to insert a harangue in his narration, laying stress on the necessity for 
Bernard's French soldiers to be disciplined, trustworthy, brave and efficient. Thanks 
to his competence and his quickness of wit, the constable managed to carry the day, 
even though the French were less numerous than the English. Pintoin described the 
engagement in a manner which shows that he was not systematically insensitive to 
the spectacular `faits d'armes': `tous les cavaliers, donnant de 1'eperon ä leurs 
chevaux, fondirent sur 1'ennemi bride abattue et la lance en arret, ainsi qu'il avait ete 
convenu, frappant partout de leurs haches d'armes a coups redoubles et avec une 
force irresistible' 130. The Bourgeois de Paris also seems to have considered 
effectiveness as the primary virtue of a `good' knight: in his narration, the fearsome 
Earl of Salisbury often appears as his `ideal' knight, for example in his report of 
Salisbury's irresistible advance towards Orleans in 1428; he tells us how the English 
warlord `prenoit chasteaulx et villes a son vouloir, car moult estoit expert en armes'. 
There is a hint of irony in his account of Salisbury's unfortunate death before 
Orleans, as he comments that `Fortune [... ] lui monstra de son mestier dont eile seit 
ses amez sans deffier', but he still contrasted his efficacy with Bedford's alleged 
apathy13 i. 
Another trait of the `good' knight, emphasized by Pintoin in Bernard 
d'Armagnac's harangue prior to the engagement of Valmont, was his respectful and 
fearful attitude towards God. Thus the constable encouraged his knights to beg the 
Lord forgiveness of their sins, `afro d'obtenir ainsi*facilement l'assistance divine'132. 
But one of the very greatest military virtues was the ability to enforce discipline. 
Indeed, it was the slack discipline prevailing in French and Burgundian armies which 
caused most of the peasants' sorrows; on the contrary, good discipline ensured the 
support of the whole nation. Thus, Michel Pintoin presented the siege of Harfleur 
organized by Bernard d'Armagnac towards the end of 1415 as an ideal military 
130 Chronique du Religieux..., III (Book XXXVI), 753-757. 
131 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 229-230. 
90 
campaign, emphasizing how the constable would have any soldier or knight who 
bullied peasants or travellers executed, regardless of the malefactor's social standing. 
These drastic disciplinary measures had been enforced with the intention of securing 
`la faveur de tous', and Bernard d'Armagnac `maintint si bien, quatre mois durant, la 
tranquillite dans le pays, que les habitants de la campagne purent vaquer ä la culture 
des terres jusqu'au port d'Harfleur'. Pintoin's Book XXXVI ends on an optimistic 
note, with a comment allegedly made by the constable about those who tormented 
civilians: `Tete Dieu! ils meritent bien un pareil chätiment, eux qui, malgre la solde 
133 qu'ils recoivent du roi, causent toutes sortes de dommages au royaume'. 
Because he was closer to the royal circle than either Cochon or the Bourgeois 
de Paris, Michel Pintoin understood that knights would fight properly only if they 
regularly received their wages. In his opinion, the enormous and exceptional tax 
levied after the battle of Agincourt was acceptable, because it had enabled Bernard of 
Armagnac's `ideal' campaign in Normandy. At the same time, he was aware that 
most French people, who for a long time had been under pressure from heavy 
taxation, did not readily accept the fact that `si Fon payait largement les gens de 
guerre de leurs services, ils obeiraient plus fidelement, ils craindraient de mettre le 
royaume au pillage, et la discipline militaire serait rigoureusement observee' 134. Still, 
Pintoin knew that taxation was a necessary evil that ensured a proper defence of the 
Kingdom. As a result, although he blamed them for their insolent arrogance, he could 
not entirely disagree with the knights of the Armagnac garrison of Paris who, in 
1417, openly declared: `Certes [... ], nous n'irons pas risquer notre vie pour la 
defense des manants de ce pays. D'ailleurs, le roi ne peut plus retribuer 
convenablement les services militaires'135. Other clerical chroniclers were often 
opposed to the concept of exacting from the people the soldiers' pay, if only because 
the Clergy often had to contribute as well. The Bourgeois de Paris, for instance, was 
strongly opposed to the creation, in 1445, of a special taille which would regularly be 
levied on the French population in order to provide the wages of the soldiers of 
Charles VII's newly created standing army. With evident bad faith, he asserted that 
132 Chronique du Religieuz..., III (Book XXXVI), 755. 
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`tout temps faisoit on grosses tailles, sans ce que on feist aucun bien pour le 
commun; et touzjours s'enforcoient les Angloys et avitalloient leurs forteresses'136; 
in fact, the taille, together with the military reforms of 1445 and 1448, allowed the 
swift recovery of Normandy, a campaign which most other chroniclers considered'to 
be ideal. Similarly, Bishop Thomas Basin of Lisieux, who in many respects appears 
as a clerical chronicler of the next generation, wrote against the establishment of a 
standing army paid through a special taille; in his opinion, the whole nobility of the 
Kingdom, whose very function was to defend the realm, was enough to protect it, and 
this force presented the advantage of not needing any wages in peacetime. Moreover, 
Thomas Basin regarded the military ordonnances of 1445 and 1448 as a first and 
drastic step towards the establishment of an autocratic regime137. 
Michel Pintoin also had to acknowledge that, in dire times - such as after the 
battle of Agincourt, where so many knights of the Kingdom had been slain - it was 
necessary to turn to foreign mercenaries to protect the realm. Personally, he preferred 
Genoese mercenaries, because of the old alliance between France and Genoa. He did 
not deny that the Genoese had behaved bravely in 1415 and 1416, as they were 
protecting the coast of Normandy against the return of Henry V. Pintoin contrasted 
their conduct with that of the Spanish mercenaries, who fled before King Henry's 
fleet, and depicted the viscount of Narbonne branding the Spanish as a `race 
degeneree' in his harangue to the Genoese mercenaries 138. What Pintoin could not 
stand was the fact that, in these troubled times, many men of low descent who had 
become thugs would take advantage of the war to make a career in the army: such 
false knights, he tells us, were particularly numerous in the host of the Dukes of 
Burgundy, who seemed to be encouraging them. He describes how these brigands 
`acheterent de beaux chevaux, prirent les allures de nobles ecuyers, et se reunirent 
aux Bourguignons et aux troupes qui gardaient les places fortes et les villes closes'. 
Their behaviour was by far the worst of all, as they did not even spare children 139. 
We do find evidence of this in Monstrelet's chronicle, as he relates how the leader of 
'36 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 379. 
137 On the ordonnances and the chroniclers' reactions see Chapter 7 of this thesis, Section 1. 
138 Chronique du Religieux..., III (Book XXXVII), 13,37-43,57; III (Book XXXVIII), 99; quotation 
from III (Book XXXVII), 39. 
139 Ibid., III (Book XXXVIII), 91. 
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a troop of brigands, called Tabari, was claiming to be on Duke Philip's side (III, 
283). Monstrelet seems to have considered him, at first, with much suspicion; one 
year later, as he pointed out that Tabari and his men were amongst Philip's company, 
Monstrelet referred to him as `ce vaillant chevalier [... ] ä tout ses brigans' (III, 376- 
377)140: unless we should read the sub-text as an ironical comment, it seems that, by 
setting his seal of approval to the transformation of a brigand into a knight, Duke 
Philip had determined Monstrelet's attitude vis-a-vis Tabari. 
We have seen that, on rare occasions, during the period in question, the monk 
of Saint-Denis extolled the `faits d'armes' of the chivalry of France - or even the 
mercenaries - and generally expressed a more sympathetic opinion on French knights. 
These supportive moods coincide with periods where the knights were behaving 
better towards civilians - often because they had exceptionally received some wages 
- or had achieved particular successes. After 1417, however, as Henry V was 
performing his spectacular conquest of Normandy, the monk of Saint-Denis relapsed 
into a hostile, attitude towards the knights of the realm, cursing the whole Kingdom's 
chivalry in vehement tirades; following the murder of John the Fearless in 1419, his 
imprecations are principally directed against the Armagnacs 141. And yet, after the 
Treaty of Troyes in 1420, there seems to be, in Pintoin's chronicle, a strong return of 
confidence in the chivalry of France, which remains evident until the close of his 
work in 1422. The main reason for this change seems to have been a compelling 
patriotic feeling. Michel Pintoin admired the chivalry of England, and more generally 
King Henry's army, for its worth and efficiency 142, but he still considered Henry V as 
an aggressor. Throughout his narration of the conquest of Northern France, Michel 
Pintoin had written in support of those who had offered resistance to the English 
advance, whether they had been clerics, knights or even women - like the noble 
widow of La Roche Guyon, who, after vainly trying to resist the English attack on her 
castle, refused to marry, as King Henry wished, the pro-English Frenchman Guy le 
Bouteiller, whom she called `traitre' and `deloyal' 143. Pintoin favoured the resistance 
of all classes of the population, but, in his narration, French knights seem to be - at 
140 For a mention of Tabari's death see ENGUERRAN DE MONSTRELET, III, 3 87. 
141 See for example Chronique du Religfeux..., III (Book XLI), 443. 
142 Cf. Ibid, III (Book XLI), 447. 
143 Ibid, III (Book XXXIX), 313. 
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least de facto - in the foreground as the traditional defenders of the realm. After the 
Treaty of Troyes, Pintoin wrote more and more enthusiastically about the deeds of 
the Armagnacs, whom he had castigated earlier. He extolled the exploits performed 
by Etienne de Vignolles - the famous La Hire - against Duke Philip, calling him 
brave and skilful'44. The last military engagement related by Pintoin in his chronicle 
is a French victory won in 1422 by the Count of Aumale and the Viscount of 
Narbonne near Mortagne, in Perche - shortly after another small victory won near 
Bernay. Here, Pintoin calls the Armagnacs French for the first time, describes many 
French knights as `chevaliers pleins de vaillance', and concludes his account by 
stating that the English soldiers had been hunted down like so many wild beasts'45. 
One can also see an apparent return of confidence in the knights of France in 
Cochon's chronicle, only at a later date, in 1429, with Joan of Arc's successes. 
Again, the main incentive was Cochon's patriotic feelings, mixed with the fact that 
the French had at last achieved some notable and even spectacular victories. Thus 
Cochon related very enthusiastically the victory of Patay, concluding with a few lines 
where he gave free rein to his hatred of the invaders 
Et lä furent Anglois tres bien catres, plus que onques mes n'avoient 
este en France. Et s'en vouloient retourner en Angleterre et leissier 
ainssi le pais; se le regent leur eust souffert. Et estoient adonc Anglois 
si abolis que ung Franchois en eust cachie trois146. 
Throughout the year 1429, Cochon extolled the `fais d'armes' of the French chivalry 
- we saw that he particularly appreciated the fact that the common people were given 
the chance to, couple their action with that of the knights. It is quite clear that his 
attitude towards the Kingdom's chivalry had changed: as he related the impressive 
seizure, by the French, of Chateau-Gaillard - one of La Hire's greatest coups - and 
the subsequent release of Barbasan, a Dauphinist captain - referred to by Cochon as 
`ung bon et notable chevalier' - who had been kept prisoner for seven years in the 
fortress, Cochon wrote with exultation: 
144 Ibid, III (Book XLI), 459. 
'45 Ibid, III (Book XLIII), 475-479. 
146 PIERRE COCHON, p. 300. 
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Et fu le dit Barbasan mene ä Loviers ä grant joie et solemnite, avec iii 
ou iiij autres chevaliers qui avoient este pris audit lieu de Melun; et les 
avoient lä mis les dits Anglois comme ung des plus fors lieux de 
147 Normandie, et de ce furent moult courcies lesdits Anglois. 
He also described the attack on Paris very enthusiastically. Cochon emphasized that 
Charles VII was condemning the behaviour of the routiers of Aumale, Blangy and 
Estrepaigny, who were rampaging through the countryside around them, thus 
dissociating them from the reconquest effort 148. His pro-French feelings also led him 
to disavow the action of the people of Paris: having mentioned that the Parisians had 
made a sortie against some Dauphinist troops who were surrounding Paris, he 
scornfully concluded `y mourut grant quantite des gens de Paris qui ne fluent pas 
plains, car ilz ne savoient riens de fait de guerre' 149. Cochon, however, concluded his 
chronicles with bitter words, as by 1430 the English had checked the French advance: 
until the next French successes, the war would recover its usual aspect. 
Only the Bourgeois de Paris' diary does not betray a similar return of trust in 
the chivalry of the Kingdom. The Bourgeois considered the liberation of Paris, in 
1436, as a special, moving and joyful moment' so; however, he did not stop thereafter 
his imprecations against the knights, the soldiers, the governors and the King himself. 
The reconquest was' not, in his opinion, proceeding quickly enough; he denounced - 
very unfairly - the constable Arthur de Richemont as an idler and an incompetent's 
1; 
'he kept moaning against the taxes, stating with much bad faith that no one could see 
any positive military results 152; in 1443, he went as far as charging the Dauphin Louis 
with buying the cows and horses which his `larrons' (his soldiers) had stolen from the 
peasants of the Ile-de-France 153. The Bourgeois de Paris was an espritfrondeur by 
nature; he seems to have been systematically opposed to the ruling class. In a sense, 
the type of petulant and personalized historiography which he wrote was bound to 
disappear from the French literary scene for a long time: it was a product of the 
political chaos which had prevailed during the Hundred Years War. With the re- 
147 Aid, p. 308-309. 1481bid, p. 302-304. 
'491bid, p. 309. 
150 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 314-320. 
151 Ibid, p. 346-347. 
152Ibid, p. 369-370 and p. 379. 
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establishment of royal power and the rise of absolutism, which started under Charles 
VII and, of course, Louis XI, clerical chroniclers could no longer allow themselves to 
be as radical in their ideology as the Bourgeois de Paris. It is quite a revealing fact 
that many passages of the Bourgeois' diary were at some stage scratched out or 
otherwise eradicated, and Colette Beaune has wondered whether these extracts of a 
`texte qui sentait le soufre' had been censored during the 16th century, with a view to 
a possible edition'54. 
C. The `chivalrous', chronicle in France: diversity in a tentative genre 
1. A more unadorned type of historiography than the Burgundian `chivalrous' 
chronicle 
Not all historiographical works written in France during the first half of the 
15th century belong to the clerical genre. Indeed, the chivalrous chronicle, a chronicle 
which fitted the aristocracy's interests, was flourishing, but it was a much simpler, 
plainer type of writing than the genre of historiography which was developing in the 
Duchy of Burgundy, under the aegis of Duke Philip the Good. Compared with the 
chronicles of Wavrin, Chastelain, Saint-Remy or even Monstrelet - the most 
unpretentious of all - the chivalrous chronicles written in France appear, with a few 
exceptions, rather dry and very factual. To look for the author's few subjective 
comments in the chronicle of Gilles le Bouvier - also known as Herald Berry - for 
instance, is a task akin to that of looking for a needle in a haystack. In a sense, French 
chivalrous chronicles were closer in spirit to Jean le Bel than Froissart: Jean le Bel 
had advocated the use of prose over that of verse to celebrate chivalrous exploits, for, 
in his opinion, verse by nature tended to embellish and exaggerate martial deeds to 
153 Ibid, p. 369. 154 Cf. Colette Beaune's introduction in her edition, p. 9-10. 
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such an extent that they became `oultrageuses' and implausible'55. Moreover, French 
chivalrous chronicles do not present the homogeneity of the Burgundian chivalrous 
chronicles. Chastelain, Wavrin, Saint-Remy, and also, to a comparatively lesser 
extent, Monstrelet, were all dedicated to the cause of the House of Burgundy, and 
they all appeared partisan, very partisan in the case of the first three. By contrast, the 
French chivalrous historiography of the period does not have such a set character. 
Some chronicles, of course, were written with the primary aim of extolling the King 
of France, of depicting the truly impressive process by which the `roi de Bourges', as 
his enemies derisively called him, slowly became the roi tres victorieux, thanks 
notably to the action of his noble chivalry, and also to his diplomatic successes - 
though the chroniclers, without overshadowing these achievements, naturally focused 
on the martial deeds, which, after all, were responsible for the eventual recovery of 
Normandy (1450) and Guyenne (1453). Chief amongst these is the chronicle of Jean 
Chartier, who was raised by Charles VII to the status of first official historiographer 
of the Kings of France. The monks of Saint-Denis were already considered as the 
semi-official historiographers of the French sovereigns, but Jean Chartier's function 
was made official by the fact that he was appointed a royal officer; Chartier had to 
take an oath, and on 18 November 1437, royal letters were issued, ensuring that he 
would receive yearly wages 156. Chartier's chronicle covers the years between 1422 
and 1450157; in addition, he was the author of a chronicle written in Latin'58. I have 
also used the chronicle of Charles VII's first herald Gilles Le Bouvier, which opens 
in 1403 and ends in 1455159 Apart from these chronicles composed specifically for 
the King of France, there was a host of chivalric biographies which were written for 
princes or great officials of the Kingdom. I have chosen not to ignore them altogether 
in my study as their ideology is very close to that of chivalrous chronicles. They also 
provide additional information of a similar kind - after all, chivalrous chronicles 
were composed from the testimony of eyewitnesses from the chivalrous class, such as 
155 JEAN LE BEL, Chronique, ed. J. VIARD and E. DEPREZ for the SIIF, 2 vol., Paris, Laurens, 1904- 
1905,1,1-2. On this aspect of Jean Le Bel's historiography see KEEN, `Chivalry... ', p. 402. 
156 Cf. GUENEE, p. 341-342. 
157 JEAN CIIARTIER, Chronique de Charles VI!, ed. A. VALLET DE VIRIVILLE, 3 vol., Paris, Jannet, 
1858. Unless otherwise specified, quotations from Jean Chartier are taken from this edition. 
158 For extracts of this chronicle see JEAN CHARTIER, Chronique latine ade Charles VI! ], ed. C. 
SAMARAN (La chronique latine inedite de Jean Chartier (1422-1450)), Paris, Honore Champion, 
1928 (Bibliotheque duXV siecle, XXXVI). 
159 GILLES LE BOUVIER, also known as LE HERAUT BERRY, Les chroniques du roi Charles V11, ed. 
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heralds or knights - about the events of the times in which their main character had 
been involved. I have used the Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont, beginning with the 
year 1398 and closing in 1458, written by the Breton Guillaume Gruel for the 
constable of France and Duke of Brittany Arthur de Richemont160 as the work does 
not much differ from a conventional chronicle, save that it focuses on the events 
where the constable played a part. Admittedly Guillaume Gruel was a Breton, like his 
patron, but his Chronique seems much closer to the French tradition of biography and 
historiography than Burgundian works. We also have some chronicles written 
specifically for a House of the Kingdom of France: the best example is Perceval de 
Cagny's Chroniques, begun in 1436 for the Dukes of Alencon161. What is especially 
interesting about this work is that the author frequently disapproved of the King's 
policy, though he conventionally laid the blame on the King's counsellors - this will 
be developed in the next chapter. Finally, I have used the curious Chronique de la 
Pucelle, a chronicle written at a much later stage than the other works mentioned. 
Indeed, the chronicle is now considered to have been written after Joan of Arc's 
Rehabilitation Trial in 1456162. In my opinion, however, the first part of the work 
may well have been written at an earlier stage, for the character of the chronicle 
changes drastically with the appearance of the Maid: before 1429, it appears as a 
rather conventional French chivalrous chronicle, but with a few interesting comments 
that one does not find anywhere else; after 1429, as it relates the deeds of the Maid, 
the work verges on hagiography 163 
2. Respect for the chivalrous class and its values 
Unlike the clerical chronicles, the chivalrous chronicles, which were written 
specifically for the aristocracy or, in the case of Jean Chartier and Herald Berry, the 
King himself, had great esteem for the institution of chivalry, and its values. This is 
H. COURTEAULT and L. CELIER for the SHF, Paris, Klincksieck, 1979. 
160 GUILLAUME GRUEL, Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont, ed. A. LE VAVASSEUR for the SHF, 
Paris, Renouard, 1890. 
161 PERCEVAL DE CAGNY, Chroniques, ed. H. MORANVILLE for the SHF, Paris, Renouard, 1902. 
162 Cf. P. CONTAMINE, `Naissance d'une historiographie. Le souvenir de Jeanne d'Arc, en France et 
hors de France, depuis le "proc8s de son innocence" (1455-1456) jusqu'au debut du XVI° siecle', in 
De Jeanne d'Arc aux guerres d italie, p. 139-162 (p. 153). 
98 
particularly evident in the opening of Chartier's chronicle - begun in 1437 - as the 
King's historiographer declared that he had undertaken to write the history of Charles 
VII's reign `affin qu'il soit perpetuelle memoire des gestes et faiz du dit roy, de 
sesdits adversaires et de leurs chevalleries', and that the King's intention was `ä 
l'aide de sa tres noble chevallerie et au moyen de la conduicte de son bon conseil, de 
conquerir son droit paternel et dedens brief temps de expeller sesdits ennemis et de 
mettre telle et sy bonne police en son dit royaulme, que son peuple vivra en bonne 
paix soubz luy'164. It is interesting to note that, in the Latin chronicle that he had 
begun writing shortly before his French chronicle, Jean Chartier's style was, at the 
beginning and throughout the first few pages, much more `chivalrous' than in his 
French chronicle. If one compares the first chapters of the Latin chronicle and those 
of the French work, one realizes that the historical substance is identical in both texts, 
only in the Latin version one finds many additions with an obvious `chivalric' 
flavour: thus Chartier explains in his Latin chronicle how, as Charles VII had become 
King in 1422, his father having died that year, the loyal Dauphinist knights `se 
sentirent de toutes parts regeneres de joie dans leurs curs et dans leurs esprits, et se 
preparerent sur divers points ä une lutte belliqueuse' 165. As Jean Chartier recounted, 
in the Latin chronicle, the victory of Mortagne won by the Count of Aumale and the 
Viscount of Narbonne (1422), he added a few personal comments such as `ces 
magnanimes champions conduisaient l'avant-garde', and as he related the fight of 
Blanque-Taque, he described the fight in rather epic terms: `Lä s'eleva un combat si 
äpre et si acharne des deux parts, que Bien du monde y trouva, pour prix de sa peine, 
une mort effroyable' 166. We have seen, however, that when Michel Pintoin was 
elated by the deeds of the French, he was very willing to extol them by means of his 
Latin rhetoric. Chartier used the last chapter of Pintoin's work in order to relate the 
events which happened around the time of the deaths of Henry V and Charles VI, and 
he seems to have emulated, or even outdone Pintoin's style, in order to extol the 
deeds of Charles VII's chivalry. Soon, however, the Latin chronicle becomes very 
163 Chronique de la Pucelle, ed. A. VALLET DE VIRIVILLE, Paris, Delahays, 1859. 
164 JEAN CIIARTIER, 1,27. 
165 Ibid., I, 14. Vallet de Viriville has translated, in opening pages of the first volume of the Chronique 
de Charles VII, the first few chapters of the Chronique latine. It seems, however, from Vallet de 
Viriville and Charles Samaran's indications (La chronique latine..., p. 5,50-5 1), that from Chapter 6 
onwards, with a few exceptions (Chapters 11 and 12), the two works are almost identical. 
166 JEAN CHARTIER, 1,15,20. 
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similar in style to the French chronicle, which relates the military events of Charles 
VII's reign rather dryly, with only a few occasional subjective comments. 
However plain French chivalrous chronicles may seem compared to what was 
emerging in Burgundy, through the impetus given by Philip the Good, they still 
include enough idiosyncratic comments to show that their authors and readers 
regarded the ideals and values of chivalry with the same deference. We have seen 
that Chartier's work was, like the chivalrous chronicles of Burgundy, and like the 
chronicle of Froissart, devoted to the relation of the noble deeds of the Kingdom's 
chivalry. The same aims are advertised in the opening pages of Herald Berry's 
chronicle, as he tells his readers `que au xvie an de mon aalte, qui fut l'an mil cccc et 
deux', he decided to take his `plaisir et delectation a veoir et a suivyr le monde ainsi 
comme ma complection y estoit encline'. First and foremost he committed himself to 
`veoir a mon poveoir les honneurs et haulx faiz de cellui tres noble et tres chrestien 
royaulme'. His ambition, now that he had reached a riper age - and that, as Charles 
VII's first herald, he could claim to have seen many `haulx faiz' - was `d'escripre a 
mon povoir et en ma conscience a la verite sans donner louange a l'une partie ne que 
a l'autre des differends et guerres que cy apres ont este ou dit royaulme de France et 
aussy des autres choses advenues et autres royaumes ou je me suis trouve' 1 67. As one 
can see, his prologue is, in essence, quite similar to that of Froissart's chronicle, 
though it lacks all the literary lustre of the older work. 
The French chivalrous chroniclers show that they shared the same system of 
values as the historiographers of Burgundy. Thus the importance, for a nobleman, of 
keeping his word is exemplified in the Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont, as we are 
told that Richemont, who had been captured by the English at Agincourt, refused to 
escape, even when offered the opportunity by some Breton ambassadors, because he 
had sworn an oath to Henry V: `Et lui [Richemont] fut demande se il vouloit que on 
1'emmenast par force; mais il ne voult et ne l'eust pour riens fait. Le conte de Suffort 
1'avoit mene jouer aux champs et tirer de 1'arc'168. The knights' reverence for the 
notion of `proesce' is also clearly manifested on many occasions: Guillaume Gruel, 
167 GILLES LE BOUVIER, p. 3-4. 
168 GUILLAUME GRUEL, p. 22. 
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for instance, recalled that, like the ideal `preu' of Froissart 169, Richemont had been 
found on the battlefield of Agincourt: the Breton prince `fut congneu ä sa cote 
d'armes, et si estoit eile toute sanglante' 170. Our chroniclers also show that they had 
the greatest respect for the chivalry of France, the Kingdom's mounted heavy cavalry, 
as a tactical force. One simply needs to read Perceval de Cagny's account of the 
battle of Beauge to understand that, in his opinion, the supremacy of the French 
heavy cavalry over that of any other country was indisputable, and that the only 
reason why the English had so often had the upper hand, was that they did not fight 
in the traditional, noble manner - in a word, they did not observe the rules of the `war 
of the knights'. According to de Cagny, on the day of the fight, 
ledit de Clarence ne se voult point aider d'ung bien grant nombre 
d'archiers qui estoient pres d'illecques, et ne print sinon les archiers 
de son corps, disant que ceulx de France disoient que les Englois ne 
gaignoient point les journees, sinon par les archiers et que ä ceste fois 
verroit comme il luy en prendroit. Et ainsi fut mort et ceulx de sa 
compaignie. 
De Cagny concludes his account of the battle which could be seen as a modest 
French revenge for Agincourt, with the very chivalrous words: `Ceste journee fut 
moult honnourable' 171 . There is also evidence, in the French chivalrous chronicles, of 
the fact that the chroniclers of the aristocracy did not usually think highly of the 
communes' support, which was so dear to the clerical chroniclers. Thus the author of 
the Chronique du bon duc Loys de Bourbon, a chivalrous biography composed 
around 1429 and relating the deeds performed by Louis de Bourbon in the previous 
century, casually recounted how Louis de Bourbon `avoit [... ] licencie le plus des 
gens inutiles et des communes, et n'ot retenu fors gens d'eslite en nombre', as he was 
preparing to defend his siege of Belleperche against an attack led by the lord of 
Buckingham 172. It seems that the knights' opinion of the communes did not improve 
during the 15`h century. The author of the Chronique de la Pucelle reproached them 
for having no respect for the rules of the `war of the knights': he explained how, 
169 Cf. p. 46. 
170 GUILLAUME GRUEL, p. 18. 
'" PERCEVAL DE CAGNY, p. 120-121. 
172 La chronique du bon duc Loys de Bourbon, ed. A. -M. CIIAZAUD for the SHF, Paris, Renouard, 
1876, p. 80. 
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during the reconquest by Joan of Arc and the Dauphinists of the fortresses 
surrounding Orleans `les gens du commun occioient entre les mains des 
gentilshommes tous les prisonniers anglois qu'ils avoient prins a rancon'; in order to 
save them from the wrath of the common people, the Earl of Suffolk, his brother and 
the other noble prisoners taken at Jargeau had to be conveyed to Orleans by night, on 
boats 173. 
It would be quite tedious to multiply evidences of the French chivalrous 
chroniclers' deference for the values of chivalry - we have seen with the study of the 
Burgundian chivalrous chronicles what these values were. There are, however, many 
differences between the French chivalrous works and the chronicles of Burgundy, 
apart from the fact that the former are plainer in style. One can sense, in particular, a 
growing nationalism in many French chronicles; this is particularly manifest in the 
chronicle of Jean Chartier and the Chronique de la Pucelle. 
3. The assertion of Charles VII's legitimacy and the emergence of a national 
consciousness 
The chivalrous chronicles of Burgundy were, of course, very partisan, and 
more systematically than those of France, especially the works of Chastelain, Wavrin 
and Saint-Remy. However, the ideals of chivalry implied the concept of an 
international brotherhood between knights, and one can sense that the Burgundian 
chivalrous chronicles respected this concept. Besides, the chroniclers of Burgundy 
were, in a sense, in a tricky situation: Duke Philip the Good had been allied with the 
English for more than a decade, but when they composed their chronicles, Burgundy 
had by then relinquished the English alliance, since the Treaty of Arras in 1435, and 
was now on amicable terms with France. Only Chastelain was clearly hostile to the 
English in his work. Wavrin had been fighting on the English side, and held the 
English in great esteem: his Croniques d'Engleterre were dedicated to the narration 
of their deeds. And Saint-Remy, who had been in Henry V's host at the battle of 
Agincourt, respected them. Perhaps Monstrelet, Wavrin and Saint-Remy deemed the 
173 Chronique de la Pucelle, p. 299. 
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ideal of chivalry as an international brotherhood particularly convenient in order to 
relate the war without appearing hostile to either the French or the English. French 
chroniclers such as Jean Chartier, on the other hand, did not have such complexes. 
As Charles VII was slowly gaining the upper hand in the war, Chartier was intent on 
venting the King's resentment towards the English, and his own. This is evident in 
his prologue, as he explains: 
Et a este occuppe la plus grant part d'icelluy royaulme viollamment et 
contre raison par les dits Angloiz, anciens ennemis du dit roy et de ses 
predecesseurs roys de France, comme encores est de present. Et ont 
prins et applicque les rentes et revenues des [... ] pays d'icelluy 
royaulme estans en leur subjection et dominacion, et joyssent de 
plusieurs grans citez, villes, chasteaulx et forteresses, ou grant 
prejudice et dommage dudit roy Charles septieme, heritier de France, 
et mesmement de la bonne ville [... ] de Rains174 
He also pointed out how most Frenchmen mourned over the fact that the Dauphin 
had been denied any legitimacy at the Treaty of Troyes, 
considerans les enormes maulx qui leur povoient venir par la 
mutacion de leur seigneur naturel, et que ladite seigneurie se 
gouverneroit par estranges manieres et nacions, qui estoit et est contre 
raison et ordre de droit, ä la totalle destruction du peuple et du 
royaulme de France17s 
Already Michel Pintoin had stated, as he related the death of the fearsome conqueror 
whose ambition was to wear the crown of France, that Henry V's reasons for 
invading the Kingdom were `peu fondees"76. Systematically, French chroniclers of 
the next generation pointed out, at least briefly, in their works that, according to 
them, the English kings' claims to the throne of France had no legitimacy. Thus 
Gilles Le Bouvier, as he related that the Prince of Orange had refused to swear 
allegiance to Henry V, curtly commented: `le roy d'Engleterre se disoit roy [de 
France] indeument en plusieurs manieres' 177. These `legitimist' passages in French 
chronicles echo the discourse of a different kind of French literature from the period: 
174 JEAN CHARTIER, 1,26. 
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the whole corpus of war propaganda writings, originating mainly from the King's 
civil servants, for example Jean de Montreuil, Noel de Fribois, Jean Juvenal des 
Ursins or Robert Blondel, which appeared during the 15`h century. This outbreak of 
propaganda literature has been studied in detail by Peter Lewis'78. It is quite clear that 
the Hundred Years War had exacerbated national sentiments on both sides of the 
channel. The slow emergence of what could be called a national consciousness was 
not a creation of the royal circle: it can be felt in many works of diverse origins from 
the period, such as the poems of Charles d'Orleans or the chronicle of Pierre Cochon. 
However, the most flagrant manifestation of this shaping of a national consciousness 
took a political form: a host of treatises began to appear, intending to convince their 
readers that the assertions and claims of the King of France were fully justified. The 
same phenomenon can be witnessed in England at the same period. One could argue 
that the impulse came from the top, and was dictated by the personal concerns of the 
sovereigns. It would be wrong, however, to neglect the personal motivations and 
convictions of these political writers, and the fact that they had a wide audience. War 
propaganda could take many forms in these treatises. It could appeal to the reason of 
its readers by using political arguments; it could also emphasize religious aspects, 
such as God's alleged support of one of either causes. Finally, war propaganda could 
resort to bare emotions, such as hatred. This was evident in the treatise A toure la 
chevalerie de France written by the royal secretary Jean de Montreuil, as he declared: 
`quant je voiz que ilz ne desirent rien tant que gaster et destruire ce royaume [... ] je 
les ay en telle abomination et haine que j'aime ceulz qui les heent et hez ceulx qui les 
aiment'179. One should note that Jean de Montreuil's invectives were directed not 
only against the English, but also against all Frenchmen he viewed as collaborators. 
In his Latin chronicle, Jean Chartier similarly castigated those who could be accused 
of having collaborated with the enemy, as he denounced the Frenchmen who 
`preterent un serment inoui autant que criminel au roi d'Angleterre, cet intrus tel 
quel, afin de laisser le gouvernement aux Anglois'180. Chartier explicitly singled out 
the Parisians as one example of Frenchmen who had collaborated during the 
occupation; he did not, however, dare to say anything about the behaviour of the 
178 Cf. P. S. LEWIS, `War Propaganda and Historiography in 15`x' Century France and England', in his 
work Essays in Later Medieval French History, London, Hambledon Press, 1985, p. 193-213. 179 Cf ibid., p. 194 
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Burgundians, France being at peace with Burgundy at the time, and the re- 
establishment of France having been achieved thanks to Burgundy's change of 
alliance. In his French chronicle, the invective against collaborators was abandoned 
altogether, perhaps because Chartier did not want any longer to twist the knife in a 
fresh wound. According to Charles Samaran, Chartier started to compose his French 
chronicle after 1437, and by this time, Paris had been under Charles VII's rule for 
already quite a few years'81. It is thus quite likely that Charles VII did not want to 
insist upon the past mistakes of the city, having pardoned the Parisians on their 
liberation day. 
The bitter resentment towards the English and the emergence of national 
sentiments can also be felt in the Chronique de la Pucelle, which often appears quite 
violently anti-English. Thus the chronicler emphasized the brutality of the Earl of 
Salisbury's behaviour during his Loire campaign, the fact that the Duke of Orleans 
had vainly asked him not to attack his territories `veu qu'il estoit prisonnier' - thus 
making Salisbury's conduct appear anti-chivalrous - and the fact that his soldiers had 
looted the church of Clery and committed `des maux innumerables'. He explained 
how a multitude of soldiers `tant Anglois comme faulx Francois' subsequently 
besieged Orleans, and referred to the English captain Glasdale as a man `de hault 
courage, plein de toute tyrannie et orgueil'. The chronicler also praised the fierce 
resistance of all the people of Orleans, in particular the women `dont aucunes furent 
veues durant 1'assault qui repoussoient de lances les Anglois', and who brought wine, 
food and fruits to the defenders182. With the appearance of Joan of Arc, the 
nationalist discourse naturally strengthens. One particular episode which has the 
calibre of a symbol is the story of the Bastard of Bar, a French knight who was a 
prisoner of Talbot and was kept `enferre par les pieds d'un gros et pesant fer' by the 
English during the siege of Orleans. When the English were forced to raise their 
siege, the Bastard of Bar was taken away by Talbot's confessor, an Augustinian friar, 
but the two men could not catch up with the English troops. As he found himself 
alone with the English friar, the French knight `print 1'Augustin a bons poings et luy 
dit qu'il n'iroit plus avant, et que, s'il ne le portoitjusques ä Orleans, il lui feroit [... ] 
181 Cf. SAMARAN, La chronique latine..., p. 50-51. 
182 Chronique de la Pucelle, p. 256-25 8,260-263. 
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desplaisir'. The friar had to carry the knight upon his shoulders to Orleans. Surely the 
chronicler regarded this tale - which, it seems, first appeared in Chartier's chronicle 
- as an emblem of the new vitality of the Kingdom of France, which had been under 
the yoke of the English for so long' 83. 
4. A more realistic image of the knight and a more pragmatic discourse on 
warfare 
The French chivalrous chronicles also differ from the Burgundian ones in the 
sense that they sometimes appear more realistic in their discourse on warfare. This 
might be due to the fact that the style of the Burgundian chivalrous chronicles is 
rather bombastic, while their French counterparts usually remain down to earth. In 
particular, the French chivalrous chronicles of the period often give us a more 
genuine picture of knights. One revealing example is a curious episode of the first 
part of the Chronique de la Pucelle, a work which is otherwise rather factual in its 
first half. As the chronicler related the fight of Montargis, an encounter where the 
Dauphinist knight Etienne de Vignolles, also known as La Hire, had again won 
renown, he recounted how, shortly before the fight, 
La Hire trouva un chapelain auquel il dist qu'il luy donnast 
hastivement absolution, et le chapelain luy dit qu'il confessast ses 
pechez. La Hire lui repondit qu'il n'auroit pas loisir, car il falloit 
promptement frapper sur 1'ennemy, et qu'il avoit fait ce que gens de 
guerre ont accoutume de faire. Sur quoy le chapelain luy bailla 
absolution teile quelle 84. 
The chronicler thereafter relates how La Hire `fit sa priere ä Dieu, en disant en son 
gascon, les mains jointes: "Dieu, je to prie que tu fasses aujourd'huy pour La Hire, 
autant que tu voudrois que La Hire fit pour toi s'il estoit Dieu et que tu fusses La 
Hire"', and adds: `Et il cuidoit tres bien prier et dire'. The chronicler carries on, 
recounting the fight `qui fut, comme on disoit, une bien vaillante entreprise mise a 
effet par ledit Estienne de Vignoles dit La Hire. [... ] Au pourquoy les pauvres gens 
183 Ibid., p. 298; JEAN CIIARTIER, I, 79-80. 
184 Chronique de la Pucelle, p. 246. 
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firent la nuict grande joye et chere dans la ville'185. The episode of La Hire's 
confession and prayer is, by its vivid realism, like a gem in an otherwise very plain 
text, as it shows the knight behaving in a very practical manner, knowing that any 
time wasted might jeopardize the fight's outcome; our chronicler certainly does not 
blame La Hire for having somewhat livened up the conventional practice of religion, 
in his wish to be efficient, as he knew that haste in this particular situation was 
required above anything else. Moreover, it puts the crimes for which knights were 
often blamed into perspective: as La Hire explained to the chaplain: `il avoit fait ce 
que gens de guerre ont accoutume de faire'. In other words, one could not make an 
omelette without breaking eggs. La Hire's comments made the Bourgeois' opinion 
that soldiers placed not only their bodies, but also their souls at risk, `pour gaigner 
ung you d'argent'186, appear outmoded. Finally, by stressing that the poor people of 
Montargis, the town he had saved, celebrated La Hire's victory, the chronicler 
emphasized that knights did not systematically bring sorrow to the common people; 
the whole Kingdom could benefit from their successes, and the people could follow 
their adventures and rejoice over the exploits of particular heroes, such as La Hire. 
The Chronique de la Pucelle's tale of La Hire's prayer and the realistic 
picture of a French knight that it offers are very reminiscent of the kind of stories and 
speeches one finds in Jean de Bueil's Jouvencel, a semi-autobiographical work which 
has received much praise from modern scholars 187. Le Jouvencel was not exactly a 
chronicle, but it was based on its author's experiences of war. Besides, Guillaume 
Tringnant, one of the three original editors of the work, has given us in his 
`Exposition', in the opening pages of the Jouvencel, many important clues which 
help us to retrace the whole of the author's career and know the real events to which 
he is referring. In a sense, Le Jouvencel is de Bueil's memoirs in disguise; the realism 
with which he describes his career as a knight and, later, an officer of the King, 
heralds Blaise de Monluc's Memoires. Jean de Bueil's work, composed around 1470, 
was written as a manual for young squires intending to make a career in the army. It 
is interesting to note that La Hire also appeared in the Jouvencel - the famous knight 
185 Ibid., p. 247. 
186 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 233. 
187 For modern assessments of the Jouvencel's worth in the war literature of the times see, amongst 
many other works, HUIZINGA, p. 77-78 and KEEN, `Chivalry... ', p. 413-414. 
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had been de Beuil's captain for many years - as the old captain of Crathor; Jean de 
Bueil had certainly derived much of his philosophy of the waging of war from his 
teachings. In the Jouvencel, the figure of the modern soldier is emerging; the work is 
much more pragmatic than Geoffroi de Thoisy's Livre de chevalerie, and gives a very 
realistic picture of the life of French knights during the Hundred Years War. In 
particular, the Jouvencel showed that there was nothing glamorous about the 
everyday life of a young squire who wanted to gain renown: stealing the goats and 
the laundry of the soldiers from the nearest enemy fortress were the first deeds 
performed by the `Jouvencel' at the start of his career188. This reminds us of the 
Chronique de la Pucelle's portrayal of Charles VII's army during the coronation 
campaign: the chronicler explained how many noblemen `non ayant de quoy eux 
armer et monter, y alloient comme archers et coustillers, montez sur petits chevaulx'; 
under the walls of Troyes, the knights found themselves in such dire necessity - for 
Charles VII did not have enough money to pay their wages - that they had to live on 
a diet of `espies de bled froissez et [... ] febves nouvelles'189. The Jouvencel gave an 
explicit picture of the way of life and motivations of the modern knight, in his role as 
an officer of the King. His ambitions should be to gain honour and reputation `ä 
soustenir bonne querelle et A secourir son souverain seigneur ou son prouchain en 
bonne querelle et en bon droit'; de Bueil primarily insisted on the need to loyally 
serve the King, and he simply assumed that his quarrel was just. He also emphasized 
the need to be disciplined, explaining: `le principal point de toute la guerre, c'est 
apres Dieu la discretion du chief. Jean de Beuil was never oblivious of religious 
aspects, but we get the impression in his work that the soldier simply needed to be 
confident in the fact that, by loyally serving the King, he would achieve salvation. 
The author himself had spent his life waging the wars of the Roi Tres Chretien `en 
soustenant sa querelle de tout mon petit pouvoir"90. The soldier should not expect 
any material comfort from his profession: comradeship and the satisfaction one feels 
when performing one's duty would be his main pleasures. When old and penniless, 
the good knight would be invited into every house, and people would exclaim: `Ha! 
le bon homme, qui a si bien servi le Roy et le royaulme! C'est grant pitie qu'il ait 
188 JEAN DE BEUIL, I, 24-25. 
189 Chronique de la Pucelle, p. 312,315. 
190 JEAN DE BEUIL, 1,118,130,15. 
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necessite"91. Jean de Beuil was aware of the fact that soldiers could not live on fresh 
air, thus he pragmatically recommended: 
s'ainsi est que, pour avoir d'autres affaires ou moyennant le conseil 
d'aucuns, il soit trouble et desconseille en maniere qu'iI ne nous 
puisse donner provision de payement ou de gaiges, il nous faudra 
lever de nous-mesmes vivres et finances, tant sur ceulx de nostre 
obeissance comme sur nos ennemys, le plus raisonnablement que faire 
se pourra. 
Knights could demand `tribuz et appatissemens' from enemies `et, sur ceulx de 
nostre party, ferons aucune cueillette la moindre et la plus doulce que faire se pourra, 
en leur remonstrant comment par ce moyen nous les soustendrons contre tout le 
monde'. He knew, however, that ideally the King should provide his soldiers with 
regular wages. By the time he composed the Jouvencel, the ordonnances of 1445 had 
already been created, ensuring that the soldiers of the King's standing army would 
receive regular pay. Thus he could retrospectively explain: `Et ainsi passerons le 
temps jusques ad ce qu'il plaise au Roy nous faire aucune ordonnance'192. As the 
great medievalist Johan Huizinga clearly saw, the Jouvencel, with its realistic 
depiction of the figure of the knight, was a typically French product. In L'Automne du 
Moyen Age (Herfsty der Middeleeuwen), he contrasted the personage of the 
`Jouvencel' with that of Jacques de Lalaing, as depicted by Chastelain, and shrewdly 
concluded: 
La litterature bourguignonne, de caractere plus archaique, plus 
solennelle et plus emprisonnee dans les formes feodales, n'aurait pu le 
produire [the `Jouvencel']. A cote du Jouvencel, le heros bourguignon 
[... ] est une curiosite antique faite, comme Gillon de Trazegnies, sur 
le vieux cliche du chevalier errant. Le livre des exploits de ce heros 
3 est plus rempli de tournois romanesques que de guerres veritables'9 
Generally, one can say that, at the dawn of the Renaissance, the French 
chivalrous chroniclers were offering a more realistic and up-to-date depiction of the 
knight and his ideology than their Burgundian homonyms. But it also seems that their 
whole attitude towards the waging of war was much more pragmatic than that of the 
191 Ibid., I, 56. 
192 Ibid., I, 95-96. 
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Burgundian chivalrous chroniclers. For example, one can observe that their 
comments on a key aspect of the waging of war, strategy, are often sharper. The 
Burgundian chroniclers did not fail to point out the mistakes made by the losing side 
in a battle, but they often excused them, and their indications of the faux pas made by 
an army were often buried in an epic discourse. Guillaume Gruel's narrative of the 
battle of Agincourt is not lengthy. He was not insensitive to the `grandes armes bien 
combatues', and related how King Henry was knocked down to his knees by a 
powerful blow during the battle. However, he devoted half of his report to a 
discerning analysis of the reasons for the defeat of the French, and summarized them 
very acurately, explaining that the battlefield 
trop estoit estroicte pour combatre tant de gens; et y avoit grant 
nombre de gens ä cheval de notre parti, tant Lombars que Gascons, 
qui devoient ferir sur les esles des Angloys; et quant ils sentirent le 
trait venir si espessement ilz se misdrent en fuyte et vindrent rompre 
la bataille de noz gens, en teile maniere que a grant peine se peurent 
jamais rassembler que les Angloys ne fussent tousjours pres d'eulx194 
In this passage, the causes of the defeat are briefly and lucidly exposed: the 
battlefield was too narrow and did not allow any strategic moves; the shooting of the 
English archers forced the French advance guard to turn back, thus paralysing and 
disorganising the whole of the French army. It was then annihilated by the English 
host, which kept advancing like a road roller. Similarly, in the first part of the 
Chronique de la Pucelle, the author presented some of the causes of the French 
defeat of Verneuil, without being afraid to denounce the errors in some generally 
accepted ideas and to blame the foolishness of many members of the Dauphinist host. 
Thus he recounted how, as the Dauphinists were informed of the Duke of Bedford's 
advance, the Scottish leaders and `aucuns Francois jeunes de grande volonte et 
courage qui n'avoient pas cognoissance des faicts de guerre et venoient droict de 
leurs maisons' decided to fight the English army, contrary to the opinion of the Earl 
of Aumale, the viscount of Narbonne and 
autres anciens capitaines et gens de guerre qui scavoient parler de 
193 HUIZINGA, p. 78. 
194 GUILLAUME GRUEL, p. 17-18. 
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telles matieres, renommez d'estre vaillans et eulx cognoissans en faict 
de guerre: car oncques on ne conseilla au royaume de France combatre 
les Anglois en batailles rangees, et si on l'avoit faict il en estoit mal 
venu19s 
It is interesting to note that the chronicler, unlike the chivalrous chroniclers of 
Burgundy, did not regard pitched battles as awesome events, the most prestigious 
experience that a knight could have in his career. Chastelain, for example, had 
empasized how eager Duke Philip was to fight the Dauphin and his troops in a 
pitched battle, as he was marching to rescue Cosne-sur-Loire, stating: `c'estoit la 
chose en terre que plus il demandoit' (I, 321). By contrast, the author of the 
Chronique de la Pucelle indicated that a long experience of being defeated in pitched 
battles by the English had taught the French to avoid fighting them in battles. Aumale 
and Narbonne would have rather brought reinforcements into Verneuil and the 
neighbouring fortresses. But according to the chronicler, `y eust aucuns qui disoient 
qu'il sembloit que ceux qui estoient d'opinion qu'on ne combatist point avoient peur; 
et toutefois c'estoit des plus vaillans et mieux cognoissans en faict de guerre'196 
Eventually, those in favour of a battle had their way. The chronicler thereafter relates 
how the two armies marched against each other, the knights having dismounted on 
both sides, `mais les Anglois marchoient pesamment et sagement, sans eulx gueres 
eschauffer'; the Scots on the contrary `marchoient legerement et trop hastivement, du 
desir qu'ils avoient de parvenir ä leurs ennemis, et pareillement les Francois, 
tellement qu'on disoit que la plupart d'eux estoient hors d'haleine avant que de 
joindre aux ennemis'197. The French chroniclers usually did not fear to blame the 
knights' errors; they could also praise particular decisions taken, even if they were 
controversial from a conventional chivalric point of view. Thus it is interesting to 
note that Guillaume Tringnant, author of a short chronicle which he added to Le 
Jouvencel in order to make de Beuil's work less cryptic, paid tribute to Falstoffls 
decision, at Patay, to take flight with his company, by explaining: `Messire Jehan 
Fastoc emmena une Compagnie d'Anglois jusques a Yenville et les saulva par sa 
bonne conduicte' 198. The compliment is all the more remarkable since Falstoff was 
19' Chronique de la Pucelle, p. 223-224. 1961bid., p. 224. 
197 Ibid., p. 225. 
198 See Guillaume Tringnant's Commentaire in JEAN DE BEUIL, II, 265-299 (quotation p. 280). 
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Out of all our French chivalrous chroniclers, the one who appears the wisest 
in military matters and the quickest to blame French knights for their mistakes, is 
Herald Berry. This comes somehow as a surprise, for the reader could expect Gilles 
Le Bouvier, as a herald, to have fallen into all the chivalrous cliches. But Le Bouvier 
had taken a modest part in the political proceedings of the period, he had been on 
some important diplomatic missions, and seems to have watched with great concern 
the political and military happenings of his time in France. His chronicle is generally 
very dry in tone, but the few subjective comments one finds in his work show that he 
had strong opinions about the conduct of warfare. Le Bouvier reveals, for instance, 
that unlike the Burgundian chroniclers who had praised Philip the Good for fighting 
alongside his knights at Mons-en-Vimeu, he was opposed to the idea that the King 
should participate in fights. Thus he explained how, in 1415, the Duke of Berry - who 
was already furious to learn that a battle had been decided - categorically refused to 
let the King take part in the battle, arguing that `il avoit este ä la bataille de Poitiers 
ou son pere le roy Jehan fut prins, et disoit que mieulx valoit perdre bataille seule que 
roy et bataille'. And yet, as Le Bouvier tells us, `[le] Roy y fust voulentiers alle, car il 
estoit hardi chevalier et fort et puissant"99. But the point was not whether the King 
was courageous and a worthy knight; what mattered was that he was the King, and as 
such could run the risk of being killed or captured, for experience and history had 
shown that the consequences would be tragic. Herald Berry saw war as a serious 
business, and there was no place for frills in his conception of the waging of war. On 
many occasions his views, as expressed in his chronicle, run counter to the ideals of 
chivalry. Thus he felt no need to mourn over the death of the Earl of Arundel, an 
English knight described as a `vaillant chevalier', who died from his wounds after 
having been captured before Gerberoy in 1435: Herald Berry noted that his death did 
not profit those who had captured him, `car ilz en eussent eu grosse finance'; on the 
other hand, he observed: `ce fut grandement le proffit du Roy, car [... ] se il eust plus 
vescu, il eust bien peu faire plus grant dommaige a la seignorie de France et au bien 
de la chose publique'200. Le Bouvier's remark is almost Machiavellian, as it shows 
'99 GILLES LE BOUVIER, p. 67. 
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that in his opinion, the good of the Kingdom took priority over the sadness that one 
may have felt at the death of a worthy disciple of chivalry. 
Herald Berry was also eager to denounce the faults of the chivalry of France - 
or, occasionally, those of English knights - without fear of using strong language. 
Foolhardiness was one of his bites noires. It is interesting to contrast Herald Berry's 
report of the death of the Duke of Clarence at Beauge with that of Monstrelet. The 
Burgundian chronicler excitedly described how Clarence had darted to the battle 
without bothering to wait for `la grant tourbe de son ost', in order to engage in a 
`bataille merveilleuse et dure et moult ensanglantee'. He saw the death of Clarence as 
a tragedy `car moult estoit ayme pour sa prudence' (IV, 38-39). Herald Berry 
depicted him rising from the table, all inflamed, upon hearing that the Dauphinists 
were near, and exclaiming: `Alon leur corre sus! Ilz sont nostres! et que il ne viengne 
avecques nous que les hommes d'armes'. His account of the battle is brief and 
merciless, with only a few carefully selected details intended to emphasize 
Clarence's pride: `Le due de Clarence vint devant sa bataille, ung chappeau de fer en 
sa teste, et of dessus ung chappeau d'or et de pierrerie moult riche, lequel fut le 
premier tue'201. When his side was to blame, Herald Berry was all the more acid. 
Thus he explained how, in 1415, the French had won a victory over the English at 
Valmont, but had thereafter spoilt much of it: as the French were chasing them, the 
English `attendirent en ordonnance et les Francois les assaillirent follement'; as a 
result, 200 Frenchmen were killed `par leur oultraige'202. He also was infuriated by 
occurrences of indiscipline in the French army, for he recognized lack of discipline as 
one of the main sources of defeats. He recalled how, at Verneuil, the Lombard 
cavalry, which had been entrusted with an attack from the rear, had soon left the 
battlefield so as to chase the English pages, and ended his account of the battle with 
the caustic remark: `tost apres la desconfiture retournerent les Lombars dedans le 
champ, cuidans que les Francois eussent gangnee la bataille, et trouverent les 
Francois mors et tous nus'203. He also recounted how Le Mans had been taken by the 
English because the French `n'avoient faite aucune fortifficacion entre la ville et le 
chastel et aussi [... ] ne faisoient point de guet'; as the English entered the town, they 
201 Ibid., p. 100. 
202 Ibid., p. 75. 
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found les Francois couchez en leurs litz ou ilz dormoyent comme pourceaulx'204 
Thus, in many ways, the French chivalrous chroniclers' discourse on warfare 
was usually much more pragmatic than that of the Burgundians. The reason for this 
difference is not difficult to imagine: the many bitter defeats inflicted by the English 
on the French, and the slowness of the re-establishment of France, which only took 
place after a long process of trial and error in the military domain, had provided 
French chroniclers with food for thought. Leaving aside the issue of the change of 
alliance of Burgundy, it is quite clear that the French army had eventually managed to 
overcome its weaknesses and its complex vis ä vis the redoubtable and remarkably 
efficient English army, and was, by the end of the Hundred Years War, one of the 
most formidable military forces in Europe. By contrast, the Burgundian chivalrous 
chroniclers, whose state had not been through France's painful and laborious 
experience, still appeared, at the same period, rather immature. 
" Conclusion 
I hope I have shown the main characteristics of the different genres which, in 
Burgundy and France, throughout the first half of the 15`h century, until the 1460s, 
described the `war of the knights', and specifically the resumption and the end of the 
disturbingly long conflict now known as the Hundred Years War. It may seem that I 
have generalised the features of the different genres, in order to conveniently place all 
these different authors into three categories. Still, the existence, in France, at the 
time, of two different schools of historiography, and the development, in Burgundy, 
of a genre of chronicle and of a discourse on warfare which particularly fitted Philip 
the Good's interests, is manifest. By the 1450s, the best chivalrous chronicles of 
Burgundy had acquired a literary gloss, a kind of Proustian lustre205, which pervades 
2031bid, p. 119. 
204 Ibid., p. 128. 
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the whole of their works. Admittedly Proust was referring to the masters of literature, 
and only Chastelain's work, out of all the others, could perhaps be regarded as a 
masterpiece. Still, the language - particularly ornate in Chastelain's Chronique - and 
the ideology of the best exponents of Burgundian chivalrous historiography give their 
work a sort of homogenizing gloss, due to the light shed by the ideals of chivalry. 
And in a sense, the narratives of the battle of Agincourt that we find in the works of 
Monstrelet, Saint-Remy and Wavrin could be considered as small masterpieces, 
suffused as they are with the emotion that the authors felt when recalling the tragic 
death of the flower of French chivalry, and the failure of many chivalrous ideals. 
Of course, the chronicles of Monstrelet, Saint-Remy, Wavrin and Chastelain 
do present some idiosyncratic features. Wavrin, for example, could be very pragmatic 
when describing military actions: we saw how he recognised that the `faits d'armes' 
were not very useful strategically; we shall also see that his narrative of a crusade 
could be at the same time, but in turns, epic and yet strikingly realistic, a proof that 
while Wavrin considered the crusade, the chivalrous activity par excellence, as a 
special event, he was aware of the fact that crusading no longer was what it used to 
be (if it ever was). The case of Chastelain is also particularly interesting, for one can 
feel, as one advances in the reading of his chronicle, an increasing maturity. With the 
end of the Hundred Years War, the Duchy of Burgundy will enter a long period of 
peace; thus Chastelain will be less concerned with the writing of martial actions, and 
more with politics. With the advent of Louis XI and Charles the Bold, Chastelain's 
tone becomes very disenchanted. When Molinet took over from Chastelain, 
following the older author's death, his tone was very reminiscent of that of the first 
chapters of Chastelain's chronicle, as he praised to the skies the martial deeds of 
Charles the Bold. Soon however his excitement is replaced by anxiety and 
disenchantment, until the settlement of the Burgundian crisis. 
The present chapter should not lead the reader into thinking that all 
Genette has explained: `C'est sans doute ä de tels effets que pensait Marcel Proust lorsqu'il ecrivait 
que ]a "beaute absolue" de certaines oeuvres leur vient d' "une esp&ce de fondu, d'unite transparente, 
oü toutes les choses, perdant leur aspect premier de chores, sont venues se ranger les unes ä cote des 
autres dann une espece d'ordre, penetrees de la meme lumiere, vues les unes dans les autres, sans un 
seul mot qui soft reste en dehors, qui soit reste refractaire ä cette assimilatilon"'(p. 30). On the 
Proustian lustre see also, in the same work, `Proust palimpseste', p. 39-67 (p. 43-44). 
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Burgundian historiography was purely `chivalrous'. The `clerical' tradition did exist: 
the long and fascinating chronicle of Adrien de But, which has, unhappily, never 
been translated, is the perfect example of a Burgundian clerical chronicle206. 
However, it seems that clerical chronicles in Burgundy were overshadowed by the 
genre Philip the Good appreciated most. Still, some Burgundian chronicles were 
somewhere in between the clerical chronicle - even though their authors were not 
clerics - and the chivalrous chronicle: the author known as Pierre de Fenin, for 
instance, is most of the times as chivalrous in his ideology as Monstrelet, whose 
narration he obviously used, but he more often than Monstrelet deplored the damages 
committed by knights in Picardy, his country207. Similarly, Jacques Du Clercq's 
chronicle is in form very similar to the chivalrous chronicles, and often presents signs 
of a chivalrous ideology, but Du Clercq was also prone to denounce the exactions 
committed by knights as well as their pride; he did not shrink from holding them up 
to ridicule. His chronicle often seems typical of a bourgeois mentality. 
What is specially interesting in the case of France is that while at the 
beginning of the 15`" century the clerical chronicle, a well-established genre, could 
claim to have a semi-official character, thanks to its representative Michel Pintoin, by 
1437, with the appointment of Jean Chartier as Charles VII's official historiographer, 
the chivalrous chronicle had replaced the clerical one as the type of historiography 
officially supported by the Kings of France. For Jean Chartier, despite being, like 
Pintoin, a monk of Saint-Denis, wrote in a clearly different mode: Chartier's 
chronicle belongs to a French genre of chivalrous historiography which, albeit that it 
was still tentative at the time, already had many distinctive features. Despite the fact 
that the reign of Louis XI inspired some of the best history writers of the century, 
such as Thomas Basin and, of course, Philippe de Commynes, it seems that Louis XI 
was not really interested in promoting official historiography. Guillaume Danicot 
may be regarded as the official historian of Louis XI, but he did not receive any 
206 Cf. ADRIEN DE BUT, Chronique, in Chroniques relatives ä 1'histoire de la Belgique sous la 
domination des ducs de Bourgogne, ed. J. M. B. C. KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, 3 vol., Brussels, 
Hayez for the Academic Royale de Belgique, 1870-1876, I, 211-717. 
207 PIERRE DE FENIN, Memoires (1407-1427), ed. E. DUPONT for the SHF, Paris, Renouard, 1837. 
According to Emilie Dupont, Pierre de Fenin was a different person from Charles VI's ecuyer et 
pannetier. 
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wages, and neither did he hold an office208. The reign of Charles VIII and especially 
that of Louis XII, however, would see the re-establishment and development of the 
chivalrous chronicle as the kind of historiography most favoured by the King; the 
major properties of the French chivalrous chronicle at the dawn of the 16tß' century 
will be studied in detail in my fifth and seventh chapters. 
By 1437, the clerical chronicle was outmoded as the Kings of France's 
official kind of historiography. However, it certainly did not disappear, even though 
the radical type of diary written by the Bourgeois de Paris would not have any 
progeny. The clerical chronicle continued to be written by various authors, but in 
developed forms. Thomas Basin seems to be the most gifted heir of writers such as 
Cochon or Pintoin. In many ways his chronicle is typically clerical. Basin often refers 
to the Bible, in particular the Old Testament, in his discourses. He also, on many 
occasions, spoke in favour of the peasant class, stressing for example their unhappy 
attempts to organise themselves into self-defence groups, or even armies, in order to 
resist the attacks of pillagers, or when they rebelled against the English, in 1436209 
Basin also demystified the Hundred Years War: some of his most famous pages are 
those which describe, in moving and strikingly realistic terms, the desolate state of 
Normandy during the darkest years of the conflict210. Finally, some of his comments 
have quite a subversive character: already in his Histoire de Charles VII he had 
written against the creation of a standing army, denouncing the change as one step 
towards the establishment of a tyrannical regime. And as is well known, the primary 
aim of his Histoire de Louis XI, written in exile, was to demolish the figure of Louis 
XI. Basin, however, wrote a new type of clerical chronicle: Marc Spencer has shown 
in his book on Basin211 how strongly influenced the chronicler's histories were by 
Italian humanist historiography, in particular the works of Leonardo Bruni, compared 
to contemporary French chronicles. This is evident, not only in his choice of 
references - many are taken from classical history or Roman authors such as Cicero - 
but also in the structure and ambition of his works. The clerical chronicle was no 
longer the type of historiography most favoured by the King, but it had not 
208 Cf. GUENEE, p. 344. 
209 THOMAS BASIN, Histoire de Charles VII, 1,192-209. 
210 Ibid., 1,84-89. 
211 See my Introduction, note 12. 
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disappeared, and was constantly evolving. Even at the very end of the 15th century, 
the spirit of the clerical chronicle was still alive in the chronicle of the Breton 
historiographer Alain Bouchart, who wrote for Anne de Bretagne, or the work of 
Robert Gaguin, the first true humanist historiographer of France. This will be 
developed briefly in the overall conclusion of this work. For the moment, I intend to 
turn to a brief and exceptional event of French late medieval history, of which the 
narratives are very revealing of the evolution, in ideological terms, of the French 
historiographical discourse on warfare: this event is the episode of Joan of Arc, 
which took place between 1429 and 1431. 
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Chapter 2: `La matiere de la Pucelle est si haulte et si merveilleuse 
que c'est chose bien a noter et digne d'entrer en tons livres-registres, 
pour memoire perpetuelle, a la gloire de Dieu et honneur du 
royaume'. The evolution of the discourse on Joan of Arc in French 
historiography 
Comment voyje ses Anglois esbays! 
Resjoys toy, franc royaume de France. 
On apparcoit que de Dieu sont hays, 
Puis qu'ilz n'ont plus couraige ne puissance. 
Bien pensoient, par leur oultrecuidance, 
Toy surmonter et tenir en servaige, 
Et ont tenu a tort ton heritaige. 
Mais a present Dieu pour toy se combat 
Et se montre du tout de to partie... 
Charles d'Orleans, Ballade' 
" Introduction 
Joan of Arc, the Maid of Orleans, crossed the political, military and social 
scene of her time like a meteor, causing intense feelings and reactions. Countless 
historians, from 1429 to the present day, have recounted her short and extraordinary 
story: Joan's assertions that God had sent her to help Charles VII recover his realm, 
the victories won in 1429 at Orleans, Jargeau, Meung, Beaugency and Patay, when a 
few months before the French were losing hope, Charles VII's journey to Reims and 
his coronation on 17 July 1429, the failed attack on Paris, Joan's capture in 
Compiegne on 23 May 1430, her trial, and her death in Rouen on 30 May 1431. 
Joan's successes and her failures are well documented, but because the facts are so 
t CHARLES D'ORLEANS, Poesies, ed. P. CHAMPION, 2 vol., Paris, Honore Champion, 1923-1924, I, 
157, v. 1-9. In this piece, Charles d'Orleans is not referring to Joan of Arc, but to the recovery of 
Normandie and Guyenne. Still, this Ballade expresses many ideas which will be studied in this 
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extraordinary, and because of the elusive nature of Joan herself, all modern 
historians, from the cynical Henri Guillemin to the enthusiastic Regine Pernoud, look 
upon Joan's story differently'. 
For those interested in Joan the individual, the trials of condemnation and 
rehabilitation's minutes make for fascinating reading3. Although Henri Guillemin 
deems the witnesses' testimonies biased, the minutes still contain crucial information 
about Joan's youth and adventures which will not be found anywhere else. The other 
source of information we have is the testimony of numerous chroniclers. Their 
comments are also of great interest to the historian; in particular, they reveal how 
public opinion was clearly divided according to political allegiances: while the King 
of France's supporters accepted Joan's claims more or less wholeheartedly, 
Burgundians were usually very hostile to the Maid. Until the Arras treaty in 1435, the 
Duchy of Burgundy was allied to England, thus most of the people who supported the 
Burgundian regime considered Joan as a foe, even after 1435 - had she not fought 
against the Burgundians, at Lagny and Compiegne? For Burgundian writers, stating 
or suggesting that Joan had been sent by God to help Charles VII with his war would 
have meant criticizing the policy of Philip the Good, who had been England's ally for 
more than a decade. And since it was the Burgundians who had captured Joan at 
Compiegne, arguing that Joan was on a divine mission would have been suggesting 
that Philip the Good and Jean de Luxembourg had committed a great sin by selling 
the Maid to the English. 
chapter, such as the joy and relief occasioned by the re-establishment of France and the conviction that 
France was now in favour with God. 
Z Joan of Arc has obviously been the subject of many biographies. Among many other interesting 
works, see H. GUILLEMIN, The True History of Joan 'ofArc', transi. W. OXFERRY, London, Allen & 
Unwin, 1972 (first published as Jeanne dice 'Jeanne d'Arc' in 1970); R. PERNOUD, Jeanne d'Arc, 
Paris, Seuil, 1959; Jeanne d'Arc, par elle-meme et ses temoins, Paris, Seuil, 1962; W. S. SCOTT, 
Jeanne d'Arc: Her Life, Her Death, and the Myth, London, Harrap, 1974. 
3 Cf. Proces de condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc, ed. P. TISSET for the SHF, 3 vol., Paris, Klincksieck, 
1960-1971; Proces en nullite de la condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc, ed. P. DUPARC for the SHF, 5 
vol., Paris, Klincksieck, 1977-1989; see also the Proces de condamnation et de rehabilitation de 
Jeanne d'Arc dite la Pucelle, ed. J. QUICIIERAT for the SHE, 5 vol., Paris, Renouard, 1841-1849. 
Jules Quicherat, a pioneer in the study of Joan, incorporated in his fourth and fifth tomes the 
testimonies and opinions of a great number of chroniclers and poets. 
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The opinions of French and Burgundian chroniclers on Joan of Arc have been 
studied by many scholars, from Jules Quicherat and Charles Lightbody4 to Philippe 
Contamine5. Lightbody and Contamine have preferred to focus on the nature of the 
comments of chroniclers themselves rather than on the persona of the Maid, for the 
comments of 15`h century chroniclers on Joan tell us a lot about late medieval 
attitudes towards warfare, politics, or specific social issues. In a recent article, 
Philippe Contamine offered an exhaustive review of the judgement of French, 
Burgundian and English chroniclers on Joan throughout the 15th century 6. He put 
forward many interesting ideas about specific authors, showed how the debate about 
Joan of Arc had developed in the three states, and demonstrated that the 
Rehabilitation Trial (1456) had been a crucial event in the evolution of the discourse 
on Joan in French historiography. However, Contamine was mainly interested in the 
survival of Joan's memory in 15th century historiography, and thus did not fully 
develop all his conclusions, for example on the tenor of the comments about Joan, in 
France, towards the end of the 15th century. Besides, the sheer quantity of material 
considered by Contamine demanded that he should overlook some of the peculiarities 
of many accounts, such as those of Perceval de Cagny or Martial d'Auvergne. 
In this chapter, I have chosen to focus primarily on the evolution of the 
discourse on Joan in French historiography, throughout the 15th century. The 
comments of Burgundian chroniclers are of course interesting, and offer a thought- 
provoking variety of refutations of Joan's assertions that God had sent her to help the 
King of France7. However, Burgundian opinions on Joan did not evolve, while 
French accounts offer an interesting pattern of development, which is very revealing 
of some of the tendencies of the evolution of the chroniclers' discourse on the French 
monarchy, the Kings of France's war, and God. The aim of this chapter is to study 
the process through which these three elements became intimately linked, at the dawn 
of the Renaissance, in order to produce a propagandist writing of history. But before 
we can tackle the issue of Joan of Arc, it is necessary to examine, in a more general 
° Cf. C. W. LIGHTBODY, The Judgements of Joan: Joan of Arc: a study in cultural history, London, 
Allen and Unwin, 1961. 
S Philippe Contamine has recently devoted many articles to Joan of Arc in his work De Jeanne d'Arc 
aux guerres d'Italie. 
6 Cf. CONTAMINE, `Naissance d'une historiographie'. 
For an excellent survey of the Burgundian opinions on the Maid see LIGHTBODY, p. 58-83. 
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context, the attitude of her contemporaries with regard to the problem of God's 
possible involvement in a secular war; this will inevitably lead us to consider a very 
important concept in medieval thought on warfare: the just war. 
1. God and secular warfare: medieval attitudes of mind 
The medieval mind was naturally inclined to explain every aspect of the 
world that surrounded it by having recourse to God's will. And warfare was 
something that recurrently affected men during the Middle Ages: either as 
participants or as victims, all would, at least once during their lifetimes, find 
themselves involved in it. Thus it seems natural that medieval men should have 
involved God in their speculations about war. Because wars happened so often, and 
because their outbreak seemed unavoidable, they were seen as being part of God's 
plan. In an Epistle to the Romans, Saint Paul had written, referring to the secular 
prince: `he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil' 
(13.4). According to Honore Bonet, author of the standard treatise about warfare, 
written in the reign of Charles V, which was widely read at the close of the Middle 
Ages, war was certainly not condemned by divine law: `bataille n'est une male chose 
aincois est bonne et vertueuse, car bataille ne regarde autre chose selon sa droite 
nature que retourner tort ä droit et faire retourner dissenssion a paix selon le contenu 
de 1'Escripture'8. From Augustine and Aquinas to Bonet, theologians and lawyers 
had tried to define the concept of the just war, the kind of war Christians were 
allowed to wage. According to Thomas Aquinas, three conditions were required for a 
war to be just. Firstly, it had to be waged by a prince, since they alone bore the 
responsibility for the state's welfare. Secondly, the cause had to be just, that is to say 
the people against whom war was declared had to be guilty of some injustice. 
Defending the faith, the native land or fellow Christians was also considered as a just 
cause. Finally, the belligerent's intention had to be right. He would wage war `neither 
from aggrandisement nor cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of repressing 
122 
the evil and supporting the good'9. One should note that Aquinas included defending 
the fatherland amongst his examples of just causes. The patriotic argument was 
particularly developed during the 15th century by Charles VII's propagandist writers, 
such as Jean de Montreuil or Jean Juvenal des Ursins1°. From the 14th century 
onwards, theologians also began to turn their attention towards a problem which they 
now considered as crucial: the need for jus in bellum. A war could not be just if 
conducted in a wicked way' 1. Thus, immediately after having stated that war was not 
evil by nature, Honore Bonet, who was painfully aware of all the exactions 
committed by knights and soldiers during the Hundred Years War, added: `Et se en 
bataille se font plusieurs maulx, ce n'est mie selon la nature de la bataille, mais est 
faulx usaige. Si comme de ung homme d'armes qui prent une femme et lui fait honte 
et vergongne ou fait bouter le feu en 1'eglise'. 
Since war was not intrinsically wicked - as Bonet reminded his readers, God 
had himself waged war, in his realm, against the evil angels12 - and since just wars 
were considered to be profitable for humankind, should one conclude that God would 
systematically help the righteous in war? No, answered Bonet. Indeed, often the good 
had been defeated in battle. He tells us that the Church was against going to war in 
order to prove one's right, because this meant dictating to God what He should do. 
And what would be the purpose of Judgement Day, if all ills were to be punished in 
t3? this world 
And yet, a large proportion of medieval society still tended to consider war as 
an ordeal, the judgement of God. Honore Bonet was aware of this as he wrote that, 
despite the opinion of the Church, it was a well-established practice amongst rulers to 
go to battle in order to prove their right. But Bonet also wrote, referring to the story 
of David and Goliath: `Dieu qui est verite et qui surmonte tout pouvoir et toute 
8 HONORS BONET, p. 83. 
9 THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, vol. 35: Consequences of Charity, ed. and transl. T. R. 
HEATH, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1972, p. 81-93 (2a2ae, 40: `De bello'). Quotation p. 83. 
10 Cf. P. CONTAMINE, `La theologie de ]a guerre ä la fin du Moyen Age: la guerre de Cent Ans fut- 
elle une guerre juste? ', in De Jeanne d'Arc..., p. 39-51 (on the patriotic or nationalistic argument seep. 
46). 
11 On this issue see CONTAMINE, `L'idee de guerre... ', p. 83 if. 
12 HONORS BONET, p. 5. 
131bid., p. 70-71. 
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puissance mieulx donnera la victoire ä celui qui est bien son amy combien qu'il soit 
moult foible de corps qu'il ne fera ä celui qui est bien fort de corps sans avoir 
1'amour de lui', and declared: `nostre seigneur Dieu mesme est sire et gouverneur des 
batailles'14. As one can see, it was hardly possible for medieval men to dissociate 
God from victory or defeat, since after all, nothing in this world could occur without 
God's consent. The losing side would often explain a defeat with the argument that 
God had allowed the enemy to triumph in order to punish the vanquished for their 
pride and sins. This argument is found over and over again in French chronicles or 
poems dealing with the catastrophe of Agincourt 15 
The winning side would rarely disagree. In his chronicle, Enguerran de 
Monstrelet pictured Henry V modestly - but not tactfully - explaining to Herald 
Montjoye: `Nous n'avons point faict ceste occision, ains a este Dieu tout puissant, 
comme nous creons, par les pechez des Francois' (III, 110-111). As one can see, in 
the medieval mind, God and the outcomes of warfare were always intimately linked. 
The English, who had obtained so many spectacular victories against the French 
since the outset of the conflict, had not failed to claim, as part as their propagandist 
discourse, that their great victories clearly showed that God was supporting the Kings 
of England. In 1439, during negotiations between the two sides, Archbishop John 
Kemp of York declared that the most flagrant proof that the English had rights over 
France was the many victories God's divine justice had granted them. At the same 
time, contemporaries could also argue that victories and defeats resulted from the 
whimsical tricks of fortune, rather than from a divine verdict. Thus Archbishop 
Regnault of Chartres answered John Kemp, during the same negotiations: `si 
lesdictes batailles eussent este declarratoires par justice divine de leur droit, la chose 
feust pieta finie et n'eust pas si longuement dure' 16. Medieval theories about God 
favouring one party or another in secular wars were thus rather supple. This explains 
why, when confronted with a country girl, Joan, who claimed that she would make 
God's will obvious - when usually God remained silent about His plans or about 
whom He favoured - and who did achieve, at first, some amazing successes, 15`n 
century chroniclers reacted differently. 
'4 Ibid., p. 71-72,76,84. 
15 We saw in the preceding chapter, p. 67, the monk of Saint-Denis' opinion. 
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Most Burgundian chroniclers rejected Joan's claims. Enguerran de Monstrelet 
was perhaps the least hostile towards the Maid: his refutation of Joan's assertions 
was based on prudence and reason rather than inspired by hatred or scorn. According 
to Monstrelet, Charles VII and his council were fully justified in receiving Joan, at 
first, with much suspicion, considering her as 
une folle, desvoiee de sa sante. Car, ä si grand princes, et aultres 
nobles hommes, telles [... ] parolles sont moult doubtables et 
perilleuses a croire, tant pour Pyre Nostre Seigneur principalement, 
comme pour le blaspheme qu'on en pourroit avoir des parlers du 
monde (IV, 315). 
Even in an age when everybody believed in God, those who exercised power were 
used to relying on their wit and fortune rather than miracles. With these comments, 
Monstrelet also propounded that assertions such as Joan's were theologically very 
controversial, and even dangerous, for they could well provoke the wrath of God. 
Finally, Monstrelet warned his readers against the debate which could be generated 
amongst the public by such explosive theories: when the common people are left free 
to speculate about articles of faith, heresy often raises its ugly head. As for Joan's 
miracles, Monstrelet tried to invalidate them by finding natural explanations for 
them, explaining, for instance, how public opinion had attributed the great victories 
at Orleans exclusively to Joan's presence, neglecting the fact that most of the King's 
best captains had taken part in the fights (IV, 322)17. 
Jean de Wavrin had a provocative theory about Joan. He recounted how 
Robert de Baudricourt, captain of Vaucouleurs, had sent Joan, along with an escort, 
to the King of France, and explained: 
messire Robert [... ] 1'introduisit, et aprinst de ce qu'elle devoit dire et 
faire, et de la maniere qu'elle avoit a tenir, soy disant pucelle inspiree 
de la providence divine, et qu'elle estoit transmise devers ledit roy 
Charles pour le restituer et remettre en la possession de tout son 
royaulme (III, 262-263). 
16 Both examples are taken from CONTAMINE, `L'idee de guerre... ', p. 73. 17 For a complete analysis of Monstrelet's views on Joan see LIGIITBODY, p. 61-70. 
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In his opinion, Joan was simply an actor playing a role, a creation of Baudricourt sent 
by him to Charles VII in order to raise the morale of the French and frighten the 
English. If Joan was a puppet, she certainly was not Baudricourt's puppet. 
Baudricourt was just a modest captain, and he had rebuked Joan many times before 
choosing to give her a chancels. But Wavrin's theory deserves our attention because 
it presents Joan as a political instrument. According to Wavrin, somebody - he chose 
Baudricourt, perhaps because he was reluctant to attribute such a great sin to the King 
of France - must have been cynical enough to involve God in this conflict through a 
masquerade in order to change the course of the war, by manipulating the masses. 
Wavrin was well aware of the use that could be made of God, in politics and in 
warfare alike. 
Georges Chastelain did admire the courage exhibited by Joan at Compiegne 
during the sally where she was captured (II, 48-49), but considered her as a 
`blasphemeresse en Dieu et superstitieuse devineresse' (II, 204), as she had made 
prophecies which were not always realized. Moreover, he could not accept that a 
woman should fancy herself a warrior: Chastelain stressed that it was an archer, 
`radde homme et bien aigre, ayant en grand despit que une femme [... ] seroit 
rebouteresse de tant de vaillans hommes' (II, 49), who, like a champion of manhood, 
had grabbed the Maid's coat and hurled her off her horse before capturing her. The 
rules of nature, once temporarily disturbed, had forced themselves upon Joan as 
violently as the ground upon which she had fallen. 
These are only a few of the refutations of Joan's assertions put forward by 
Burgundian chroniclers. By contrast, French chroniclers provided us with a host of 
justifications of the Maid's claims, which, as the century advanced, slowly took the 
shape of a consistent discourse. 
2. The testimony of Joan's French contemporaries 
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The testimony of the men who had experienced, in Joan's own words, `la 
pitie qui estoit au royaume de France'19, appears very heterogeneous in character, 
though most of them looked favourably on her. 
2.1. Supporters from various backgrounds 
The Maid's extraordinary story had provoked a debate which had stirred the 
entire nation. Joan rekindled the people's interest in the war, and in the Dauphin's 
cause. Her assertion that God was supporting the Dauphin, her deeds, her sentence 
and death gave rise to a controversy, which gripped the whole of the civilian class, 
men and women alike. She won supporters from all classes of medieval society, and 
this is well reflected in the chronicles of the period. The Bourgeois de Paris hated 
Joan, because she was supporting the Armagnac party, but he offered the best 
evidence that her deeds and sentence had sent a shock wave throughout the Kingdom. 
After relating her death, he commented: 
Assez avoit lä et ailleurs qui disoient qu'elle estoit martire et pour son 
droit signeur, autres disoient que non et que mal avoit fait qui 1'avoit 
tant gardee. Ainsi disoit le peuple, mais quelle mauvestie ou bonte 
qu'elle eust faicte, eile fut arse celui jour20. 
Amongst the non-official chroniclers who supported Joan, two writers were 
particularly enthralled by her deeds: Pierre Cochon, the Norman priest, and Perceval 
de Cagny, who was master of horse to the Duke of Alenron. We saw in the first 
chapter how Cochon passionately related the deeds performed by the Dauphinists, 
headed by Joan, against the old enemies of the Kingdom. Cochon supported Joan 
because she was effective (at least at the beginning) against the English, and her 
custom of giving ultimatums, as well as her tactics which privileged assaults over 
long sieges, particularly pleased him, because they livened up the knights' usual way 
of waging war. We saw how the knights were often accused, in the literature 
produced during the Hundred Years War that reflected the common people's 
interests, of making wars last in order to enrich themselves. Cochon must have seen 
18 LIGHTBODY, p. 73. 
19 Proces..., ed. TISSET, I, 163. 
20 Journal..., ed. TUETEY, p. 270. 
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Joan's methods as a breath of fresh air in the practice of the war of the knights: as 
long as these methods were successful, they made the war visibly progress, when it 
usually looked like a stalemate. Moreover, Pierre Cochon particularly appreciated the 
fact that Joan, who was herself a country girl, and, as such, a symbol of the people's 
readiness to help the King in his war, had encouraged the communes of the towns and 
villages near Orleans to take part in the realm's liberation. He wrote very 
enthusiastically about the fact that they could, alongside the knights, contribute 
towards the expulsion of the English from France: 
Et avoit avec eile grant quantite de gens de pais a pie, lesquielx 
faisoient tres bien leur devoir, et avoient fait es batailles contre les 
Anglois. Car les Anglois les avoient menachies d'ardoier: par quoy ilz 
estoient plus indignez contre eulx21. 
Knights usually despised the communes, yet with this comment Cochon pointed out 
that they could fight, and were willing to participate in the realm's defence. 
Cochon's comments on Joan reflect the opinion that the common people who 
supported Joan were likely to hold. By contrast, Perceval de Cagny discloses the 
views of one of the most powerful princes of royal blood: the Duke of Alencon. 
Alencon was one of Joan's closest noble companions, thus it should not come as a 
surprise if de Cagny appears as an enthusiastic adherent of the Maid. In his opinion, 
Joan was indisputably God's envoy. Thanks to her, the French had liberated seven 
cities in less than four months and won the battle of Patay, Charles VII had been 
crowned, and, throughout the coronation campaign, `touz chevaliers et escuiers et 
autres gens de guerre' had been happy to serve the King, `combien qu'ilz furent 
petitement souldoyez'. All these achievements were, in his eyes, sufficient proofs of 
the divine nature of her mission22. De Cagny was careful to emphasize that Alencon 
was the Maid's closest friend, as he pointed out: `eile amoit [Alencon] tres fort: et 
faisoit pour lui ce que eile n'eust fait pour nul autre'23. Thus Alencon appeared very 
privileged, having won, more than anybody else, the Maid's affection. 
21 PIERRE COCI ION, p. 301. 
22 PERCEVAL DE CAGNY, p. 172. 
23 Ibid.., p. 170. 
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The most interesting aspect of de Cagny's account, however, is that the story 
of Joan granted him the opportunity to criticize the policy of the King and of his 
council. In his opinion, Joan could very well have accomplished all that she 
undertook. If she failed before Paris and La Charite, it was because the King and his 
counsellors did not really want to fight against the English. De Cagny explains that, 
after his coronation, Charles had slipped into a kind of lethargy: he seemed to be 
content with what he had regained, uninterested in furthering the reconquest. The 
chronicler shows how reluctant Charles was to attack Paris, and relates that, the day 
after the assault, the King ordered Joan and Alencon - who were already preparing 
for another attack - to return to Saint-Denis, even though the whole army trusted Joan 
to take Paris. Charles eventually left Saint-Denis, and de Cagny concludes in a very 
24 critical manner: `Et ainssi fut le vouloir de la Pucelle et 1'armee du roy rompue'. 
De Cagny is the only French chronicler of his time to reveal clearly that Joan 
had grown to be an embarrassment for Charles. Although he was careful to add: 
`sembloit que il [the King] fust conseille au contraire du voulloir de la Pucelle, du 
due d'Alencon et de ceulx de leur compaignie'25, it is worth noting that de Cagny 
criticized the King's policy in a rather explicit manner. His comments reflect the 
opinion of the war party, a lobby which was opposed to any negotiation with England 
or Burgundy, and promoted the exclusive use of force for the recovery of the 
Kingdom26. Alencon, who wanted to regain his territories in Normandy as quickly as 
possible, was one of the spearheads of this war party, and his aims were in harmony 
with Joan's expeditious methods. De Cagny made this clear as he stated that, 
following the failure of Paris, the King's counsellors, Regnault de Chartres, Gaucourt 
and La Tremoille `ne vouldrent oncques consentir, ne faire, ne souffrir que la Pucelle 
et le due d'Alencon fussent ensemble, ne depuis ne la poeult recouvrer'. While the 
Maid and Alencon only wanted to fight the English, the King and his council were 
inexplicably trying `de trouver appointement avecques le roy d'Engleterre et le due 
de Bourgoigne', and de Cagny added very sarcastically: `Pour demourer en paix, le 
roy monstra bien que il en avoit tres grant vouloir et ayma mieulx a donner ses 
heritaiges de la couronne et de ses meubles tres largement que soy armer et soustenir 
241bid., p. 164-170. 25 Ibid., p. 165. 
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le fais de la guerre'27. He also accused the King and his council of having neglected 
to help the Maid after September 1429: because they had sent her neither money nor 
supplies, she was forced to raise her siege of La Charite. In his opinion, the King was 
flagrantly ungrateful to God and the Maid, `par laquelle le roy avoit receu et eu de 
tres grans honneurs et biens dessus desclaires'28, as he was searching for a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict, instead of proceeding with his war, as God wanted. 
Modern historians have shown that Charles was aiming to consolidate his power in 
the territories he had recovered, and above all to win the Duke of Burgundy's 
support. In the long run, this policy proved to be the best choice, but according to de 
Cagny, Charles was simply and inexplicably neglecting the encouragement expressed 
by God Himself. De Cagny was, in any case, strongly opposed to any reconciliation 
with Philip the Good, who had `confisque et forfait tout ce qu'il tenoit de la 
couronne'. His comments about the Treaty of Arras reveal all his hostility, as he 
states that making peace with Philip was kind enough, but that Charles VII should 
not have agreed to give money to Philip so that churches might be built in John the 
Fearless' memory: this had brought dishonour upon the French. He probably hoped 
that Alencon would replace Philip as the greatest prince of royal blood. Indeed, as he 
related Charles VII's coronation, he pointed out with evident satisfaction thät 
Alencon had knighted the King that day, adding: `et le servit de per de France ou lieu 
29 du duc de Bourgoigne'. 
2.2. The cautious stand of many captains 
From the beginning, many chroniclers revealed that Joan had not been 
unreservedly welcomed by those in charge of the King's war, Charles' captains. Jean 
Chartier, for example, explained that `quelque conclusion qu'ilz [the captains] 
prinssent, [... ] eile concluoit aucune autre chose ou contraire et contre l'oppinion de 
tous les cappitaines, chiefs de guerre et autres qui lä estoient'30. No wonder that many 
of the army's captains regarded her with much suspicion. As experienced warriors, 
26 Cf. LIGI ITBODY, p. 43. 
27 PERCEVAL DE CAGNY, p. 171,206. 
28 Ibid., p. 172,205. 
291bid., p. 208-209,159. 
30 JEAN CHARTIER, I, 75. 
130 
they were naturally distrustful of this young girl who intended to take a large part in 
the decision-making process. Besides, the bitter defeats of the first decades of the 
century had taught French soldiers to consider the waging of warfare as a serious 
business, and to be suspicious of frills. Guillaume Gruel, the biographer of Arthur de 
Richemont, seems to reflect best some of these captains' attitude. According to him, 
shortly before the battle of Patay, Joan ordered La Hire and other captains of the 
King's host to fight Richemont's company, in accordance with the King's wish, as 
the constable was approaching to offer the French his help. The captains allegedly 
replied 'qu'il y en avoit en la compagnie qui plustost seroient ä luy que ä eile, et 
qu'ilz ameroient mieulx lui et sa compagnie que toutes les pucelles du Royaume de 
France'. By emphasizing the loyalty of the captains towards their comrades and the 
bonds that united them, Gruel seems to suggest that the Maid was out of her place in 
such a manly environment as the French army. As he relates Richemont's encounter 
with Joan, Gruel shows that the constable of France avoided declaring himself about 
Joan; Richemont apparently told Joan: `je ne scey si vous estes de par Dieu ou non; si 
vous estes de par Dieu, je ne vous crains rien, car Dieu sceit mon bon vouloir; si vous 
estes de par le deable, je vous crains encore moins'31. Richemont was content with 
having his conscience at peace, by acting according to what he thought was just; the 
rest did not really concern him. 
Gilles Le Bouvier, also known as Herald Berry, was not a captain, but he 
certainly took great interest in military matters. It seems that he did not reject Joan's 
assertions, for as he narrated the story of the herald sent by her to the English at 
Orleans, he wrote: 
Ilz prindrent le herault et jugierent qu'il seroit ars [... ] ; et toutesfois 
avant qu'ilz eussent le conseil ou oppinion de ceulx de la ville de 
Paris pour l'ardoir ilz furent levez, mors et desconfiz ; et partirent si 
hastivement qu'ilz laisserent en leurs logeis ledit herault bien enferre 
et s'en fouirent32. 
Herald Berry's style is rarely subjective, yet clearly what he means is that the English 
should not have taken Joan's threats so lightly, and that a message from God, such as 
31 GUILLAUME GRUEL, p. 71. 
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the one brought by the herald, should not be rejected without due consideration. Still, 
Le Bouvier was disappointed by Joan's failures before Paris and La Charite, and used 
harsh words to refer to the latter, calling it a `defaite honteuse'33. On the whole, he is 
rather cold towards Joan, and it is worth noting that he does not even mention her 
death, or her trial. Perhaps he felt embarrassed about stating an opinion on Joan, who 
suffered a number of failures after the coronation campaign; perhaps he simply did 
not care about her fate. 
2.3. The accounts of Charles VII's historiographers 
Jean Chartier and Robert Blondel, the author of De reductione Normanniae, a 
work completed in 1455, which related Charles VII's glorious reconquest of 
Normandy, left interesting accounts of Joan's career, which are very favourable to the 
Maid. Since both authors wrote their works before the Rehabilitation Trial (1456), 
their accounts are the earliest official versions of Joan's history to be found in French 
historiography. However, the fact that they chose to extol the Maid does not 
necessarily mean that the King had given them guidelines to follow in that respect; 
they might well have been inclined to do so. Still, the versions that they offer already 
contain many elements of the later discourse on Joan of Arc. 
Robert Blondel was extremely enthusiastic about Joan's deeds, and praised 
them with all his Latin rhetoric. In his opinion, Joan had undoubtedly been sent by 
God: he refers to her as `haec Puella sancto spiritu monita ac divino fervore accensa' 
and explains that it was God, not men, who had instructed her about military matters. 
The English had infuriated God by their conduct, and He had decided to expel them 
from the Kingdom. Blondel expressed this idea with particular vehemence, 
explaining how the English, `gens rapax, gens sacrilega', had desecrated the rich 
chapel of Notre Dame de Clery, and concluding, aiming at them: `Exinde omnia 
infausta tibi sacrilegae procedunt'. God had turned his back on the English and was 
now standing by the French, who, through His support, would perform amazing 
deeds. Blondel presented the struggle for Orleans in a Manichean light, emphasizing 
32 GILLES LE BOUVIER, p. 134. 33 Ibid., p. 141. 
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the formidable might of the English siege, and described the battle of Patay as a 
stupefying miracle, where the power of God had been manifest: as if stricken with 
paralysis, the otherwise strong and well-trained English soldiers had let themselves 
be butchered like pigs on the market; like peasants inexperienced in the waging of 
war, they had offered no resistance34. 
Blondel concluded his account with a reflection on Charles VII's coronation, 
marvelling at the fact that the King, once so dejected, had now recovered the glory 
inherent in his position, thanks to divine assistance: `nunc providentia divina sacro 
diademate redimitus, verus et legitimus sceptri haeres, in regem sublimatur'. He did 
not, however, talk about the Maid any longer following the coronation. 
The story of the Maid provided Robert Blondel with the opportunity 
for asserting the King's legitimacy; in 1429, God had clearly shown the justice of 
Charles' cause. In the course of his narrative of Joan's adventures, Jean Chartier 
stressed that Charles VII's war was obviously a just war, as he related that the French 
reconquered `ce que injustement [les Anglais] avoient occupe sur le royaulme de 
France, de longtemps et sans raison'35. He ignored the Kings of England's claim that 
they had justly inherited the throne of France. Chartier saw no blasphemy in Joan's 
assertion that it was God's will that Charles VII should recover his Kingdom. He tells 
us that Joan's conduct was `belle et honneste' - every week she would go to 
confession and receive Holy Communion36 -a proof that she was not, as the English 
maintained, a heretic. Another, greater proof of the fact that she had indeed been sent 
by God was the deeds that she performed. One of her greatest actions was the 
remarkable fact that, thanks to her, after the great victories obtained on the Loire, 
hundreds of French knights had rallied to the King, attracted by what they had heard 
about Joan, `laquelle tenoient plussieurs estre venue de par Dieu, car ses oeuvres et 
gouvernement le demonstroient assez'37. They knew that Charles could hardly afford 
34 `Mirum! velut inepta membra et manus abscissas gererent, corpore robusti et bello exercitatissimi, 
invasi, minus reluctantes truncantur: ac alii huc illuc per sepes et dumos fusi, miseranda caede ut porci 
ad macellum expositi, non dico a militibus, verum a rusticis bello inexpertis, trucidantur'. For Robert 
Blondel's comments about Joan of Arc see Proces..., ed. QUICIIERAT, IV, 347-349. 
35 JEAN CHARTIER, 1,83. 
36Ibid, I, 89,122. 
37 Ibid., I, 84. 
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to pay them, but the will to fight in a war sponsored by God Himself was stronger 
than the lure of money38. Finally, as his most persuasive argument, Chartier mentions 
some of Joan's extraordinary actions that were regarded by many as miracles: how 
she instantly recognized Charles at Chinon amongst his courtiers, though some were 
more richly dressed than him, or how she asked for a sword hidden in the church of 
Sainte-Catherine-de-Fierbois, whose existence nobody suspected39. By mentioning 
these supernatural events, Chartier almost presented Joan as a saint. He also was one 
of the first chroniclers to unequivocally present her as a martyr, stating that, after 
having captured her, the English, `sans proces, maiz de leur voulente indeue, la firent 
ardoir en icelle ville de Rouen publiquement, en luy imposant plusieurs malefces'ao. 
In his Latin chronicle, written before his Chronique de Charles VII, Chartier was 
much more explicit in this respect, as he compared Joan before her judges to Christ 
before Caiaphas, and stated that Jean de Luxembourg, like Judas, committed suicide 
after having sold Joan to the English41 
Chartier tried to provide an explanation for Joan's change of fortune after the 
coronation campaign, and presented a very quaint theory. In his opinion, it was at 
Auxerre that Joan lost her powers, as she broke her sword - the sword that had been 
miraculously found in the church of Sainte-Catherine-de-Fierbois - over the back of a 
prostitute, while beating her with the flat of the weapon. He related how the King's 
blacksmiths could never mend it -a sign that the sword came from Heaven - and 
concluded: `Et estoit chose notoire que, depuis que ladite espee fut rompue, ladite 
Jehanne ne prospera en armes au prouffit du roy ne autrement, ainssi que par avant 
avoit fait'42. The modem reader is rather startled by this strange, superstitious 
explanation, which shows how remote from the modem understanding of warfare 
some medieval views still could be in the 15th century. God's action is here so 
intimately linked to the results of wars that any consideration about strategy or the 
balance of power becomes irrelevant. Instead, Chartier concentrates all the strength 
of the French into an object of divine origin: the sword of Joan, which acquires a 
38 Ibid., I, 80-81. 
39 Ibid, 1,67,71. 
40Ibid., I, 122. 
41 Passage quoted and translated in CONTAMINE, `Naissance d'une historiographie', p. 144-145. 42 JEAN CIIARTIER, I, 90,122. 
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nature akin to that of the `oriflamme', the red standard allegedly offered by God to 
the Kings of France. 
The explanation offered by Chartier probably did not convince all supporters 
of Joan, for one of the first preoccupations of the next generation of chroniclers 
would be to provide some more satisfactory reasons for Joan's change of fortune, as 
well as her capture and death. These chroniclers also developed the themes handled 
by Chartier and Blondel: mainly, the saintliness of Joan, the divine origin of the help 
she offered to the King, and the glorification of the French monarchy through her 
story. 
3. Joan in French chronicles, immediately following the Rehabilitation Trial 
As time passed, Joan's memory seemed to recede in France. It looks as if 
Charles VII was not particularly eager to promote her remembrance - after all, he had 
done nothing to save her from her fate. But as the years elapsed, and as Charles was 
becoming more and more triumphant, regaining Normandy in 1449, the feelings of 
the King towards Joan changed. According to Henri Guillemin - but Guillemin's 
systematic cynicism challenges somewhat the reliability of his assertions - the idea of 
a Rehabilitation Trial originated solely in the brains of the royal circle; it was the 
King's magistrats allegedly, who `dug up' Joan's mother, so as to make her request a 
revision of her daughter's trial, to clear the family's reputation. Contamine seems less 
inclined to believe that the Rehabilitation Trial, held in 1456, was only the result of 
cold calculation. In any case, the fact that a retrial was held shows that the 
rehabilitation of Joan's name did matter for Charles VII, if only because her sentence 
to death as a heretic stained the glory of the reconquest, and the prestige of the crown 
of France. The Rehabilitation Trial did not receive as much publicity as Joan's 
mother had requested, but it did cause a renewal of interest in Joan in the 
historiography of the period43. It is to the comments of three chroniclers, who wrote 
a' On the Rehabilitation Trial see GUILLEMIN, p. 172-194, and CONTAMINE, `Naissance d'une 
historiographie', p. 139-140,151-152. 
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their works shortly after the retrial, that I now wish to turn: the anonymous author of 
the Chronique de la Pucelle, Mathieu Thomassin, and Thomas Basin. 
3.1. Joan in the Chronique de la Pucelle and Thomassin's Registre Delphinal: 
achieving sanctity 
The Chronique de la Pucelle, which incorporated much information from 
Joan's trial and retrial, is a curious work which seems to belong more to hagiography 
than historiography. In 1932, Rene Planchenault put forward the hypothesis, which 
has not been rejected, that the work was composed by Jean Juvenal des Ursins44. 
Thus it seems very likely that the Chronique de la Pucelle originated from the royal 
circle: the chronicle would be an official tribute to the memory of Joan, the retrial's 
follow-up work. At the same time, it is interesting to note that the work was never 
completed, and stops abruptly after the siege of Paris: a sign, perhaps, that the King's 
interest in Joan was rather inconstant. 
The Chronique de la Pucelle shed a supernatural light on all the military 
events in which Joan had taken part, making Joan appear as a saint - without, 
however, explicitly referring to her as one - and depicting the war waged in 1429 in a 
way which clearly stressed that God had been overseeing every French deed. The 
novelty, by comparison with the narratives of Blondel and Chartier, was that the 
work used much material drawn from the testimony of the witnesses interrogated 
during the retrial, thus adding many miracles, great and small, which had not been 
mentioned earlier in chronicles. Apart from making the narrative more detailed and 
lively, these additions were intended to convince the reader more fully of the divine 
nature of Joan's mission. Thus we find, for example, a story recounted by Joan's 
squire Louis de Coutes and by Dunois in their testimony, according to which the 
assault of the English bastille of les Tournelles, at Orleans, only proved successful 
after Joan had given a particular signal: having planted her standard near the rampart, 
Joan waited for the banner to be touching the bulwark, and only then did she declare 
to the French fighters: `Tout est vostre, et y entrez'. According to the testimony of 
as R. PLANCIIENAULT, `La Chronique de la Pucelle', in Bibliotheque de I'Ecole des Chartes, 93 
(1932), 55-104; CONTAMINE, `Naissance d'une historiographie', p. 153. 
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some great captains who had been involved in this action, the chronicler adds, the 
French mounted and assailed the bulwark `aussi aiseement comme par un degre'; 
they could not understand how this could have happened, `sinon par un oeuvre 
divin'45. The chronicler also explained that, in such a manly environment as the 
army, Joan's chastity had been preserved partly thanks to divine intervention: many 
knights, and even some great lords, had tried to seduce the Maid, but, as if 
miraculously, `aussi tost qu'ils la voyoient, toute volonte leur cessoit'. This was 
drawn from the testimony of Alencon and Joan's page Jean d'Aulon, who had stated 
that they had occasionally slept on loose straw next to Joan, or seen her breasts or 
r legs as she dressed, but had never felt aroused, though they found her fai a6 
The Chronique de la Pucelle also stressed that Joan had waged war in a just 
manner, a point emphasized in the retrial; thus the campaigns led by Joan appeared 
exemplary as far as jus in bellum was concerned. The chronicler was the first, with 
Mathieu Thomassin, to incorporate in his narration the famous letter written in 
simple and straightforward terms by the Maid at Blois, in which she had requested, in 
the name of the King of Heaven, the English lords, knights, and even archers to leave 
the country, warning them that if they did not comply, she would make `si gros 
hahay, que encore a mil ans en France ne fut veu si grant'47. Offering one's enemies 
the chance to avoid destruction by sending an ultimatum was one of the basics of Jus 
in bellum. The chronicler also recounted how, at Blois, before leading her troop into 
Orleans, Joan had insisted that every French soldier should make sure that he was in 
a state of grace: she ordered her men to confess, and had their fillettes sent away. 
Finally, he showed that Joan could not be accused of being unnecessarily cruel: 
during the assault of the Fort of Saint-Loup, she protected some English soldiers who 
had disguised themselves as priests, on the grounds that `on ne debvoit rien 
demander aux gens d'eglise'48. As he relates that she had them safely led into 
Orleans, the chronicler seems to imply that Joan knew they were not priests, but that 
she had taken pity on them. 
as Chronique de la Pucelle, p. 293-295; Proces en nullite..., ed. DUPARC, IV, 6,49-50. 
46 Proces en nullite..., ed. DUPARC, I, 486 and IV, 70; Chronique de la Pucelle, p. 314. 
47 Ibid., p. 282. 
48 Ibid., p. 283,289. 
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We have seen that Robert Blondel had avoided the issue of Joan's change of 
fortune, and that Chartier had offered a rather simplistic explanation. The Chronique 
de la Pucelle put forth a solution which has since then been more popular with 
supporters of Joan than Chartier's. In a short episode, Dunois asked Joan whether she 
knew the time and place of her death. Joan replied: `J'ay accomply ce que Messire 
m'a commande de lever le siege d'Orleans et faire sacrer le gentil roy; je vouldrois 
bien qu'il voulüt me faire ramener aupres mes pere et mere, [... ] et faire ce que je 
soulois faire'49. The chronicler had drawn this material from Dunois' own testimony 
for the retrial: Dunois had apparently overheard Joan saying that, when God did not 
need her services any longer, she wished to return to her parents; he also explained 
later on how Joan kept repeating that God had sent her to raise the siege of Orleans 
and lead Charles to Rheims50. The chronicler fused the two comments into one 
episode, thus clearly defining Joan's mission and making it end with Charles' 
coronation. Joan could therefore not be blamed for any failure subsequent to that 
event. 
Mathieu Thomassin wrote his Registre Delphinal, a register of the rights and 
history of the Dauphins of France, for the Dauphin Louis. His treatment of Joan of 
Arc was rather different from that of the Chronique de la Pucelle, being more a 
discourse than a story. The Chronique de la Pucelle introduced various narrative 
elements about Joan of Arc into historiography; with Thomassin, many ideological 
ingredients entered the French historical discourse about Joan, which would be 
developed under the reigns of Charles VIII and Louis XII. In Thomassin's dicourse, 
the prophecies made by the Maid or allegedly made about the Maid loom large. He 
explained how, as Joan was being examined at Poitiers, some clerks and doctors had 
dug up `une prophetie de Merlin, parlant en ceste maniere: Descendet virgo dorsum 
sagittarii et flores virgineos obscurabit'. This prophecy, already mentioned in Joan's 
time by Christine de Pisan51, was now part of the whole mythology associated with 
the Kingdom of France. Thomassin amplified this mythology with an important 
491bid 
, p. 326. 50 Proces en nullite..., ed. DUPARC, IV, 10-11. 
51 CHRISTINE DE PISAN, Ditie de Jeanne d'Arc, ed. and transl. A. J. KENNEDY and K. VARTY, 
Medium Aevum Monographs, New Series IX, Oxford, Society for the Study of Mediaeval Languages 
and Literature, 1977, p. 34, stanza XXXI. 
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prediction of the Maid herself: he recounted how Joan had augured that, even if she 
had to die, the English would still be eventually expelled from France52. Thomassin 
had drawn this prophecy from the minutes of Joan's trial: Joan had indeed declared to 
Cauchon that the English would, in the end, be `boutez hors de France', adding that 
she revealed it now, so that people might remember her words when the French 
would be triumphant53. Thomassin had seen the last English soldiers leave France, 
and he could emphasize that this prediction, crucial for France, had since then been 
realized. 
Mathieu Thomassin also was the first chronicler to see all the potential that 
could be extracted from the Maid's story, in order to extol the Kingdom of France 
and show its privileged position as God's protege. Christine de Pisan had already, in 
1429, presented many of the ideas which would become commonplace in the 
discourse about Joan at the end of the century; thus it should not come as a surprise if 
Thomassin quoted a few verses from her Ditie as a tribute to the poetess, and to the 
fair sex, `par le moyen duquel toute chrestiente a eu tant de biens'. Thomassin 
compared, rather boldly, the mission of the Maid, who had saved the Kingdom of 
France, with that of the Virgin Mary, who had brought salvation to the whole of 
humankind54. Sending the Maid was the greatest sign of love God had ever made to 
the Kingdom. Indeed, God especially loved the Kingdom of France, and kept a 
watchful eye on it, because He had elected it as His favourite agent, the zealous 
propagator and defender of the Catholic faith: 
Et sache ung chacun que Dieu a monstre et monstre ung chascun jour 
qu'il a aime et aime le royaulme de France, et 1'a especialment eslu 
pour son propre heritage, et pour, par le moyen de lui, entretenir la 
saincte foy catholique et le remettre du tout sus: et par ce, Dieu ne le 
veut pas laisser perdre55 
The same ideas had been expressed by one of the learned authors who had written 
treatises in Joan's favour to help with the rehabilitation procedure: Robert Ciboule 
had pointed out that by saving the Royaume Tres Chretien, whose Kings had always 
52 Cf. Proces..., ed. QUICHERAT, IV, 305,311-312. 
53 Proces..., ed. TISSET, I, 166,169-170. 
54 Cf. Proces..., ed. QUICHERAT, IV, 310. 
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encouraged the practice of the true religion, inside and outside their realm, and were 
known as the devoted supporters of the Holy See, Joan had in fact saved the whole of 
Christendom56. It is difficult to tell whether Thomassin was speaking in favour of a 
new crusade as he wrote about God's plans for the Kingdom, but there is no sense of 
urgency in his lines; it seems that he was mainly referring to the Kingdom's 
crusading history, which had earned it a reputation as a zealous defender of the faith. 
Mathieu Thomassin provided the reader with his own explanation for Joan's 
change of fortune at the end of her short career, and his solution was the most 
elaborate of all offered so far. According to Thomassin, Joan had been asked whether 
she thought that she would last long, and had replied that, 
s'il luy convenoit mourir avant que ce pour quoy Dieu l'avoit envoyee 
fust accomply, que apres sa mort eile nuyroit plus ausditz Anglois 
qu'elle n'auroit fait en sa vie, et que non obstant sa mort, tout ce que 
pour quoy eile estoit venue se accompliroit57. 
In other words, she would act from heaven, by interceding with God. Thomassin still 
considered that Joan's mission was to completely expel the English from France; by 
stating that she had not only her earthly life, but also her after-life to carry out this 
mission, he could account for the fact that she had died well before the final French 
triumph. Not only did Thomassin virtually present Joan as a saint, but he also 
described her as a patron for France: after her death, she could intercede with God for 
the Kingdom, and protect it from heaven. As we know, Thomassin's views have 
enjoyed a great popularity, even though Joan had to wait until 1920 before the Holy 
See canonized her. 
Finally, because Joan's story was so wonderful and outstanding as a sign of 
the great love God bore the Kingdom, Thomassin expressed the wish that it should be 
forever extolled in French historiography. Thomassin explained why he himself had 
related the story in the Registre Delphinal, arguing that it concerned one of the 
Dauphins of France, Louis' father, and added, in a declamatory tone: `D'autre part, la 
ss Ibid., IV, 309. 
56 CONTAMINE, `La theologie de la guerre ', p. 50. 
57 Proces..., ed. QUICIIERAT, IV, 311-312. 
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matiere de la Pucelle est si haulte et si merveilleuse que c'est bien ä noter et digne 
d'entrer en tous livres-registres, pour memoire perpetuelle, a la gloire de Dieu et 
honneur du royaume et du Daulphine'58. 
3.2. The opinion of Thomas Basin on Joan 
The opinion of Bishop Thomas Basin of Lisieux, who wrote a memoir 
supporting Joan's cause for the Rehabilitation Trial, is particularly valuable as it 
offers the judgement of a prelate. We have seen, through Bonet's words, that the 
Church generally preferred not to involve God in matters of secular warfare. Thomas 
Basin may well reflect this caution as he refuses to assert that Joan's voices came 
indeed from God, and concludes: `Sur sa mission, sur les apparitions et revelations 
affirmees par eile, nous laissons ä chacun la liberte de penser ce qu'il voudra [... ] 
selon sa capacite et son jugement'59. However, Basin also explains that God could 
very well have sent Joan in order to help the French against the English `qui alors 
opprimaient gravement ledit royaume'. Like Chartier, Basin refuses to consider the 
claims of the Kings of England, and sees in this conflict mainly one aggressor, the 
English, and one victim, the French. Why should Christ not decide to help an 
oppressed people? He also speculates on the argument that God might have sent Joan 
`pour abaisser 1'orgueil des Francais et des Anglais'60. This argument is particularly 
interesting, as it does not spare the French either: Joan might have been a help, but 
she was also a reminder that the French were helpless by themselves, and that all 
good came from God. Finally, like Christine de Pisan61 and many other contemporary 
writers, Basin reminds us that the Old Testament was full of precedents for God 
choosing a woman in order to help an oppressed people: were not the Jews 
successively saved by Deborah, Judith and Esther? This particular argument was very 
popular amongst those who wrote treatises in favour of Joan62, but it had not been 
mentioned in a chronicle. As for Joan's failures, Basin tried to explain them through 
theology. He reminded his readers that many messengers of God, like the prophets, 
58 Ibid., IV, 311. 
59 THOMAS BASIN, 1,167. 
60 Ibid., I, 165. 
61 See CHRISTINE DE PISAN, Ditie, p. 45, stanza XXVIII. 
62 On the symbolical importance of Judith see M. WARNER, Joan of Arc. The Image of Female 
Heroism, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1981, p. 230-232. 
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had to experience great misfortunes, before being eventually executed by men. 
Perhaps God was disappointed by the lack of gratitude expressed by the French? And 
after all, Basin concludes, `qui a pu penetrer les intentions du Seigneur ? 963. 
As we can see, Basin was very inclined to accept the idea that Joan was on a 
divine mission, which is not surprising, since he had contributed to the retrial. 
However, one should note that his analysis of Joan's case was rather prudent and 
relatively disinterested compared to that of official or semi-official chroniclers such 
as Chartier, the Chronique de la Pucelle, or Thomassin: rather than starting with the 
assumption that Joan was a saint, before commenting on her life, Basin, who was 
writing for himself, examined Joan's career according to the precepts of theology. It 
is also interesting to note that Basin blamed the ungratefulness of the French and of 
the King himself, without, however, being more explicit in his statements. During the 
last decade of the 15th century, a number of chroniclers were to develop the themes 
put forth by Chartier, the Chronique de la Pucelle, and Thomassin; in particular, 
these chroniclers would use Joan's story in order to laud the Kingdom of France, and 
its monarchs, to the skies. 
4. The memory of Joan in French historiography in the reigns of Charles VIII 
and Louis XII 
In his Registre Delphinal, Mathieu Thomassin expressed the wish that Joan's 
story should be systematically extolled in French historiography. But Louis XI, for 
whom Thomassin had been writing before he became King, did not seem to take 
much interest in the figure of Joan64. Perhaps Louis was too serious a politician to be 
charmed by her tale. On the other hand, Louis was not particularly interested in 
promoting historiography in general. Thomassin's wish was only realized at the very 
end of the century, which saw a remarkable renewal of interest in the figure of Joan, 
in French historiography. 
63 THOMAS BASIN, I, 165-167. 
64 CONTAMINE, `Naissance d'une historiographie', p. 156. 
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The first important work which dealt at length with Joan was Martial 
d'Auvergne's Vigiles du roi Charles VII, a work composed in verse, intended by its 
author as a tribute to Charles VII, and offered to Charles VIII in 1484. The work was 
to be very popular with readers until the end of the 15th century. On the whole, the 
Vigiles were the natural continuation of Thomassin and the Chronique de la 
Pucelle's discourses on Joan. The use of verse allowed Martial d'Auvergne to exalt 
Joan's story and emphasize the miraculous character of her deeds. As he closed his 
account of the siege of Orleans, he invited his readers to reflect on the greatness and 
benevolence of God towards the Kingdom, explaining: 
Or, notons icy la merveille, 
Les faiz de Dieu et les vertus, 
Quant a la voix d'une Pucelle 
Les Anglois furent abatus6s 
Martial d'Auvergne refuted and rejected the argument of Burgundian 
historiographers like Monstrelet, according to which experienced rulers knew well 
that assertions such as Joan's were `moult doubtables [... ] ä croire', as he pointed out 
that 
Nostre Seigneur communement 
N'a point acoustume de ouvrer, 
Ne de donner alleigement 
Quant ailleurs on le peut trouver. 
Mais oü nature et les humains 
N'ont plus de povoir et puissance 
C'est alors qu'il y mect les mains, 
Et qu'il fait sa grace et clemence66 
Indeed, God did not often use miracles in order to change the course of politics, but 
this was because men could (and did) rely on themselves in such matters. But when 
all hope was lost, God was the last resort, and through his kindness he could take pity 
on men, and decide to help them. Martial d'Auvergne included in his account an 
observation on the tricks of fortune, which superbly encapsulates what seems to have 
65 Proces..., ed. QUICIIERAT, V, 58. 
66 Ibid., V, 58-59. 
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been the French reflection on the experience of the Hundred Years War at the dawn 
of the Renaissance: 
Se Fortune au commencement 
Si donne persecution 
C'est pour apres plus haultement 
Octroyer consolation. 
Drawing on Boethius, he added: 
Que fortune adverse est plus seure 
Pour congnoistre Dieu et bien vivre, 
[... ] 
Elle impartist humilite, 
Elle soustient tous aspres deulz 
Et apres, par prosperite, 
Ung seul bien si fait valoir deux. 
France had emerged victorious and stronger from the traumatic conflict; in a sense, 
like Job in the Old Testament, the Kingdom had learnt, through suffering, how to get 
closer to God. Now that God was again with France, sheltering her under His wing 
and protecting her from her enemies, the times of prosperity had returned. And since 
Joan had been the sign of God's return of benevolence, her story had to be exalted. 
As Martial d'Auvergne concluded: 
Ne fut-ce pas moult grant merveille 
D'avoir reveille tant de gens 
Au bruit d'une simple Pucelle? 67 
It is amusing to note - but this is what the Maid's story is all about - that, while 
Burgundian authors such as Chastelain found the fact that a young woman had been 
leading Charles VII's army unnatural, thus shocking, French authors such as 
d'Auvergne found it unnatural, and, as such, miraculous. 
Martial d'Auvergne did not neglect to laud the King whenever his narrative 
gave him the opportunity to do so. This is particularly manifest in a short episode, 
67 Ibid., V, 66-67. 
144 
which appears neither in Chartier, nor in the Chronique de la Pucelle or Thomassin. 
As the English garrison of Troyes were leaving the town, which had chosen to open 
its doors to the King, they intended to take their French prisoners with them. The 
prisoners subsequently turned to Joan and implored her help, kneeling before the 
Maid. Charles VII was informed about this incident, and the chronicler explains: `Sy 
commenca ä soy soubzrire / Du desbat et de la querelle'. Charles decided to content 
each side by paying the ransom out of his own pocket, and the English `louerent le 
feu roy fort, / L'appelant prince de facon'. The chronicler goes further, exalting the 
King for his sense of justice, which was manifest in his relations with the enemies, as 
well as with his own soldiers68. Not only does the King appear chivalrous and 
magnanimous in this episode, but he almost appears as a figure of God the Father, 
bringing redemption to his subjects through his kindness and magnificence; one 
should note that the chronicler emphasized how the French prisoners had first turned 
to Joan, as if to a saint who would intercede for them. 
Interestingly, Martial d'Auvergne took care, in his narrative, to clear the 
King's conscience in regard to the way he treated Joan after the failure of Paris. The 
chronicler explained that, having returned to Gien, Charles intended to send the Maid 
against Rouen `pour conquester et besongner', but this plan was opposed by La 
Tremoille and the other counsellors, who deemed `qu'il n'en estoit point de mestier', 
and sent her before Saint-Pierre le Moustier instead69. From the beginning, 
chroniclers had been inclined to accuse the King's counsellors, or the army's 
captains, of mistrusting the Maid, or of acting malevolently towards her, thus making 
them partly responsible for Joan's failures and death. However, by stating that the 
King wanted to send the Maid against the powerful capital of the English conquests - 
which is very unlikely - Martial d'Auvergne made the responsibility for Joan's 
failures and death fall on the counsellors alone. His version of Joan's story is thus 
very different from that of Perceval de Cagny. 
Following the Vigiles de Charles VII, more works appeared that were written 
along the same lines, only giving more importance to the themes developed by 
68 Ibid., V, 63-64. 
69 Ibid., V, 71. 
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Mathieu d'Auvergne and Thomassin. This does not mean that the memory of Joan, 
when extolled, was systematically treated in a bombastic style. Robert Gaguin, for 
instance, presented the Maid's story as a miracle performed by God in favour of the 
King of France, and ranked her among the justes et preuzdhommes' who had been 
persecuted by tyrants and their villainous counsellors70. The episode of the Maid was 
presented as a sign of God's love for the Kingdom, but without strong emphasis. 
Some chroniclers, however, developing Thomassin and d'Auvergne's discourse, gave 
much more importance to the Maid's story as a symbol of God's special fondness for 
the Kingdom and its monarchs. This tendency is also illustrated in other kinds of 
literature, as in Octavien de Saint-Gelais' Sejour d'honneur, a poem composed in 
1489. In this piece, the poet has a vision of `ung roy glorieux, prepare / Fulcy de paix, 
begnin, doulx comme ung ange', triumphant `en champ d'honneur pare / Et siege 
d'or tapisse de louenge'. Next to him, he sees a woman `sur fier cheval marchant, / 
[... ] qui fut d'harnoys luysant armee'. This strong and martial feminine figure, who 
acts `comme si tous jours eile / Tint en seurte les souldars soubz son aesle', is the 
guardian and saviour of France; the Maid `par miracle trouvee'71 is the first person, 
in Saint-Gelais' mind, that can be associated with the glorious figure of Charles VII. 
Around 1500, a history of the Maid containing a summary of the two trials 
was composed by an anonymous writer, known as `1'abreviateur du proces'. The 
author himself tells us that the work was written on Louis XII's order, at the 
instigation of the admiral Louis Malet de Graville72. In his account, `l'abreviateur du 
proces' claimed that he could reveal the famous prayer secretly made by the King, 
which the Maid had repeated to Charles in Chinon, to convince him of the divine 
nature of her mission. The secret disclosed by the author is far too affected and 
carefully structured to be convincing as the secret, but it is nonetheless interesting as 
it offers a digest of the King's worries with regard to his war. In his first prayer, 
Charles allegedly begged that, should he not be the Kingdom's true heir, God should 
make all his courage vanish, that he may no longer be `cause de faire et soustenir la 
guerre dont procede tant de maulx'. In his second prayer, he requested that, should 
70 ROBERT GAGUIN, Les Grandes croniques, transl. PIERRE DESREY, Paris, Poncet le Preux, 1514, 
fol. cliv, v°-clxii, r°. 
71 Proces..., ed. QUICHERAT, V, 91-92. 
72 Ibid., IV, 257. 
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the miseries that had befallen the Kingdom proceed from his own sins, God might 
relieve the people of their torments, and punish him instead. Finally, Charles prayed 
that, if the miseries of the war proceeded from the people's sins, God might forgive 
them, `et apaiser son ire, et mectre le royaulme hors des tribulations es quelles il 
estoit, jä avoit douze ans et plus'73. The story of the Maid thus allowed our author to 
expose the anxieties that the war caused the King. His first concern was about the 
justice of his war, and his second concern about his subjects. The King is intimately 
united to his people; uncertain of whether the calamities which had befallen his realm 
proceeded from their sins or his own, he intercedes for them with God, and is ready 
to bear the burden of chastisement, should he be the one guilty. But as we know, God 
had listened to Charles' prayer: his cause was just, and the French were now again in 
God's grace. 
Because of the weight carried by Joan as a sign of God's grace offered to the 
French, some chroniclers included her in the whole Christian mythology associated 
with the Kingdom's history. This is manifest and eloquently expressed in Pierre 
Sala's Hardiesses des grands rois et empereurs, a work offered to Francis I in 1516, 
where the former butler reminded the young King that France had a very long history 
of being miraculously saved by God in wars, declaring: 
Cela est chose notoire que, de tous temps, Nostre Seigneur n'a jamais 
abandonne ses bons roys a leur grant besoing. N'avez-vous pas ouy cy 
devant des beaulx miracles qu'il fit pour le roy Clovis, qui fut le 
premier roy crestien, et consequemment pour le roy Dagobert, pour 
Charles le Grant et pour plusieurs autres roys? Et de fresche memoire, 
de celluy gentil roy Charles VIIe, dont nous parlons74. 
Ever since Clovis had made a pact with God, the French had been under His 
protection. Before Pierre Sala, the `abreviateur du proces' had explained that, having 
read the whole corpus of historiography dealing with the Kingdom of France, `toutes 
les croniques qu'on appelle les Croniques de France, de Froissart, de Monstrelet, de 
Gaguin et autres croniques', he had compared Joan's story with `tous les merveilleux 
cas advenus audit royaume, depuis le temps Marcomire et Pharamon [... ] jusques ä 
73 Ibid., IV, 258-259. 
74 Ibid, IV, 278. 
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present'. Of all the marvels and miracles which had happened in France since the 
times of the legendary Frankish king Pharamond, Joan's epic was, in his opinion, the 
most striking and the most extraordinary; more than any other, it was worthy of being 
exalted in chronicles, `en memoire perpetuelle des Francois'75. 
9 Conclusion 
The history of the treatment of the episode of Joan, in French historiography, 
throughout the 15th century, is thus the story of a long manipulation of the material 
available, aiming to make it fit the French monarchy's interests, and to give it the 
status of an emblem. During the first half of the century, the opinion of non-official 
chroniclers on Joan was apparently much influenced by the authors' own ideals, or 
interests: Pierre Cochon was enthusiastic about Joan partly because she livened up 
the conventions of the war of the knights and symbolized the common people's will 
to participate in the realm's defence; as for Perceval de Cagny, he took advantage of 
her story to criticize the King's policy which displeased his patron, the Duke of 
Alencon. At the end of the century, the discourse about Joan in French historiography 
seems much more homogenous, though some works are more magniloquent in their 
discourse than others. Many present Joan as one of the most extraordinary signs, 
sometimes the most extraordinary sign of all times, of the love God has always borne 
the Kingdom. France and its monarchs appear as being favoured by God; the Lord 
protects them from all their enemies, because France has a special role to play in His 
divine plan. Joan is almost a pretext to extol the French monarchy. Ironically, the 
relations between the Maid and Charles VII had often been tense; after the failure of 
Paris, she had quite clearly become an embarrassment for the King. But this fact was 
increasingly hushed up as the century advanced; the blame was laid solely on the 
King's counsellors, or on some of his captains. 
75 Ibid., IV, 257. 
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Of course, the development of the treatment of the `matiere de la Pucelle' was 
not uniform throughout the 15th century. The story of the Maid was exalted in 
historiography during particular times: shortly after her death, after the Rehabilitation 
Trial, and during the reigns of Charles VIII, Louis XII and the early years of Francis 
1. But there were whole periods where the memory of Joan was rather neglected. 
Charles VII's interest in Joan was quite inconsistent, even though he did order her 
posthumous retrial to be held, and Louis XI hardly did anything to keep the memory 
of the Maid alive. Still, the general trends in the development of the discourse about 
Joan are clearly visible. One should note that, more than the Kings of France, it was 
apparently the Kings' subjects who made the discourse about Joan in French 
historiography evolve: although their innovations were along the lines of what the 
Kings of France expected, the impulse seems to have been theirs, except in the case 
of the Chronique de la Pucelle, which may have been commissioned by Charles VII, 
and of the work of `l'abreviateur du proces' - written on Louis XII's order. 
Finally, the development of the treatment of Joan in French historiography 
demonstrates particularly well the shaping of the French propagandist discourse on 
war, in this case defensive war. The notion that God loves the Kingdom of France 
and its monarchs, that they are part of His divine plan, and that He thus watches over 
them and protects them from their enemies, the reflection on the eventually beneficial 
role of adverse fortune, with regard to the experience of the Hundred Years War, all 
these ideas were slowly elaborated throughout the century in French historiography, 
though many of them were present from the beginning in the works of propagandists 
or poets such as Christine de Pisan. Our understanding of the nature of the French 
propagandist discourse on war, in historiography, at the end of the 15th century, will 
be completed in Chapter 5, which is devoted to the treatment, in French 
historiography, of an offensive war: the conquest of the Kingdom of Naples by 
Charles VIII in 1494-1495. For the time being, however, let us turn to what was 
being written, in Burgundian historiography, under the rule of Philip the Good, about 
a war which also involved God, but in a more natural and traditional way: the 
crusade. Throughout his life, Duke Philip seriously considered embarking upon this 
very chivalrous adventure, and the chroniclers of Burgundy gave much of their 
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attention to this preoccupation. It is the comments made by Burgundian chroniclers 
about the crusading endeavours of Philip the Good that I now propose to study. 
1O 
Constantinople besieged by the Ottoman Turks (1453), as represented in a 
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Fig. 4. `Le siege du grant turc'. The topography of the site of the Golden Horn and the 
tactics used by the Turks are accurately represented ; however, the figures of the Turks are 
very fanciful : Mehmet II and his subjects are dressed in pseudo-oriental accoutre, a 
nixture of antique, Western and fantastic clothes and armours. To judge by appearances, 
he Turkish siege seems eqivalent to a Burgundian guerre de magnificence, only the 
Iragons on the banners denote that the Turks belong to the forces of evil. From a 







Chapter 3: Philip the Good's crusading endeavours in Burgundian 
historiography (I). A war never waged, the proposed `saint voiage' 
(1453-1464) 
Alors le Turcq, comme desesperez, fist avanchier ses banieres [... ]. 
Lors les Francoiz, a haultes voix criant: `Jhesus! Nostre Dame! 
Monjoye! Saint Denis! ' la baniere du roy s'avanca, et toutes les 
aultres la sievyrent; et, tant que destriers puerent aller, les ungs 
parmi les aultres s'entrefierent tellement que le seigneur de Saintre, 
qui sur son tres puissant destrier arme estoit, tous deux tres 
richement houssez d'orfavrerie esmaillee a ses armes, [... ] comme a 
Dieu pleust, ataint le Turcq de sa lance par l'estroit de sa baviere 
[... ] , et, a l'espaindre qu'il fist, le renverssa au le troncon de sa 
lance tout mort ä terre. 
Antoine de La Sale, Saintre 1 
" Introduction 
Often regarded as a hinge between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the 
year 1453 saw two considerable events, which would change the face of geopolitics 
in Europe: the end of the Hundred Years War, and the fall of Constantinople to the 
Ottoman Turks. The Hundred Years War ended de facto with the battle of Castillon 
on 17 July 1453, but no treaty was signed to make this official, and although Charles 
VII could justifiably be called le tres victorieux, his attention was still devoted to the 
English problem, in case of their possible return; moreover, the heavy task of 
restoring the Kingdom to prosperity was certainly not finished. Meanwhile, Philip the 
Good could take advantage of the long period of relatively untroubled peace - with 
the exception of the bloody wars of Ghent (1453) - which his disengagement from 
1 ANTOINE DE LA SALE, Saintre, cd. M. EUSEBI, 2 vol., Paris, Honore Champion, 1993-1994, II, 
327-328. 
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the English alliance had inaugurated for Burgundy, to give his attention to an old 
dream: his crusading plans. 
Philip the Good had always felt deeply concerned about the defence of 
Christendome. He had often sent galleys and men-at-arms to the Levant, to help save 
the last shreds of the Byzantine Empire. His major effort, an expedition sent to 
Constantinople in 1444 as a contribution to the Varna crusade, will be looked at in 
detail in the next chapter, through the study of Jean de Wavrin's narrative of this 
crusade. Some successes had been achieved: in 1444, the help of Geoffroy de 
Thoisy's soldiers had proved decisive in the relief of the island of Rhodes, besieged 
by a composite force of Mamelukes and Turks. Philip also regularly sent financial 
help to the Christian communities of the Middle-East. After the fall of 
Constantinople, Philip the Good's desire to take part in a major passagium - the usual 
term for a crusading expedition beyond the seas - became one of his primary 
concerns. At the Feast of the Pheasant in February 1454, Philip made his famous vow 
that, should the King of France decide to take the cross, or send a prince of his blood, 
or another prince with an army against the Turks, or should any other prince decide to 
go on a crusade with a sufficiently powerful army, he, Duke Philip, would take part 
in this crusade with all his chivalry. It should be noted that Philip's gesture was 
generous but prudent, his vow being conditional: the reservations were clearly 
expressed 3. Philip subsequently left his Duchy to attend the Imperial Diet of 
Regensburg (April 1454), where plans of a crusade were to be elaborated by the 
2 Historians have devoted much attention to Philip the Good's crusading efforts, and the modem 
material available on the subject is constantly expanding. See in particular HOUSLEY, p. 101-109; J. 
RICHARD, `La Bourgogne des Valois, l'idee de croisade et la defense de 1'Europe', in Le Banquet du 
Faisan. 1454: 1'Occidentface au defi de l'Empfre ottoman, Actes du colloque tenu ä Lille et ä Arras 
du 21 au 24 juin 1995, ed. M. -T. CARON and D. CLAUZEL, Arras, Artois Presses Universitd, 1997, p. 
15-27; C. MARINESCO, `Philippe le Bon, duc de Bourgogne et la croisade: premiere partie: 1419- 
1453', in Actes du Vf Congres international d'etudes byzantines, t. 1, Paris, Ecole des hautes etudes 
Sorbonne, 1948, p. 147-168; `deuxii me partie: 1453-1467', in Bulletin des etudes portugaises de 
l'Institut francais au Portugal, n. s. 13 (1949), 25-32; J. PAVIOT, La politique navale des ducs de 
Bourgogne, 1384-1482, Lille, Presses Universitaires, 1995, p. 105-139; Y. LACAZE, `Politique 
"mediterraneenne" et projets de croisade chez Philippe le Bon: de la chute de Byzance ä la victoire 
chretienne de Belgrade (mai 1453-juillet 1456)', in Annales de Bourgogne, 41/161 (1969), 5-42 (part 
1) ; 41/162 (1969), 82-132 (part 2). 
3 On the Feast of the Pheasant, one of the most striking and intriguing festivities of the Middle Ages, 
see M. -T. CARON, Le Banquet du Viceu du Faisan. Fete de cour et prise de conscience europeenne, 
Arras, Universite d'Artois, 1995; A. LAFORTUNE-MARTEL, Fete noble en Bourgogne au Xis siecle. 
Le Banquet du Faisan (1454): Aspects politiques, sociaux et culturels, Montr6al / Paris, Bellarmin / 
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Reichstag. Philip was unsure whether he would return to his Duchy, and it seems that 
from the Holy Roman Empire he would have proceeded on his way towards the 
Levant, had an expedition been organized with the princes of the Empire. But the 
Emperor did not attend, which shocked both Philip and the princes, and no definitive 
conclusions were reached. It was decided that another Diet would take place in 
autumn in Frankfurt. This time Philip could not attend in person, but sent 
ambassadors. Although the princes of the Empire did eventually agree on a crusade, 
the Diet of Frankfurt revealed what sort of problems rendered the organization of a 
major passagium extremely difficult. The humanist Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, a 
most ardent advocate of a crusade, was representing the Emperor at the Diet, and 
recorded how the princes were constantly complaining about the Emperor, the Pope 
and the curia, `who, they said, were false and greedy and wanted to rake in gold 94 . 
Eventually the crusade was postponed because of Pope Nicholas V's death. Philip the 
Good encountered many internal difficulties during the pontificate of Calixtus III, 
making it impossible for him to fulfil his vow. Yet, his desire to take part in a 
crusade was still strong, and in 1463 intensive preparations were made in the Duchy, 
as Philip was hoping to join Aeneas Sylvius, who had become Pope Pius II, on a 
passagium. But new difficulties arose, and Philip had to postpone his departure. His 
natural son Antoine was sent with many Burgundian noblemen as a vanguard. The 
fiasco of the 1464 expedition, described in great detail by both past and present 
historians, is one of the most romantic events of the 15th century. It seems that the 
passagium was doomed even before Pius II's death at Ancona definitively settled the 
question. Philip the Good was in any case too old to fulfil his vows. 
Many studies, especially during the last decade, have been devoted to the 
impressive corpus of literature related to crusading written in the Duchy of Burgundy 
during Philip the Good's rule6. The sheer mass and variety of material: plans for a 
Vrin, 1984; M. DE GREVE, Le Viceu du Faisan et les ecrivains, problemes de reception, in Le Banquet 
du Faisan. 1454: VOccident..., p. 137-144. 
4 On the Diets of Regensburg and Frankfurt, see R. SCIIWOEBEL, The Shadow of the Crescent. The 
Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453-1517), Nieuwkoop, de Graaf, 1967, p. 32-33. Quotation p. 33. 
s On the 1464 fiasco and the last days of Pius II see R. J. MITCHELL, The Laurels and the Tiara. Pope 
Pius 11.1458-1464, London, Harvill Press, 1962, p. 255-265. 
6 See for example G. DOUTREPONT, `A la cour de Philippe le Bon. Le Banquet du Faisan et la 
litterature de Bourgogne', in Revue generale, 35 (1899), 787-806 and 36 (1900), 99-118; 
SCIIWOEBEL, p. 82-10 1; J. DEVAUX, `Le Saint Voyage de Turquie: croisade et propagande ä la cour 
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crusade, reports of spies sent to the Levant, romances related to crusading, is 
particularly striking, and demonstrates that Philip's interest and ambitions were more 
than a whim or mere hypocritical boasting. The testimony of Burgundian chroniclers, 
however, has attracted relatively less attention. It also seems that their message has 
sometimes been overlooked. According to the historian Jacques Paviot, apart from 
Chastelain and Wavrin, Burgundian chroniclers were apparently not very interested 
in Philip the Good's crusading efforts; in his opinion, this probably reflects a lack of 
concern about the chivalric ideals of their prince7. The aim of this chapter is to show 
that, on the contrary, Burgundian chroniclers did support their prince in his plans; the 
nature of their ideas on crusading, and on Philip's plans, will be made explicit. The 
last part of this chapter will be specifically devoted to the testimony of Georges 
Chastelain, which is by far the most important and the richest in ideas expressed. We 
shall see the evolution in Chastelain's thought about Philip's plans, which made him 
the only Burgundian chronicler to draw conclusions from Philip's failure to fulfil his 
vow: mainly that, in the 15`h century, crusading ideals could no longer be the same as 
before. Before anything, however, it is necessary to briefly recapitulate the theory of 
crusading, and its peculiarities in the 15th century. 
1. Theory and practice of crusading in the 15th century 
The concept of holy war had been slowly elaborated by the Church 
throughout the first millenary of the Christian era. At the beginning of the 5`h century, 
Augustine, whose cathedral city had been besieged by the Vandals, laid the 
foundations of the just war in De civitate Dei. We saw its ingredients in the last 
chapter; Thomas Aquinas did not make any substantial changes. But the just war was 
no holy war: it was considered as a necessary evil. Still, it was a first step towards the 
de Philippe le Bon (1463-1464)', in 'A 1'heure encore de mon escrire'. Aspects de la litterature de 
Bourgogne sous Philippe le Bon et Charles le Temeraire, Les Leitres romanes, n. s. (1997), 53-70; J. 
GUERET-LAFERTE, `Le livre et la croisade', in Le Banquet du Faisan. 1454: 1'Occident..., p. 107- 
114. 
PAVIOT, p. 133-134. 
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sanctification of particular military actions. During the 9`" century, the repeated 
attacks on Christendom by pagans, notably the Vikings and the Moors, 
led the 
Church to unreservedly promise salvation to all warriors who fought, under its aegis, 
against the enemies of the faiths. The holy war soon also became offensive: it was 
basically the war waged for the Papacy, against those viewed as enemies of the faith, 
whether external, such as the Muslims, or internal, such as heretical sects. With the 
conquests of the Seljuk Turks against Byzantium, new goals appeared for a holy war: 
recovering the Holy Land and Jerusalem, Christ's patrimony, which was now in the 
infidels' hands, and rescuing the Christian communities and peoples of the East. In 
1095, Pope Urban II preached the First Crusade in the name of Christ (as opposed to 
that of Saint Peter) to all knights of Christendom (as opposed to the Papacy's faithful 
servants), likening the passagium to an armed pilgrimage, thus blending the lure of 
holy war with that of pilgrimage9. By the 13`h century, the legal customs surrounding 
crusading had been authoritatively defined by canonists such as the jurist Hostiensis 
and Pope Innocent IV1°. The legitimacy of offensive holy war was defended by 
Innocent IV and Thomas Aquinas, who declared that crusading in the Levant was 
necessary if only because of the hostility with which Islamic authorities faced 
Christian missionaries. In the words of Aquinas: `Christ's faithful frequently wage 
war against the infidels, not indeed to coerce them to believe [... ] but in order to 
compel them not to hinder the faith of Christi 
1 
In his excellent work The Later Crusades, Norman Housley has shown that, 
contrary to what one might think, throughout the 14`h and 15`" century, enthusiasm 
for the crusade was still strong among Catholic society, and that the legitimacy of 
crusading was largely undisputed. There were opponents to the concept of crusading, 
and well before Luther, who argued, like William of Tripoli in 1271, that Muslims 
could be converted `through the pure word of God'. But such men were in a minority. 
Moreover, the very evolution of geopolitics in the 14th and 15`h century made it 
unlikely that Christians would think more pacifically about their non-Christian 
8 On the evolution from the concept of the just war to that of the holy war see J. FLORI, Pierre 
1'Ermite et la premiere croisade, Paris, Artheme Fayard, 1999, p. 119-128. 
9 Cf. J. FLORI, `Dieu, cet 6ternel alibi', in L'art de la guerre au Moyen Age, 6-11. 
10 Cf. M. J. HEATH, Crusading Commonplaces: La Noue, Lucinge and Rhetoric against the Turks, 
Geneva, Droz, 1986, p. 13. 
11 This quotation, and the next, are taken from HOUSLEY, p. 381. 
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neighbours, and Muslims in particular, for the expansionist policy of the Ottoman 
Turks endangered Europe itself. In the second half of the 14`h century, Murad I had 
occupied Thrace, Roumelia and Macedonia. His son Bayezid crushed the Serbs at 
Kosovo Polje in 1389, and Serbia and Bulgaria were annexed. During the first half of 
the 15`h century, Murad II secured Thessalonica, Bosnia and Wallachia. And on 30 
May 1453, the young Mehmet II stunned the whole of Europe by taking 
Constantinople after a long siege, thus definitively bringing what remained of the 
Byzantine Empire to an end. The shock caused in Europe can be imagined from 
reading the accounts of contemporary chroniclers. Jean de Wavrin inserted a long and 
accurate account of the siege in his chronicle (V, 251-257), a translation of the 
famous report of Jacopo Tedaldi, an eye-witness. Mathieu d'Escouchy left a different 
version of the story, greatly exaggerating the atrocity of the massacres. In an episode 
that seems directly taken from the Legenda Aurea, he recounted that the Emperor's 
daughter was raped by Mehmet II, then stripped naked and forced to watch the 
slaughter of hundreds of Christians, before being eventually beheaded, as she refused 
to abnegate her faith 12. Olivier de La Marche was rather shocked by the fact that, 
with the violent and heroic death of `la plus noble personne du monde', Emperor 
Constantine XI Paleologus, who descended from the Roman Emperors, the oldest 
dynasty in the world had become extinct (II, 337)13. The alarming advance of the 
Ottoman Turks provoked a chorus of horrified reactions, notably from humanists, 
emphasizing the moral necessity of a crusade, to save not only the Christians now 
living under the Turkish yoke, but also Greek culture and its antique heritage 14. In 
particular, they appealed to the moral obligation to protect Christendom that faced 
the Christian princes, who had done nothing to save Constantinople. 
To defend Christendom was considered as the primary responsibility of a 
Christian prince. Originally, this had been the task of the Holy Roman Emperor, as 
the Pope's right arm. Charlemagne himself had clearly defined his role, referring to 
the example of Josuah, who fought the armies of Amalek while Moses was 
interceding for him by raising his hands15: 
12 MATHIEU D'ESCOUCHY, II, 50 if. 
13 For a study of the 15`h century accounts of the fall of Constantinople see SCHWOEBEL, Chapter 1. 
14 Cf. HEATH, Crusading Commonplaces, p. 25-37. 
15 Exodus, 17.8-15. 
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A nous, avec le secours de la piete divine, de defendre partout au- 
dehors 1'Eglise du Christ contre les attaques des paiens et les ravages 
des infideles et de veiller au-dedans a faire reconnaitre la foi 
catholique. A vous, tres Saint Pere, en elevant, tel Moise, les mains 
vers Dieu, d'aider notre armee afin que, par votre intercession et par le 
don du Dieu qui le guide, le peuple chretien ait toujours et partout la 
victoire sur les ennemis de son saint nom16. 
However, since the deterioration of the relations between the Papacy and the 
Emperors, the sovereign pontiffs had turned to the other princes of Christendom'7. 
God had granted the Christian princes power, and it was only natural that they should 
use it to defend the faith. They were the shield of Christendom. Thus Pius II could 
declare to Alfonso V of Portugal: `to obtain salvation you are obliged, as a prince and 
as a Christian, to assist with all your strength in defending the holy faith' 18. Before 
him, Gregory VII, Innocent III and Boniface VIII had often recalled princes to their 
duty to defend the faith19. Still, despite the fact that princes kept boasting about their 
crusading ambitions, and although they did feel concerned about the fate of 
Christendom, their rule appeared increasingly self-seeking, a result, no doubt, of the 
rise of autocratic regimes and of the emergence of nation-states20. Christendom was 
less and less united. 
Below the figure of the prince, the Church could address knights - even 
though they were becoming increasingly dependent on the prince - for crusading was 
traditionally seen as the chivalrous duty, ever since Pope Gregory VII had given a 
literal meaning to the word miles Christi21. We saw in the first chapter how, 
according to Geoffroi de Charny, the first garment a knight had to put on prior to his 
dubbing ceremony symbolized his duty to protect the faith22. In the 14th and 15th 
century, knights still saw crusading as the most honourable thing they could do. 
Georges Chastelain never tired of praising the Burgundian knight Jean de 
Rebremette, who had taken part in the Reconquista, and had successively slain two 
16 Quotation found in FLORI, Pierre 1'Ermite, p. 120. 
'7 Ibid., p. 127-128. 
18 Quotation from HOUSLEY, p. 453. 
19 Cf. SCIIWOEBEL, p. 73. 
20 Ibid, p. 33-34. 
21 Cf. CARDINI, p. 321-322. 
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Moors in single combat, before the walls of Granada. Rebremette had taken a public 
oath at the Feast of the Pheasant to fight a Saracen in single combat; he had fought 
for the King of Portugal in Africa, but had not been able to fulfil his vow there. The 
King of Castile, seeing Rebremette's remarkable deed, knighted him on the spot and 
granted him, as arms, the severed head of a Moor balancing on the tip of a sword. 
Chastelain concluded: `depuis en haut lieu d'honneur ay vu porter audit Rebremette 
ledit tymbre, lequel lui refrecissoit sa gloire [... ] en la bouche des hommes' (III, 353- 
358). In the 14`h and 15`h centuries, many knights such as Rebremette took part, as 
volunteers, in crusades in Spain, Lithuania, Africa or the Levant. According to 
Norman Housley, many of the most widely respected knights of the period, such as 
Gaston-Phoebus de Foix or Marshal Boucicaut, were characterized by the extent of 
their crusading service23. Having a hero of the crusades among one's ancestors, as 
Philip the Good could claim about Baudouin de Flandres, was, of course, particularly 
reputable. Thus, as a prince, and also as a knight, it was only natural that Duke 
Philip, who had chosen chivalry as the line of conduct for his Duchy, should have 
taken his duty of defending the faith particularly seriously. What is perhaps more 
remarkable, is that there was apparently no hypocrisy in Philip's attitude: modem 
historians tend to consider that Philip's crusading ambitions were rather disinterested. 
Philip did not demand in advance control over certain territories that were expected 
to be liberated; in 1454 he offered Charles VII the lead of the crusade, setting up as 
his vassal. It seems that his only material interests were the glory and renown that his 
crusading endeavours earned him24. 
2. Burgundian support for Philip the Good's crusading efforts 
The moral support offered to Philip the Good by the official, semi-official and 
also non-official chroniclers of Burgundy with regard to his crusading endeavours 
and plans was expressed in many different ways. Olivier de La Marche, at the time 
ecuyer pannetier to Philip the Good, Georges Chastelain, the monk Adrien de But, 
Jacques Du Clercq, Mathieu d'Escouchy - who was Burgundian until probably 1465 - 
22 Cf. p. 36-37. 
23 On noble attitudes towards crusading cf. HOUSLEY, p. 394-403. 
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and the monk of the Abbey of Floreffe firstly emphasized Philip's isolation among 
other Christian princes in his concern about the safety of Christendom, and in his 
positive actions on that score. They often sternly blamed the other princes for their 
apathy. Chastelain was particularly severe towards Charles VII and Henry V, as he 
explained that God had punished them by cutting their lives short, because they had 
not taken the warnings of the hermit Jean de Gand seriously enough (I, 337-341 and 
IV, 368-369). Both stories show that Chastelain considered the defence of the faith as 
the primary duty of a Christian prince; the fact that Henry V died well before the fall 
of Constantinople was deemed irrelevant. If Chastelain was particularly acrimonious 
towards Henry V and Charles VII, it was because the English conqueror had chosen 
to be the persecutor of another Christian people, instead of fighting for the faith; as 
for Charles VII, he was guilty of ingratitude, having failed to realize that `telle grace 
et gloire ä luy donnee, comme d'avoir tout son royaume recouvert sans dangier, 
n'avoit point este faite a luy pour glorifier sa personne'. God's gift of power carried 
consequences: He had exalted the prince above all other men, but this in turn implied 
greater responsibilities for the prince. Power was a grace bestowed by God upon the 
prince to give him the means to serve His purposes. In fact, the more powerful a 
prince was, the more guilty he should feel if he did not do anything to protect the 
faith. Instead of trying to pick a quarrel with Philip for having sheltered the Dauphin 
Louis, Charles should have paid more attention to his Christian duties. In the same 
vein, but with more caustic humour than stern moralizing, Jacques Du Clercq 
mocked Emperor Frederick III, who had failed to attend the Diet of Regensburg 
because he was afraid that Philip might compel him to accompany him: `il n'y volloit 
pas aller, car icelui empereur Frederic n'estoit pas chevallereux en armes, ains estoit 
tout quoy avec sa femme, et ne ly challoit de guerre'25. Frederick's faint-heartedness 
contrasted with the Duke's chivalrous eagerness to expose his body for the faith. 
Olivier de La Marche was less harsh towards the Christian princes, as he suggested 
that their nonchalance, at the time of the fall of Constantinople, might have been part 
of God's plan. Thus La Marche could envisage God's plans in a different way than 
Chastelain: his attitude was, in a sense, more fatalistic. 
24 Cf. RICHARD, p. 25-27. 
25 JACQUES DU CLERCQ, XIII, 170. 
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In the context of the other Christian princes' lack of concern, all Burgundian 
chroniclers pointed to Philip the Good as the major, if not the only source of hope for 
Christianity. Olivier de la Marche was careful to emphasize that Philip could not, 
among the Christian princes, be blamed for the fall of Constantinople: he had warned 
the other Christian rulers against the danger by sending them embassies, but had not 
been able to shake their inertia (II, 206). The Duke could not save Christendom on 
his own; his chivalrous ideology and generosity did not prevent him from being 
realistic, and one should note that he was careful to make his vow conditional at the 
Feast of the Pheasant. In any case, he could not be accused of ingratitude towards 
God. Olivier de la Marche made it clear that Philip's crusading endeavours fulfilled 
his moral obligation to make good use of the power that God had offered to him, as 
he related how, in 1464, Philip `qui avoit accoustume de recongnoistre envers Nostre 
Seigneur les biens et les graces qu'il luy faisoit' immediately answered the Pope's 
call by mobilizing his chivalry (III, 35-36). 
Praises of Philip's crusading efforts did not originate solely from members of 
the Duke's household. In the little chronicle that he wrote in verse for his fellows, the 
monk of the Abbey of Floreffe lavished praises on Philip for his repeated actions in 
defence of the faith26. He admired him especially for his vow, by which Philip had 
obliged himself to take a decisive step for the defence of Christendom. The monk of 
Floreffe was by no means an official or semi-official chronicler, but he gave us, for 
our `recreation', a long account, in prose, of the famous `banket' held in Lille on 17 
February 1454. He insisted upon the great cost of the Feast - `plus de diex mille 
escus'27 - not, it seems, from the general, admiring tone of the account, in ' order to 
blame it, but rather to impress the reader with Philip's magnificent expenditure on 
this very worthy occasion. The monk of Floreffe took care to explain that the primary 
aim of the Feast was not only to inspire Philip's knights, but also to stimulate the 
other princes of Christendom to follow Philip's example, by impressing them: 
Et aussi ce pour animer 
26 Chronique de 1'abbaye de Floreffe, in Monuments pour servir a 1'histoire des provinces de Namur, 
de Hainaut et du Luxembourg, ed. F. DE REIFFENBERG for the Academic Royale de Belgique, 8 vol., 
Brussels, Hayez, 1844-1874, VIII, 63-198 (p. 168-169). 
271bid., p. 170. 
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Les corages des prinches franchois 
Et aultres seigneurs de nos lois... 
They should not fear to leave their realms: the Duke himself had superbly ignored, in 
his magnanimity, those who declared: 
Bon duc, se widiez vos pays, 
[... J 
L'en vous juerat de faus traix. 
Franchois sont sur vous envieux. 
Trop vous porriez fyer en eulx! 28 
The aim of the banquet was to advertise the crusade and to infuse into the knights 
who witnessed it a holy desire to act. Olivier de la Marche praised Philip for this 
intention, stating that Philip wanted his knights to follow him `de leur volonte et 
devocion, sans contraincte' (II, 337-338). Modern scholars have shown that the 
banquet of Lille was a major work of propaganda. 
From reading Burgundian chronicles, we can sense that the Feast of the 
Pheasant created a great stir among Philip's subjects. Olivier de la Marche, who was 
on the committee which organized the event, and Mathieu d'Escouchy inserted in 
their narration what could be seen as the official account of the Feast - perhaps 
written by La Marche. This long and detailed account describes at length all the 
impressive entremets which demonstrate how developed the art of festivity was in 
Burgundy. It also includes an allegorical episode in which the author is shown 
pondering about the banquet once the tables have been removed, wondering whether 
he has been dreaming. The author then shares his thoughts with a chamberlain of 
Philip, suggesting that the cost may have been excessive, and wondering whether 
Philip's decision to take the cross was not a little hasty. But the chamberlain 
emphasizes that Philip's resolution had been carefully considered for a long time, 
that Philip held his projects dear, and that the banquet was ultimately his idea: the 
Duke had intended to make his vow public as impressively as he possibly could29. 
Bruno Laurioux has suggested that this episode was intended as a criticism of the 
28 Ibid., p. 169, v. 3021-3025,3027-303 1. 
29 OLIVIER DE LA MARCIHE, 11,369-371; MATHIEU D' ESCOUCIIY, 11,222-223. 
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Duke's lavish expenditure30, but it seems that, on the contrary, it was meant to 
silence any objections. 
I wish to conclude on the banquet with a comment made by Chastelain, which 
shows that the Duke's chronicler understood perfectly all the consequences of 
Philip's vow, and thus all its purposes. The pages of Chastelain's chronicle that 
perhaps related the banquet are lost, however on many occasions he referred to the 
grand event. As he recounted Philip's return from the Holy Roman Empire, 
Chastelain explained that the Duke only had one thing on his mind: the preparation 
of his `voiage de Turquie', for not only was he particularly bent on making the 
passagium, but also `y avoit-il mis l'honneur plus avant que nul autre, parce que de 
tout ancien temps s'y estoit offert, et sur tous les autres princes chrestiens avoit este 
continuel susciteur de ceste besogne' (III, 10). The honour of the Duke was at stake: 
this was the best guarantee of his action, for what could be more valuable to the 
creator of one of the most prestigious orders of chivalry in Christendom, the Order of 
the Golden Fleece, than his honour? 
We saw that Duke Philip intended to give as much publicity as he could to his 
vow, and thus made the Feast of the Pheasant one of the most magnificent festivities 
of the century. As a rule, magnificence was a crucial element of Philip's crusading 
endeavours, and it seems important at this stage to study its origin and manifestations 
more carefully. 
3. Magnificence: a key aspect of Philip's crusading endeavours 
In his celebrated work La guerre au Moyen Age, Philippe Contamine called 
our attention to a thought-provoking expression that he found in a short propagandist 
French treatise of the mid-15`h century entitled Le debat des herauts d'armes de 
France et d'Angleterre: the guerre d'honneur et de magnificence. It seems that the 
practice of extolling the prince and his power, and the military history of one's state, 
30 B. LAURIOUX, `Banquets, entremets et cuisine ä ]a cour de Bourgogne', in Splendeurs de la cour de 
Bourgogne. Recits et chroniques, ed. D. REGNIER-BOHLER, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1995, p. 1027- 
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gave rise to this concept towards the end of the Middle Ages. In the Debat, the 
French herald explains to the English one that, in his opinion, the English, contrary to 
the French, have never waged any guerre de magnificence, and adds: 
Item, sachez, sire herault, que je faiz grant difference entre guerre 
commune et guerre de magnificence. Car je dis que guerre commune 
est en soy mesmes ou contre ses voysins et lignagiers, et guerre de 
magnificence est quant princes vont en ost conquerir en loingtaing et 
estrange pals, ou soy combatre pour la foy catholique deffendre ou 
eslargir31. 
Contamine left a clear field for more developments concerning the concept of the 
guerre d'honneur et de magnificence, but it seems that scholars have not, until now, 
devoted more attention to it. As one can see, the French herald considered crusading 
as the pre-eminent example of a guerre de magnificence. But what did he exactly 
mean by this ? In Le premier volume de la Toison d'or, Guillaume Fillastre, the 
second chancellor of the Order, explains very well, with all his eloquence and 
rhetoric, how Philip the Good's crusading efforts were, first of all, an expression of 
his magnanimity; following the patterns of courtly ideology, his work clearly shows 
the importance of magnanimity and magnificence in Philip's endeavours to protect 
the faith. Magnanimity, as one can see from the medieval and Renaissance corpus of 
speculum principis, was the intrinsic desire to be great and to do admirable actions, a 
lust for greatness which was not reprehensible but praiseworthy, its primary aim 
being exemplary32. Guillaume Fillastre demonstrates that Philip the Good saw the 
fall of Constantinople as a direct challenge, and almost an insult, to his magnanimity: 
`Car ces nouvelles ouyes sa Magnanimite luy fist le sang et les membres fremir'33. As 
a great prince, Philip felt compelled to react. 
1035 (p. 1029). 
31 Le debat des herauts d'armes de France et d'Angleterre, ed. L. PANNIER & P. MEYER, Paris, 
Firmin Didot for the SATF, 1877, p. 12; CONTAMINE, La guerre au Moyen Age, p. 455. 32 See for example CHRISTINE DE PISAN, Le livre de la Paix, ed. C. C. WILLARD, The Hague, 
Mouton, 1958, p. 105-106. 
33 GUILLAUME FILLASTRE, Le premier volume de la Toison d'or, Troyes, Nicolas le Rouge, 1530, 
fol. cxxxii, v°. 
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Magnificence, a concept which has recently been carefully studied by British 
historians of art and culture34, was very much linked to magnanimity, as it was the 
physical expression of the greatness of the prince. Magnificence was the display of 
the prince's power, wealth and greatness; it was also the prince's generosity, as he 
made others benefit from his grandeur. Most Burgundian chroniclers made Philip's 
magnificence one of the chief elements of their narratives of his crusading efforts. 
The monk of Floreffe, like many others, recalled how Philip had regularly sent `grant 
nombre de navie', filled with knights, to the Levant, as well as `moult tres-grant 
finance', adding: 
Aultres innumerables biens 
A tres maintes fois fais li prinche 
Aux crestiens extans es provinces 
3s Dont dessus est faite mencion 
Similarly, the anonymous author of the curious, propagandist chronicle entitled Le 
livre des trahisons de France envers la Maison de Bourgogne, relating the 1444 
expedition, described how Philip had sent Walleran de Wavrin and Geoffroy de 
Thoisy to the Levant, with many ships, `puissamment artillies et accompaignies de 
bons archiers', among which figured `la plus grosse nave qui se trouvast adont en 
toutte la mer de Levent'36. Olivier de la Marche enjoyed recounting the magnificent - 
and noisy - departure of Antoine of Burgundy, in 1464, from the harbour of Sluys: 
et estoit belle chose de veoir les bannieres et les penons de chascun 
bateau; car chascun cappitaine vouloit monstrer quel homme il estoit 
en ce hault et sainct voiaige. Les trompettes et les clairons sonnoient, a 
34 See S. ANGLO, Images of Tudor Kingship, London, Seaby, 1992, p. 6-9; S. TIIURLEY, The Royal 
Palaces of Tudor England, Architecture and Court Life, London / New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1993, p. 11; see also G. KIPLING, The Triumph of Honour. Burgundian Origins of the Elizabethan 
Renaissance, The Hague, Leiden University Press, 1977, p. 28-30,160-164. Thurley and Kipling have 
shown how the concept of Magnificence was developed by the Valois Dukes of Burgundy, and how 
the Dukes' magnificence influenced court life in Tudor England. Kipling has also demonstrated how, 
in the court of Burgundy, Magnificence was presented as the primary ambition of the ideal Christian 
prince. 
35 Chronique de 1'abbaye de Floreffe, p. 168, v. 2997-2999,3007-3010. 
36 Le livre des trahisons de France envers la Maison de Bourgogne, in Chroniques relatives ä 
l'histoire de la Belgique..., II, 1-258 (p. 227). Ironically, throughout the 1444 campaign, the `grosse 
nave' was used as a merchant ship, and did not take part in any fights. Still, it suffered some damages, 
and was eventually left to rot before Constantinople (see H. TAPAREL, `Un episode de la politique 
orientale de Philippe le Bon: les Bourguignons en Mer Noire (1444-1446)', in Annales de Bourgogne, 
55 (January-March 1983), 5-29). 
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monter les Bens d'armes chascun en son naviere [... ] et d'aultre part 
tiroit l'artillerie, qui espouventoit et effroyoit toute la compaignie (III, 
38). 
Traditionally, the departure of a crusading fleet was always splendid; it was a special 
and moving event. One could compare this report with Robert de Clari's account of 
the departure of the crusading fleet which stormed and sacked Constantinople in 
1204; the description ranks among the most beautiful pages of Clari's chronicle. 
The guerre de magnificence was thus, for a prince, a way of acquiring honour 
and renown, through a splendid display of his wealth and power. The crusade, the 
noblest of all causes, was the best medium to distinguish and immortalize one's 
name. Philip's magnificence in his crusading endeavours was manifest in the 
expeditions he sent, as well as in the advertising of his `voiage' - this explains the 
showiness of the Feast of the Pheasant - and the staging of its preparations. However, 
in order to be truly impressive, the display of power should have visible effects. The 
chroniclers who insisted most upon Philip's magnificence emphasized the successes 
achieved. They especially praised the actions performed by Burgundian captains near 
the coasts of Africa or Syria. Olivier de la Marche recounts how, after the collapse of 
the 1464 expedition, the Burgundian knights Frederick de Witem and Pedro Vasquez 
de Saavedra -a Spanish knight who was living at the court of Burgundy - 
garnirent leurs bateaulx le mieulx qu'ilz peurent; et firent ung an la 
guerre aux Sarrasins, vaucreant la mer ä leur advantaige, oü ils 
acquirent grant honneur; car ce n'est pas peu de chose, apres l'armee 
rompue, de soubstenir la guerre ung an contre les infidelles (III, 41). 
Modern scholars have shown, however, that Burgundian corsair actions were, in fact, 
not very glorious, and often exercised against the Orthodox or Muslim subjects of 
Genoa or other merchant republics37. 
It seems that Philip's magnificence in his crusading efforts had its most 
important effects, not on the Turks, but on other Catholic countries. Indeed, our 
Burgundian chroniclers show the prestige that Burgundy had gained, thanks to 
37 See TAPAREL, p. 20-22; PAVIOT, p. 119-123,138-139. 
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Philip's magnificence, in the eyes of the German princes, for instance, who were very 
impressed by the fact that Philip had taken the trouble to come in person to the heart 
of the Holy Roman Empire to attend the Diet of Regensburg. This journey in the 
Roman Empire was often depicted, in Burgundian chronicles, as a pre-'voiage', a 
prelude to the passagium, where Philip had visited `maintes regions estrangnes [... ] 
par tous les Allemaingnes'38. Chastelain especially insisted upon the courage 
exhibited by Philip on this occasion: this journey in Germany could have proved very 
dangerous, since some German princes were originally rather hostile to Philip (III, 
35). But Philip's visit was eventually a triumph. Mathieu d'Escouchy depicts the 
glorious reception enjoyed by the Duke in various towns of Bavaria. Often, as in 
Ulm, the Germans would ask Philip to reconcile different parties39. In his account, 
the prestige and power of the Duke is made very clear, as he adds: `Et joyssoit par 
tout oü il passoit de touttes prerogatives, comme se eust este 1'empereur en 
personne'40. This remark is especially interesting as it implies contempt for the real 
Emperor, who had failed to attend the Diet of Regensburg. 
Mathieu d'Escouchy also describes with admiration the great honours 
bestowed by Pius II upon the prince of Cleves, Philip's ambassador at Mantua in 
1459. He recounts that Pius made the Duke of Cleves sit amongst the cardinals, 
whereas even Antonio d'Aquaviva, one of the greatest princes of the Kingdom of 
Naples, had to sit amongst the other ambassadors. He also depicted Pius benevolently 
listening to the Duke of Cleves, as the Duke asked for Philip to be excused for not 
having come in person, and answering: je stay bien les excuses estre veritables et 
raisonnables; et pleust ä Dieu que chascun prince de la crestiente, selon soy, fist 
aussy bon devoir comme lui! '. Finally, he contrasted these honours with the rather 
cavalier, almost rude manner in which Pius received Charles VII's ambassadors 41 
Thus, although this guerre d'honneur et de magnificence was never to be 
waged, at least in the grand way, as a passagium, it was successful in the sense that it 
brought honour not only upon Philip, but also upon the whole Duchy, and that it 
38 Chronique de 1'Abbaye de Floreffe, p. 174, v. 3122-3123. 
39 MATIIIEU D'ESCOUCHY, II, 387-392. 
40 Ibid, 11,249. 
41 Ibid., 11,387-392,394. 
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demonstrated his Magnificence. But was this enough ? After all, the fact remains that 
the expeditions sent by Philip often did not achieve much, and, more importantly, 
that Philip eventually never fulfilled his much advertised vow. Admittedly, the vow 
was conditional, but it had been pronounced very bombastically, to say the least. 
Still, it seems that none of our Burgundian chroniclers judged Philip's failure to enact 
it severely. Often they do not mention the fact, thus defending him by omission. The 
author of the Livre des trahisons de France simply states, in a marginal note, that 
Philip could not fulfil his vow, `pour la mort quy le souprist'42. Adrien de But 
explicitly states that Philip did not fulfil his vow, but lays the blame on external 
elements, in particular on Louis XI, who prevented Philip from departing on many 
occasions, the first time when he was still the Dauphin, and took shelter from his 
father at the court of Burgundy, thus making Franco-Burgundian relations very tense, 
and the second time in 1462-1463, by inducing the inhabitants of Liege to rebel 
against Philip - something which de But blamed with particular vigour 
43 
As for the results of Philip's crusading efforts, Burgundian chroniclers could 
not always blow up the few successes achieved out of proportion - as the author of 
the Livre des trahisons de France did with the 1444 campaign, stating that Walleran 
de Wavrin and Geoffroy de Thoisy had `mervilleusement couru et pillie les terres du 
soldan et les terres du Turc'44 - and sometimes they had to acknowledge that only 
poor results had been achieved. Yet Olivier de la Marche, for example, did not seem 
to feel a contradiction as he wrote, having described the glorious departure of 
Antoine's fleet: `et fut celle belle assemblee rompue ä petit exploit' (III, 41). A better 
example, since after all the collapse of Antoine's expedition was due to Pius' death, 
would be, as we shall see in the next chapter, Jean de Wavrin presenting, in his 
dedication, the 1444 expedition to the Levant as a war of magnificence, but showing 
in his narration that few positive results had been achieved. It seems that, simply, the 
results did not call into question Philip's Magnificence for our authors. 
4. The more critical stance of some chroniclers 
42 Livre des trahisons..., n. 2, p. 227. 
43 ADRIEN DE BUT, p. 445,449. 
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Some Burgundian chroniclers, however, appear more critical than the rest. 
Unsurprisingly, they were not official historiographers. As Jacques Paviot has 
mentioned, Adrien de But related at length how `quasdam galeas et navim grandem' 
sent by Philip to Rhodes had threatened to loot his very abbey in Flanders, and how 
the abbot only could get rid of them by paying a heavy ransom. These men had been 
sent to fight the infidels, but `ad effectum, pullulantibus domesticis insidiis et 
rebellionibus, nichil est aliud actum quam more piratarum ad oras insistere rapinis et 
illunionibus'45. It had necessitated an attack on his very monastery to open de But's 
eyes about the kinds of deeds that Philip's crusaders could perform. However, Paviot 
failed to point out that de But did not attribute these excesses to a fault in the 
organization of this particular expedition, even though Philip, like Jacques Coeur and 
others, found it very convenient to fill his galleys with idlers, criminals and other 
`caimans' in order to provide the ships with a cheap crew46. Instead, de But blamed it 
on the vicious natures of the crewmen themselves, and of their captain. A few pages 
later, de But described how Philip again resorted to the same practice in order to fill 
some new galleys, but, despite the excesses committed a few years earlier, he did not 
blame this practice; on the contrary, it seems that he considered it necessary, since, 
after the wars of Ghent, Flanders was full of idlers and criminals47. On the whole, 
Adrien de But acknowledged and admired Philip's crusading efforts. 
Jacques du Clerq was also more critical than other Burgundian chroniclers. 
The most striking instance of his attitude is the very cold words he used to close his 
summary of the Feast of the Pheasant, ironically concluding that many lords `feirent 
plusieurs grands voeux, desquels je n'en parlerai pour tant qu'il ne feurent pas 
accomplis ne faits, et si seroit la chose trop longue ä racompter'48. At the end of the 
day, the Feast of the Pheasant was, to use Shakespeare's words, `much ado about 
nothing'. Du Clercq also shows that the demands made by Philip to his subjects were 
not always as wholeheartedly accepted as Chastellain would have us believe in his 
as Livre des trahisons..., p. 227. 
as ADRIEN DE BUT, p. 309; PAVIOT, p. 123. 
46 Cf. TAPAREL, p. 9. 
47 ADRIEN DE BUT, p. 352. 
48 JACQUES DU CLERCQ, XIII, 168. 
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Chronique (III, 77). He recounts how the Estates of Artois were `moult esbahis' by 
his exorbitant demands, which they granted `tant par crainte que par amour'. A few 
pages later he recounted how the taxes were collected `nonobstant qu'il [the Duke] 
n'allast nulle part, et qu'il euist dit qu'il n'en vouloit nulles, jusques a ce qu'il iroit 
49 sur lesdits Tures'. 
Du Clercq is often bitter, sometimes mean - on such occasions, his work is 
reminiscent of the Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris. As he related the return of 
Antoine's expedition in 1464, he stated: `et fust leur voyage de petite value et peu 
d'efficace'. He also blamed the fact that the knights had not performed anything on 
this occasion, `combien que par la mer qu'ils passerent, ils passerent par moult de 
pays sarrazins et infidels'. However, it should be noted that most of Du Clercq's 
rancour was directed at the knights, who would much rather `guerroyer ä leurs 
voisins' than protect Christendom, and that he never seemed to question the Duke's 
good will5o 
On the whole, from reading the Burgudian accounts of Philip's efforts, we get 
the impression that most chroniclers were very traditional in their attitude towards 
crusading. Du Clerq is certainly the most backward: to him crusading chiefly meant 
that the noblemen of the Duchy should go to the Levant, or any other place full of 
Saracens, and fight, as opposed to giving priority to the most active enemies of 
Christendom, the Ottoman Turks. He also found it difficult to accept the financial 
requirements of crusading. Still, our chroniclers did notice some changes. The 
commonplace but relevant fact that the constant strifes between Christian princes 
made the organization of a major passagium almost impossible is one of them. It is 
also worth noting how Chastelain emphasized that Pius II had declared a crusade 
against the Turks because Mehmet II, `le travailleur des chrestiens', was undeniably 
Christendom's greatest enemy, and that Antoine was not supposed to attack the 
`Tartares', nor the `Mores de Grenade, ne de Barbarie', without the Pope's explicit 
consent (V, 51). Some chroniclers also stressed that the actual fighting in crusading 
was now the business of professional armies. According to Norman Housley, the old 
491bid., XI 11,175,208-209. 
50 Ibid., XIV, 378-381,337. 
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crusading ideal of an armed pilgrimage was still popular among the common people 
in the late Middle Ages: rather than perpetually giving money for indulgences, and 
most of the times seeing no results, they often preferred to serve in person51. In 1456, 
mass crusading had miraculously saved Belgrade from the Turks, but most of the 
times, it created more havoc than good. Thus du Clerq explained that the masses of 
common people who decided to respond to Pius II's appeals by serving in person 
would probably have achieved nothing because they had no leader to discipline or 
guide them52. The court chroniclers seem to accept the fact that what was now 
needed from civilians was financial help. Jean Molinet, in his famous Complainte de 
Grece, emphasized their role as he mentioned their financial contribution, in the 
prophecy of Merlin recalled and explained by `Angleterre': 
Ne verrons nous pareillement en ses jours degoutter argent des ongles 
des mugissans? Et qui sont ceux mugissans? Ne sont ce mie les 
paysans et riches bonshommes qui desployeront l'espargne de leurs 
tresors pour secourir au bien publicque? 53 
Thus Molinet placed on a comparable level the help offered by the Burgundian 
knights and the financial contribution of civilians. 
I hope I have shown that, contrary to Jacques Paviot's opinion, Burgundian 
chroniclers not only supported Philip the Good in his crusading plans and 
endeavours, but also took pride in them. They presented his efforts as a guerre 
d'honneur et de magnificence - save that it was never waged, at least as a passagium 
- emphasizing that Philip's magnificent actions in favour of the safety of 
Christendom brought honour upon him, and that this was ultimately profitable to the 
whole Duchy. However, there is certainly some truth in Paviot's statement that the 
conflict between Charles the Bold and Louis XI, which started shortly after 1464, and 
the events happening in England, were ultimately more important to the Burgundian 
chroniclers than the liberation of Eastern Europe. It seems that the chroniclers' 
interest for the crusade died with Philip the Good: after the fiasco of 1464, when 
51 HOUSLEY, p. 403,407-410. 
52 JACQUES DU CLERCQ, XIV, 341-342. 
53 JEAN MOLINET, `La complainte de Grece', in his Faictz et dictz, ed. N. DUPIRE, 3 vol., Paris, 
SATF, 1936-1939, I, 9-26 (p. 23). 
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Philip was definitively too old to fulfil his vow, their concern became much more 
sporadic. A symbol of this shift of interest could be Adrien de But's assertion that, in 
1466, Louis XI learnt from reading the Koran how to behave like a tyrant, and that 
princes did not commit a sin if they persecuted their adversaries, or used fraud and 
treachery 54. In other words, Louis XI was becoming as dangerous as the Turks to the 
welfare of the Burgundian state. But it is perhaps unfair to chose Adrien de But as an 
example for this shift of interest, for he seems to be the only chronicler whose 
concern about the progresses of the Ottomans remained unchanged. 
Moreover, the Burgundian chroniclers often found themselves in a clumsy 
position as they were trying to extol Philip's crusading efforts when the results were 
often rather disappointing. And none drew any far-reaching conclusions from a 
crucial point, the sign of a chivalric ideal's defeat: Philip's eventual failure to fulfil 
his vow. None, except, perhaps, Georges Chastelain, and it is to his testimony that I 
now wish to turn exclusively. 
5. Georges Chastelain and the death of an ideal 
Georges Chastelain, Philip's official historiographer, is the Burgundian author 
who has the most to say about his patron's crusading endeavours. Whole chapters of 
his Chronique are devoted to this theme, and they can be analyzed as a quite 
independent whole, in a sense, a story inside the story. Until recently, only Jean- 
Claude Delclos had devoted some interesting lines to this part of Chastelain's 
narration. In particular, Delclos demonstrated that the sixth book of the work was 
composed almost as the events proceeded, which gives a striking sense of immediacy 
to Chastelain's comments, and enables us to see the evolution of his thought". Jean 
Dufournet briefly pointed out an important aspect of the chronicler's thought, the 
Machiavellian character of some of his comments on crusading in the Chronique's 
54 'Ludovicus, Franciae rex, volumina legens Machometi, coepitjuxta contenta despotico regimine uti, 
quo contra Dei mandata multa sibi licere dixit atque non esse peccatum adversarios persequi, quolibet 
modo, fraudulenter auf intoxicatione, et a fratre suo primum incepit'. Cf. ADRIEN DE BUT, p. 474. 55 Cf. DELCLOS, Le temoignage..., p. 71-74,134-137,149,265,293. 
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sixth book56. Very recently, Jean Devaux concerned himself with Chastelain's 
comments, stressing again the chronicler's support for his patron's plans, however he 
failed to emphasize the striking originality of Chastelain's testimony: the evolution of 
the chronicler's reflection, and his increased realism with regard to crusading57. 
According to Delclos, Chastelain's comments on the 1464 expedition do not question 
his support of Philip's ambition to take part in a crusade: his reserve was based on 
the fact that, seeing the disastrous turn which the expedition was taking, and the fact 
that very few states had offered their support, Chastelain, fearing for the Duke's 
safety, opposed the idea that Philip should join this particular expedition58. In this 
section, however, I propose to show that Chastelain's opposition to Philip taking part 
in the 1464 crusade was heralded by the chronicler's earlier comments on the 
problems which prevented Philip from taking the cross, and that the defects of the 
expedition only revealed and reinforced a new turn of mind with regard to crusading. 
By studying the evolution of his thought from 1454 to 1464, I intend to demonstrate 
that Chastelain, who felt deeply concerned about Philip's dream, presented the 
Duke's crusading endeavours as a kind of tragedy in many acts of which Philip 
would be the hero, a psychological drama which could be entitled: `the death of an 
ideal'. 
The story for us starts in 1454, since the parts of the chronicle that would have 
dealt with the fall of Constantinople and the Feast of the Pheasant are lost. We do 
know, however, from Chastelain's prologue, that he felt very distressed about the fall 
of the Byzantine capital, and the achievements of Mehmet II. It is a significant fact 
that Chastelain gave so much importance to the Turkish advance in his prologue, 
when chroniclers usually simply promised, at that stage, to relate the `nobles 
entreprises, conquestes [... ] et fais d'armes' performed by noble and valiant men `taut 
de crestiente comme des infidelles de nostre foy'59. Chastelain instead replaced the 
deeds of Mehmet II in the general context of the troubled age he lived in, when 
kingdoms were made and unmade, when the cosmos itself had shown `signes et 
56 J. DUFOURNET, `Retour A Georges Chastelain', in Le Moyen Age, 88 (1982), 329-342 (p. 338-339). 
57 DEVAUX, `Le Saint Voyage... ', p. 55-59. 
58 DELCLOS, Le temoignage..., n. 238 p. 134. 
59 MATHIEU D'ESCOUCHY, I, 1. 
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prodiges'. In this truly apocalyptic context, Mehmet appeared as a new antechrist, 
whom none dared to oppose, except Philip: 
Et dernierement, qui pis vaut, s'est esleve en mes jours 1'ennemy cruel 
de Dieu, le grand Turc, un nouveau Mahomet, violeur du crucifix et de 
son Eglise, [... ] prince de l'armee de Satan, lequel [... ] a oste aux 
chrestiens leur bastille de Constantinople et soumise a sa dition en 
confuse et doloreuse attente cy-pres. Et n'a este trouve un seul prince 
chrestien qui, par ensemble, ny particulier, se soit essaye [... ] y resister, 
ny par armes, ny par conseil, reserve un seul de qui presentement ne 
veul faire mention, pour raison de non autruy charger, ny grever (I, 
11). 
In 1454, as Philip returned from his travels in the Holy Roman Empire, he 
was, according to Chastelain's narrative, at the height of his glory. He was even, so to 
speak, in a state of grace: throughout the journey, this `long perilleux voiage' (III, 6), 
during which all the princes `qui autreffois I'avoient deffie de feu et de sang' (III, 35) 
had miraculously become, not only his friends, but almost his subjects, God had 
clearly demonstrated that he was watching over Philip, as an acknowledgement of his 
efforts to serve Him. In the good towns of his Duchy Philip was acclaimed wildly, as 
a hero, so much that `ä peine a mortel homme n'en seoit point faire autant' (III, 6). At 
this moment, the ideal of crusading was not only alive and well, but at its most 
exalted point. Everybody, in the Duchy and elsewhere, was expecting the Duke to 
take the cross. The excitement reached its climax with the apparition of a comet, `un 
grant merveilleux feu [... ] si merveilleusement clair que tous voians s'en 
espoentoient', which, during the first night that Philip was staying in the Hague (he 
had come to Holland, amongst other things, to ask the Estates for subsidies for the 
crusade) crossed the dark sky, flying over Philip's town house, and disappeared into 
`la parfonde mer' (III, 69). Many witnesses gathered that this comet was heralding 
great things for the Duke; Chastelain felt assured that these things were related to the 
passagium. 
Chastelain's narrative of the events of 1454 and the following months, when 
everybody was expecting the Duke to take his leave shortly, is filled with a curious 
mixture of excitement and sadness. The sadness appears, for instance, in the words 
supposedly uttered by Charles VII, who admired the Duke at the time, envied him, 
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and feared that he might never meet him, as Philip was about to depart for a perilous 
journey: 
Saint Jehan! saint Jehan! beau-frere de Bourgogne s'en va en Turquie, 
ce poise moy, saint Jehan! c'est le plus honore prince qui vive, il doit 
beaucoup ä Dieu, si je l'avoie vu une fois, j'en morroie plus aise, saint 
Jehan! saint Jehan! (III, 32). 
In these lines, crusading appears as the dream, the fantasy so to speak, of every head 
of state; Charles admired Philip because he was about to make this dream a reality. 
The sadness is also felt in the discourse of Jean Boursier, a French knight who had 
come to Philip's court in Bruges to tell Philip that the King was granting him his 
leave and allowing him to levy the subsidies: Boursier `plusieurs fois fondit en 
larmes que ne pooit restraindre' (III, 37), as he was telling the Duke that Charles 
greatly admired him and encouraged him, but felt compelled to warn him against the 
great dangers of the journey. 
This mixture of joy and sadness is comparable to the feeling that a Christian 
would harbour when seeing a fellow Christian walking towards martyrdom. 
Chastelain emphasized that Philip understood he might never return from his 
journey, and that he accepted it. The chronicler depicts Philip almost scolding a 
French bishop who warned him, considering `tel prince qu'il estoit', against the 
dangers of a passagium. Philip answered the bishop: 
Vraiement, monseigneur de Langres, je considere bien que vray est ce 
que vous dites, et que du dangier y chiet beaucoup, [... ] mais face Dieu 
de moy ce qu'il lui plaira, car quant je sauroye veritablement que j'y 
devroie mourir [... ] , si je trouve les choses disposees pour y pooir 
aller, sy irai-je et ne m'en tenra riens nulle (III, 33). 
In this speech, religious fervour triumphs over reason, to the point of becoming 
madness, in the positive, Christian sense of the term. Philip could not understand that 
a clergyman should play the devil's advocate by trying to bring him to his senses, and 
by subtly suggesting that, as a head of state, he had no right to jeopardize his life. 
From reading Chastelain, we get a very precise idea of what the chronicler's 
conception of a crusade was, at least before the dramatic events of 1464. Chastelain 
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appears as a deeply religious man, even when judged according to the religious 
standards of the 15`" century. He insists very much upon the smallness and 
helplessness of man compared to the greatness of God. Men had to submit to God's 
will; this also applied to great princes, whatever considerable responsibilities they 
may have had. God expected Philip to risk his life and leave his states, and he had to 
obey: `Dieu le veult! ' - in the words of the First Crusade's heroes. 
We have seen how most chroniclers presented Philip's proposed passagium 
as a guerre de magnificence. Chastelain also emphasized the magnificence of 
Philip's crusading efforts: we only need to refer to his description of the Duke's 
preparations between November 1463 and February 1464, when Philip still thought 
that he would take part in an expedition. The description gives us a clear idea of 
Philip's power and wealth: everything is mentioned, from the `louchets et [... ] pelles 
de fer pour manouvriers' to the rich tents, trappings for the horses, and `autres riches 
estoremens de corps pour fait de guerre, qui valoient rancons de rois et princes'. The 
Duke naturally had some armours and garments prepared, which were particularly 
splendid `car les avoit gardes pour cestuy voyage comme pour fin de sa gloire' (IV, 
430-431). However, Chastelain, more than any other chronicler, also insisted on 
Philip's humility, for the crusade was primarily a penitential experience, and nowhere 
else do we get such a powerful image of the Duke actually `taking the cross', 
ultimately laying everything in God's hands, ready to imitate Christ. The crusade 
would bring glory, but it was also a burden. The story of Charles VII's widow asking 
the Duke to let her take part in the expedition, `non pas, ce fit dire, comme une royne 
de tel Estat comme eile avoit este, mais comme une povre meschine toute humble, 
dessous la grace de Nostre-Seigneur' (IV, 363-364), is I think very revealing of the 
state of mind of Philip, as it appears in Chastelain's narration. It is difficult to 
imagine what this crusade, led by an old man, followed by the knights of the Duchy, 
accompanied by an old woman in her carriage, could have achieved. As we can 
gather, Philip's ideals of crusading as depicted by Chastelain were not exactly 
practical, despite the intensive preparations made. Apparently, the results of the 
campaign did not even matter that much; the most important thing was that, should 
Philip die, he would go straight into heaven. 
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The first difficulties, after the excitement of 1454, arise with the Dauphin's 
arrival at the court of Burgundy in 1456, and they will regularly prevent Philip from 
taking the cross until 1464. Chastellain marvels at the character of these unexpected 
difficulties; to him, they appear extraordinary. He recalls a prediction made to Jean 
de Chalon -a Burgundian lord who seems to have been more practical than Philip, 
since, unsure of whether the crusade would take place, and wishing `a en savoir le 
vray, afin de soy pourvoir et preainser sur ce, selon 1'exigence du cas', Chalon had 
recourse to an astrologer, who explained: 
Je trouve que qui voudroit aller querir une pierce au fond de la 
parfonde mer, en une roche, on la tireroit dehors aussi facilement et ä 
si peu de peine, comme on pourra mener, ne traire ce prince dont la 
question est, en cestuy voyage (IV, 451-452). 
The last difficulty, the quarrel between Philip and his son Charles, which 
made it impossible for Philip to leave since Charles was supposed to govern the 
Duchy in his absence, is described by Chastelain as being simply diabolical (IV, 
459). Clearly the devil was doing all he could to prevent Philip from taking the cross. 
But quarrels between princes an their sons often occurred in the Middle Ages: the 
same thing had happened between Charles VII and the Dauphin Louis. Philip and 
Chastelain were starting to realize how difficult it was for a Renaissance prince to 
chivalrously defend the faith in person: because the prince was governing more 
autocratically, his office implied many new obligations and responsibilities. If one 
adds to this the problem of the neighbouring states' attitude, it is quite easy to 
understand why Philip eventually never took the cross. 
Nevertheless, at the time, Philip's crusading ideals were still vivid: this is 
quite obvious in the very moving pages that relate the preparations made between 
November 1463 and February 1464, when Philip was still hoping to depart. 
Chastelain depicts the Duke in front of all the knights who had taken a vow at the 
Feast of the Pheasant ten years earlier, inquiring whether they were ready to follow 
him. Jean Devaux has pointed out how skilfully Chastelain pictured the virtues of 
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chivalry slowly taking over the crowd (IV, 441)60. The noblemen were at first quite 
taken aback, until a knight loudly renewed his vow: 
luy, non le tout plus sage du pays, beoit par une arrogance d'embler 
cestuy mot ä tous les grands qui lä estoient [... ] par quoy, quant il fut 
dit, il demeura dit, fust fol, fust sage, n'y accomptoit riens, et les 
autres qui en rirent 1'ensievirent (IV, 442). 
In this passage, religious `madness' and chivalrous enthusiasm still triumph over 
reason. Soon this will change. The episode where Chastelain insists upon the fear of 
the Estates of the `bonnes villes', who saw that Philip was preparing to leave without 
having solved the problem of his quarrel with his son, thus not knowing who would 
govern the Duchy, and who decided `de [... ] aller par un commun accort eux ruer ä 
genoux devant le duc et luy prier qu'en compassion de tous ses bons et humbles 
subgects, il leur voulsist declarer avant son partement en quelle main [... ] il les 
laisseroit' (IV, 464) illustrates perfectly Norman Housley's comment that, although 
the prince was theoretically obliged to defend the faith, he soon realized that `the 
obligation faced by each subject to put service to prince before everything inevitably 
entailed a corresponding obligation on the prince's part to do nothing which would 
61 imperil the realm and his subjects'. 
Considering all these difficulties, Chastelain wrote Chapter 62 of Book VI 
wherein he declared that, should Philip never manage to fulfil his vow, which seemed 
likely in January 1464, he should be excused, `car qui fait ce qu'il peut, ne Dieu, ne 
homme, ne fortune ne peuvent demander plus riens'. And to protect him against `les 
mal parlans', Chastelain added `que sa bonne volente et diligence montrees tous les 
jours, luy seront et devront estre reputees pour effet lors'. Philip's crusading 
endeavours had earned him as much honour as if he had actually taken the cross, and 
his `gloire perpetuelle quant au monde' was intact (IV, 461). It is strange that no 
scholar should have emphasized the importance of this chapter whereby the official 
historiographer took it upon himself to excuse his prince from a chivalric vow as 
honourable and ambitious as that pronounced by Philip. Being clearly disappointed 
60 DEVAUX, `Le Saint Voyage... ', p. 58. 
61 HOUSLEY, p. 453. 
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with the unfavourable circumstances, almost with God himself - after all, Philip 
could not do anything if He did not pull his weight - Chastelain resorted to the more 
practical solution of stating that Philip's endeavours were, in terms of honour gained 
or saved, equivalent to a passagium. 
Yet, at the beginning of 1464, there were still chances that Philip might fulfil 
his vow: Pius II was organizing a large-scale expedition, and had decided to lead the 
crusade in person, despite his age, in the hope that other rulers might follow his 
example. Pius also was constantly pressing Philip to keep his promise and take the 
cross62. In his narrative of the collapse of Pius' expedition, the shift in Chastelain's 
attitude becomes even more striking, and in these pages the ideals of crusading, as 
they were expressed in the first part of the chronicle -I do not wish, of course, to 
suggest that Chastelain became opposed to crusading in general - receive a fatal 
blow. Chastelain describes in great detail the collapse of the expedition, the heated 
debate that took place at the court of Burgundy, and the grief of the Duke who 
gradually had to relinquish the idea of fulfilling his vow, even though he never 
completely abandoned the hope of taking the cross. 
Chastelain's comments about the practice of mass crusading, for example, 
show that his views were increasingly contrasting with Pius' ideals concerning 
crusading. Crowds of common people had responded to Pius' appeal by choosing to 
serve in person. Pius could not be blamed for this because he had explicitly stated 
that only those who were fully armed and could sustain themselves for at least half a 
year should serve in person63. However, we learn from the small gifts he made, as a 
gesture of good will, to priests who had proposed to raise their own companies, that 
he had not discouraged the common people from taking the cross if they wanted. 
After all, as the Sienese envoy Leonardo Benvoglienti had pointed out to the 
Signoria, these improvised crusaders were much more praiseworthy than all the 
princes who were not performing their duty as defenders of the faith64. Chastelain 
started by blaming the Venetians who were asking the common people to pay a fee in 
order to join the crusade; however his argument soon changed. He described in vivid 
62 ADRIEN DE BUT, p. 421-422,449; GEORGES CHASTELAIN, V, 45. 
63 Cf. MITCHELL, p. 264. 
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detail the turn which the crusade would have taken if these amateur soldiers, who 
arrived in flocks `atout la Croix en leur poitrine', with no money, had been welcomed 
with open arms, stating that `on les eust tues et meurdris comme bestes; fussent 
morts de faim et de povrete, eussent fait et cuidie faire meschief, [... ] car n'eussent 
point eu de chef, ne de prince pour ä qui eux retraire, ne rallier' (V, 47). Of course, 
there is no evidence that Chastelain was ever in favour of mass crusading, and one 
cannot assert that his ideals changed in that regard. But what matters is that 
Chastelain, who was at the beginning blaming the Venetians, ended up stating: 
ne suis pas tant for adherent au parti de ceux qui blasment les 
Venitiens en leur convoitise, que je ne soie encore de la secte de ceux 
qui distinguent et discernent leur haulte et merveilleuse prudence, qui 
les tient et a tenus jä si longuement en regne et en gloire (V, 47-48). 
The subtle use of the word `discernent', and the laudatory words employed to 
describe the Venetian Republic, strongly suggest that Chastelain was in fact much 
more inclined to praise the Venetians than to blame them. Yet, we saw how 
Chastelain had hitherto prized enthusiasm higher than prudence. Eventually, his 
desire to see this crusade as starting very badly - and it admittedly was - in order to 
excuse Philip's failure to join it led Chastelain to praise the Venetians, whom Pius 
had always held in contempt, because they were `seeking the Peloponnese not 
Jesus' 65 
Chastelain's disillusionment and increasing pragmatism becomes more 
obvious in the next pages, as the chronicler describes the heated debate that took 
place at the court of Burgundy, over the question of whether Philip should join the 
Pope. Pius vigorously requested the Duke's presence, and Philip's ambassadors had 
promised in his name that he would personally join company with the crusaders. Yet, 
Chastelain shows how strongly rebuked by Philip's counsellors Guillaume Fillastre 
was, because the chancellor insisted that it was a question of honour that the Duke 
should go (V, 54-55). Chastelain excuses the prelate, whose good will was obvious, 
but cannot agree with him. He depicts with frightful images the fate that awaited 
64 Ibid., p. 262. 
65 Quotation from Pius II's Commentaries found in SCEIWOEBEL, p. 77. 
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Philip and the House of Burgundy, as could be gathered from the rather appalling 
state of the crusading fleet - few of the promised troops had arrived, and pestilence 
had broken out in Ancona: 
la maison de Bourgogne en seroit destruite et minee ä jamais d'avoir 
et de substance, et n'en venroit riens ä effet, ne ä fruit; car il [Philip] 
mourroit en chemin, ce disoit-on, en estrange terre [... ] et n'auroit 
assistance des princes chrestiens, si non povre (V, 49). 
As one can see, the thought that Philip might die like Saint Louis, however glorious 
such a death would be, did not enchant our chronicler. 
The last sparkles of the Duke's earlier crusading ideals can be seen in 
Chastelain's description of Philip's long tormented thoughts (V, 53), a passage which 
has been praised by Jean-Claude Declos because it demonstrates Chastellain's skill 
as an amateur psychologist 66. For Chastelain, however, the break was accomplished. 
In a startling passage about Guillaume Fillastre which sounds the death knell for 
many medieval ideals, Chastelain explicitly states that religion and politics are two 
distinct things which cannot always be reconciled: 
Et pour ce dit-on que ces grans theologiens et ces gens devots qui riens 
ne savent des affaires du monde, ne sont experts des humaines 
convenabletes [... ] et ne sont communement point profitables ä royaux 
consaux, ne en affaires de princes, pour ce que leur jugement gisent 
tout lä haut en 1'air, et n'ont point de pieds [... ] en terre, certes, parce 
qu'ils n'y ont point de vocation, ne de pratique, ne maniance de 
publique necessite, avecques qui toute divine loi et escript dispensent 
et ploient (V, 55). 
Thus, Chastelain's original ideas about crusading had changed radically. He 
used to envisage crusading as an act of folly inspired by God, unhindered by earthly 
considerations, a generous and joyful walk to martyrdom, exactly like Pius II, who 
movingly declared to his cardinals on September 23,1463: `we must change to paths 
long disused [... ]. Abstinence, purity, innocence, zeal for the faith, religious fervor, 
scorn of death, eagerness for martyrdom have set the Church of Rome over the whole 
66 DELCLOS, Le temoignage..., p. 335. 
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world'67. But in his desire to excuse the Duke, Chastelain ended up blaming Pius for 
having tried to drag Philip down with him in his mad suicidal dream, stating that the 
Pope `usoit de legerete [... ] et de peu d'avis, de le [Philip] solliciter ainsy seul pour 
un si grant cas' (V, 63)68. Eventually Philip won, because his frustrated crusading 
efforts had still brought him glory, and because he had done everything he humanly 
could. 
" Conclusion 
Philip's crusading endeavours surely were a generous and relatively 
disinterested action, springing from a sincere desire to perform his duty as a Christian 
prince, and from a true concern about the safety of Christendom, but they were also 
motivated by a thirst for honour and glory. We saw that crusading was a chivalrous 
ideal par excellence; it is thus not surprising if Philip, as a most chivalrous prince, 
eager to procure his state more prestige on the international scene, chose to direct his 
attention to this particular activity. Burgundian chroniclers emphasized all the 
magnificence of Philip's crusading actions and endeavours, and how much honour 
they had brought him. But there was more than one flaw in this guerre d'honneur et 
de magnificence. Most importantly, the chroniclers could not provide an adequate 
explanation for the fact that Philip eventually never fulfilled his vow, which, albeit 
conditional, had been pronounced with almost outrageous ceremony at the Feast of 
the Pheasant. Georges Chastelain, who clearly adored his Duke, took his dearest 
dream most seriously, and as he closely followed the unfolding of events, he saw 
better than anyone else the tragedy unfolding, the slow death of an ideal. Chastelain's 
particular sensitivity was also due to the fact that he was as much an artist as a 
chronicler; besides, as an amateur psychologist, he was most fitted to describe this 
67 Quotation from SCIIWOEBEL, n. 72, p. 81. 
68 There seems to have been a lot of resentment in Burgundy against Pius at the time of his death, 
perhaps for the same reason, for Jacques Du Clercq declared that Pius died `en grand dangier pour son 
ame, et en parloit-on en mauvaise maniere; [... ] et en ce temps le plus des gens d'eglise [... ] estoient si 
abandonnes et outrageux en orgueil, luxure et convoitise, qu'on ne polroit plus dire' (JACQUES DU 
CLERCQ, XIV, 352). 
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`war never waged'. His writing and thought was acquiring more and more maturity, 
especially when compared to his narrative of the early years of Philip's rule, as seen 
in my first chapter. However, as far as his report of Philip's crusading efforts is 
concerned, the distance travelled by Chastelain is tantamount to a loss of illusions, in 
this case about the old chivalric dream of crusading. 
For the next chapter, I wish to remain within the field of Philip's crusading 
endeavours, turning to a different problem: the practice of crusading, on the field. 
Philip never went to the Levant, but sent many Burgundian knights as part of his 
crusading endeavours. One of the best testimonies of these Burgundian experiences 
of the Levant is Jean de Wavrin's narrative of the crusading expedition lead by his 
nephew Walleran in 1444-1445: we shall see how Walleran, as an eyewitness, and 
his uncle described these exotic military operations; we shall also see that the 
expedition was often far from being a guerre d'honneur et de magnificence, though it 
was conceived as one. 
Crusading as 
a guerre de magnificence : 
a 15 `h century 
illumination 
0 
Fig. 5. All sails set : the 
magnificence of a 
crusading fleet steering for 
alien lands. This 15`h 
century illumination depicts 
a Franco-Genoese expedition 
to Barbary which took place 
in 1390. From a manuscript 
of Froissart's Chroniques. 
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Chapter 4: Philip the Good's crusading endeavours in Burgundian 
historiography (II). Adventures in the Levant: Jean de Wavrin's 
narrative of Walleran de Wavrin's expedition against the Ottoman 
Turks (1444-1445)' 
Item, quand Pon arrma lesdites galleez l'on porta la banniere 
de monseigneur le Duc [... ] en la loge de la pleyse Sainct 
Marc et fu fait ledit armement publicquement a son de 
trompettes et de menestrez... 
Extract from Walleran de Wavrin's report of the 1444 
expedition2 
41 Introduction 
The preceding chapter concentrated primarily on the theory and ideal of 
crusading in Burgundy under the rule of Philip the Good, taking a particular interest 
in the Burgundian chroniclers' comments about Philip's proposed `saint voiage'. We 
saw, however, that the help offered by Philip to the Christian states and communities 
of the Levant was not purely theoretical, since much of his naval policy was directed 
towards the relief of the Christians threatened with, or already under the Turkish 
yoke. Most Burgundian chroniclers presented the expeditions sent by Philip to the 
Levant as magnificent actions, and praised the deeds performed by Burgundian 
captains, though some, more critical or better informed than the others, were aware of 
the defects in these expeditions, or in the results achieved. In this chapter, I propose 
A French version of this chapter, entitled `Des chevaliers bourguignons dans les pays du Levant: 
1'expedition de Walleran de Wavrin contre les Turcs ottomans (1444-1445) dans les Anchiennes 
cronicques d'Engleterre de Jean de Wavrin', will be found in Le Moyen Age, 106 /2 (2000), 255-275. 
2 ADN, B 1984, no 59 234, article VIII. 
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to further investigate the treatment, in Burgundian historiography, of these crusading 
actions, by concentrating exclusively on the best account of a crusading expedition 
sent by Philip to the Levant to be found in a Burgundian chronicle: Jean de Wavrin's 
narrative of his nephew Walleran's crusade. 
In 1444, Burgundy was one of the only Western European powers to take part 
in what Francois Pall referred to as the last European alliance against the enemies of 
Christianity3 - although modern historians tend to regard every 15`h century crusading 
effort as `the last crusade'. In June or July 1442, Philip and his court had been visited 
by a rather exotic `chevalier'4, the Greek ambassador Theodore Carystos. Carystos 
had been sent by the Byzantine Emperor John VIII Paleologus to various Western 
European princes to request them to help save the Byzantine Empire's last remains. 
Only Pope Eugene IV, the Venetians and Philip were to respond positively. Philip 
promised to send ten ships, though he only had his `grosse nave', a carvel and a 
whaler at his disposal. The Duke had four galleys built in Nice, and the Republic of 
Venice lent him four more galleys. Walleran de Wavrin was appointed `lieutenant et 
capitaine general' of the Burgundian fleet, and was to share the command of the 
Christian fleet with the Venetian prelate and papal legate Francesco Condelmare, as 
well as with the Venetian admiral Alvise Loredano5. 
We must be thankful that Walleran happened to be the nephew of Jean de 
Wavrin, for the latter inserted in his Croniques d'Engleterre an accurate and 
fascinating account of Walleran's crusade, which is also the longest wholly original 
report to be found in his chronicle. This exotic interlude, rather unique in Burgundian 
historiography, testifies to Jean de Wavrin's interest for crusading and Levantine 
affairs, and offers us an invaluable insight into the reflections that direct 
confrontation with the reality of 15th century crusading could inspire in Burgundian 
knights. In 1967, Robert Schwoebel described Wavrin's account as `one of the 
longest, most interesting and best informed reports on any Turkish-related topic to be 
3 F. PALL, `Un moment decisif de I'histoire du Sud-Est europeen: la croisade de Varna (1444)', in 
Balcania, 7 (1944), 102-120. 
° Cf. GEORGES CIIASTELAIN, Le livre des faits du bon chevalier messire Jacques de Lalaing, in 
G2uvres, VIII, 1-259 (p. 33). 
s On the preparation of the fleet and the campaign see TAPAREL, `Un episode... ', and PAVIOT, p. 113- 
123. 
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found in any Western chronicle of the 15th century', adding that it deserved to be 
studied more carefully6. It seems that the longest analysis of the narrative which is 
not purely historical was made by Dorothy Vaughan in 1954; it still is mainly a 
summary, and her personal comments about the text are scarce. The notes which 
Emilie Dupont and Nicolas lorga added to their editions of the report are invaluable, 
but they mainly help to clarify this text dealing with events which were in their time 
very obscure7. 
We learn from Jean de Wavrin himself that he often participated in long 
conversations about history and war with his lord - for Jean de Wavrin was a bastard 
- and nephew Walleran (I, 1-2)8, and certainly the main source for Jean's report was 
Walleran's own oral narration of his adventures to his uncle. Nicolas lorga thought 
that Walleran had dictated the narrative to Jean9. But in his dedication of the 
Croniques d'Engleterre, in the prologue, Jean seems to imply that Walleran may be 
surprised - and probably delighted - to find a narrative of his adventures in the 
chronicle. Comparing Jean's account with the short reports that Walleran wrote for 
his Duke, preserved in the Archives departementales du Nord1°, does not help 
identifying the `true' author. One could argue that the reports, unlike the account, are 
written in a business-like style and that Jean, as a compiler, had more literary 
experience than Walleran; on the other hand, Walleran did not intend his reports to 
be literary exercises. Thus the `true' author eludes us; probably both Walleran and 
Jean should be considered as the narrative's authors. In fact, the absence of one 
single author helps us to see `l'c uvre fermee [se transformer] en oeuvre ouverte', to 
paraphrase Umberto Eco and Roland Barthes, with regard to the message of the 
6 SCI I WOEBEL, n. 12, p. 110. 
7 Cf. D. M. VAUGHAN, Europe and the Turk. A Pattern of Alliances (1350-1700), Liverpool, 
University Press, 1954, p. 60-61; JEAN DE WAVRIN, Anchiennes cronicques d'Engleterre. Choix de 
chapitres inedits, ed. E. DUPONT for the SHF, 3 vol., Paris, V Renouard, 1858-1863, II, 12-162; N. 
IORGA, `Cronica lui Wavrin si Rominii', in Buletinul Comisiei istorice a Romdniei, VI, Bucarest, 
Datina Romaneasca, 1927, p. 59-148. See also N. IORGA, `Les aventures "sarrazines" des Francais de 
Bourgogne au XV° siPcle', in Melanges d'histoire generale, ed. C. MARINESCO, Cluj, Cartea 
Romäneasca, 1927, p. 7-56. 
g All references to Wavrin's Croniques still apply to William Hardy's edition, unless when Emilie 
Dupont's edition is explicitly mentioned. 
9 IORGA, `Les aventures... ', p. 14. 
10 ADN, B 1984, n° 59 234 and ADN, B 2074, n°65 309. 
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account". Indeed, Wavrin's account is rather ambiguous, because it is the story of 
the confrontation of chivalrous ideals with other mentalities. There is a plurality of 
voices and senses in the account that does not need a study of the words' semantics to 
be detected: it simply results from the fact that Walleran and Jean faithfully 
transcribed the opinions of men of cultures different than their own: the Hungarian 
Turk hunter Janos Hunyadi, the Byzantine Emperor, even some Turks. Wavrin's 
account is also the story of the confrontation of a Westerner's expectations vis ä vis 
the crusade with reality. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the way in which 
Wavrin - whether Walleran or Jean or both - depicted this 15th century crusade, to 
understand how a Burgundian nobleman imagined, and experienced, the reality of 
crusading in the Late Middle Ages. 
1. Context of Walleran's crusade 
Before turning our attention to Wavrin's narrative, it is interesting to take a 
close look at Jean de Wavrin's dedication of his work to Walleran, as it explains why 
Jean included an account of Walleran's Levantine adventures in the Croniques 
d'Engleterre: 
Et aussi se en ce mon tres honnoure seigneur comprendez ou trouvez 
chose qui puist tourner ou pourfiter ä 1'amplification et 
recommandation de vostre noble personne, il le vous plaise retenir ä la 
loenge de nostre seigneur Jhesu Crist, en aiant, par vostre grace 
memoire de vostre tres humble serviteur (I, 4). 
As one can see, Wavrin's first reason for including this narrative in his chronicle was 
to praise his nephew and patron, by advertising the good work he had performed for 
Christendom. In fact, we shall see that Walleran did not accomplish much with this 
" `Chaque epoque peut croire [... ] qu'elle detient le sens canonique de I'ceuvre, mais il suffit d'6largir 
un peu I'histoire pour transformer ce sens singulier en lens pluriel et ('oeuvre fermde en ceuvre ouverte. 
La definition meme de l'ceuvre change: eile nest plus un fait historique, eile devient un fait 
anthropologique, puisque aucune histoire ne I'epuise'. Cf. R. BARTHES, Critique et verite, Paris, 
Seuil, 1966, p. 50. Barthes is here drawing on U. ECO, L'o'uvre ouverte, Paris, Seuil, 1965. 
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expedition, but the fact that he put his life at risk for Christendom - which should be 
the dream of every knight - was in itself laudable. As if expecting some show of 
modesty from Walleran, Jean added that his narrative was ultimately intended to 
extol the name of God, who was and always should always be honoured by great 
works for the protection and propagation of the Christian faith. One should note that, 
despite the title of his chronicle, Wavrin, keeping with the medieval tradition of the 
speculum historiale, was always prone to narrate important events that took place in 
far-off countries, especially when related to the progress or defeats of Christianity's 
enemies. 
In his dedication, Jean de Wavrin also emphasized how Walleran had been 
sent 
comme capitaine general de pluiseurs galees et navires armees et 
garnies de grant nombre de gens d'armes et de trait, par l'ordonnance 
[... ] de tres hault et tres exellent et puissant prince Phelipe, duc de 
Bourgoingne [... ] es mers du Levant et de Grece, pour obvier [... ] 
alencontre des entreprises des infideles turcs (I, 2). 
By laying stress on the power of the fleet, Wavrin clearly portrayed the expedition as 
a magnificent and generous gesture from Philip, in a word, a guerre de magnificence. 
Having seen how Jean heralded his narrative, let us now turn to the account. 
It is greatly to Jean de Wavrin's credit as a historian that he placed the 
conflicts in which Walleran took part in the broader context of the Ottoman sultans' 
attempts to extend their dominion. Throughout the first part of his narration, Jean de 
Wavrin skilfully skips from events in the Occident, in Rhodes or the Bosphorus to 
affairs taking place in Hungary, Wallachia, or Bulgaria. In the case of the latter three, 
Wavrin could not rely on first hand testimony, but he still dwelt on them at length in 
his effort to produce a continuous and intelligible narrative. Wavrin's story begins in 
Wallachia, with the imprisonment of Vlad Dracul, the Voivode of Wallachia, father 
of Vlad Tepes better known as Dracula. He recounts, with many colourful details that 
demonstrate his skill as a story-teller, how Sultan Murad II, hearing for the first time 
about a country called Wallachia, `pays fort riche et bien peuple d'hommes grans et 
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puissans' (V, 5), started to get envious and expressed the wish to incorporate 
Wallachia into his Empire. Murad II invited Vlad Dracul to a feast at the Sublime 
Porte on the pretext that he wished to conclude an alliance between the Wallachians 
and the Turks. Vlad accepted, but he was seized during the feast, and imprisoned. It 
should be noted that Wavrin greatly simplified the relations between Wallachia and 
the Porte: to him, Vlad's imprisonment and the Turkish aggression upon Wallachia 
that followed simply resulted from Murad's greed. But in reality, Murad knew both 
Wallachia and Vlad Dracul very well, the latter being Murad's vassal, albeit a 
Christian. It seems that Vlad II was in fact ousted from his throne by Janos Hunyadi, 
who was chasing the Turks of Transylvania and was angry at the fact that Vlad had 
let them pass freely through Wallachia. Vlad subsequently sought refuge at the Porte, 
and was imprisoned for having had intelligence with the Hungarians 12. The story that 
Vlad II had been betrayed by the Turks seems to have been widely circulated in the 
15`h century as we also find it in a letter of the Constantinopolitan friar Barthelemy de 
Genes13. We cannot, however, expect Wavrin to have understood how critical Vlad's 
position was, since the Voivode was obliged to compromise both with the 
Hungarians and the Turks. Wavrin's narrative is otherwise remarkably well 
informed, with informative touches of local colour: this is noticeable for instance in 
his description of the feast held at the Porte, as he describes the sultan sitting `dedens 
ung pavilion tout double d'un veloux cramoisy, [... ] pare de riches coussins et 
oreillies de drapz d'or et de soye, lequel pavilion estoit [... ] trousse contremont 
environ de dix piedz de haulteur adfin qu'il veist ses gens et capittaines' (V, 7). 
Wavrin subsequently relates the victories obtained by Hunyadi against the Turks in 
Wallachia, which encouraged the Hungarians to undertake a major offensive in 
Bulgaria. 
Our chronicler appears particularly well informed in his account of the Long 
Campaign or Langer Feldzug, when the new Polish King of Hungary Wladislaw III 
Jagellon, Janos Hunyadi, the papal legate Cesarini and the exiled Serbian Despot 
George Brankovic managed to penetrate deep into Ottoman territory, gaining some 
impressive victories without the help of the powers of the Occident, who were either 
12 For a biography of Vlad II see R. FLORESCU and R. T. MC NALLY, Dracula. A Biography of Had 
the Impaler, New York, Hawthorn Books, 1973, p. 29-45. 
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unprepared, or engaged in domestic disputes. The campaign is presented as a conflict 
between the forces of God and evil. Wavrin relates at length how, prior to their 
greatest victory, Cesarini granted absolution to all Christians, and adds: `le legat fist 
dreschier la croix et porter devant luy, et le roy fist desploier ses banieres et marchier 
ses batailles ou nom de Jhesu Crist contre le Turcq' (V, 28). It is interesting to note 
that Wavrin knew how severe the casualties in the Christian host had been, due to the 
cold mainly, even though, as he himself points out, the Hungarians and Cesarini had 
decided to keep this fact secret and to contradict those who would spread it (V, 30). 
Nonetheless, Wavrin dwells on the torments endured by the Christians in the 
mountains shaken by snow-storms 14. Walleran had probably been told about these 
hardships by some Hungarian or Wallachian knights. Jean de Wavrin concludes by 
depicting the grief mixed with joy of the survivors, adding that God may have 
allowed this stroke of misfortune to reward some of the courageous warriors for their 
`bonnes affections et voullentez [... ] pour renumeration desqueles choses il les 
voulloit herbregier en son paradis par tel martire' (V, 29-30). 
The successes of the Langer Feldzug were advertised all over Europe. This 
impressive news was what the Western powers needed to accelerate the preparations 
of their fleet and in July 1444 Walleran de Wavrin left Venice with his galleys, 
steering towards Greece. 
2. First encounters of the Burgundians with infidels 
Walleran's arrival in the Straits of the Dardanelles provides us with an 
interesting passage. Wavrin recounts how Walleran halted at Tenedos where, as he 
was told, the ancient Greeks on their way to attack Troy had landed. He then inquired 
where the site of Troy was and decided to have his first skirmish against the Turks on 
that location (V, 38-39). This episode shows how excited Walleran felt about waging 
war in places which were oozing history. His desire to fight on a spot where the great 
heroes of Antiquity had battled before him may be regarded as a chivalrous fantasy: 
13 The letter appears in JEAN DE WAVRIN, ed. DUPONT, II, 2-11. 
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Walleran wanted to be able to regard himself as the successor of Achilles, 
Agamemnon, and their likes. After all, as Michael Heath has pointed out, many 
people in the 15th century considered the Turks as the Trojans' descendants", 
perhaps Walleran did also. Later in the account, Jean de Wavrin will describe at great 
length the harbour of Mangalia on the Black Sea, explaining how it had been built by 
the Amazons (V, 64). These two cultural interludes seem to illustrate to some degree 
Gordon Kipling's theory that the ideal of the `learned knight' in the 16th century was 
a legacy of the Burgundian court 16. 
While Walleran de Wavrin was in Constantinople, his fellow Geoffroy de 
Thoisy, who had left Nice in May 1444, decided, with Philip's agreement, to lend 
assistance to the knights of Rhodes, who were being besieged by a composite force of 
Mamelukes and Turks. The raising of the siege was the greatest deed to be 
accomplished during the whole campaign, and Wavrin related the fierce combats 
with many details (V, 33-38). This episode allows us to witness Geoffroy de Thoisy's 
heroic and self-assured attitude, which seems to have been the norm among our 
Burgundian crusaders. Upon his arrival in Rhodes, Geoffroy learnt from the Grand 
Master how the mercenaries sent by the King of Aragon were about to take their 
leave, because the knights of Rhodes could not afford the high wages that they 
demanded. Geoffroy required of the Grand Master to be officially welcomed by the 
knights of Rhodes in the presence of all the foreign captains, and before them the 
Burgundians declared that they did not ask for any wages, and that 
se aulcuns par laschete de courage demandassent guaiges excessifz 
adfin de par ce querir moyen de la ville et cite habandonner a leur 
honneur, et quant ores aulcuns le habandonneroient si estoient ilz 
assez puissants pour au Dieu plaisir la tenir contre tous les 
malvoeillans (V, 35). 
Geoffroy's exemplary stance put all the foreign captains to shame, and won back 
their support. We shall see how Walleran later displayed a similar assurance 
141 have not found this episode in any French, Burgundian or Greek chronicle, which seems to indicate 
that the Christian losses were indeed kept secret. 
's M. J. HEATH, `Renaissance Scholars and the Origins of the Turks', in Bibliotheque d'Humanisme et 
Renaissance. Travaux et documents, XLI, Geneve, Droz, 1979, p. 453-471. 
16 See especially Chapter 7 in KIPLING. 
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successively before John VIII and Hunyadi, only less successfully, for his chivalrous 
self-confidence would clash with the Emperor and the Hungarian hero's prudence. 
3. Two dramatic episodes: Murad II crosses the Straits and overwhelms the 
Hungarians at Varna 
A month after Walleran's departure from Venice, Wladislaw III ratified the 
treaty of Szeged, which provoked a well-known controversy following the disaster of 
Varna'7. Some of Wavrin's contemporaries made violent remarks about the fact that 
Wladislaw had broken the peace solemnly sworn at Szeged. The Greek 
historiographer Chalcodondyles seems to agree with George Brankovic as he depicts 
the Despot declaring to Wladislaw that it was `chose trop detestable de fausser ainsi 
les promesses jurees' 18. And the Byzantine chronicler Doukas explains, as he relates 
Murad II's death, that Murad had never broken his word, unlike some Christians who 
were thereafter `justly punished by the judgment of the Avenger'19. Wavrin gives his 
version of the facts with many details, concentrating on the excuses given by 
Wladislaw to Cesarini for having signed the treaty, and on Cesarini's anger (V, 42). 
He does not, however, state a personal opinion, perhaps because he deemed the 
subject delicate. Still, we sense that Jean de Wavrin was certainly not traumatized by 
the fact that the Christians had broken their treaty. Keeping one's word was a 
chivalric virtue, but it seems that when dealing with the infidel, derogations were 
allowed. Wavrin gives us all the arguments of the legate Cesarini, without showing 
any disapproval. The Pope had not been asked his opinion, therefore the treaty was 
void (V, 42). Wavrin shows well through Cesarini's words that making peace would 
have meant missing a unique opportunity. He pictures the legate exclaiming: 
17 On the controversy see HOUSLEY, p. 88; VAUGHAN, p. 58-59, and PALL, p. 107-113, the latter 
being particularly informative. 
1I have used the 16`h century translation of Chalcocondyles by Blaise de Vigenere entitled L'Histoire 
de la decadence de ! 'Empire grec et establissement de celuy des Turcs, Paris, Abel 1'Angelier, 1584. 
Despite its age it is a trustworthy translation, at least for our purpose. For Brankovic's comments see p. 
423. 
19 DOUKAS, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, trans!. H. J. MAGOULIAS, Detroit, 
Wayne State University Press, 1975, p. 188-189. 
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pensez-vous se le Turcq feust puissant pour convenir a bataille contre 
vous qu'il vous eust convoquie a paix [... ] ? Certes nennil. Nostre 
Saint-Pere a eu nouvelles [... ] que le Turcq est si has et a tant perdu es 
preterites batailles contre vous et autres qu'il ne scet ou recouvrer 
gens, et que ores est-il heure de reconcquerir la Grece ou jamais (V, 
42-43). 
Chalcocondyles makes it clear in his chronicle that, at the time of the treaty, the 
Turks were facing problems from every quarter, and considered themselves 
doomed20. Finally, Wavrin shows Cesarini absolving the Christians for breaking their 
treaty without a single word of disapproval. In any case, Jean de Wavrin's opinion on 
this subject probably reflects that of Walleran, and it is hard to imagine that Walleran 
would have been pleased to have made this whole journey for nothing. Jean's 
account depicts the confusion of the members of the Christian fleet when shown the 
treaty by some Turkish officers, and their relief as the news arrives that the treaty is 
void (V, 46). 
The Christian fleet's mission was to prevent the Turkish forces of Anatolia 
from crossing the Straits of the Bosphorus to face Wladislaw's army. Wavrin's 
narrative of the Christians' helplessness as Murad's powerful host passes from one 
continent to another is probably the most exciting passage of his report, and it is 
strange that no scholar should have yet commented upon it. Some modem historians 
even doubt that the fleet made any attempt to stop Murad's troops21. Perhaps 
Walleran did not tell his uncle the whole truth, yet I find Jean's narration quite 
convincing, and in any case very powerful. By inserting the letter of the 
Constantinopolitan friar Barthelemy in her edition of Wavrin's chronicle, Emilie 
Dupont augmented the dramatic impact of this narration, for Barthelemy, who was 
confident in God's help, wrote to the prior of Saint John of Jerusalem: `que feroient 
vingt gallees pour garder le destroit? Je vous di, tres cher seigneur, que dix galees 
souffiroient, ä present, pour garder le pas contre eulx'22. 
Wavrin starts by showing Walleran patrolling the Straits shortly before the 
arrival of the Turkish army, in a passage which bathes in a `peace before the storm' 
20 LAONICOS CHALCOCONDYLES, p. 412-421. 
21 Cf. HOUSLEY, p. 88: `no attempt was made by the fleet to stop him [Murad]'. 
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atmosphere. This episode is also intended to excuse Walleran in advance for his 
failure: according to Jean, the Christians clearly saw that the shots of the Turks' 
culverins could reach the other side of the Straits (V, 47). Walleran explains to 
Emperor John VIII, through his envoys, that it will be impossible to guard the Straits 
if he does not occupy either the Roumelian shore, or the Anatolian shore with his 
troops, but John VIII refuses. The prudent Emperor failed to be reassured by 
Walleran's chivalrous and heroic offer of his body and troops to assist the Byzantine 
soldiers Walleran wanted him to send (V, 48). All he could do was send two of his 
own galleys in support of the Christian fleet. 
Wavrin then depicts, with many colourful details, the arrival of Murad's army 
on one side of the Straits, while his heir, the young Mehmet, and Khalil Pasha occupy 
the other side with their troops. The Turks begin to bombard the galleys with guns 
cast on the spot, thanks to the metal carried by camels. As often in a drama there is a 
traitor: in Wavrin's narrative the part is played by the Geneose, with whom Walleran 
would later have some altercations, in Caffa, for having captured three merchant 
ships23. According to Walleran and the Venetians, the Genoese had supplied the 
Ottomans with boats (V, 46-47). As the Turks proceed to cross the Straits on these 
small boats, Walleran and his galleys try to stop them, but because of the Turkish 
cannon-shots and of the particularly strong current between the two shores, they 
cannot do much (V, 49). Wavrin's narrative then takes epic and almost apocalyptic 
dimensions. During the night, `ung grant orage et tempeste venant de la mer Majour 
[the Black Sea]' breaks out, making the Christians' task even more dangerous. 
Wavrin gives Manichean proportions to the episode, presenting it as a struggle 
between God and Satan, as he states that this tempest seemed to be `chose 
dyabolicque', whereas the Turks `le reputoient a fast de leurs dieux' (V, 50). The 
Turks install an enormous bombard which will luckily explode after the third shot 
`par l'ayde de Dieu [... ] et se eust ataint une gallee a plain cop elle 1'eust envoie au 
fons de 1'eaue par la fortune du tempz, la radeur du courant et l'ayde du deable' (V, 
51). The poor Emperor of Constantinople receives a severe judgement from Wavrin 
as he tells us that John VIII's galleys were the ships that received the most damage, 
22 See Wavrin's Anchiennes cronicques..., ed. DUPONT, II, 10. 
23 TAPAREL, p. 20. 
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as if this was God's punishment for the Byzantines' cowardice: `comme se ce feust 
miracle les pierces d'engiens par deseure celles de Bourgoigne, si battoient celles de 
1'empereur et dommagoient plus que nulles des autres' (V, 50). Wavrin closes his 
narration with a particularly dramatic event. A Turkish officer demands to parley 
after the passage of the last Turkish soldier. Admitted on board, he declares : 
`Le roy de Hongrye et les Hongres ont parjure et faulse leur by, 
Moratbay [Murad II] va a bataille contra eulz', et en frapant de sa 
droite main sur la manche de son espee dist: `mais par ceste espee 
nous vainquirons la bataille' (V, 51). 
It seems that the inclusion of this climactic and terribly prophetic event betrays some 
sort of uneasiness that Wavrin may have felt: we saw that the chronicler was not 
particularly shocked by the violation of the treaty, yet this striking scene which closes 
the chapter, besides being an instance of literary flourish, seems to indicate that his 
assurance quivered for a moment. 
Wavrin's narrative of the battle of Varna (10 November 1444) is also 
remarkable, besides being an original and valuable source for historians. Once again, 
Wavrin gives epic dimensions to this event, making the battle much different from 
other `secular' battles. In order to fully feel the drama taking place, one must bear in 
mind that the Hungarians did not expect Murad to have crossed the Straits. We can 
sense a worried atmosphere as he depicts the Hungarian knights who are startled by 
the sight of many fires over the mountains at night. Hunyadi is not convinced that 
these are merely peasants burning dry weeds and decides to take a closer look. He 
hears the drums beating and knows for sure that the Turks are near (V, 52). Such 
colourful details - the use of drums was a typical aspect of the Ottoman way of 
waging war - make Wavrin's narrative particularly lively. He describes the battle 
with all the tactical details one always finds in his accounts of engagements; having 
been a soldier himself, he surely intended his accounts of battles to be as useful as 
possible to captains. Wavrin appears as strikingly well informed, especially if we 
compare his account with those of Gilles le Bouvier or Adrien de But24, who stated 
that Wladislaw and Cesarini were captured, tortured and eventually flayed alive. 
24 ADRIEN DE BUT, p. 276; GILLES LE BOUVIER, p. 271-272. 
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Presumably Walleran learnt the details of the battle from the Hungarian survivors 
taken under his protection at Mesembria (V, 63-64). 
It is particularly interesting to see what Wavrin has to say about the King's 
foolish behaviour, which cost him the victory and his life. Wavrin emphasizes 
Hunyadi's wisdom; having put to flight most of Murad's army, Hunyadi tries to 
dissuade Wladislaw from attacking the Sultan and his janissaries who are standing 
firm on top of a mountain, arguing with moving words: `Pour l'honneur de Dieu ne 
vous mettez pas en necessite de perdre ce quy est guaignie'. The battle, he adds, is 
won, the sun is setting, and there is no need to fight the janissaries, who will resist 
fiercely (V, 55). The reference to God's honour clearly indicates that excessive 
heroism would be, not only a strategic mistake, but also a sin: it could ruin what had 
been achieved through God's grace. Wavrin reports the jealous comments of the 
knights to Wladislaw: `Sire, le vaivode a fait sa bataille dont il a honneur, ceste 
bataille seconde doit estre ä nous [... ] forgons le fer entandis qu'il est chault' (V, 56). 
The speeches that Wavrin inserted in the Livian and Tacitean tradition seem 
sometimes commonplace, but after all, history - especially military history - has a 
tendency to repeat itself. Wavrin also denounces the fanatic zeal of Cesarini, as he 
depicts the legate shouting, aiming especially at Hunyadi, that all those who refuse to 
take part in the fight will be excommunicated. Nonetheless, Wavrin is filled with 
admiration for the Hungarian and Polish knights as he relates their disastrous 
offensive: he recounts how the Christians `se misrent au ramper comme tygres' and 
attacked Murad `par grant corage et hardement', adding the epic detail that 
Wladislaw may have fought against Murad himself, before getting his head chopped 
off by ajanissary (V, 57). Such a mixture of blame and admiration does not appear in 
Chalcocondyles' narrative of the battle, which is also very detailed. The Greek 
historiographer is much more severe: he explains that Wladislaw, `pousse d'un 
appetit de gloire', made a decision to attack the Janissaries which was `ä la Write plus 
hardie et courageuse, que bien digeree'25. In other words, Wladislaw had acted like a 
fool. One could say that Wavrin illustrates the medieval and chivalrous point of view, 
while Chalcocondyles presents us with a judgement closer to the classical mentality. 
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The same remark springs to mind if one compares the comments of both 
authors about the decision of John VIII, who really does not get a very good press in 
Wavrin's report, to make peace with the Turks after hearing about the Christians' 
defeat. Chalcocondyles praises Chatites, a Greek vassal of Murad, who had avoided 
informing Murad frankly of John VIII's decision not to support the Turks after the 
successful crossing of the Straits, and was the principal author of the peace 
subsequently made, a peace which would last until Murad's death and brought Murad 
the praises of the Byzantine chronicler Sphrantzes26. Wavrin, on the other hand, tells 
us how Walleran chivalrously promised John VIII, who was dreading Murad's attack, 
that he would offer his body and troops to defend the city. However, 
il fut dit ä l'empereur qu'il envoieroit ambassadeurs devers le Grant 
Turcq pour avoir paix ä lui s'elle se povoit trouver, ä quoy il s'accorda 
voullentiers [... ] et se fist ce traitie au desceu desdis cardinal et 
seigneur de Wavrin, dont ilz furent moult mal contentz (V, 59). 
Wavrin goes on to say that Walleran and Condelmare, the Venetian cardinal with 
whom he shared the command of the fleet, considered that the Emperor had imposed 
on their good will: their help was bound to be useless, since John VIII had refused to 
occupy one shore of the Straits with his troops. 
It is also very illuminating to compare Chalcocondyles' conclusion about the 
battle with Wavrin's comments. The epic Wavrin tries to minimize the extent of 
Murad II's victory by stating that, according to Greek witnesses, `on trouvoit les 
corpz des Turcqz mengies des pourceaulz, mais ilz n'atouchoient auz Christiens'; 
above all, he stresses: `il fat trois jours que Turcqz ne Crestiens ne se moustrerent sur 
la place' (V, 57), a sign that, according to the old medieval customs of warfare, there 
had been no real victor. By contrast, Chalcocondyles sums up the historical 
consequences of Varna with a clear-headedness modern historians would not 
contradict: 
25 LAONICOS CHHALCOCONDYLES, p. 438,442. 
26 Ibid, p. 429,444; GEORGE SPHRANTZES, The Fall of the Byzantine Empire (1401-1477), trans!. 
M. PHILIPPIDES, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1980, p. 58. 
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le gaing de cette bataille haussa le menton aux Turcs et leur rendit 
l'Empire de 1'Europe du tout asseure et paisible, d'autant que les 
Grecs, et autres peuples circonvoisins se repentans de s'estre ainsi 
legierement declarez contre Amurat, firent de lä en avant sa volonte en 
toutes choses27. 
4. Corsair activities on the Black Sea 
After Varna, it was decided that some of the Christian ships should patrol the 
Black Sea's various harbours, in a desperate and quixotic search for Wladislaw, who 
was thought by some to be still alive - though Wavrin makes it clear that the quest 
was most probably vain. This is where some of the most striking Burgundian acts of 
piracy mentioned in the previous chapter took place. Wavrin recounts how Walleran, 
on his arrival at Caffa, heard with much distress that Geoffroy de Thoisy had been 
taken prisoner in Georgia. Geoffroy had learnt at the court of David, the Greek 
Emperor of Trebizond, that a rich merchant ship was supposed to be sailing 
somewhere off the coast of Georgia and had decided to capture it; as Emperor David 
was trying to dissuade him from doing so, arguing that it was a Christian ship, 
Geoffroy had replied to his face `qu'il avoit commandement de guerroier tous 
scismaticques non obeissans ä nostre saint pere' (V, 66). Having arrived off Georgia, 
Geoffroy decided to loot the little harbour of Poti. Unhappily for him, the prince of 
the region, the Patan of Gouria, had been warned by some Greeks against Geoffroy's 
activities. As he landed in Poti, Geoffroy was attacked by the Georgians and captured 
despite his resistance. Wavrin relates how Walleran sent Renaud de Confide, who 
had brought this news, back to Emperor David, to beg him `que pour Dieu, et de sa 
grace il voulsist envoier au pays de Georgie' so that Geoffroy may be released (V, 
66). 
Wavrin gives many details, but he does not seem to blame Geoffroy. Perhaps 
the comment that Geoffroy, on his arrival at Poti, `avoit grant voullente de pillier le 
village' (V, 66), indicates that Geoffroy was going too far, but on the whole the 
27 LAONICOS CIIALCOCONDYLES, p. 444. 
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incident is recounted as a fortune de guerre, one of these things which happened. As 
Nicolas lorga has pointed out, acts of piracy in campaigns against infidels would not 
be criticized by contemporaries until well into the 17th century28. We saw in the last 
chapter that Adrien de But's bitter comments about piracy in crusades followed an 
aggression against the chronicler's own abbey in Flanders; there is no evidence that 
he would have blamed an attack on Orthodox Christians. Walleran himself had 
captured three merchant ships from the Orthodox or Muslim subjects of Genoa; 
Wavrin casually recounted the episode, stating that the ships were Turkish. But in 
fact, they only looked Turkish, and Wavrin did not mention that when Walleran 
arrived in Caffa, the Genoese confiscated part of his booty. As Henri Taparel 
cynically remarked, the only visible result of the whole campaign was that Philip the 
Good and the Genoese remained on bad terms: Philip never understood that the 
Orthodox or Muslim subjects of Genoa could not be considered as enemies29. 
Still, it seems that Wavrin felt somewhat uneasy as he related Geoffroy de 
Thoisy's adventure, especially if we compare his account with a short Burgundian 
chronicle partly published by Emilie Dupont in her edition of Wavrin's chronicle. 
This anonymous account presents all of Geoffroy de Thoisy's actions on the Black 
Sea and the Mediterranean as glorious deeds, making his cruise appear as a guerre de 
magnificence. As for Geoffroy's capture in Georgia, the chronicler recounts it as an 
honourable adventure, stressing that the Georgians were very chivalrous, albeit rather 
exotic in manners: Geoffroy `fut doucement traicties; car, non obstant que en ce dit 
pais, que 1'on appelle Mygrelye [Mingrelia], soient gens estranges et d'estrange vie, 
toutesfois entre eulx cely seroit deshonnores qui aroit mal traicter [... ] ung 
prisonnier'30 
5. Crusading adventures in Romania 
28 IORGA, `Les aventures... ', p. 9. 
29 TAPAREL, p. 20-22,28. 
30 See Wavrin's Anchiennes cronicques..., ed. DUPONT, III (Pikes justificatives), 151-159 (quotation 
p. 157). 
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Walleran de Wavrin had sent the Spanish knight Pedro Vasquez de Saavedra - 
an habitue of the Burgundian court - to Buda in order to ask the Hungarians whether 
they would be ready to attempt a new invasion of Greece. Amazing as it may seem, 
since they had lost their King, the Hungarians accepted. Janos Hunyadi replied that 
he would meet Walleran and Condelmare before Nicopolis in mid-August 1445. 
Walleran was to ask the help of Vlad Dracul, and while the Hungarians were getting 
organized, he decided to help Vlad II to recover some forts along the Danube from 
the Turks. Wavrin describes these crusading adventures in Romania with a profusion 
of colourful details that demonstrate again his art as a story-teller, only this time he 
could rely on the first-hand testimony of Walleran. As a result, his account of 
Walleran's actions in Romania has a very different flavour from that of his narratives 
of Varna and the Long Campaign: here there is no epic inspiration, but a very down- 
to-earth realism instead. Wavrin does not inform us so much about the geography of 
medieval Romania - though he does make some comments of that type - as about the 
mentality of our 15th century crusaders, whether Wallachian, Hungarian, Venetian or 
Burgundian. One cannot say that Wavrin's account of Walleran's adventures in 
Romania is always agreeable to read; in fact, many of the actions recounted are rather 
brutal and raw. We saw in my first chapter that Jean de Wavrin had himself been a 
soldier, as well as a crusader - albeit against heretics - and that he had taken part in 
some very gruesome actions31. Thus we cannot expect too many sentimental 
considerations from him. 
Wavrin occasionally shows the darkest side of man, made even more 
frightening by the fact that it is mixed with a certain innocence. He depicts, for 
instance, how the crusaders decided to set fire to the fort of Turtucaia. Our crusaders 
were to find this technique very practical and eventually resorted to it quite 
systematically -a sign that artillery still had much progress to achieve in 1445. At 
Turtucaia, the Christians piled up wood against a tower, and Wavrin comments: 
Quant doncques ce bois fut ainsi assemble a l'encontre du pan de mur, 
aussi hault qu'on le povoit gecter contremont la tour, on boutta le feu 
dedens quy fut en la fin grant et horrible a veoir [... ] si commencerent 
31 See p. 38. 
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A esprendre ladite couverture et les barbacanes, pourquoy tous les 
Christiens commencerent a cryer noe [Noel] (V, 84). 
Wavrin describes the Turks' reaction with some suggestive details: `et sembloit bien 
ä oyr le son des veraulz [venous] que les Turcqz eussent grant haste d'issir'. Later in 
the evening, as the crusaders were contemplating the glowing remains of the tower, 
some comments were made by `les compaignons de Pycardie que pour une nuit Saint 
Jehan ilz n'avoientjamais veu plus beau feu' (V, 86). 
Crusading certainly does not appear, in the narrative of Walleran's actions in 
Romania, as a guerre d'honneur et de magnificence, despite Wavrin's presentation of 
the expedition as such in his prologue. Here, Wavrin exposes all the pieces of 
meanness, cruelties, abuses and jealousies between the representatives of different 
nations which made this crusade, all things considered, very un-magnificent. At its 
best, the lack of harmony between the crusaders has some very amusing effects. In 
the episode of the planned attack on Silestra, for instance, we see Walleran leading 
the vanguard with his galley on the river and joining the Wallachians who are already 
camping in front of the town. The Wallachians inquire where Condelmare is and 
Wavrin shows them the sails of the cardinal's galley, adding that he will arrive soon. 
However, much to their confusion, Walleran and the Wallachians see Condelmare 
lowering his sail. The Wallachians do not understand and Walleran has some very 
bitter words: `quant on fait ung prestre chief de guerre il n'en pourroit pas bien venir' 
(V, 73). Many hours pass; the sun reaches its zenith and it becomes too hot to 
consider an attack on the town. Eventually Condelmare arrives, and Wavrin 
describes, with much skill, the comic features of the protagonists: 
quant ledit cardinal vint il passa devant la gallee du seigneur de 
Wavrin ouquel regardant commencha a rire, mais ledit de Wavrin luy 
moustra visage felon et courouchie, si entra prestement en une barque 
[... ] et quant il aprocha la gallee du cardinal il crya en hault: 
`monseigneur est-il bien heure d'assaillir la ville? ' (V, 74). 
This is however nothing compared to the quarrel between Walleran and Condelmare 
which will later break out, because Walleran had attacked Turtucaia without the 
cardinal's consent, while the latter's galley was aground on a sand bank. Wavrin 
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depicts the scene with much insight into character, showing Walleran uneasy because 
the cardinal does not salute him, then bashful as Condelmare pettily reproaches him 
for having committed `une grande trahison, laquele il nuncheroit d nostre saint pere le 
pape et a tous les princes christiens'. Walleran offers to defend his honour in single 
combat; the cardinal declines the proposal, on the grounds that he is a priest, but 
Walleran hastily specifies that the offer was not intended for him. Eventually, 
flattered by Walleran's argument that the honour of the taking of Turtucaia will fall 
to him by right, Condelmare composes himself, `parlant [... ] tousjours un peu sur 
gorge'. But Walleran will bear Condelmare malice, and it is only after having been 
reprimanded in turns by a Constantinopolitan friar that the two commanders will 
make peace with one another (V, 87-92). Walleran did not always get along with 
Condelmare; unsurprisingly, his relations with Saoudji, a cousin and rival of Murad 
II, whom the crusaders trusted to gain the support of the Turks of Silestra, but who 
miserably failed in his attempt, were also rather tense (V, 76-78). 
At its worst, the disharmony between the crusaders gives rise to scenes of 
extreme violence and barbarism: Dorothy Vaughan has called our attention to a 
shocking passage where we see the Burgundians and the Wallachians fighting against 
each other over the prisoners made at Turtucaia32; unable to separate them sword in 
hand, Walleran gave the order to kill all the prisoners, but the crusaders still fought 
over the weapons and dresses of the slain Turks (V, 85). Dorothy Vaughan has also 
commented upon the problems that arose because of Vlad Dracul and Walleran's 
diverging opinions on the ethics of warfare, pointing out that throughout this episode, 
it became clear that Vlad II was simply making use of his Western allies. Yet to 
Walleran this probably did not really matter, since helping Vlad meant helping 
Christians against Turks. We do detect, however, a growing irritation with Vlad on 
the part of Walleran, especially after Vlad provoked, through carelessness and 
technical incompetence, the explosion of Walleran's best bombard, thus killing two 
of Walleran's sailors (V, 95). Walleran was also shocked by the massacre of the 
Turks of Giurgiu perpetrated by Vlad's son Mircea, on Vlad's orders, when the Turks 
had been granted a safe conduct. Although Walleran had done nothing to save the 
Turks, he had refused to sign their safe conduct, when Mircea had revealed his 
ýý 
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treacherous plans. And as the Christians, while sailing towards Nicopolis, saw the 
Turks' naked bodies lined up by the Wallachians along the riverbank, they deemed it 
`cruele chose a veoir'; perhaps Walleran then acknowledged that Christians could be 
more barbaric than the Turks (V, 101-102)33. Yet it was Vlad who provided the 
crusaders with the best proof that their efforts had not all been wasted. Encouraged 
by the Christians' victories, thousands of Bulgarians asked Vlad II to take them under 
his protection. The crusaders helped them to cross the Danube, and Vlad declared 
that: 
quant ores la presente armee de nostre saint pere et du duc de 
Bourguoigne n'auroient fait en ce voyage autre bien que de saulver 
onze ou douze mille ämes des Christiens, et les corpz mis hors de 
chetivoison et des mains des Sarrazins, ce luy sambloit bien estre une 
grant operation (V, 105). 
Vlad did not fail to point out that Walleran and Condelmare had not only saved the 
refugees' bodies, but also their souls, since living under Turkish rule meant, for 15th 
century Christians, not only the subjection of the body, but also the danger of losing 
one's soul, as one could be tempted to abnegate one's faith and become a Muslim3a 
To the Westerners, this was no small consolation. Luckily for him, Walleran 
probably never learnt that, soon after these events, Vlad, who could no longer afford 
to wage war against the Turks, agreed to renew the peace negotiations; one of the 
requirements of the peace treaty was the expulsion from Wallachia of 4,000 
Bulgarian settlers35. 
9 Conclusion 
32 VAUGHAN, p. 60. 
33 For a short analysis of Walleran's attitude towards the Turks in general, and Wavrin's portrayal of 
the Ottomans as individuals, see my article `Des chevaliers bourguignons... ', p. 272-274. 
34 Cf. on this matter E. FÜGEDI, `Two Kinds of Enemies - Two Kinds of Ideology. The Hungarian- 
Turkish Wars in the Fifteenth Century', in War and Peace in the Middle Ages, ed. B. MC GUIRE, 
Reitzel, 1987, p. 146-160. 
35 FLORESCU and MC NALLY, p. 38. 
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I hope I have shown all the worth and interest of this narrative of Walleran's 
crusading adventures, a literary interlude comparable to the travel accounts of 
Bertrandon de la Broquiere and Ghillebert de Lannoy36, which demonstrates the 
interest Duke Philip and many of his subjects took in the Levant. The practicality and 
informative aspect of such texts contrasts with the more fanciful depiction of 
Levantine adventures that we find in Jean Wauquelin's La Belle Helene de 
Constantinople, Gillion de Trazegnies or Antoine de La Sale's Le Petit Jehan de 
Saintre, all romances related to the Levant and crusading that flourished at the court 
of Burgundy under Philip's rule. Just as both kinds of works, the realist and the 
fanciful, seem to be representative of Philip's interest in crusading, Wavrin's 
narrative presents us with an interesting mixture of epic spirit and realism - though 
even in the epic parts, Wavrin still appears particularly well informed. It seems that, 
for the episodes of the Long Campaign and the battle of Varna, Wavrin's epic and 
impassioned tone results from the fact that he drew his information from second- 
hand testimony. Thus the writing of these particular episodes was strongly influenced 
by the crusading fantasies of Jean de Wavrin, Walleran, and the Hungarian knights 
who had related the events to Walleran; here, a heroic and Manichean vision greatly 
magnified the facts. However, whenever Wavrin's report draws on first-hand 
testimony, it slips into a realistic vision, thus enabling us to see how this late 
medieval crusade was conducted, and gain valuable insight into the crusaders' 
character. The one exception to that rule is the episode where Murad II crosses the 
Straits, which is clearly epic and almost apocalyptic. Apart from the fact that the 
event was indeed extraordinary, it seems that Wavrin's impassioned tone was 
intended to excuse Walleran for his failure, by presenting him at grips with 
superhuman forces. 
One may wonder whether Wavrin's realism in the second part of his narrative 
was actually meant to demonstrate that the expedition was far from being, in practice, 
a guerre d'honneur et de magnificence, or whether the graphic details were simply 
there to make the narrative an enjoyable story. It is doubtful that Wavrin had any 
36 BERTRANDON DE LA BROQUIERE, Le Voyage d'Outremer, ed. C. SCIIEFER, Paris, Leroux, 
1892 ; for Lannoy's travel accounts see GHILLEBERT DE LANNOY, c'uvres, ed. C. POTVIN and J. - 
C. HOUZEAU, Louvain, Lefever, 1878, p. 99-162. Both La Broquiere and Lannoy had been sent as 
spies to the Levant to gather information with a view to a passagium. 
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intentions to divest the ideal of crusading of its mythical quality. The `voyage' 
brought honour to Walleran, if only because he had proven his good will; in 
acknowledgement and thanks for the trouble he had taken, he received a precious 
relic from Emperor John VIII, and indulgences from Pope Eugene IV. Wavrin 
concludes his narrative by stating that the relic, a fragment of Christ's dress woven 
by the Virgin Mary herself, was now exposed in the church of Lillers, and that all 
visitors could benefit from Wavrin's indulgences (V, 119). Still, Wavrin's realistic 
presentation of the facts does betray Jean and Walleran's disillusion with regard to 
this particular crusade. The expedition had hardly achieved anything. Georges 
Chastelain made it clear as he bluntly declared about our crusaders in his biography 
of Jacques de Lalaing: `comme j'entendis pour lors, ils ne profiterent guere ä la 
chrestiente, ne aussi ne fat faite chose qui fust ä leur profit'37. Walleran was aware of 
this, and Jean's account does not hide his disappointment. However, Walleran cast 
the blame on others, notably the Byzantines and the Hungarians: on his return to the 
Occident, he reported to the Pope that `se plus avant euist peu faire service a la 
deffence de la Christiennete et que la chose de la partie des Hongres et Grecz euist 
este mieulz disposee, que liberalement et voullentiers il s'i feust plus avant 
employez' (V, 118). We saw that Walleran had been displeased with John VIII's 
refusal to occupy one shore of the Straits with his troops, and with his decision to 
make peace with Murad II. As for the Hungarians, they had irritated him by refusing 
to chase the Turkish host, the Turks having eventually returned deep into their 
territory, burning the land behind them. Hunyadi had then offended Walleran and 
Condelmare by telling them that they might as well return home, as winter was 
approaching, which meant that the galleys would be ice-bound if they stayed (V, 115- 
116). At the end of the day, it seems that Walleran did not get on very well with men 
of different cultures and mentalities. In particular, his heroic, self-assured, chivalrous 
stance clashed with John VIII and Hunyadi's prudence and experience. It also 
appears, from his report to Eugene IV, that he did not learn much from this 
campaign. Still, because Wavrin's narrative faithfully reports the opinions and 
statements of all protagonists, the reader may choose a different conclusion to the 
adventure, offered by Janos Hunyadi, `le blanc Chevalier', a man who was greatly 
37 GEORGES CI-IASTELAIN, Le livre des faits..., in cEuvres, VIII, 34. 
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admired in the whole of the Occident, and, of course, Burgundy38. Having explained 
to Walleran that the Turks, who were retreating into their territory burning everything 
on their track, expected the Christians to chase them and hoped to attract them deep 
into their Empire, so that, their supplies cut off, the Christians might be at their 
mercy, Hunyadi closed his speech with the words: `est necessite de combattre les 
Turcqz soubtillement et malicieusement quy les voelt vaincre, car ilz sont gens 
cauteleux' (V, 115-116). In other words, a campaign against the Turks should not be 
led heedlessly; it required a lot of wisdom. Perhaps Jean de Wavrin understood 
Hunyadi's lesson better than Walleran. 
In the next chapter, I shall pursue on the theme of the `guerre de 
magnificence', only this time looking at French historiography, towards the close of 
the century. As the painful experience of the Hundred Years War was receding in 
time, France was becoming an increasingly powerful nation. Charles VII had restored 
peace in France, thanks notably to his institution of a permanent army paid by 
regularly collected taxes. Louis XI had subdued the princes of royal blood, and had 
contributed to the fall of his most unruly vassal, Charles the Bold - though the ruin of 
Burgundy was largely due to the failure of Charles the Bold's ambitious expansionist 
policy. In 1494, the young King Charles VIII could indulge in the luxury of 
undertaking an outstanding offensive military campaign: the conquest of the 
Kingdom of Naples, thus inaugurating the Wars of Italy, an enterprise to which the 
Kings of France would devote their attention for many decades. We shall see how 
most French historiographers of the period presented Charles VIII's conquest as a 
guerre de magnificence, but without the complex or the feeling of disillusion 
harboured by Burgundian chroniclers with regard to Burgundy's guerres de 
magnificence. 
38 Cf. D. DE COURCELLES, `Le roman de Tirant Jo Blanc et le Viceu du Faisan: le pouvoir de 1a parole 
entre politique et litterature', in Le Banquet du Faisan. 1454: 1'Occident..., p. 173-186. On Hunyadi 
see p. 179-180. 
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The King of France Charles VIII and his French subjects, magnificent 
and triumphant victors over the Italians (Fig. 7,8,9) 
Fig. 7. Charles VIII in full martial glory. Charles' garments and 
his horse's apparel are strewn with Jerusalem crosses, a reminder of 
the fact that Charles is not only King of France, but also of Sicily 
and Jerusalem. The flaming sword featured on the tent -a symbol, 
no doubt, of armed Justice - is another of Charles' emblems. From 
a manuscript entitled Louanges de la France, c. 1497. 
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Fig. 8. Charles VIH's solemn entry into Naples 
(12 May 1495). From the illustrated chronicle of 
Ferraiuolo. In his unsophisticated style, akin to 
that of a modern cartoonist, the Neapolitan 
chronicler has sketched all the details of Charles' 
entry into Naples, thus recording the pomp and 




Fig. 9. Charles' entry into Naples: the Sword 
of Justice, the brotherhoods and the clergy. 
From Ferraiuolo's illustrated chronicle. 
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Chapter 5: Tales of a conquest (I). `Comment le roy Charles huitiesme 
[... ] alla conquerir le royaulme de Naples en grant triumphe': Charles 
VIII's invasion of Italy (1494-1495) in French chronicles 
Au demourant je vous prie d'avertir les prelatz, gens de bien, 
bonnes villes et citez de mon royaume de France des grandes 
graces que Dieu m'a faictes et de la victoire qu'il luy a pleu me 
donner ä la conqueste et recouvrement de mon royaume de 
Napples [... ], car je vous asseure, mon frere, qu'il n'est plus de 
nouvelles en Ytalie [... ] du cymetiere des Francoys qu'ilz 
disoient y estre, mais ya acquis la nation de I'honneur et 
renommee largement, et autant qu'il est possible. On parle sans 
cesse de mon exploit et de mon artillerie... 
From a letter of Charles VIII to Pierre de Bourbon, lieutenant 
general of France during the conquest, under the date of 28 
March 1495' 
" Introduction 
In 1494, the twenty-four year old King of France Charles VIII was crossing the 
Alps at the head of an army of 1,500 French lances and 1,500 Italian lances (which 
amounts to 15,000 horsemen of which 7,500 were fighters), 1,200 mounted cross- 
bowmen, and 14,000 foot-soldiers of whom 3,000 were Swiss pikemen, to conquer the 
Kingdom of Naples, ruled by Alfonso II of Aragon. Charles VIII had inherited his claim 
to the Kingdom from the bon roi Rene d'Anjou, who had bequeathed Anjou, Provence 
' Campagne et bulletins de la Grande Armee d'Italie, ed. J. DE LA PILORGERIE, Nantes / Paris, Forest et 
Grimaud / Didier, 1866, p. 214-215. Quotation in title from ROBERT GAGUIN, fol. ccxvi, v°. 
2 For details about the numbers of Charles' invading army see I. CLOULAS, Charles VIII et le mirage 
Italien, Paris, Albin Michel, 1986, p. 46-48. 
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and his rights to the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily to Charles' father Louis X13 . To the 
great surprise of the Venetians and of the King of Spain, Ferdinand the Catholic, Charles 
VIII did not only reach Naples after a triumphant descent into Italy, of which the 
different people warmly welcomed him, but was also crowned King of Naples on 12 
May 1495, Alfonso II and his son Ferrandino having fled from their realm4. Charles left 
ministers and troops in his new Kingdom and started his return journeys. By this time, 
however, Pope Alexander VI and the Venetians had turned overtly hostile, and on 12 
April 1495, the Holy League had been proclaimed, officially uniting Alexander VI, the 
Holy Roman Emperor, the King of Spain, Ludovico Sforza and Venice against the Turk 
and the enemies of Italy. Of course, the League's primary aim was to oppose Charles 
V1116 . At Fornovo, Charles' army, then of about 10,000 men, 
had to confront a 
composite force of Venetians, Milanese and Bolognese troops, amounting to 30,000 
men. A fierce battle was fought (6 July 1495), and both sides have since claimed the 
victory to be theirs. It is however generally attributed to the French, who inflicted a great 
number of casualties on the Italians while losing only a few men, managed to force the 
passage and could thus return safely to France7. 
The French descent into Italy was narrated by many French and Italian 
chroniclers. Modem historians have tended to devote most of their attention to the Italian 
accounts - such as the remarkable narratives of Guicciardini, Machiavelli, or Marino 
Sanudo - and to Philippe de Commynes' relation. Although Commynes' narrative has its 
weaknesses, it is a truly exciting and intelligent work, and it is difficult to understand 
how Sainte-Beuve could ever write: `A partir de la mort de Louis XI, les Memoires de 
3 See in particular D. ABULAFIA, `Introduction: From Ferrante Ito Charles VIII', in The French Descent 
into Renaissance Italy. 1494-1495. Antecedents and Effects, ed. D. ABULAFIA, Aldershot (Hampshire), 
Variorum, 1995, p. 1-25. 
4 For a comprehensive overview of Charles VI11's campaign see especially CLOULAS and Campagne et 
bulletins... 
S On Charles' policy for the Kingdom of Naples and his institutional reforms see E. SAKELLARIOU, 
`Institutional and Social Continuities in the Kingdom of Naples between 1443 and 1528', in The French 
Descent, p. 327-353, and A. DENIS, Charles V111 et les Italiens: Histoire et mythe, Geneva, Droz, 1979, p. 
96 ff. 
6 On the formation of the League see CLOULAS, p. 155-160. 
7 On the battle of Fornovo see CLOULAS, p. 194-206; D. CHAMBERS, `Francesco 11 Gonzaga, marquis of 
Mantua, "Liberator of Italy"', in The French Descent, p. 217-229 (p. 223-226). 
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Commynes perdent sensiblement en interet'8. Jean Dufournet has shown much of the 
richness of Commynes' account9. 
It is said that, compared to the best Italian accounts and to Commynes' narrative, 
other French accounts appear rather superficial, propagandist, and lacking insight. This 
does not, however, make them uninteresting, and it is on these other French chronicles 
that I intend to concentrate in this chapter. The most notable source is Andre de La 
Vigne and Octovien de Saint-Gelais' Voyage de Naples, published between 1498 and 
1502, a work written half in verse and half in prose1°. It is interesting to note that Andre 
de La Vigne took part in the expedition and was entrusted with writing the official 
French account of the expedition; this was, it seems, a novelty in French historiography, 
and demonstrates the Kings of France's concern, at the dawn of the 10h century, for an 
official writing of their wars which would promote their vision, ambitions and aims. 
Most other French accounts, apart from Guillaume de Villeneuve's Memoiresll 
(completed in 1497) and Jean de Saint-Gelais' Histoire de Louys X1112 (written around 
1510), follow closely de La Vigne's narrative. Thus we have Pierre Desrey's addition to 
his translation of Robert Gaguin's Compendium entitled Les Grandes croniques13, first 
published in 1514, and a Mer des hystoires published in 1503 by Antoine Verard14 
Finally, we have Jean Bouchet's Annalles d'Acquitaine and a section of Bouchet's 
Panegyric du seigneur Loys de la Trimoille (1527)' 
8 C. -A. SAINTE-BEUVE, Causeries du Lundi, 3'd ed., 15 vol., Paris, Gamier, 1857-1872, I, 240-259 (art. 
of 7 January 1850). Quotation p. 258. 
9 See for example J. DUFOURNET, `Commynes et I'Italie', in his work Philippe de Commynes, p. 81-112. 
10 See ANDRE DE LA VIGNE , Le 
Voyage de Naples, ed. A. SLERCA , Milan, Universitä 
Cattolica del 
Sacro Cuore, 1981. 
11 GUILLAUME DE VILLENEUVE, Memoires, in Choix de chroniques et Memoires sur 1'histoire de 
France, ed. J. A. C. BUCIION, Paris, Delagrave, 1886, p. 269-293. 
12 JEAN DE SAINT-GELAIS , Histoire 
de Louis X11, Roi de France, Pere du peuple, ed. T. GODEFROY, 
Paris, Abraham Pacard, 1622 (see p. 79-97). 
13 `Addition de Pierre Desroy [... ] sur et avecques les croniques du tres fam6 hystoriographe [... ] Robert 
Gaguin', in ROBERT GAGUIN, fol. ccxvi, v°- ccxxxiv, r°. According to Franck Collard, Robert Gaguin's 
relation of Charles VIII's conquest is mainly based on the bulletins published in France relating Charles' 
progresses, and does not present any particular interest. Cf. F. COLLARD, Un historien au travail a la fin 
duXV siecle: Robert Gaguin, Geneva, Droz, 1996, p. 210. 
14 Mer des hystoires, 2 vol., Paris, Antoine Verard, 1503 (see vol. 2, fol. cclxxi, v°-cccvii, v°). 
15 JEAN BOUCIIET, Annalles d'Acquitaine, Poitiers, Jacques Bouchet, 1524 (see fol. liv, r°-lix, v°); Le 
Panegyric du seigneur Loys de la Trimoille, in Choix de chroniques et Memoires, p. 727-807 (see p. 755- 
762 for the narrative of the conquest). 
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It does not take a thorough reading of these sources to see that all of our writers 
took a very partisan stance, and posed as champions of Charles VIII's cause. In this 
chapter, I intend to look into the discourse of these chroniclers and consider the light in 
which they presented the expedition, to specify the ideological elements of their 
propagandist talk. We shall see that, apart from Philippe de Commynes, all our French 
writers presented Charles VIII's conquest of the Kingdom of Naples as a guerre 
d'honneur et de magnificence, though they did not explicitly use this expression of the 
Debat's French herald 16. Commynes appears as the exception, for his narrative of the 
conquest is radically different; the nature of his discourse will be analysed in the next 
chapter and contrasted with the partisan discourse of other French writers. 
1. The intended crusade 
It is quite well-known that Charles VIII presented the Naples expedition as a 
preliminary step for a crusade against the Ottoman Turks. A manifesto in Latin 
published in Florence on 27 November 1494, bearing the King of France's seal, provides 
the best example of Charles' publicized intentions. The manifesto starts by recalling, in 
rather commonplace rhetorical language, `les meurtres et les massacres, le sac des nobles 
cites, la ruine des peuples fideles [... ], crimes odieux et sans nombre commis par les 
ignobles Turcs'. The King then declares his resolution to chivalrously defend the faith, 
`quittant avec regret notre tres-chore epouse et notre fils unique, implorant en outre le 
secours de Dieu, dont nous embrassons la cause'. Charles VIII also emphasizes that, by 
taking the cross, he is acting according to `la coutume de nos pores, les rois de France 
tres-chretiens'. Finally, he indicates that, on his journey, he intends to recover his 
Kingdom of Naples; all other principalities should have no fear, for his sole intentions 
16 See my third chapter, p. 162-163. 
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are to protect Christendom `et [... ] travailler [... ] a augmenter [... ] la puissance, l'honneur 
et la dignite de la sainte Eglise'17. We have seen at length in the last two chapters that 
crusading was the supreme example of a guerre de magnificence. Especially in times 
when the Christian princes neglected their primary duty, there could not be, for a prince, 
a more honourable, praiseworthy and exemplary way of showing his power and might 
than putting it in the service of the defence of the faith: such a martial deed was the best 
way to acquire eternal renown and glory. As Charles VIII pointed out in his manifesto, 
and as contemporary French panegyrists were repeatedly emphasizing, the Kings of 
France had a long history of distinguishing themselves in such guerres de magnificence; 
since the times of Clovis, the Rois Tres Chretiens were the mot zealous defenders and 
propagators of the faith. As Mathieu Thomassin had written, they almost had a contract 
with God: He protected the Kingdom from its enemies while they fought to uphold the 
' Church s 
Charles VIII's crusading aims were allegorically expressed by Andre de la Vigne 
and Octovien de Saint-Gelais in a poem called Ressource de la Crestiente, published in 
1494, before Charles had reached Naples; the Ressource thereafter served as an 
introduction to the Voyage de Naples and the two works were published under the title of 
Le Vergier d'honneur19. The Ressource records the lamentations of `Dame Crestiente', a 
fair woman in distress. She enters a delightful orchard and meets `Noblesse', a princess 
of Trojan descent, who then takes her to `Majeste Royale'. `Majeste Royale' 
benevolently listens to `Dame Crestiente"s complaint against the Turks and promises to 
avenge her. A character called `Je-ne-stay-qui', whom Anna Slerca identifies with the 
people20, opposes Charles' crusading plans, but his advice is refuted by `Bon Conseil', 
and the crusade is decided. The Ressource is very reminiscent of Jean Molinet's 
" This text has been translated and published by J. de La Pilorgerie in Campagne et bulletins..., p. 101- 
103. 
18 See my second chapter, p. 138. 
19 There are many 16`h century editions of the Vergier d'honneur; see for instance ANDRE DE LA VIGNE 
and OCTOVIEN DE SAINT-GELAIS, Le Vergier d'honneur, Paris, Antoine Wrard, 1500. 
20 Cf. A. SLERCA, `La Complainte des estatz sur le voyage et guerre de Neaples de Jean Bouchet', in 
Passer les monts. Francais en Italie - l'Italie en France (1494-1525), ed. J. BALSAMO, Paris / Florence, 
Honoris Champion. / Cadmo, 1998, p. 213-236 (seep. 222-223 and 225-226). 
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Complainte de Grece, one of the first pieces that Molinet wrote for Philip the Good, in 
support of his crusading plans. The two pieces are very similar in form: like Molinet, de 
La Vigne and Saint-Gelais chose a very fashionable literary expedient, developed by 
Alain Chartier, Jean Gerson and Christine de Pisan, presenting us with a dream fantasy, 
an allegorical setting. Both works make a conventional analogy between defending 
Christendom and saving a beautiful lady - such an allegory was obviously bound to 
please a knight. An important difference, however, is the appearance of `Je-ne-stay-qui' 
in the Ressource, who represents the opposition and is silenced by `Bon Conseil'. The 
chroniclers will point out how, on his triumphal return to France in 1495, Charles 
neglected to visit Paris, to punish the Parisians for having refused to offer him 100,000 
francs for his expedition21. 
Originally, Charles' crusading intentions were thus forcefully advertised. 
However, de La Vigne hardly mentioned Charles' crusading plans in the Voyage de 
Naples, and nor did the other French chroniclers. Only Commynes dwells on them, and 
describes one unhappy effort to make the peoples of the Balkans revolt against the 
Turks; what is more surprising is that our realist author did believe in Charles' chances 
of success, because he assessed them according to political factors: compared with 
Mehmet II, Commynes deemed Bayezid II incompetent (III, 102). Presumably, the other 
French chroniclers did not mention Charles' crusading plans because they had not 
materialized, and because his efforts had been unsuccessful. They did, however, refer to 
them on one occasion: as they related the death of Djem, Bayezid's brother, this `captif 
estrange'22 whom Pope Alexander VI Borgia had handed over to Charles VIII, and who 
`eust peu estre cause dont le roy Charles eut recouvert Constantinople' 23, Pierre Desrey 
and Jean Bouchet explained that `on l'avoit donne au roy tout empoisonne'24. Thus the 
failure of the crusade was entirely the Pope's fault. The crusade remained fine words, but 
this did not prevent our chroniclers from presenting Charles' expedition as a successful 
guerre d'honneur et de magnificence; we shall now see on what grounds. 
21 ROBERT GAGUIN, fol. ccxxxiv, v°. 
22 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, Le voyage de Naples, p. 240. 
23 JEAN BOUCEIET, Annalles..., fol. Ivii, r°. 
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2. A host of honourable motivations 
Charles VIII may have emphasized his crusading aims in 1494, but his primary 
objective - and the one he achieved - was the conquest of the Kingdom of Naples. The 
French chroniclers -I am leaving aside Commynes' work for the moment - all present 
Charles VIII's conquest as a just war, inspired by the most praiseworthy motivations. 
Apart from those who seem to take it for granted, such as the compiler of the Mer des 
hystoires of 1503 who simply says, about the Kingdom of Naples: `lequel luy 
appartenoit'25, our authors demonstrate that the Kingdom belonged to Charles. Some, 
such as Jean Bouchet in his Annalles d'Acquitaine, even took the trouble of reproducing 
the whole history and genealogies of the Angevin Kings, starting with Urban IV's gift of 
the Kingdom to Charles of Anjou. Bouchet stresses that Charles was careful to ask `les 
presidens de ses cours de parlement avec son Chancelier et les princes du royaume' to 
fully investigate his rights26. Surely this demonstrated his concern about the justice of his 
cause. 
Our chroniclers also express the opinion that by recovering his heritage, Charles 
made a charitable action with regard to his Neapolitan subjects. Many ghastly stories 
were circulating in France about the Kings of Aragon, and it is difficult to judge whether 
they had substance. At any rate, the chroniclers did not question them - even Commynes 
repeated them. In the Voyage de Naples, Andre de La Vigne makes Charles appear as a 
saviour, as the King does not fail to respond to the pleas - expressed in rather unkempt 
rhetoriqueur verse - of the Neapolitans who were in exile in France: 
Remembre toy de tes pofvres esclaves, 
serfs et espaves, ou cent fois pis qu'en caves 
24 PIERRE DESREY, `Addition... ', fol. ccxxiv, r°. 
25 Mer des hystoires, 1503, vol. 2, fol. cclxxi, v°. 
26 JEAN BOUCIIET, Annalles..., fol. liv, r°. 
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mis aux entraves, maleureux ä tousjours27. 
Later in his narrative, de La Vigne will resort to supernatural arguments to 
convince us more fully of the rightness of Charles' claims. A phial containing some of 
Saint Gennaro's blood was kept in Naples cathedral. When placed next to the skull of 
San Gennaro, the dried blood would usually liquefy. According to de La Vigne, the 
Neapolitans firmly believed that the liquefaction of the blood showed that God was 
listening to their prayers, and they had told the French that `par ce sang [ils] avoient la 
cognoissance de leur prince s'il devoit estre leur seigneur ou non'. On 1 May 1495, a few 
minutes after having been stirred by Charles VIII, the blood of Saint Gennaro started to 
liquefy. De La Vigne was filled with wonder and commented that it was `ung des grans 
miracles que jamais homme ne vit, dont tout le peuple francois [... ] se donnoient grant 
merveilles de ce voir'28. The Pope had refused to grant Charles his title, but God Himself 
had demonstrated that Charles was truly King of Naples. 
Our chroniclers do not only stress that Charles' rights were valid, but also imply 
that, since the Kingdom was his property, it was for Charles a question of honour to 
recover his own. The Burgundian chronicler Jean Molinet was, since the death of 
Charles the Bold, a subject of the Holy Roman Emperor, but he wrote his poem `Le 
voiage de Napples' in support of Charles VIII's undertaking, and used the same 
ideological language as the French chroniclers29. In his poem, Molinet explains that 
Charles VIII, `le cerf non serf - the hero of the piece is a hart, for the heraldic animal of 
the Kings of France was the `cerf volant' - `Sentant mengier l'herbe de sa pasture [... ] / 
Pour soy vengier s'est vollut deslogier'30. In the same vein, Pierre Desrey tells us that 
Charles, `prince tousjours magnanime et de noble cueur', could not leave his inheritance 
27 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 131, v. 32-34. 
28 Ibid., p. 261-262. 
29 According to Jean Devaux, Molinet's poem may well have been commissioned as a present to Charles 
VIII by Archduke Philip the Fair, who did not want to jeopardize the peace obtained in the Lower 
countries, despite his father Maximilian's injunctions. Besides, it was rather natural that Molinet, as a 
faithful admirer of the ideals of chivalry, should have been enthralled by Charles' Italian campaign. Cf. J. 
DEVAUX, Jean Molinet, p. 323-336. 
30 JEAN MOLINET, `Le Voiage de Napples', in his Faictz et dictz, I, 277-283 (p. 278). 
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in somebody else's hands31. According to de La Vigne, preserving one's honour was, for 
the prince, not only a necessity but also a source of anxiety, almost a burden: at the end 
of his account, he pitied Charles who had to be confined to bed for three days in 
Grenoble, and commented: 
non sans cause, car il avoit souffert en son voyage, a mon advis, autant de 
paine, de traveil, de soucy, de chagrin et d'autres choses que peult avoir 
ung prince et ung roy qui ayme son honneur comme il faisoit, que 
32 pourroit ne scauroit faire homme vivant du monde. 
In chivalrous society, one was morally obliged to preserve one's honour. 
Recovering the Kingdom of Naples was also a question of honour, and the fact that the 
risks and troubles taken may seem disproportionate to such a motivation made the 
enterprise even more admirable as a guerre d'honneur et de magnificence. Steven Gunn 
has stressed how, for Western princes, by the beginning of the Renaissance, honour had 
become the main excuse for an aggressive foreign policy33. 
Finally, there was another reason that moved Charles to cross the Alps, and it 
was not the least important: de La Vigne explicitly referred to `los, gloire, bruyt et 
renom'34 as one of Charles' motivations. The aim of a guerre de magnificence was, for 
a prince, to attract the attention of the whole of Christendom, and to immortalize his 
name, state and nation. Charles certainly succeeded in doing so, and our chroniclers 
wrote with enchantment about the grandeur of his enterprise, which he successfully 
brought to effect; the French historiographers thus ensured that his fame would be 
perennial. 
3. An outstanding exploit 
31 PIERRE DESREY, `Addition... ', fol. ccxvi, v°. 
32 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 323. 
33 S. GUNN, `Chivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court', in Chivalry in the Renaissance, ed. S. 
ANGLO, Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 1990, p. 107-128. 
34 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 130, v. 6. 
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Our chroniclers clearly present Charles' conquest, this `voyage et tres magnifique 
entreprinse'35, as the Grandes croniques call it, as an extraordinary undertaking. The 
argument is emphatically stated and encapsulated in the speech delivered by a young 
maid on Charles' return at Chieri. This speech figured in the numerous pageants staged 
for Charles in the towns that welcomed him on his triumphal return, and de La Vigne 
integrated it into his narrative36. It enumerates all the things that made Charles' venture 
admirable. Firstly, of course, the place was remarkable. Charles' `voyage' had taken him 
far away from his Kingdom; he had shown his might in the remotest, but also the most 
renowned of places. As the young maid declared to Charles: 
tu Was pas passe par ung villaige seullement, tu Was pas fait apparoir to 
puyssance merveilleuse en ung petit bourg sans plus [... ] tu as dompte et 
mys soubz la mercy de to main dextre Millan la populouse, Genes la 
superbe, Pavye la saige, Boulongne la crasse, Florence la belle, Pise 
l'antique, Sene la vierge, Napples la gentille et Romme la saincte, qui est 
la ville cappitalle de tout le monde. 37 
Truly this made Charles' expedition a guerre de magnificence. The crusade had failed, 
but this did not really alter the prestige gained by Charles in this enterprise: as the French 
herald declared to the English one in the Debat des herauts d'armes, a guerre de 
magnificence was also `quant princes vont en ost conquerir en loingtaing et estrange 
pais'38. Italy was obviously a `loingtaing et estrange pals' - at least, considering that 
Charles had gone as far as Naples, and that he had succeeded where the 15`h century 
Angevin princes had failed; moreover, it was a renowned and celebrated country. De La 
Vigne and the chroniclers who used his account described at great length the marvels of 
Italy, the great monuments, the famous towns, the ruins of Rome, Poggio Reale - the 
country residence of the Kings of Naples, an enchanting place - and the natural marvels 
such as Etna, `une grande montaigne moult forte laquelle brusle et art tousjours'39. The 
35 PIERRE DESREY, `Addition... ', fol. ccxvii, r°. 
36 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 296-299. 
37 Ibid., p. 298. 
38 See my third chapter, p. 163. 
39 PIERRE DESREY, `Addition... ', fol. cxxvii, v°. 
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conquest is almost presented as a touristic expedition, and Charles and his soldiers did 
not neglect to visit all these places. 
The speech of the young maid also dwells on the reputation of the Italians, in 
particular the magnificence of their princes. One would have expected such an opulent 
country to have been fiercely guarded, in a sense, as difficult of access as the Garden of 
the Hesperides, yet in less than two months, Charles had subjugated `le pays ou se disoit 
estre toute la largesse du monde'40. The compiler of the Mer des hystoires of 1503 
replaced `largesse' by `sagesse', probably intentionally, to refer to the Italians' reputation 
for wisdom and astuteness41. The young maid also tells us how the Kings of Aragon 
were renowned for their bravery and their martial worth: 
estoyent, ainsi qu'on disoit, le roy Alphons et son filz duc de Calabre, les 
plus fiers et plus heureux en armes qui furent oncques en Ytallie, 
acompaignez des plus oultrageux gendarmes tant barbarins, estradiotz que 
autres qui furent oncques veuz. Mais que sont ilz devenus? 42 
By praising the Italians, in particular Charles' enemies, and emphasizing their doom, the 
pucelle makes Charles' conquest look truly extraordinary. 
4. Charles' stupendous wealth and might displayed 
As Sydney Anglo and other modern scholars have shown, magnificence was all 
about display43. What may seem to us today to have been an outrageous wasting of 
money was considered to be vital for the welfare of the state by those who governed and 
their satellites. The King had to show that he was the King, therefore he had to display 
his wealth and his power. This also ensured the reverence of his subjects, hence their 
obedience, hence order in the realm. It seems that the importance, for Renaissance 
40 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 298. 
41 Mer des hystoires, 1503, vol. 2, fol. cclxxxxix, v°. 
42 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 298-299. 
43 See above, Chapter 3, n. 34. 
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princes, of being magnificent also applied in times of war, for the waging of war 
provided rulers with the opportunity to display their wealth and might not only to their 
enemies, but also to all their subjects and neighbours, who would then be in awe of 
them. This element of display in warfare becomes very important in the chronicles of the 
late 15th and early 16th centuries, especially in official and semi-official ones. The 
chroniclers of the Dukes of Burgundy, who had made magnificence a primordial element 
of their rule, had paved the way. One simply needs to refer to Jean Molinet's description 
of `la magnificence au siege de Nuysse' (1475), in his Chronique, to understand the 
importance that Charles the Bold attached to magnificence in his campaigns. Molinet 
marvelled at the tents of the Burgundian nobles, `mansions de diverses fachons et 
pompeuses coustances, composees par mirable et solide artifice comme pour y demourer 
a perpetuite' ; as in a town, one could see in the Burgundian siege taverns, a market, 
public baths, courts of real tennis, etc. On the whole, Charles the Bold's siege was 
`chose admirable et la plus somptueuse qui jamais avoit este veue de nostre temps' (I, 
56-57)44. 
The French accounts of Charles VIII's invasion show well that the conquest was 
for Charles an opportunity to display his awesome power to the whole world. In de La 
Vigne's Voyage de Naples and the Mer des hystoires of 1503, several pages are devoted 
to the preparations for the conquest, which take gargantuan proportions. Andre de La 
Vigne uses enumeration, a trick of rhetoric, enhanced - according to contemporary taste - 
by many plays on words and alliterations, in order to impress us. Everything is 
mentioned, from the ships 
plains de harnois, d'arbalestres, de vires, 
de gros canons, serpentines, courtaulx 
pavoys dorez, grand escussons d'yvires... 
44 It seems that the field of magnificence at war during the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance is still 
largely unexplored by scholars. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the few attempts to study it have originated from 
art historians. Christiane Raynaud, for instance, has noted that for late medieval princes, and the Dukes of 
Burgundy in particular, magnificence did not only excuse, but also explain and justify the waging of war. 
Cf. C. RAYNAUD, `L'imaginaire de la guerre dans L'histoire du bon roi Alexandre', in her work Images et 
pouvoirs au Moyen Age, Paris, Le Leopard d'Or, 1992, p. 119-137. 
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to the 
broches, briaches, branches, brandons bruslez, 
bribeurs broillez, bricoleurs barboillez, 
bruns bredoillez, bigarees banieres 45 
Participants are being summoned from all over Europe: armourers from Milan, 
craftsmen from Spain and Flanders, and mercenaries, `Lancequenetz, Suysses / et leurs 
complices', from Switzerland and German y46 
The long description of Charles VIII's army appears as an obligatory passage in 
our chroniclers' narratives, to mark the King's overwhelming power. The chroniclers 
enumerate the different army corps with their captains: the Scottish archers, the Swiss 
pikemen, the hundred gentilshommes de 1 'hotel du roy - an elite corps on whom the 
Kings of France, like their European princely neighbours, were increasingly relying47 - 
etc. The King's artillery, which had done so much to expel the English from France, and 
was at the time the most modem in Europe48, is naturally not neglected: de La Vigne 
dwells on the power of the `grosses bombardes', or the `trop marmiteuses coulevrines 
piteuses'49. The chroniclers are impressed by the composition of the navy: 11 `caraques', 
226 galleys, 24 `grosses naves', 60 brigantines, `non comprinses les barques et flettes 
desquelles y avoit sans nombre'50, Desrey adds. Charles sent ambassadors and other 
nobles 
bien renommez par leurs haulx vasselaiges, 
riches d'onneur et de laschete minces, 
as ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 132, v. 107-110,91-93. 
461bid., p. 131-132. 
47 Cf. J. R. HALE, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620, Leicester, Leicester University 
Press / Fontana Paperbacks, 1985, p. 136. 
48 Guicciardini, for instance, showed well the preponderant part played by `this pestilential armament' 
during Charles' Italian campaign. Cf. FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI, History of Italy and History of 
Florence, ed. and abridged by J. R. HALE, transi. C. GRAYSON, Chalfont St. Giles, Sadler and Brown, 
1966, p. 152 (History of Italy, Book I, Chapter 11). 
49 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 133, v. 115,122. 
50 PIERRE DESREY, `Addition... ', fol. ccxvii, r°. 
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parfaitz en bien, vertueux en langaiges 51 
all over Italy. The chroniclers also marvel at a novelty, the appointment of a `Marechal 
des Loges', 
lequel en grande curiosite et diligence bailla par escript en beaulx petis 
rosles au roy Charles et ä les mareschaulx tous les lieux, cites, viles [... ] et 
vilages d'icelluy voyage, et si narroit et donnoit ä entendre la situation des 
52 logis. 
Charles' expedition may have been an invasion, but the French were now civilized; the 
work performed by the `Marechal des Loges', for instance, showed that they had evolved 
since the times of the barbarous Gauls' descent into Italy. A conventional courteous 
element appears repeatedly in de La Vigne's account: the analogy between the conquest 
and winning a woman's heart. Thus, among all the King's followers, the mignons are 
described as `pour assaillir ung feminin donjon / trop plus propres que dix autres 
miliers'53 
The King is followed by all his servants, and all the objects needed for his service 
and everyday activities, `bagage servant a tous offices de la maison du roy comme pour 
la chambre, chapelle, garde robe, panetrie tant de bouche comme de commun [... ] et 
aussi pour garde vaisselle de bouche [... ], pour tapisserie et fourrures'54... As the 
compiler of the Mer des hystoires of 1503 points out: `quelque part que le roy aille son 
estat ne se bouge de sa vitaille, ne de sa bouche, ne des chambellans et de tous ses 
domestiques'55. The army also includes an infinity of craftsmen, carpenters, coalmen, 
carters, `maitres pour faire cordes et chables and gens scavans pour abatre murailles'56. 
Finally, there is another infinity of people who are just there to make the army even more 
impressive and magnificent: 
51 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 149, v. 751-753. 
52 PIERRE DESREY, `Addition... ', fol. ccxviii, r°. 
53 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 152, v. 831-832. 
sa PIERRE DESREY, `Addition... ', fol ccxvii, v°. 
ss Mer des hysloires, 1503, vol. 2, fol. cclxxv, v°. 
56 PIERRE DESREY, `Addition... ', fol. ccxvi, v°. 
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clerons, trompettes [... ] joueurs de haultsboys, sonneurs de comets [... ] 
joueurs de la grande espee et de la petite au bouclier, joueurs de la hache 
d'arme et de la courte dague, jousteurs de lance [... ] et gentilz 
compaignons qui avoient bon corps pour faire souplesses57. 
However, by contrast with Desrey, de La Vigne mentions `ung grant tas de rustres 
gauldisseurs / qu'on voit souvent suivre et hanter la court'58, referring to such men. A 
swarm of parasites was a natural consequence of Charles' largesse. 
To the modern reader, the descriptions of Charles VIII's army during its entries 
into Florence, Rome or Naples quickly become tedious - and we do not find them in 
Commynes' narration. However, the fact that our chroniclers devoted so much ink to the 
detailed descriptions of these parades show that they were considered as very important. 
These ostentatious displays of power were intended to impress the Italians, and they 
certainly did as we learn from reading the Italian chronicles. The French chroniclers 
describe the gentilshommes de 1'hötel, `tous moult bien armes et montes sur chevaulx 
excellentement bardes de diverses parures', their footmen, `richement abilles de draps 
d'or, velours, satin ou taffetas pour le mendre drap', with `belles rapierres en leurs 
mains', or the archers of the guard, `armes de brigandines gardebras, gorgeries et cleres 
salades, charges de belle orfavrerie'59. Charles' soldiers appear both beautiful and 
fearsome; this general impression was the one intended, and is epitomized in de La 
Vigne's description of the gentflhommes de /'hotel, who `monstroyent bien par leurs 
ruades bauldes / qu'en France ya gens qui ont cueur et corps'60 
Charles' princely virtue of magnificence at war is also shown and praised at 
Vercelli - where in September 1495 Philippe de Commynes and others were trying to 
conclude a peace treaty with the League - as the chroniclers depict Charles inviting the 
Milanese and Venetian ambassadors to visit his camp `tout a leur bon plaisir'. Charles' 
57 Ibid., fol. ccxviii, r°. 
58 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 152, v. 837-838. 
59 PIERRE DESREY, `Addition... ', fol. ccxxi, v°. 
60 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 215, v. 3108-3109. 
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behaviour is contrasted with that of the Duke of Milan Ludovico Sforza, who had never 
let any ambassador visit his camp, `de paour que l'on sceust son ordre, estat et facon de 
faire'. Charles did not have such complexes, because he was the strongest: on this 
occasion, his magnanimity forced the Italians to acknowledge his superiority. The 
ambassadors, de La Vigne adds, `s'esmerveillerent moult du bon ordre, de 1'excellence 
et de la puissance au roy de France'61 
As we know, Charles VIII's descent into Italy was, on the whole, a triumph - 
save for the ticklish fact that the Neapolitans rebelled against the French less than two 
months after Charles' departure from Naples, something which the chroniclers mention 
briefly but do not really dare to analyse. Like a Gallic Caesar, Charles had come to Italy, 
he had seen Italy and he had vanquished the Italians at Fornovo. Since a guerre de 
magnificence was all the more impressive when successful, our chroniclers highlighted 
every moment where Charles' power had taken effect. Each one of his martial deeds was 
extolled. One of the events at which the chroniclers marvelled most, and which was truly 
a exploit, was Charles' crossing of the Appenine passes on his return journey with all his 
artillery, as he had refused to dismantle it. This feat of arms was hitherto unheard of in 
military history. De La Vigne describes at length how the Swiss infantrymen harnessed 
themselves by hundreds to each piece of artillery, together with the horses, and hauled 
the canons up the mountain under an exceptionally hot sun. Once the top had been 
reached, the Swiss had to hold the canons back on the way down, which was even more 
laborious. De La Vigne presents the whole event as a tremendous exploit, depicting the 
Swiss musicians playing their tabors amongst the `cris et hurlemens merveilleux' to 
cheer the workers, and concludes with some awe: `a bien regarder les croniques et 
hystoires du temps passe, on ne trouve point si grande ne si penible entreprise avoir este 
faicte'62. Charles' subjects could not fail to underline the analogy to be made between 
Charles crossing the Alps to invade Italy, and Hannibal who had performed the same 
deed with his elephants. But as the maid of Chieri pointed out, Charles had surpassed 
61 Ibid., p. 305. 
62 Ibid., p. 278. 
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Hannibal himself, for Hannibal had not been able to enter Rome, while Charles had 
visited the holy city and exercised justice there 63 
As for the battle of Fornovo, de La Vigne related it in a heroic style, emphasizing 
the courage and valour of the French, their artillery's efficiency compared to the poor 
results achieved by the Italian guns, and the doom of the League's forces. In the Livian 
tradition, the chronicler depicted Charles delivering a harangue to his knights in very 
conventional language; the young King stressed that his cause was just, that God was 
with the French and that He would demonstrate on this day `la bonne amour, la dilection 
et la charite singuliere qu'il a aux bons et loyaux Francoys'. Charles also held out to the 
soldiers the `onneur, louenge et gloire' which would await them in France on their 
victorious return. The fact that a violent storm had broken out during the battle provided 
de La Vigne with the opportunity to depict the confrontation in an epic and almost 
apocalyptic light: `autant que dura la tuerie, la chace et l'escaramouche, oncques ne 
cessa de venter, de plouvoir, de tonner et d'esclerer comme si tous les dyables eussent 
este par les champs'. De La Vigne saw this as a sign of the wrath of God against the 
treacherous Italians, who, once friendly - Charles had come to Italy at Ludovico Sforza 
and Alexander VI's request - had become hostile to the French. Eventually, God granted 
the victory to the French, `pour garder et sauver le tres crestien roy, pillier de la foy 
catholique', and the Italians were vanquished `et mis soubz les piedz des vertueux 
Francoys'TM. As one can see, the idea that God supported the Kings of France in their 
wars, because they were His faithful and zealous servants - an idea which, as we saw, 
often appeared at the dawn of the 16`h century in the chroniclers' discourse about Joan of 
Arc65 - also applied to offensive wars. 
5. The French chroniclers and the Italians 
63 Ibid, p. 298. 
64 For de La Vigne's account of Fornovo see ibid., p. 283-289. 
65 See Chapter 2, Sections 3.1 and 4. 
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De La Vigne's comments on the Italians in his report of the battle of Fornovo 
show that he did not make much effort to understand the natives' feelings. The same can 
be said of all our chroniclers. Thus, they praised the fact that, until Fornovo, the 
conquest had been remarkably peaceable - save for Louis of Orleans' victory at Rapallo 
(5 September 1494) and the brutal sack of a few towns by Charles' vanguard - but they 
attributed it exclusively to Charles' great power. It is true that the deterrent strength of 
Charles' army partly explained the fact that the French had hardly met any resistance. 
However, unlike Commynes, other French chroniclers did not try to understand why the 
Italians had not only let Charles cross the peninsula, but also welcomed him 
wholeheartedly on his descent. It appears as if this was simply to be expected. After all, 
as Molinet - who was supporting Charles' venture - metaphorically expressed it: `Le 
moine doit danser au pied l'abbe'66. Charles was the King of France, and his will simply 
had to be obeyed. According to Jean de Saint-Gelais, Charles was welcomed everywhere 
`ainsi qu'il appartient ä un tel prince de Festre' 67. Andre de La Vigne severely criticized 
the Florentines for having dared to resist68, but the chronicler did not recognise the irony 
in his speech as he reproached the Florentines for arrogantly claiming that Pisa belonged 
to them69. Apparently, only the King of France had the right to declare a country his 
property, and to wage war against its rulers. 
By the time of Louis XII's conquests, it seems that the French chroniclers had 
lost a few of their illusions. In the part of his work dealing with Louis XII, Jean de Saint- 
Gelais explained, as if he had just realized it: `il n'est aucune nation qui scaiche tant ni 
ne veuille complaire ä ceulx qui sont les plus forts que font les Italiens'70. In a way, the 
word `scaiche' is an acknowledgement that the strongest was not necessarily the ultimate 
winner. In any case, none of our chroniclers understood the Italians as well as 
Commynes, and none of them saw more clearly why the Italians had welcomed Charles 
so warmly, to later turn their backs on him. 
66 JEAN MOLINET, 'Voiage de Napples', p. 279, v. 48. 
67 JEAN DE SAINT-GELAIS, p. 85. 
68 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 208, v. 2885-2889. Piero de Medici had first opposed the French before 
eventually giving much more than they expected. 691bid., p. 201. 
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" Conclusion 
The works of the French chroniclers - leaving Commynes aside - are not very 
helpful for us to understand the reactions of the Italians; however, they illustrate 
perfectly the concept of the guerre d'honneur et de magnificence. Charles' crusading 
plans had failed, but this did not seem to matter for our chroniclers; at this early stage of 
the wars of Italy, their confidence in the King's power, and in the renown that Charles 
had gained thanks to this magnificent martial deed, was intact. Their assertiveness 
contrasts with the kind of uneasiness and disillusionment that we saw in many 
Burgundian accounts of Philip the Good's crusading endeavours. The conquest of a far- 
off country like the Kingdom of Naples was a perfect way, for the King of France, of 
displaying his power, and this is what our chroniclers remembered from Charles' descent 
into Italy: the marvels of the journey, and Charles' triumph. It should be noted that the 
concept of the guerre de magnificence is closely linked with the ideals of chivalry; 
indeed the conquest appears as a prouesse, an outstanding feat of arms which brought 
the King glory and renown. As for the material realities of the conquest, such as the 
financial gains, they were either ignored by our chroniclers, or included amongst the 
marvels of Italy. Thus de la Vigne marvelled at the profusion, variety and richness of the 
goods that the French had found inside the Castello Nuovo, and added with disarming 
simplicity: `1'en fut plus de huyt jours entiers a les vuyder par force de gens et de 
charrettes'71. After all, this was a prize Charles only deserved, after his tremendous 
prouesse. 
Of all our French chroniclers - save Commynes - only Guillaume de Villeneuve 
depicted in detail the un-magnificent part of the conquest: the expulsion of the French 
70 JEAN DE SAINT-GELAIS, p. 148. 
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from Naples, which Charles had not witnessed. Villeneuve was naturally well informed 
about these later events, as he had been personally involved in them, as a French captain. 
He had also suffered from them, having been taken prisoner by Ferrandino and detained 
on a galley, as well as in the Castel Nuovo, for a whole year. Still, his narration does not 
differ much in ideology from that of other French chroniclers: it is all about honour - his 
honour as a French knight, and that of Charles - and about the chivalrous virtues of the 
French. Villeneuve made no attempt to look beyond the martial, chivalrous and heroic 
aspect of events and to understand the Italians' feelings, or the political side of the whole 
story. In fact, he willingly avoided considering this aspect of the invasion, arguing for 
instance about the formation of the League: je m'en tairay, car ä moy n'appartient, ne 
mon sens n'est assez suffisant pour parler [... ] d'une si haute matiere ne si corrompue 
comme ceste-cy'72. The role of the King of France's soldiers was not to discuss such 
matters, but simply to obey orders; besides, politics - especially Italian politics - were far 
too subtle and fraudulent affairs for a simple, honest French knight. Still, Villeneuve's 
experience led him to question Charles' magnificence - without at all criticizing the King 
- for he felt impelled to `supplier, que si une autre fois vous amenez le tres-chrestien roy 
de France aux Italies, [... ] que pour l'onneur de Dieu, vous 1'amenez mieulx 
accompaignie qu'il n'estoit, ä celle fin que vous ne mettez en si grant peril [... ] la 
couronne de France'73. Villeneuve was here referring to the battle of Fornovo, whose 
outcome could well have been tragic for the French. Perhaps the tremendous power of 
Charles, as extolled by de La Vigne, was not sufficient after all for such a considerable 
enterprise. 
Not all literature written in France about Charles' conquest was overtly 
supportive. Anna Slerca has shown that Jean Bouchet's Complainte des estatz sur le 
voyage et guerre de Neaples was rather ambivalent, and might suggest that the people of 
France did not wholeheartedly support Charles' Italian projects. The piece was written 
shortly after Charles' return, in 1496, when the King was considering a second descent 
71 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 251. 
72 GUILLAUME DE VILLENEUVE, p. 271. 
73 Ibid., p. 270. 
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into Italy. It was offered to the King as a present, when a delegation of the people of 
Lyon were visiting Charles to ask for the creation of a parliament in their town74. Thus it 
was quite natural that the Complainte should reflect the interest of the people; it is in a 
way close to the `clerical' tradition of literature that we saw in the first chapter. 
However, as far as late 15`h and early 16`h century historiography was concerned, the tone 
seems to have been unanimously admiring, and all chroniclers - if we expect the few 
anxious reserves made by Villeneuve - implicitly presented and extolled the conquest as 
a guerre de magnificence, which brought honour and renown to France. Only one voice 
was dissenting: that of Commynes, whose account will now be discussed. 
74 Cf. SLERCA, `La Complainte des estatz... '. Jean Bouchet's Complainte des estatz appears in his larger 
work L'Amoureux transy sans espoir. 
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Fig. 10. Charles VIII and his army set out on their return journey (20 May 
1495). From Ferraiuolo's illustrated chronicle. There is hardly anything magnificent 
about Charles in this drawing. As in a caricature, the King is presented as a short, 
weak and rather unattractive young man, whose tough warriors -a primordial factor 
of his successes - are head and shoulders above him. 
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Chapter 6: Tales of a conquest (II). Charles VIII's descent into Italy in 
Philippe de Commynes' Memoires 
Les Francais, pour s'heberger ä leur maniere, forcaient de tous 
cotes ('entree des maisons, jetaient dehors hommes, betes et 
meubles, brillant le bois, mangeant et buvant ä discretion sans 
rien payer, ce qui occasionna une grande rumeur dans le peuple. 
Jean Burchard, Journal' 
" Introduction 
In the last chapter, we saw how most French chroniclers implicitly presented the 
conquest as a guerre d'honneur et de magnificence. I now wish to contrast their 
interpretation with the very different vision of a French contemporary, as exposed in his 
Memoires: Philippe de Commynes. Like Villeneuve and de La Vigne, Commynes 
participated in the conquest, though he only was with the King during part of the return 
journey, having spent the last months of 1494 and the first of 1495 as Charles VIII's 
ambassador in Venice. Commynes' version of the events is particularly valuable, not 
only because he witnessed, for some time, the behaviour of the French, but also because 
he was in a privileged position to see the Italian reactions. 
1 Extract from JEAN BURCILARD, Diarium, in Archives curieuses de 1'histoire de France depuis Louis XI 
jusqu'ä Louis XVII!, ed. M. L. CIMBER (L. LAFAIST) and J. L. DANJOU, 27 vol., Paris, Beauvais, 1834- 
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When Commynes was sent to the Serene Republic in September 1494, he had a 
long experience of politics, having been Louis XI's adviser for about a decade. His views 
on war, of great originality for the times, have been exposed and analysed by Jean 
Dufournet, Jean-Claude Delclos and Joel Blanchard2. In particular, these scholars have 
shown, concentrating mainly on the Memoires' first six books that relate Louis XI's 
struggle against Charles the Bold, that unlike the `chivalrous' chroniclers of Burgundy, 
Commynes saw no greatness in the waging of war: our memorialist considered warfare 
very lucidly, regarding it mainly as the source of much unnecessary suffering and 
cruelty. Moreover, Commynes - like his former master Louis XI - reckoned that going to 
battle was most of the time baneful to politics, because it gave too many odds to chance, 
and one could not rely on chance when the future of the state was at stake3. To taking the 
field, Commynes much preferred diplomacy. Thus, because of his realist and pragmatic 
outlook on warfare, and because the exercise of violence failed to seduce him, 
Commynes was rather insensitive to the great ideals of chivalry. 
In this chapter, I intend to show that, unlike the other contemporary French 
chroniclers, Commynes stripped the conquest of all its magnificence, as a result partly of 
his outlook on war in general, and partly of a knowledge of men and politics unaltered 
by chivalrous ideals. There was, however, another reason for Commynes' particular 
tone, which cannot be ignored. Jean Dufournet has shown that Commynes bore Charles 
VIII a grudge, because the King had not made capital out of his talent; Commynes was 
used to much more consideration for his person under Louis XI's rule. Thus Commynes 
was jealous of the King's advisers, such as Bishop Guillaume Briconnet (who was made 
a cardinal during the conquest), and tended to denigrate their opinion. Moreover, 
1840,1ý" serie, I, 225-313 (p. 273). Translated by the editors. Jean Burchard was master of ceremonies of 
the chapel to Pope Alexander VI. The scene is set in Rome. 
2 See Chapter 2 and Chapter 7 of J. DUFOURNET, La destruction des mythes dans les `Memoires' de 
Philippe de Commynes, Geneva, Droz, 1966; J. DUFOURNET, `Comment lire les Memoires de 
Commynes ? L'entrevue de Peronne et 1'expedition contre Liege', in Philippe de Commynes, p. 217-249 
(p. 242-249); J. -C. DELCLOS, `Les rayons et les ombres... ' ; J. BLANCIHARD, Commynes 1'Europeen : 
1'invention dupolitique, Geneva, Droz, 1996, p. 233-243,275-283. 
3 This opinion is often expressed in the Memoires; see for instance I, 65; 1,121; III, 224. 
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Commynes was held responsible by many courtiers for the rapid loss of the newly 
conquered Italian territories, because he had failed to prevent the formation of the 
League while in Venice, and had been fooled by Ludovico Sforza's empty promises of 
support for Charles, following the King's return to France. As a result, Commynes wrote 
his account partly as an apology: he emphasized that he had acted wisely, contrary to 
many, but that all his efforts had been in vain, notably because of lack of support from 
the court4. 
Finally, we shall see that, faced with the overall success of Charles' descent into 
Italy - when he had predicted a shameful 
failure - and having been greatly impressed by 
the whole venture, which eventually had come to be a grand and epic event, Commynes 
ultimately reconsidered his opinion: Charles having safely returned to France, 
Commynes became in favour of a new expedition, which he would perhaps even have 
regarded as a true guerre de magnificence. But before turning our attention to 
Commynes' account, I wish to consider the original nature of his feelings with regard to 
Charles' conquest, and conquests in general. 
1. Commynes and conquest 
Commynes did not make any comments in his Memoires about the concept of 
wars of conquest, however it is easy to see that he was not easily seduced by such 
brilliant feats of arms, or guerres de magnificence. When he explains that the Venetians 
`ne sont point pour se acroistre en haste, comme firent les Romains; car leurs personnes 
ne sont point de telles vertus' (III, 113), we feel that he tends to agree with their position. 
Commynes fought at times alongside his masters - at Montlhery with Charles the Bold, 
or at Fornovo - but he much preferred politics to war, intellectual duels to violence. In 
4 Cf. J. DUFOURNET, `Commynes, 1'Italie et la Ligue anti-francaise', in Italie 1494, ed. A. C. FIORATO, 
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the first part of his Memoires, Commynes blamed Louis XI for having decided to invade 
Burgundy following Charles the Bold's death; the King had thus initiated a long and 
painful war. Instead, Commynes advocated the search for a peaceful solution, for 
example the Dauphin's wedding to Mary of Burgundy (II, 166-168). Commynes was a 
prudent man, and warfare, with all the risks it brought, was not the solution that met his 
support. 
This does not mean that Commynes was systematically opposed to conquests. He 
deemed the Catholic Kings' Reconquista (completed in 1492) admirable, calling it `une 
belle et grande conqueste, et la plus belle qui ayt este de notre temps' (III, 288). As one 
can see, the lure of the crusade did not leave him insensitive - indeed, he believed that 
Charles VIII could have expelled the Turks from the Levant. But Commynes generally 
admired remarkable princes, and it comes as a surprise to see that he likewise thought 
rather highly of Mehmet II - when considered according to political standards, rather 
than moral ones - even though, as a Christian, he felt ashamed that Constantinople 
should have fallen to the Turks (II, 338). However, men such as Mehmet II, `saige et 
vaillant prince, plus usant de sens et de cautelle que de valleur ne hardiesse', were 
exceptional, and Commynes would certainly not have advised any prince to launch into 
wars of conquest. Indeed, the thirst to attain glory through conquests had spelt ruin for 
Charles the Bold, because he did not possess the cunning and `malice' necessary to bring 
his high ambitions to a successful issue, and `avecques les autres choses propices a faire 
conquestes, si le tres grant sens n'y est, tout le demourant n'est riens' (I, 189). 
For such reasons, Commynes was opposed in 1494 to the idea of the King 
embarking on the conquest of the Kingdom of Naples, for in his opinion, the very things 
needed to carry out `si grand emprise' (III, 3) were wanting: the King and his entourage 
did not possess the necessary wisdom and experience, and the material means brought 
into play were not sufficient. 
Paris, Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1994, p. 95-120. 
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2. The conquerors divested of their mythical quality 
Andre de La Vigne, Desrey, Saint-Gelais, Villeneuve - with reservations - and 
the Mer des hystoires of 1503 all presented Charles VIII as the most powerful prince on 
earth, displaying his power to the Italians, who had to submit to his authority. 
Commynes' narrative is poles apart from this perspective: there is nothing magnificent in 
his Memoires about the King, his ministers or his army - though Commynes 
acknowledged Charles' good will, the worth of some of his captains, the soldiers' zeal 
and the strength of Charles' artillery. 
Other chroniclers pictured Charles VIII as a new Caesar or Hannibal; Commynes, 
by contrast, presented him as a king who fancied himself a new Caesar or Hannibal. In 
1494, Charles was very young `et ne faisoit que saillir du nyd' (III, 33); Commynes 
describes him as `foible personne, plain de son vouloir' (III, 3), hardly the figure of a 
conqueror. He was not serious and industrious enough to bear the burden that the rule 
and administration of a new and foreign country would represent. At Naples, once in 
possession of the Kingdom, Charles `ne pensa que ä passer temps' (III, 134). In 
December 1495, as Commynes had just returned from a journey to Venice and Milan, 
where he had been trying to negotiate a solution, so that the King might keep his new 
Kingdom, Commynes found Charles in Lyon `entendant a faire bonne chere et joustes; et 
de nulle aultre chose ne luy challoit' (III, 253). Jousting may have been a most 
chivalrous activity, but it would not help Charles to keep Naples. 
Commynes shows well that the idea of a conquest, with all the glory traditionally 
associated with it, had turned the King's head. He exposed how Ludovico Sforza had 
manipulated Charles to serve his own ends, taking advantage of the King's fancies, and 
using fine language such as: 
`Sire, ne craignes point ceste emprise. [... ] Quant vous me vouldrez 
croire, je vous aideray a faire plus grant que ne fut jamais Charlemaigne, 
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et chasserons ce Turc hors de ceste empire de Constantinoble aiseement, 
quant vous aurez ce royaulme de Naples. ' (III, 45) 
This reported speech of Ludovico is like a parody of all the dreams of eternal renown 
that the King and many members of the court associated with this conquest, imaginings 
lucidly described by Commynes as the `fumees et gloires d'Italie' (III, 20) - though he 
did believe that the King could have liberated Constantinople, only this necessitated far 
more work and material means than what had been done and brought into play. 
The situation would have been less worrying had Charles been surrounded by 
good advisers; however, Commynes' portrayal of Charles' entourage is rather 
unflattering. These men lacked the experience needed for such affairs, and seemed to 
multiply mistakes. Guillaume Briconnet, the Bishop of Saint-Malo, did not know much 
about war. At Fornovo, Commynes was amazed at his suggestion that perhaps 
everything would be fine if the army simply passed alongside the League's host under 
the cover of a few gunshots (III, 173). At Vercelli, on the other hand, Briconnet opposed 
the peace process, and Commynes severely criticizes this prelate who was in favour of a 
battle when he would not have had to fight himself (III, 231). Commynes also recounts 
how he was sent shortly after the battle of Fornovo, together with Briconnet and Gie, to 
negotiate with the Italian captains. As neither the Italians nor the French envoys could 
agree to cross the river, Gie and Briconnet told Commynes to cross it and start upon 
negotiations. Commynes accepted, but once on the other side of the river, a French 
herald arrived and told him that Gie and Briconnet had decided to return to the French 
host, and that he could negotiate whatever he wanted. Commynes was left in a very 
embarassing position, as he did not even know what the King really wanted (III, 197- 
199). 
Louis of Orleans, Charles VIII's cousin and the future King of France, also gets 
his share of blame in the Memoires5. While Charles was in Italy, Louis was supposed to 
S It should be noted that Commynes felt rather resentful towards Louis of Orleans, for personal reasons: 
Commynes had compromised himself in the `guerre folle' by supporting Louis, and had been imprisoned 
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remain in Asti with his troops and the reinforcements sent there from France after the 
formation of the League. Should any difficulties arise, Louis could thus have come to 
Charles' rescue. But `non obstant ce que le roy luy avoit escript, luy vint ceste praticque 
si friande que de luy bailler ceste cite de Novarre, qui est ä dix lieues de Millan' (III, 
150). Commynes is very ironical when stating that Louis intended to be useful to Charles 
by laying hands on Novara: he knew that Louis was satisfying his own ambitions, since 
the House of Orleans had rights to the Duchy of Milan. Jean de Saint-Gelais does not 
fool anybody today when stressing that amongst all of Charles VIII's subjects, even the 
humblest, one could not have found anyone more obedient and devoted to his King than 
Louis of Orleans6. In Commynes' opinion, Louis was not only disobedient, but almost 
incompetent as a tactician: if Louis had decided to attack Ludovico Sforza, he should 
have gone as far as possible - since Ludovico's subjects were supporting him - and made 
the most of the opportunity. Instead of that, Louis thought that Novara was enough, and 
let himself be besieged in Novara by Ludovico's forces, which had by then grown in 
number. And because he had neglected to gather any provisions inside the town, his 
troops had to suffer from a dreadful famine, attributed by Saint-Gelais to `la haulte vertu 
du gentil prince qui estoit dedans, lequel eust mieulx aime mourir que d'entrer en traicte, 
ny prendre party qui ne luy eust este honorable'7. As a result, Commynes concluded, 
instead of being helped by Louis, Charles had to come to Louis' rescue (III, 150). 
As for the King's favourites, apart from Briconnet, most of them were young 
knights, eager to fight, and full of self-confidence. In their youthful arrogance, they 
completely underestimated the Italians: `toute sa compaignie estoient jeunes gens et ne 
croyoient point qu'ilz fussent nulz aultres gens qui portassent armes' (III, 141). 
3. Charles' magnificence questioned 
for five months as a result, yet on his accession to the throne, Louis did not pay particular attention to our 
author (Memoires, III, 314). 
6 JEAN DE SAINT-GELAIS, p. 94. 
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We have seen the importance granted. by de La Vigne to the preparations for the 
conquest, which demonstrated Charles' magnificence. By contrast, Commynes bluntly 
stated: `toutes choses necessaires ä une si grand emprise failloient'. Of course, the King 
had assembled a great army, but there was a lack of good captains, not enough tents for 
everybody and, above all, `nul argent content' (III, 3). Commynes understood that money 
was the sinews of the conquest, and that, without finances, Charles' efforts would not 
achieve much, at least in the long term. One of the reasons why money was so crucial to 
the undertaking is exposed later on in the account: Italian princes - save for the richest - 
captains and families `ne servent point sans argent' (III, 272-273), because they in turn 
would not be served by their troops if they did not pay them. Italy may have seemed 
remarkably easy to conquer, the ideal territory to earn renown with great conquests, 
because it was full of riches and politically fragmented, but the very peculiarities of Italy 
also presented prospective conquerors with unforeseen difficulties which could only be 
overcome with experience. 
Other French chroniclers were only slowly realizing that Charles' apparently 
overwhelming power might not have been sufficient to keep the conquered territories. 
De La Vigne hardly commented upon the Neapolitans' rebellion which happened while 
Charles was still in Italy, but Villeneuve felt impelled to beg the King to bring more 
troops with him on his next journey. By the time of Louis XII, Jean de Saint-Gelais 
could timidly point out some of the defects of Charles' expedition - for instance, the fact 
that Charles had borrowed money from Ludovico Sforza - so that Charles' successors 
may not make the same mistakes; the chronicler stressed that a conqueror needed at least 
four things to bring his enterprise to a successful issue: a great number of soldiers, 
`argent largement a les souldoyer, et pour subvenir ä tout ce qui peut advenir', artillery, 
and `vivres qui ne faillent point par faulte d'ordre, ny autrement'8. 
In Commynes' Memoires, the French lack of money at the start of their enterprise 
is epitomized by the rings of the Duchess of Savoy and of the Marchioness of 
' Ibid., p. 94. 
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Montferrat, which Charles borrowed on the way and pawned for 24,000 ducats 
altogether. Commynes concluded: `Et pouvez veoir quel commencement de guerre, si 
Dieu n'eust guide 1'euvre! ' (III, 37). This telling detail contrasts wonderfully with the 
magnificence of Charles' preparations that appears in other French chronicles. 
4. Charles' army and the hardships of war 
The onward march of the French was undeniably an awesome event, especially 
because its success was completely unexpected - at least from the Italian point of view. 
Commynes, like the Venetians with whom he was staying, heard with amazement the 
news of Charles' unchecked advance, of his triumph as the populations of Italy warmly 
welcomed him and as princes fled before him. Commynes' awe was all the greater 
because he had predicted a failure. However, Commynes showed that the return of the 
French to France was far less glorious than the other chroniclers would have us believe. 
His depiction of the journey of the French from Siena to Asti is a masterpiece of realism, 
owing to the fact that Commynes had taken part in the return march. Other French 
chroniclers had emphasized the overwhelming power of Charles' army, which always 
appeared ready to face any situation, and was never overtaken by events. Commynes 
showed the power of the seemingly invincible French army, but also presented it as 
something human, exposing its many weaknesses. Beyond this, we can see that 
Commynes was naturally inclined to concentrate on the hardships of war and on human 
factors such as fear, uncertainty, weariness - all the imponderables of war which de La 
Vigne had only described to extol the soldiers' virtue, by showing what they had 
stoically endured - and to present the soldiers, not as heroes, but as humble human 
beings. 
The greatness of the victory of Fornovo, for instance, is much diminished. There 
is only one truly `glorious' moment: Commynes' depiction of the King just before the 
8 Ibid., p. 84. 
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battle. Charles was radiant with determination, mounted on a splendid horse; for the first 
time, this short and weak youth `sembloit [... ] tout aultre que sa nature ne portoit ne sa 
taille ne sa complexion; [... ] ce cheval le monstroit grant; et avoit le visaige bon et bonne 
couleur et la parolle audacieuse et saige'. At this moment, the words of Savonarola, who 
had told our chronicler that Charles was God's instrument, crossed Commynes' mind 
(III, 175-176). This `magnificent' episode is very different from all the moments where 
de La Vigne extolled Charles VIII - for instance, in his account of Fornovo, when de La 
Vigne compared Charles to Caesar, Hannibal or Alexander9 - because it describes a very 
personal, passing but forcible impression. And because Commynes' admiration was 
spontaneous, his tone is all the more moving and convincing. 
This is, however, the only `glorious' passage of the account of the battle. The 
fight itself is described very realistically, with some gruesome and noticeably un- 
magnificent details. For instance, Commynes describes the role of the French servants 
who wielded their small axes - normally used to chop wood - to finish off the Italian 
knights who had fallen from their horses: `presque tous avoient des haches pour coupper 
boys [... ] dont ilz rompirent les visieres des armetz, et leur en donnoient de grans coup 
sur les testes; car bien mal aisez estoient ä tuer, tant estoient fort armez' (III, 186-187). 
The act of killing has no nobility in his account. Commynes pitied Francesco Gonzaga's 
uncle Rodolfo, who was one of the first Italians to be killed, though he had been opposed 
to the battle (III, 181,186). Commynes stressed that at Rapallo and Fornovo, the Italians 
were shocked by the brutality of the French; they were used to sparing prisoners (III, 39, 
186,192,200). 
According to Guillaume de Villeneuve, Charles left the battlefield of Fornovo 
like an epic hero, `'espee au poing, et toujours retournant sa face droit ä ses ennemys'lo 
Commynes presents us with a totally different picture. After the battle, the Italians' host 
was still large, for many squadrons had not fought. Commynes was trying to negotiate 
some kind of agreement with the Venetians. However, on the second night after the 
9 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 288. 
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battle, the King's chamberlains informed him of Charles' decision to leave shortly before 
dawn, when the Venetians were still sleeping. A few hours later, a French trumpet 
sounded `faictes bon guet' to deceive the Venetians. The army left, and Commynes adds: 
`nous tournions le dox aux ennemys et prenions le chemin de sauvete, qui est chose bien 
espouventable pour ung ost' (III, 203). 
In Commynes' account, the return journey appears hectic and unorganized, 
anything but magnificent. De La Vigne stressed that the soldiers were by then beginning 
to be very tired, and that they sometimes had to bear great troubles. Still, in his report, 
they appear above the difficulties. Above all, fear is never mentioned". By contrast, 
Commynes relates how the French wandered from their road in the woods near Fornovo. 
He could hear the captains asking for the guide, and receiving the same answer: `Je n'en 
ay point' (III, 203). In a sentence that greatly challenges the magnificence of our 
conqueror, Commynes adds: `il n'estoit point de croyre que ung tel roy chevauchast de 
nuyt sans guyde, lä oü il en pouvoit assez finer'. He recounts that the army was seized 
with fright as it came out of the woods, because the soldiers mistook their vanguard for 
an enemy battalion, while the vanguard mistook the army, which was not coming out 
from where expected, for the Venetians (III, 204). Commynes also tells us that for quite 
a few days the Venetians were only twenty miles away from Charles' army, and that the 
rearguard was constantly being attacked by stradiots, kept at a distance by the German 
arquebusiers. During those days, `[nous] avions peu de gens de cheval qui se voulsissent 
mettre derriere' (III, 207). The men were harassed, and were starting to think only about 
one thing: getting home as soon as possible. Food was lacking, and the knights had to 
sleep wherever they could (III, 209). Commynes' account is rather different from that of 
Desrey, who stated that Charles crossed Lombardy `sans plus creindre ses ennemys [... ] 
tousjours en gloire et en triumphe'12. 
10 GUILLAUME DE VILLENEUVE, p. 272. 
11 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 292 if. 
12 PIERRE DESREY, `Addition... ', fol. ccxxxii, v°-ccxxxiii, r°. 
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5. The conquerors and the conquered 
Unlike other French chronicles, Commynes' Memoires show that the conquest of 
Naples was like a medal, with its reverse side. As Anne Denis has shown 13, Italian 
accounts of the conquest have an internal structure: they can be divided into two 
diametrically opposed parts. Italian chroniclers firstly related Charles' triumph, before 
describing his disgrace in the eyes of most of the Italian people; they recounted his 
conquest of the Kingdom of Naples, and then related how Ferrandino of Aragon 
reconquered the Kingdom with the help of the Venetians and the Catholic Kings of 
Spain, amongst others. They often compared the two stages, emphasizing how similar 
they had been in quickness and intensity, and thus illustrating a fundamental principle of 
political theory. In the words of the Milanese Giovan Pietro Cagnola, `come in poco 
tempo Carlo re lo aveva acquistato, cosi in poco tempo lo perdette'14. 
Amongst all contemporary French chronicles, Commynes' Memoires are the only 
work where we find this symmetrical structure. Apart from Guillaume de Villeneuve, 
who witnessed the collapse of the French Kingdom of Naples, most French chronicles of 
the time simply state that the Neapolitans rebelled against the French just a few weeks 
after their departure, occasionally adding a few bitter comments about the Neapolitans' 
lack of faith. Commynes did not only describe these events, but also strove to understand 
why the Neapolitans did rebel, and why the rest of the peninsula, which had firstly 
welcomed Charles, eventually turned against the French. And unlike all other French 
chroniclers, even those who took part in the expedition, such as de La Vigne or 
Villeneuve, Commynes understood the feelings of the Italians. Already before 1494, he 
had been sent to Florence by Louis XI, where he had met Lorenzo il Magnifico (II, 269- 
273). By the end of his life, Commynes could be regarded as a specialist in Italian 
affairs. In the words of the anonymous author of the Sejour de deuil pour le trepas de 
13 DENIS, p. 138 ff. 
14 Quotation from ibid., p. 139. 
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messire Philippe de Commynes: `Il cognoissoit mieux 1'Ytallye / Que nul qui nous soit 
demoure' 15. 
In 1494, Commynes tells us, the people of Italy had great expectancies about the 
French. Guicciardini may have referred to the years immediately preceding 1494 as a 
`golden age', but according to Commynes, Italy was full of problems and crises, which 
he described as the `pitiez d'Italie' (III, 59). Already in the first books of his Memoires, 
he had explained that the `princes d'Ytalie [... ] dominent assez cruellement et 
violentement sur leurs peuples quant a leurs deniers' (II, 208). The princes of Italy, the 
faraoni as some Italian writers called them, were often acting tyrannically. The usurper 
Ludovico Sforza, for instance, used to collect 700,000 ducats every year from his 
subjects, when according to Commynes, 500,000 ducats a year would have been more 
than enough (III, 18). Moreover, many cities in Italy were harshly ruled over by others, 
such as Pisa by Florence (III, 147). 
As the people of Italy saw Charles VIII's progress, they began to put great hopes 
in the King of France: `de tous coustes le peuple d'Italie commenca ä prendre cueur et 
desiroit nouvelletes, car ilz voioient choses qu'ilz n'avoient point veü de leur temps' (III, 
50). Commynes shows that the Italians considered the French even more highly than 
other French chroniclers tell us -a guarantee of his veracity - as he explained: `le peuple 
les [the French] adouroit comme saincts, estimant en nous toute foy et bonte' (III, 51). 
But Commynes, whose understanding of politics was greatly influenced by his Italian 
experience, was aware that the Italians were not as innocent as they pretended; he 
elsewhere recounted how an Italian Carthusian monk had told him, with a hint of 
cynicism: `Nous appellons, en ce pals icy, sainctz tour ceulz qui nous font du bien' (III, 
58). The Italians expected something in return for their support; they could very well 
turn their backs on those who disappointed them. 
15 Quoted in DUFOURNET, `Commynes et 1'Italie', p. 81. 
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Commynes shows how the Italians' enthusiastic feelings quickly died down, and 
how they rapidly turned against the men they had regarded as saviours. He uses an 
unusual image in order to illustrate this change: 
Et se vit changer la fortune aussi promptement et aussi visiblement 
comme l'on voit le jour en Halande ou en Norvuewe, oü les jours d'este 
sont plus longs que ailleurs, et tant que, quant le jour fault au soir, que en 
une mesme instance ou poy apres, comme d'ung quart d'heure, on voit de 
rechief naistre le jour advenir (III, 102). 
Commynes makes it clear that the French themselves were to be blamed for this change. 
The whole of Italy could have rebelled against their princes and chosen Charles as their 
ruler 'si du coste du roy les affaires eussent este bien conduictz et en ordre et sans 
pillerie'. However, `tout se faisoit au contraire, dont j'ay eu grand dueil pour l'honneur 
et bonne renommee que pouvoit acquerir en ce voyage la nation de France' (III, 50-51). 
As one can see, Commynes attached much importance to the image of France that 
Charles and his soldiers should have given to the Italians, an image of courtesy, 
generosity and true greatness. Commynes exposes to his readers the behaviour of the 
French in Italy, which in his opinion greatly sullied the honour they had acquired with 
the conquest. An epitome of this bad behaviour could be the conduct of the knight 
Robert de Balzac16 in the Medici palace in Florence, where he had been waiting for the 
King's arrival: `quant il vit la fuyte dudict Pierre de Medicis, se print ä piller tout ce qu'il 
trouva en la maison, disant que leur bancquier ä Lyon luy debvoit grant somme d'argent' 
(III, 67). Despite the chronological mistake pointed out by Calmette'7, which makes this 
story more exemplary than true, and the fact that the people of Florence themselves 
looted what was left inside the palace after the King's departure, the picture Commynes 
gives us of Robert de Balzac's conduct illustrates perfectly the ordinary behaviour of the 
French in Italy. 
16 According to Commynes, Robert de Balzac was to sell Pisa to the Pisans notwithstanding the King's 
will, thus greatly displeasing the Florentines, who had already given money to Charles to recover Pisa (III, 
262-263). 
17 See the Memoires, III, 67, n. 3. 
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Commynes discloses how in Naples many Frenchmen thought only about two 
things: `prendre et prouffiter' (III, 134). He also says that Charles' government in Naples 
displeased the Italian nobles, especially the Angevin, because Charles gave all the 
important offices almost exclusively to Frenchmen; sometimes the same office was 
given to two or three Frenchmen (III, 101). Finally, sternly moralizing as was his custom, 
Commynes tells us how the French, drunk with glory, began to despise the Italians: `tout 
se mist ä faire bonne chere et joustes et festes; et entrerent en tant de gloire qu'il ne 
sembloit point aux nostres que les Ytaliens fussent hommes' (III, 99). Thus the 
conquered people, whose hopes had all vanished, and who saw themselves being treated 
in such a cavalier manner by some arrogant foreigners, were bound to react and to 
forsake the men they had considered so highly. 
6. The French descent into Italy, `vray mistere de Dieu' 
And yet, despite all his misgivings and criticisms, in the final analysis 
Commynes considered the Naples expedition as a glorious episode, if not a guerre de 
magnificence. As he had stated at the beginning of his narration, Briconnet and Charles' 
other favourites, whom he criticized so much, were well entitled to say `qu'ilz furent 
cause de donner grant honneur et grant gloire ä leur maistre' (III, 3). Commynes had 
opposed the expedition in 1494, yet the first part of the conquest was an immense 
triumph. Like the Venetians, Commynes had thought that Charles would never go 
further than Florence, but the King had reached Naples and conquered the Kingdom. 
And like the Italian princes, Commynes had witnessed Charles' progress with awe and 
astonishment. All his anticipations had proven wrong. Piero de Medici had fled from 
Florence, and the intelligent, brave and powerful Kings of Naples had left the country, 
after a very timid resistance. The second part of the journey also contradicted 
Commynes' expectations. The League's army could well have utterly defeated the 
French and captured the King. When the French were crossing the swamps that lay at the 
foot of the Appenine mountains, following a narrow path, even a cart thrown across the 
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track, together with two pieces of artillery, could have stopped them (III, 152). The 
French seemed to multiply mistakes, yet everything eventually went well: the League's 
army was defeated, and Charles returned home with his soldiers. As Commynes reported 
the King's decision to send soldiers to Genoa for an offensive, thereby further 
diminishing his host and jeopardizing his return, the memorialist could not repress his 
amazement at such a huge mistake: `Et m'esbays comment il est possible que ung si 
jeune roy n'avoit quelzques bons serviteurs qui luy osassent avoir dirt le peril en quoy il 
se mectoit. De moy, il me sembloit qu'il ne me croyoit point du tout' (III, 153). This is 
what makes Commynes' account so fascinating, the constant idea that everything should 
have gone wrong, but that everything went right. The troops sent for the offensive on 
Genoa had been defeated, yet Charles managed to gain the victory at Fornovo without 
their help. 
Confronted with such a mysterious enigma, Commynes had to find a solution, 
and found it in the preachings of Girolamo Savonarola. Anne Denis has shown that, 
towards the end of the century, Italy was shaken by a strong current of milleniarism'8. In 
the 1490s, the elements had broken loose: earthquakes, eclipses, violent storms and 
floods followed one another. Many, besides Savonarola, felt that either a great change or 
something terrible was about to occur. Savonarola preached that God had singled out 
Charles VIII - though not because of any personal merits - as his instrument, and that the 
French King was to punish the Italian princes for their crimes, to reform the Church 
through violence, and to convert the infidels. 
It seems that French chroniclers other than Commynes did not take the fears of 
the Italians seriously. When mentioning the mysterious collapse of a section of the walls 
of the Castello San Angelo in Rome, where the Pope had taken refuge as Charles was 
approaching the Holy City, they tell us that the Romans were very shocked and scared by 
this event. They do not, however, tell us anything about the reactions of the French, nor 
do they give their own opinion. In his Panegyric of La Tremoille, Jean Bouchet mocked 
18 DENIS, p. 52-62. 
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the superstitious pope who was scared by these prophecies and took the fall of part of his 
castle's walls as a bad omen19. Apparently, only Desrey, in a version of his addition to 
the translation of Gaguin's Compendium, mentioned the prediction made by `Hierosme 
Savonarole (qui depuis fut tres-injustement brüle a Florence par l'envie cruelle de ses 
ennemis)' in 1493 about the advent of the French in Italy. He did not, however, deal with 
Savonarola's view that Charles was God's instrument, and unlike Commynes, did not 
make this point the main theme of his narrative20. 
Commynes saw in Savonarola's preachings the answer to his questions. 
According to Savonarola, Charles `estoit envoye de Dieu pour chastier les tirans d'Italie 
et [... ] riens ne povoit resister ne se deffendre contre luy'; through Charles' agency, 
Testat de l'Eglise seroit refforme ä 1'espee' (III, 145). Commynes had met Savonarola 
in Florence, and had asked him whether Charles would be able to return home. 
Savonarola had replied: 
qu'il auroit ä faire en chemin, mais que l'honneur luy en demoureroit, et 
n'eust-il que cent hommes en sa compaignee; et que Dieu, qui l'avoit 
conduict au venir, le conduiroit encores ä son retour; mais pour ne s'estre 
point bien acquitte ä la refformation de 1'Eglise [... ] et pour avoir souffert 
que ses gens pillassent [... ] le peuple [... ], que Dieu avoit donne une 
sentence contre luy (III, 145-146). 
This prediction, personally made by Savonarola to our author, elucidated many things for 
Commynes: it explained why Charles had been able to conquer Naples so easily, to 
return safely home, despite all the mistakes, and to win the battle of Fornovo. As for the 
divine punishment with which Savonarola threatened the King, it could be the Dauphin's 
death, or the premature death of Charles himself (III, 146,309). 
As a result, Commynes concluded that the conquest, `vray mistere de Dieu' (III, 
146) had been entirely directed by God; the idea that the Lord was leading Charles' 
19 JEAN BOUCIIET, Le Panegyric..., p. 759. 
20 See Desrey's Relation du voyage de Charles VIII pour la conqueste du royaume de Naples published in 
the Archives curieuses, l6" serie, I, 199-223 (p. 282). 
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army, which recurs everywhere in the Memoires, became the main theme of his 
narrative. Strangely, the account written by Commynes, who usually appears as a realist 
amongst our French chroniclers, is impregnated with an atmosphere of milleniarism, and 
the reports of other French chroniclers, despite being imbued with the ideals of chivalry, 
and despite their laudatory tone, appear much more pragmatic in ideology: although they 
would not have dared to deny that God had been in charge of the conquest - as Charles 
conventionally states in the harangue that he makes, in de La Vigne's account, prior to 
the battle of Fornovo21 - they basically attributed the result of the expedition to Charles' 
overwhelming might. 
7. Prospects of a new descent into Italy 
Commynes' mysticism did not hold him from considering the chances of the 
Kings of France to earn more renown and lands in the peninsula, since after all the 
expedition had been full of promises; the later additions that he made to his report show 
that Commynes, who was once against a descent into Italy, and who strove at Vercelli to 
have Charles and the League make peace with one another, eventually changed his mind 
completely and wrote in favour of a new expedition. The next descent into Italy could 
well be a successful and rewarding guerre de magnificence. 
Commynes enumerated the advantages enjoyed by the King of France, which 
could make the next descent a `belle avanture' (III, 276): the King was very wealthy, 
thus he could afford to buy the support of the Italian families and captains (III, 272-273). 
He was assured of the Duke of Ferrarra's support, as well as that of Francesco Gonzaga - 
the captain of the League's army, now displeased at the Venetians - the Orsinis, the 
Vitellis, and the Florentines, who were now so weak that they had no alternative. Less 
than 80,000 ecus would have been necessary to pay those who needed wages long 
enough to destroy Ludovico Sforza; once Milan conquered, Naples could be recovered. 
21 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 285. 
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It is interesting to note that, unlike our other chroniclers, the realist Commynes did not 
attach much importance to the justness of Charles' rights over Naples, since after all the 
Neapolitans, who were never satisfied with their rulers, seemed ready to welcome 
anybody; thus Commynes declared with arresting pragmatism: `de la nature dont il [the 
Kingdom of Naples] est et les gens qui 1'habitent, il me semble qu'il est ä celuy qui le 
peult posseder; car ilz ne veullent que mutation' (III, 289). 
This does not, however, mean that Commynes did not care about the ethical 
aspect of a new campaign in Italy. Jean Dufournet sees four main reasons for 
Commynes' change of mind. The most obvious is that Commynes, who still wanted to 
regain some of the power he enjoyed under Louis XI, chose to support the idea of a new 
campaign to please Charles VIII and Louis XII. Secondly, Commynes wanted to get his 
revenge on Ludovico Sforza, who had deceived him after the conclusion of the treaty of 
Vercelli. Thirdly, our memorialist wanted to help the Florentines, who had lost all of 
their power after the loss of Pisa. Finally, Commynes had become fascinated by Italy, by 
the Italians' wisdom and shrewdness, and their subtle politics, the constant negotiations 
or `practique avecques les ennemys' (III, 70) which presented a real challenge to his 
intelligence 22. However, given Commynes' mysticism, which looms so large over his 
narrative, one may well see an additional and more ethical reason for Commynes' wish 
to see the King of France return into Italy. Commynes may have hoped that Charles VIII 
or Louis XII would carry out the mission entrusted by God to the King of France, as 
explained by Savonarola: to eradicate the `pitiez d'Italie', and to reform the Church `ä 
1'espee'. Commynes was undoubtedly supporting the motion that the Church, at the time 
governed by the very controversial figure Alexander VI Borgia, needed a thorough 
reform, if necessary through violence. In his opinion, Charles was too young in 1494 to 
perform this task, regarded by `toutes gens de congnoissance et de raison' as `une bonne, 
grande et tres saincte besongne', and his advisers were not adequate. Still, the deed could 
be done, for `le vouloir du roy [Charles VIII] y estoit bon, et est encores, en ce cas, s'il y 
estoit aide' (III, 88-89). Only the reform of the Church would require `grant mistere', 
22 Cf. DUFOURNET, `Commynes, l'Italie... ', p. 120. 
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that is to say, much difficult work, for it was a noble and holy task. But would not taking 
the sword to perform this deed, as well as to castigate the Italian tyrants, be a most 
impressive guerre de magnificence - perhaps as much as taking the cross? 
" Conclusion 
Commynes' account of the 1494 expedition is thus of great originality and 
richness when compared with the narratives of other chroniclers. It is also a highly 
personal report, which does not belong to any tradition of historiography, at least to any 
of the kinds written in the 15th century. Commynes does not write `chivalrous' history, 
nor does his work resemble the clerical chronicle. His Memoires are also very different 
from the kinds of Memoires that some of his contemporaries wrote; Guillaume de 
Villeneuve, for instance, also related the first War of Italy as a participant, but his report 
is still very close to the `chivalrous' historiography: Villeneuve's main interest lay in 
instances of `faits d'armes' and other honourable deeds. Nor can it be said that 
Commynes wrote the kind of early humanist historiography practised by Robert Gaguin: 
though he does demonstrate - especially in his relation of the conquest - some knowledge 
of classical history, classical historiography was by no means a model for him. And yet, 
his work is strongly reminiscent of one major classical source: Julius Caesar's 
Commentaries, because like Caesar, Commynes related events which he had witnessed, 
and in which he had been a participant, in unsophisticated language, with an analytical 
outlook23. 
Commynes gave us a very original picture of the French descent into Renaissance 
Italy. All his French contemporaries implicitly presented the conquest as a guerre 
d'honneur et de magnificence, but Commynes emphasized all the defects in the 
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campaign, making it appear badly prepared, poorly conducted, in a word, very un- 
magnificent. There was, of course, much jealousy in Commynes' attitude that influenced 
his view. What amazed and almost shocked Commynes was that everything should have 
gone wrong, and that everything went incredibly well for Charles: the conquest was, on 
the whole, impressively successful, and brought the King of France much honour and 
renown. Inspired by Savonarola's visionary explanations, Commynes concluded that, 
throughout the journey, God had been leading Charles by the hand. This gives his 
account a truly special flavour, as it makes the conquest appear as an extraordinary 
adventure. Commynes was obviously not the first to argue that God was helping the 
French in one of their wars: we saw in my second chapter that the treatment of Joan of 
Arc in French historiography allowed the late 15`" century French chroniclers to make a 
similar statement. However, with regard to this particular, offensive war, contemporary 
chroniclers seem to have chosen a perspective which, all things considered, appears very 
secular. Perhaps their tone resulted from the fact that the intended crusade had failed. 
Commynes' vision, by contrast, is undeniably mystical: in his narrative, the French 
appear helpless and unknowing of God's help, almost like pathetic puppets in the divine 
plan. Still, Commynes was eventually so impressed by the whole venture that he became 
openly in favour of a new descent into Italy. The idea of a guerre de magnificence in 
Italy apparently took his fancy; if the next descent was better planned, its results could be 
grandiose. 
Commynes' narrative of the conquest was published in 1528, thus it was only 
well into the 16th century that his version of the events started to alter the memory of 
Charles' venture. A Mer des histoires of 1543 used not only de La Vigne's account, but 
also that of Commynes to narrate the 1494 expedition24. From de LaVigne, the compiler 
kept the impressive figures used to describe Charles' army, and the glorious chivalrous 
deeds, praising for instance Charles' conduct at Fornovo. However, drawing on 
Commynes, he also pointed out the mistakes committed by the French, especially with 
23 On Commynes' place in the history of historiography see J. DUFOURNET, `Commynes et l'invention 
d'un nouveau genre historique: les Memoires', in Philippe de Commynes, p. 17-33. 
24 Mer des histoires, Paris, Ambroise Girault, 1543, fol. clxxi, r° to fol. clxxvii, v°. 
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regard to the loss of the Kingdom of Naples, so that his readers might reflect on them. 
Savonarola's predictions also appeared in this compilation, as in later works25; it seems 
that they greatly appealed to the imagination of readers. 
Remaining within the context of the first French conquests in Renaissance Italy - 
only, this time, including Louis XII's early Italian campaigns -I wish to end the thesis 
with a study of the representation of the King's agents in his wars. In the first chapter, 
we saw how Burgundian and French chroniclers depicted the prince's soldiers - 
concentrating almost exclusively on the knights - during the first half of the 15`h century; 
in the next and final chapter, we shall see how the representation of the soldiers had 
evolved in French historiography, by the dawn of the 16 `h century. 
25 See for example the Memoire particulier fait par une personne d'esprit et bien instruite des affaires 
touchant Charles VIII, published in the Archives curieuses, 1ý' serie, I, 159-198 (p. 185). The work 
apparently dates from the early 17`h century. The author stressed that the 1494 expedition had been related 
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Fig. 13. Louis XII's entry into Milan. An allegorical 
illustration. The knights and footsoldiers are wearing Louis XII's 
colours, a golden and red livery. Mars is driving his chariot by their 
side. From the Alarmes de Mai-s sur le i'ovage de Milan avec la 
conqueste et entree d 'icelle, an early 16`x' century manuscript. 
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Fig. 14. Beraud Stuart, Lord of Aubigny, and his company on their way to 
Italy. The mounted Scots archers are clearly recognizable. From an early 16`h 
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Fig. 15. The French army descends into Italy. A 16`h century 
illumination from the Croniques of Jean d'Auton. The pikemen, 
crossbowmen and knights are wearing Louis XII's livery. 
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Fig. 16. The siege of a town. Although it is taken from a manuscript of Enguerran de 
Monstrelet's chronicles, this illustration could perfectly represent an episode from the 
Wars of Italy: the French army of the early 16`h century, the knights, mercenaries, 
crossbowmen and guns are represented with striking accuracy. 
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Chapter 7: Images of the Renaissance French soldier in `monarchist' 
chronicles at the dawn of the 16th century 
Adieu le service du roy 
Que soloye faire soir et matin 
Danse macabre of the late 15th century' 
" Introduction 
The first chapter concerned itself with the treatment of the `war of the knights', 
in French and Burgundian historiography, during the first half of the 15th century. We 
saw that the knight was the key figure of historical narratives, as the primary agent of the 
prince in his wars. In Burgundy, the genre that flourished was the chivalrous chronicle, 
which presented knights as the heroes of the wars of their times, glorified the ideals of 
chivalry, and revelled in stories of glorious `faits d'armes'. In France, two kinds of 
historiographical literature co-existed. The clerical chronicle was very critical towards 
knights, divesting them of their mythical quality. However, by the second quarter of the 
I Paris, Guyot, 1486, fol. a vii, v°. Reproduced in L. GILLET, La cathedrale vivante, Paris, Flammarion, 
1964, p. 349-380 (quotation p. 362) 
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15th century, this vision of the `war of the knights' was losing ground. The chivalrous 
chronicle, on the contrary, was flourishing. Its evolution was much slower than in 
Burgundy, but already some distinctively French features were recognisable. Like its 
Burgundian homonym, the French chivalrous chronicle focused on the figure of the 
knight, shaping its vision and discourse according to the chivalrous ideology. But the 
lessons of the Hundred Years War made its discourse on warfare more pragmatic than 
the Burgundian one; thus French chivalrous historiographical narratives offered a more 
modem and realistic portrayal of knights, and of their role as soldiers of the King, 
emphasizing in particular the crucial need for knights to be disciplined and less 
egotistical. 
In this final chapter, it seems appropriate to return to the representation, in 
French historiography, of the King's agents in his wars, to see how the French chivalrous 
chronicle had evolved in this respect by the dawn of the 16th century. I have voluntarily 
left aside the clerical chronicle, less in vogue by then, but whose influence was still 
recognisable in some works. Instead, I will concentrate on the works then in favour with 
the King, or benefiting from royal patronage; these were the heirs of the French 
chivalrous chronicles seen in the first chapter. The sources I used are, mainly, the 
accounts of Andre de La Vigne and Jean d'Auton who respectively related, on 
commission, Charles VIII and Louis XII's Italian campaigns2. The novelty of these 
official chronicles is that, like modern journalists, de La Vigne and d'Auton followed the 
French army in its conquests; both exposed themselves to some extent to the dangers of 
war in order to understand military life, and give an authentic flavour to their narratives, 
while at the same time pleasing their readership's tastes. It seems that this new kind of 
official writing of war was inaugurated by Charles the Bold of Burgundy's official 
historiographer Jean Molinet, who was present at the siege of Neuss in 1474. Like 
Molinet, de La Vigne and d'Auton were rhetoriqueurs, and embellished their narratives 
2 When Jean d'Auton wrote his first chronicle, the Conqueste de Nolan, which I used extensively, he did 
not have an official title; by 1499, however, Louis XII had set his seal to d'Auton's work by naming him 
`historiographe du Roy'. Cf. R. de Maulde La Claviere's notice to Jean d'Auton's Chroniques de Louis 
X11, IV, xvi. 
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and discourses through refined language, while striving to sound authentic in their 
reports. 
This study also includes semi-official and non-official historiographical works 
cast in the same ideological mould as the official ones, such as Guillaume de 
Villeneuve's Memoires, which are written in a much simpler style than our 
rhetoriqueurs' chronicles, but look up to the same ideals. Apart from d'Auton, all these 
sources have already been introduced: they are the same works that presented Charles 
VIII's descent into Italy as a guerre de magnificence. Though they all extolled chivalry, I 
will not refer to them as `chivalrous chronicles', but rather as `monarchist chronicles'; 
this change of terminology seems necessary to differentiate a new type of historiography, 
which came up to the Kings of France's expectations, and served their interests, in times 
of growing absolutism. 
The reader will have noted that the title of this chapter promised a study of the 
representation of the soldier, rather than specifically of the knight. Although our 
`monarchist' chroniclers still concentrate on knights, the official ones demonstrate some 
interest in the figure of the common soldier, when older chivalrous chroniclers clearly 
despised him. This rise of interest was only justifiable, since the common soldier's 
tactical importance had constantly been increasing. During the 15`h century, as a result of 
the Hundred Years War's lessons, the Kings of France recognised the tactical worth of 
archers - which the English had known for a long time - and gave them a much more 
important role in their army. Also, the unexpected slaughter of the fine chivalry of 
Charles the Bold of Burgundy performed by the Swiss pikemen at Granson and Morat 
(1476) provided the King of France with food for thought; Louis XI was the first to hire 
Swiss mercenaries for his army, and Charles VIII then Louis XII had more and more 
recourse to them, as well as to German landsknechts, for their Italian campaigns. Finally, 
another figure had emerged, whose epoch was only beginning: the gunner, who was for a 
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large part responsible for the eventual French triumph over the English3. One section of 
this chapter will be exclusively devoted to the common soldier; we shall see that the 
chroniclers' interest in him was modest, but it still was an innovation. 
It is only relatively recently that number of works have appeared which try to 
define the ideology of the Renaissance soldier, taking a particular interest in the knight, 
since sources tell us much more about him than any other kind of fighter, but also 
because it is considered particularly interesting to study the mutations that took place in 
the minds of the chivalrous fighting class at the dawn of modern times4. Scholars are 
now more familiar with the general changes in the behaviour and mentality of the soldier 
in this period. These mutations were turning the military into a class apart from the rest 
of society; they herald the soldier of the Ancien Regime, as far as France is concerned, 
and even today's professional soldier. My aim will be to examine the image of the 
Renaissance French soldier disseminated and promoted by the sources mentioned above, 
whose perspective on that score does not seem to have attracted the attention of scholars, 
perhaps because they were deemed conventional, propagandist and often bombastic in 
style. Jean Jacquart, for instance, does not seem to find much interest in Villeneuve's 
Memoires - though he appreciates their simplicity of style - because he judges the 
adventures related very conventional, full of stereotypes also found in Bayard and Louis 
II de La Tremoille's biographies5. But in 1497, when Villeneuve completed his work, 
not all of the conventions to which Jacquart refers were age-old. Also, the fact that 
Villeneuve's narrative is conventional does not necessarily question his good faith. The 
context of my study will be Charles VIII and Louis XII's guerres de magnificence, 
looking at events that took place between 1494 and 1500. Before entering upon the 
subject, however, it is necessary to go half a century back in time, and consider the 
3 On these general changes see HOWARD, Chapters 1 and 2. On Swiss mercenaries and the Kings of 
France see P. CONTAMINE, Guerre, Etat et societe a la fin du Moyen Age. Etudes sur les armies des rois 
de France. 1337-1494, Paris / The Hague, Mouton / Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1972, p. 308. 
4 See for instance CONTAMINE, Guerre, Etat..., p. 526-531; VALE, op. cit.; Chivalry in the Renaissance, 
op. cit.; HALE, War and Society (see especially Chapter 5: `The society of soldiers: the professionals'); J. 
JACQUART, `De quelques capitaines des guerres d'Italie: de la realite a l'image', in Passer les monts, p. 
83-90. 
5 JACQUART, p. 88-89. 
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historical circumstances which influenced our chroniclers' perspectives with regard to 
the French soldier of the Renaissance. 
1. The creation of the standing army in France and the emergence of the 
professional soldier 
A historical circumstance which may have engendered new attitudes in the 
French soldier, and changes in his portrayal, may be found in the military reforms 
introduced by Charles VII in 1445 and 1448, which greatly affected the soldier's status, 
and are generally regarded as laying the foundations for the organization of the Ancien 
Regime army. In 1445, Charles VII decided that the time was ripe and the political and 
monetary situation secure enough to drastically reform his army. The King chose 15 
captains, gave them the command of 15 companies of cavalry - each company being 
composed of 100 lances - and the rest of the army was disbanded. The 1,500 cavalry 
lances which Charles retained at his service constituted the new permanent army; the 
soldiers were to be quartered `par les villes de ce royaume' and regularly paid `des biens 
du peupple'6. Because they were to stay in the King's service and received wages even in 
times of peace, the compagnies d'ordonnance's soldiers could truly be considered 
professionals. Charles had kept the best equipped fighters, and they were to be regularly 
reviewed. They were a crack corps, the King's own troops, received their wages from 
him - through a special tax levied on the people - and had to swear allegiance to the 
Crown on enrolment. With his ordonnances, Charles was greatly increasing the King's 
control over his soldiers7. 
6 GILLES LE BOUVIER, p. 271. 
7 For an exhaustive account of the mid-15`h century reforms, the composition of the compagnies 
d'ordonnance, and their evolution throughout the century, see CONTAMINE, Guerre, Etat..., p. 278-301 
and p. 488-530. A more digestible account will be found in Histoire militaire de la France, dir. A. 
CORVISIER, t. 1: Des origines ä 1715, dir. P. CONTAMINE, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, 
p. 201-205. 
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Charles VII's reforms also regulated the compagnies d'ordonnance's 
composition. A lance fournie now comprised one heavy cavalryman, his two servants, 
the page and the couslilleur, and two mounted archers aided by a servant8. One can see 
that the man-at-arms still played a preponderant role in the King's new army. A new 
generation of historians has shown that it was wrong to exaggerate the scope of the 
military changes that took place at the end of the Middle Ages by making the role of the 
heavy cavalry appear merely decorative. In the late 15`h century, the French heavy 
cavalry was still highly considered in Europe, and could prove very efficient. In 1494- 
1495, the French heavy cavalry decimated the less heavily armed Italian knights; 
together with the Swiss pikemen, they could easily rout the Italian and Spanish infantry, 
which lacked cohesion. One of the great strengths of the King of France's army, 
however, was the diversity of its forces. Charles VII's reforms greatly increased the 
number of archers in the French host. Charles had also created a special infantry force to 
reorganize the system of the communes: the francs-archers, who in exchange for their 
service did not have to pay the tailles. The chroniclers who may be regarded as the heirs 
of the early 15`h century clerical chroniclers were the first to appraise this new institution, 
which gave the common people the chance to be represented in the King's army. Thus 
Thomas Basin, taking up an idea dating back to classical antiquity, and dear to Italian 
humanist historiographers, explained that many villagers of France coveted the honour 
of joining the francs-archers' ranks, because `chez presque tous les hommes, l'amour de 
la liberte est tellement inne que pour eile les dines genereuses acceptent sans hesiter de 
s'exposer ä la mort"O. Then again, he cynically added, this zeal might have been 
motivated by the wish to be exempted from the heavy taille des gens d'armes. The 
francs-archers played an important role in the campaigns of Normandy and Guyenne 
but, partly because of inadequacies in the promoting system, probably also because their 
wages were low and irregularly paid, their office rapidly lost its appeal and prestige, and 
8 CONTAMINE, Guerre, Etat..., p. 278. 
9 Cf. J. -M. SALLMANN, `L'evolution des techniques de guerre pendant les guerres d'Italie', in Passer les 
monts, p. 59-81 (p. 68-70). See also VALE, p. 127-128. 10 THOMAS BASIN, Histoire de Charles V1!, 11,23-25. 
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they became rather inefficient". The Kings of France began to rely increasingly instead 
on foreign mercenaries, especially the Swiss pikemen, renowned throughout Europe for 
their fierceness and frightful efficiency. Finally, the French Kings had at their disposal an 
impressive artillery train; Charles VII had understood that the growing power of guns 
was a force to be reckoned with, and his successors ensured that their artillery remained 
one of the most powerful and modern forces in Europe. 
Charles VII's military reforms won applause from most of his contemporaries 
and the majority of the chroniclers of the period, such as Mathieu d'Escouchy, Herald 
Berry or Jacques Du Clercq, as well as later ones, like Robert Gaguin, emphasized their 
usefulness. One of the things the chroniclers praised most was the great improvement of 
the troops' discipline. As the soldiers were paid more regularly, they stopped - for a 
while - looting peasants and villagers. The Burgundian Jacques Du Clercq seems to have 
wished that Philip the Good had taken similar measures. He marvelled at the behaviour 
of the French troops during the reconquest of Normandy, emphasizing that the campaign 
had been exemplary with regard to jus in bellum: the King's soldiers had received their 
wages monthly, 
et n'y avoit si ose ne si hardi qui osast prendre, durant ladite guerre ou 
conqueste de Normandie, prisonnier, ni ranchonner cheval [... ], ni vivres 
en quelque lieu que ce fust sans payer, [... ] fors seulement sur iceux 
Anglois et gens tenants leur parti, qui estoient trouves faisants guerre et 
en armes. 12 
This unusual demeanour contrasted greatly with that of the Burgundian troops during the 
wars of Ghent, exposed by Du Clercq, who blamed it on the fact that Philip's soldiers 
did not receive their wages' 3. As Charles was recovering French territory, he wanted to 
ensure that public opinion would support him. The compagnies d'ordonnance could not 
have made a better impression on their first campaign. Unhappily, the troops' exemplary 
behaviour did not last for very long, and the Kings of France did not always pay their 
11 Cf. CONTAMINE, Guerre, Etat..., p. 344-366. 
12 JACQUES DU CLERCQ, X1I, 85. 
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troops with such regular precision. Yet, an improvement had been made. The subsequent 
efforts of Charles VII's successors with regard to their standing army were tending 
towards the same ideal: a professional army whose soldiers would be paid regularly, so 
that knights, for instance, would not complain that they were spending all their fortune 
on the King's war, and that the Kingdom's people would not suffer from the soldiers' 
exactions. Thus Jean de Saint-Gelais extolled Louis XII because the King did not force 
the realm's nobles to fight in his wars: the arriere-ban was never summoned 14, 'et 
[Louis XII] ne leur [the realm's nobles] a donne oncques occasion de faire despenses, 
pource que toutes ses guerres il les a conduictes et faictes ä sa solde, et sans y 
contraindre aucun, si n'est de liberale volonte, et ceulx qui sont ä ses gaiges et 
bienfaicts'. According to Saint-Gelais, Louis XII also ensured that his soldiers treated 
civilians well, for instance when billeted with the locals, so that `quand le pauvre 
laboureur a paye sa petite cotite de la taille [the taille des gens d'armes] [... ], il peut dire 
que ce qui luy demeure, soit bceuf, ou vache, veau ou mouton est sien' 15. 
The chronicler Thomas Basin was one of the only contemporaries to voice some 
disapproval when Charles VII created the standing army16. His concern is quite typical of 
the clerical genre of historiography: Basin did admire the swiftness with which 
Normandy had been recovered, and emphasized the need for the King's soldiers to be 
disciplined and to stop looting civilians, but he was shocked by the `lourdes et ruineuses 
charges' the people had to pay in exchange for their safety. Basin pointed out that 
`depuis des temps immemoriaux, le royaume de France nourrit avec une merveilleuse 
abondance une armee permanente et ordinaire'; this army was the Kingdom's nobility, 
and Basin almost presented its traditional obligation to defend the realm as an element of 
Nature's cycle. Thus he nostalgically advocated the use of the arriere-ban, oblivious of 
the fact that this force was hopelessly slow to raise, and that the nobles summoned were 
often poorly equipped and ill-disciplined: its defects had been obvious in 1415. Basin 
131bid., XII, 96-97. 
14 Summoning the arriere-ban meant that all the realm's nobles were mobilized, as happened in 1415. 15 JEAN DE SAINT-GELAIS, p. 121-122,123. 
16 See Marc Spencer's thorough study of the question in SPENCER, p. 107-119,257-258. 
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only saw its advantages: a huge army could be raised, and the nobles did not need any 
wages in peacetime. Moreover, Basin saw the instituting of a permanent force as a first 
step towards the establishment of a tyrannical regime: unscrupulous rulers could use it as 
an instrument of coercion and repression against the common people17 . The archbishop 
of Rheims Jean Juvenal des Ursins expressed the same concerns in his sermon Verba 
mea auribus percipe, Domine, which contains many clerical commonplaces' 8. And yet, 
Basin and Juvenal des Ursins seem to have been preaching in the desert: whether Charles 
VII's subjects welcomed the creation of the compagnies d'ordonnance, whether they did 
not realize that they could become a terrible financial burden -as they did in Louis XI's 
reign - or whether they did not have the choice, the standing army was now a permanent 
feature of French life. 
Thus, in 1494, the compagnies d'ordonnance had been in existence for about 50 
years. Charles VIII was leading into Italy the most powerful and modern army in Europe, 
yet its composition and structure was still extremely similar to that of the forces which 
had reconquered Normandy and Guyenne; the only major difference was the presence of 
the Swiss and German mercenaries, whose number would keep increasing throughout 
the Wars of Italy, as a result of the Kings of France's expanding need for more 
manpower, especially of the infantry type. Charles VIII's invasion inaugurated a new era 
for warfare. A well-known theme of Guicciardini's History of Italy is that the French 
introduced many calamities in Italy; most notably they changed the face of warfare in 
this country. The Italians were shocked by the fierceness of the French, who often fought 
without taking prisoners to scare their enemies, and by their artillery's awesome power. 
Soon, however, all belligerents would fight in the same brutal way, also ensuring that 
their artillery was up-to-date and made the best possible use of. Italy became the testing 
ground of all technical and tactical military innovations. 
After fifty years of military professionalism, in an age when war was rapidly 
evolving, becoming increasingly destructive - an age which the French themselves had 
17 THOMAS BASIN, 11,25-47. 
270 
introduced - and when the Kings of France's expansionist policy had the French army 
operate on foreign ground, what did the Renaissance French soldier look like? Our 
`monarchist' chroniclers offer particularly valuable images of the French soldier in 
action which explain the mentality and conduct of the actors of Charles VIII and Louis 
XII's guerres de magnificence; we shall see, however, that these images are rather 
idealized. Let us firstly turn to the figure of the knight, for it is on him that our 
chroniclers still dwelt most. 
2. Continuity and mutations in the knights' patterns of behaviour 
2.1. Reverence for traditional chivalrous ideals 
In its basic feature, the chivalrous chronicle of the early 15 `h century had not 
evolved, for knights are still in the limelight in monarchist chronicles. All knights were 
nobles, and at the dawn of the 16`h century, perhaps more than ever the nobility was 
pulling the strings in politics, administration and warfare alike. Jean d'Auton tells us that 
Louis XII embarked on the conquest of Milan when he saw that the situation at home 
was perfectly settled, that is: `les Estaz tenus et arrestes, l'Esglize unye et pacyfiee, 
Noblece exaulcee et magnifyee, Labeur sublege et soustenu' (I, 7). Everything was in its 
place, and everyone's place was clearly defined. Modern historians have pointed out 
that, more than his predecessors or successors, Louis XII, the pere du peuple, sought, 
and did obtain, the Third Estate's support19. Still, the significant power was held by the 
nobility, and d'Auton demonstrates that this was unquestioned. The Third Estate's power 
and ambitions had to be checked and bridled - for instance, in case it might refuse 
subsidies for an Italian venture - while the nobility could only be exalted. In the military 
domain, the nobility's predominance was unchanged; fighting had been the business of 
nobles for centuries, and Charles VII's reforms did not prevent them from choosing to 
become professionals. In fact, being of noble birth was always an advantage for 
18 See Histoire militaire..., 1,205-206. 
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candidates for a military career. Jean Jacquart has pointed out that the advancement of 
the famous Bayard was very slow throughout his military career, despite his reputation, 
because he was of low birth20. The nobility guarded very jealously access to the army's 
commanding posts. 
It is well established that, during the Renaissance, the ideals of chivalry still 
appealed strongly to knights, despite their anachronistic character in times when warfare 
was becoming increasingly murderous, mechanized and anonymous21. In fact, as their 
tactical usefulness diminished, knights felt more inclined to cling to the lore associated 
with chivalry that enhanced the prestige of their status. The lure of chivalry is best 
exemplified in the behaviour of the three monarchs who successively led the armies of 
France into Italy: Charles VIII, Louis XII, and Francis I. The first thing that strikes us as 
we read the chronicles of Andre de La Vigne, Jean d'Auton or Jean de Saint-Gelais, 
Desrey's `Addition' to Gaguin or Guillaume de Villeneuve's Memoires, is that none of 
the ideological decorum traditionally associated with the figure of the knight has 
disappeared; on the contrary, it looms larger than ever, sometimes verging on caricature. 
These chivalrous interests were described by Rend de Lucinge as being still very popular 
by the beginning of the 17`h century with a large aristocratic readership who took delight 
in following the latest adventures of romance heroes such as Amadis de Gaule. Lucinge 
describes how he himself had learnt from them 
les amours, les guerres, l'entregent des cours, les loix de chevallerie, la 
forme des deffis anciens, les combats singuliers, 1'honneur et le support 
que les chevaliers doivent aux dames, le soulagement des oppressez, qui 
les oblige au respect, a la foy et a la loyaute22. 
Amongst the chivalrous virtues extolled in our monarchist chronicles and 
memoirs, honour figures in the forefront. This chivalric virtue appears as Guillaume de 
Villeneuve's main concern in his narrative, as the knight emphasized that throughout his 
19 Cf. F. J. BAUMGARTNER, Louis XII, Stroud, Alan Sutton, 1994, p. 248-249. 
20 JACQUART, p. 85. 
21 See for example HOWARD, p. 12-19; VALE, p. 147-174. 
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adventures and captivity, his honour remained intact. Villeneuve had been left in charge 
of Trani after the King's departure from Naples. As the Venetians were besieging the 
castle, thirty-two of Villeneuve's men escaped to surrender to Frederigo of Aragon, and 
he was left alone with eight companions. Yet, until the very end, Villeneuve refused to 
surrender: he relates how he took refuge in a room at the top of the highest tower, where 
he had a heavy cannon installed, and how he was shouting to the Venetians `qu'ils s'en 
allassent, car il aymeroit mieux mourir que de le [the castle] rendre jamais sans le 
commandement de son roy'. As Villeneuve was held prisoner of Frederigo of Aragon, 
slave on his galley, Frederigo expressed the wish to talk to him, and suggested that our 
proud knight had originally intended to surrender to the Venetians. Cut to the quick by 
this remark, Villeneuve replied that he had turned down an offer of 10,000 ducats, and 
that whoever questioned his loyalty, `il estoit prest [... ] de le combattre 1'espee au poing 
dedans ladite poupe de la gallee et de 1'en faire desdire'. Yet, weak as he was - as he 
himself tells us - after four months spent as a galley slave, Villeneuve did not stand a 
chance against a healthy opponent23. 
In the most partisan of our chronicles, by Andre de La Vigne, the concern with 
honour often verges on the grotesque. Take, for instance, de la Vigne's account of an 
incident in the French camp at Vercelli, where the French and the League were trying to 
negotiate a peace treaty. The alarm was given for a very trivial reason: some Milanese 
soldiers had stolen two pieces of ordnance from French troops returning from Novara. 
According to de la Vigne, as soon as the news reached the camp, Louis of Orleans 
rushed out of his tent `et s'en alla tout a pied sans armures quelzconques, seullement ä 
tout un arc et sa trousse, jusques sur le pont ou il fut arme et acoustre'. He was followed 
by the King with his archers, men-at-arms and pensionnaires, `tellement que le pont 
ployoit dessoubz les gens d'armes'. The concern about honour extends to the whole 
army, for 4,000 Swiss and landsknechts thereafter `commencerent a sonner flustes et 
tabourins et marcher au champ a tout leurs enseignes desployees'24. For this particular 
22 RENE DE LUCINGE, La maniere de lire l'histoire, ed. M. J. HEATFI, Geneva, Droz, 1993, p. 66. 23 GUILLAUME DE VILLENEUVE, p. 273-274,286. 
24 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 307-308. 
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incident, Andre de la Vigne seems to have been anxious to show that, though the French, 
in their magnanimity, were trying to negotiate a peace treaty, they were ready to continue 
the war should the Italians show the slightest sign of disrespect. The last thing de La 
Vigne apparently wanted was that his readers might believe the French had chosen to 
negotiate through cowardice. The concept of honour, which embodied the pride nobles 
took in their status, would be one of the most enduring legacies of the chivalrous 
ideology. 
Honour seems the most important chivalrous element in our chronicles, but we 
still find almost all the other concepts attached to chivalry in them. Interestingly, courtly 
love, which as we saw was not particularly emphasized in 15`h century Burgundian 
chivalrous chronicles - except when dealing, for instance, with Duke Philip's many 
mistresses - and hardly ever mentioned in the French chivalrous histories, often appears 
in our monarchist chronicles, at least in the official ones. It seems that the context of 
conquest was particularly favourable to the inclusion of digressions on the beauty of 
Italian ladies, who were in turn captivated by the imposing presence of our soldiers clad 
in iron. Such comments are commonplace in de La Vigne and d'Auton's narrations of 
entries. Thus, as he depicts the beauty of countless Italian ladies who had flocked to see 
Charles VIII's entry in Florence, de la Vigne seizes this opportunity to explain, with 
many arrogant cliches and unsubtle things understood, that French soldiers are much 
better lovers than other, more soft-hearted men: 
Les Florentines a faces angeliques 
sur eschauffaulx, fenestres et tauldis. 
VenysYennes, Rommaines auctentiques 
vindrent illec voir le roy des hardiz; 
et leur sembloit estre en ung paradis 
de voir Francoys en leurs terres marcher, 
car bien scavent que pour enharnacher 
la nef Venus d'amoureux advirons, 
et pour a point ung connin embrocher, 
qu'ilz n'y vont pas ainsi que bourgerons25. 
25 Ibid., p. 209, v. 2920-2929. 
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We are reminded of Robert de Clari's description, in a similar context of conquest, of the 
ladies of Constantinople admiring the Frankish knights from the walls of the city in 
1204, commenting `que ce sembloit [... ] que ce fussent anges, si erent il bel'26; only the 
Frankish knight was more refined in his comments than our late 15`h century 
rhetoriqueur. 
2.2. Beyond the apparent constancy of ideology: the change from knight into 
officer of the King 
Despite the reverence displayed for traditional chivalric virtues, some 
unmistakable mutations can be perceived in the knight, as represented in the monarchist 
chronicles. One thing in particular springs off the page, the constant repetition of a 
concept expressed in various forms: `au service du roy', `l'ardent desir [... ] de servir leur 
vray prince et seigneur', `pour le bon zele qu'ilz avoient a lui', `faire service ä leur roy et 
souverain seigneur', `bon serviteur et loyal pour le roy', etc27. Obviously the importance 
of being loyal to one's suzerain was not a new idea. However, our monarchist chronicles 
demonstrate that loyalty to the King had become a crucial necessity. This emphasis laid 
on the French warriors' loyalty to their sovereign reveals that there had been a switch 
from the knight as vassal to the knight as officer of the King. As far as the soldiers of the 
compagnies d'ordonnance were concerned, they were now considered as professionals, 
paid for their service (more or less regularly) in times of war and peace alike. They 
fought for the King and for him only. The captains of the Maison du roi, of the 
ordonnance, of the artillery, of the francs-archers, the territorial commanders, even the 
arriere-ban's captains were directly appointed by the King. The times when a feudal lord 
could join the King's host and force himself upon the King had now almost completely 
gone. Originally, Charles VII had chosen the captains he wanted to retain in his service; 
26 ROBERT DE CLARI, La conquete de Constantinople, in Historien et chroniqueurs du Moyen. 9ge, ed. 
A. PAUPIIILET, Paris, Gallimard (Pleiade), 1952 (2°d ed., IS` pub. 1938), p. 17-91 (seep. 51). 27 Quotations respectively from JEAN D'AUTON, 1,14; ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 284; PIERRE DESREY, 
`Addition... ', fol. ccxxxii, r°; GUILLAUME DE VILLENEUVE, p. 271,277. 
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all other captains who remained under arms with their men were basically considered as 
outlaws. As for the men-at-arms of the ordonnance, they were chosen by the captains, 
but this choice had to be agreed by the King's officials during the reviews. And all the 
men of the ordonnance had to swear to their captain that they would serve the King 
`contre touz ceulx qui puent vivre et mourir'28. This explains the importance granted by 
our monarchist chroniclers to the loyalty specifically owed to the King. Steven Gunn has 
explained how the Tudor Kings of England, capitalizing first and foremost on loyalty 
owed to the suzerain, exploited traditional chivalric virtues to serve their own political 
ends29. The same could be said about the Valois rulers of France. We saw in the first 
chapter that Philip the Good and his father had tried to secure their knights' allegiance by 
extolling chivalric virtues, in particular fidelity towards the suzerain. Yet the Kings of 
France achieved more concrete results. Apart from the fact that their authority was far 
more ancient than that exercised by the Dukes of Burgundy over their noble subjects, 
one can say that the institution, in the French army, of an efficient contractual system of 
remunerated service, with prospective pensions or advancement to reward earnestness, 
greatly accounted for the improvement of the knights' constancy. The chivalrous 
ideology adapted itself to the new circumstances - and was made to fit the King's 
interests. Guicciardini saw well that one of the great strengths of the French army was 
that the captains and knights `had no other ambition than to earn their King's praise', 
unlike the Italian captains who often changed masters out of ambition or greed30. Charles 
the Bold of Burgundy had been one of the first princes to follow the Kings of France's 
example by setting up his ordinances in 1471; however, we shall never know how the 
professional Burgundian army would have evolved, since the Duke's unreasonable 
expansionist policies quickly destroyed his army and state. 
The ideals of French knights were evolving. Guillaume de Villeneuve's 
Memoires demonstrate that loyalty to the King had become a new sort of ethic. Reading 
28 See in CONTAMINE, Guerre, Etat...: `Quatrieme partie: Les debuts de I'armee de I'Ancien Regime 
(1445-1494)' (see especially Chapter 10 and Chapter 16). See also the `Conclusion generale', p. 536. 
Quotation p. 491. 
29 GUNN, p. 107-128. 
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their conclusion, one could almost speak of a religion. Villeneuve explained that the 
torments he had to suffer during his long captivity at the hands of the Aragonese had led 
him to take a vow, so that God and the Virgin Mary might hasten his release. Shortly 
after his deliverance, Villeneuve fulfilled this vow: on foot, from Monegue, where he 
had disembarked, Villeneuve went to see the King, in the same state as he was during his 
captivity. He describes for us the King's reaction: 
Mais quand il veist ledit de Villeneufve ainsi defait de sa personne, et 
piteusement vestu, avec un carcan au col cinq livres pesant, comme bon 
prince esmu de pitie [... ] et comme bon et vray pere de famille doit faire ä 
son bon serviteur, recueillit ledit de Villeneuve tres benignement, 
monstrant estre tres joyeux de sa delivrance; et qu'il soit ainsi le monstra 
par effet, car des le lendemain luy envoya ledit seigneur tous ses 
habillemens qu'il avoit vestu, jusques ä sa chemise. Et en oultre luy feist 
ledit seigneur plusieurs autres grans biens et dons inestimables ä luy et 
aux siens, pour monstrer exemple aux autres ses bons serviteurs31. 
Villeneuve's last words depict his happiness and pride now that he was close to his 
sovereign. In this episode, the loyalty owed by the soldier to the King becomes almost 
spiritual, as Villeneuve pictured himself as a martyr for the King's cause. It is interesting 
to note that this new ethic of service to the King seems to have relegated, to some extent, 
the old chivalric ideal of being in God's service to the background. More exactly, the 
two notions had been blended. In the 1470s, Jean de Bueil had declared, in the 
Jouvencel, that `tout homme qui expose son corps ä soustenir bonne querelle et ä 
secourir son souverain seigneur ou son prouchain en bonne justice et en bon droit, fait et 
accomplist le commandement de Dieu'32. But despite de Bueil's repeated injunctions to 
fight `en bonne querelle', reading the Jouvencel's career, which reflects that of de Bueil, 
we get the impression that the knight did not need to ask himself questions: by loyally 
serving the King, he performed his Christian duty. Thus we saw how Villeneuve refused 
to consider the arguments of Charles VIII's opponents, and the political aspect of the 
30 FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI, History of Italy, p. 153-154 (Book I, Chapter 11). 
31 GUILLAUME DE VILLENEUVE, p. 293. 
32 JEAN DE BUEIL, 1,118. 
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conquest: his duty was to obey the King, and fight, without asking himself questions33 
In effect, the knights' ethos was increasingly secularized. 
Our monarchist chroniclers show that all chivalric virtues were subordinated to 
that of fidelity towards the King. In Villeneuve's work, for example, all questions of 
honour rest on the issue of Villeneuve's zeal and loyalty towards his King. Egotistical 
behaviours were no longer accepted, or excused. We saw that the Burgundian chivalrous 
chronicles of Duke Philip's time related with some awe and only a hint of blame how the 
Duke of Clarence at Beauge, and French knights such as Duke Antoine de Brabant at 
Agincourt, had brought about not only their own death, but also their side's defeat, 
because they had been driven by an exclusive concern about their own glory 34. By 
contrast, Jean d'Auton stressed that the Renaissance French knight had no right to 
imperil the King's interests through an excessive concern about his own honour. This 
precept was particularly important for a captain or a commander, because he not only 
had to apply it to himself, but also to make sure that others would observe it. Thus 
d'Auton related how, as Ludovico Sforza was reconquering the Duchy of Milan in 1500, 
Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, governor of Milan for Louis XII, ordered the Count of Ligny to 
leave Como - which Ligny was determined to defend fiercely - and to join the French 
forces in Milan, so that the French might be united and thus stronger. But Ligny refused, 
and Trivulzio had to send him two further messages insisting that he should leave Como. 
Trivulzio's final letter commanded 
sur toute I'obeissance qu'il [Ligny] devoit au Roy et sur toute la craincte 
qu'il avoit de I'offencer, qu'il se retirast a Millan [... ] ou sinon, qu'il 
[Trivulzio] feroit en sorte que envers le Roy se pourroit mal trouver; et, 
en lessant la place, de riens ne povoit amaindrir le priz de son honneur, 
car myeulx estoit soy d'heure retirer, pour l'accroissement du commun 
proffit, que a la longue tenue d'honneur singulier s'arrester et hazarder le 
tout a perdicion irrecouvrable (I, 163). 
33 See my fifth chapter, p. 230. 
34 Cf. Chapter 1, p. 34-35,46-47. 
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Jean d'Auton's reference to the `commun proffit' in the last quotation shows that 
the King's service was also grafted to another notion, that of service to the state. The 
time when the model of the Roman legionary would replace that of the `preux chevalier', 
and an obedient, disciplined service, that of a more individualistic, chivalrous enterprise, 
was not far away35. In fact, there is in d'Auton at least one explicit reference to some 
models taken from classical antiquity. D'Auton praised to the skies the zeal, ardour and 
stoicism exhibited by the Bastard of Amenzay at the siege of Novara in 1500: the 
Frenchman was determined to snatch a standard from a Burgundian adversary36, and his 
tenacity was such that he seemed to be insensitive to the countless arquebus and 
crossbow shots that ran through his body throughout the fight, so that `par le degouct du 
sang, en apparaissoit la vraye enseigne' (the Burgundian standard was red, with golden 
lions: d'Auton means that Amenzay's body had become as red as the coveted standard). 
According to d'Auton, `oncques sur le dur Sceva Cesarien [Mucius Scaevola] tant de 
dars ne furent tirez [... ] que a celle foys'. Eventually, after an hour, Amenzay managed to 
seize the standard, but he was mortally wounded, and d'Auton concludes: 
N'estoit ce bien legitimer degeneree nature? Si estoit, car ancores comme 
ung autre Epaminondas, duc de Thebes, qui, joyeusement, en mourant, 
baisa l'ecu dont il avoit vigoureusement la chose publicque deffandue, 
pareillement, nonobstant les extremes singlotz dont estoit celuy francoys 
actaint, jucques a son logis 1'enseigne en emporta, sans monstrer visage 
triste par proximite de fin, sachant heureuse Renommee de vertuz 
embellye, apres mort temporelle, porter le triumphe de louange eterne (I, 
210-211). 
By comparing Amenzay to Mucius Scaevola, the Roman hero who let his hand burn in a 
fire before the tyrant he wanted to murder, to punish it for having missed its target, and 
Epaminondas, the Greek warrior who, mortally wounded, chose to die with his eyes 
fixed on his shield, a symbol of his fatherland, Jean d'Auton extolled a new ideal for the 
Renaissance French knight, that of ascetic service to the state. Like Roman soldiers, 
knights - and soldiers in general - should stoically endure the greatest hardships in the 
35 HALE, War and Society, p. 130. 
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name of the state. Yet, their reward was the same as the one Froissart promised to 
his 
heroes: thanks to the chronicler, they would earn eternal renown. 
Nonetheless, the Renaissance French knight could also expect a different kind of 
reward for his zeal, gains which were more material and probably more incentive. Some 
knights were praised for their apparent detachment from monetary rewards: in his 
biography of La Tremoille, Jean Bouchet was careful to emphasize his hero's altruism, 
stressing that the French commander had often declined any material reward. Thus, 
having led in person the celebrated manhandling of the pieces of Charles VIII's ordnance 
across the Appenine paths, La Tremoille told Charles VIII that the only reward he 
wanted was the King's grace and benevolence37. But La Tremoille's position was 
already privileged. Apart from the prospect of advancement, the knights of the 
compagnies d'ordonnances could expect more than the mere payment of their wages as 
reward for a brilliant feat. The King's generosity took a variety of forms: the reward 
could be a pension - for instance, a man-at-arms would be appointed controller of a salt 
granary - or the gift of a land, of a forest, or simply a sum of money38. 
These gifts only 
concerned a minority of soldiers, but the hope to receive such rewards could still 
increase the knights' ardour. Interestingly, the fact that the knight's zeal and loyalty was 
to an extent determined by the material rewards he could receive is made more explicit 
in our monarchist chronicles than in the earlier type of historiography. It shows that the 
practice was not seen as being incompatible with the ideals of chivalry. Thus, de la 
Vigne mentioned how, at Vercelli, Charles VIII visited his camp and his captains, 
commanding `qu'ilz feissent bon devoir' and promising `qu'il les recompenseroit bien'; 
the chronicler concluded: `de laquelle visitation et bonne chere les ditz capitaynes furent 
moult joyeux et contens'39, emphasizing that Charles' promises had the desired effect. 
Similarly, we have seen how Villeneuve's account ended with the `grans biens et dons 
inestimables' bestowed upon him by Charles VIII. After all, service to the King now had 
36 Many Burgundians were now the subjects of the Holy Roman Emperor, who had sent troops in support 
of Ludovico Sforza. 
37 JEAN BOUCIIET, Le paneg'ric..., p. 761. 
38 CONTAMINE, Guerre, Etat..., p. 512-513. 
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a contractual nature, and mentioning the King's material gifts and rewards simply 
showed his largesse and magnificence. 
3. Interest in the figure of the common soldier 
I have focused until here on the figure of the knight; yet, one of the great 
novelties of the monarchist chronicles is that some of them demonstrate an interest in the 
common soldier. Chronicles written by noblemen do not usually take more interest in 
him than they did earlier: the only names of common soldiers which appear in Guillaume 
de Villeneuve's Memoires, for instance, are those of the thirty-two men of his company 
who betrayed him and went over to the enemy40. However, it is interesting to note that 
the chroniclers who do talk about common soldiers are the official ones: not only do 
Andre de la Vigne and Jean d'Auton mention many footsoldiers by name41, but they also 
occasionally portray them as heroes. It seems that this practice was inaugurated in the 
1470s by the Burgundian Jean Molinet. Thus we learn in Molinet's Chroniques how a 
black footsoldier, Cristofle, `ung grant morienne [... ] de la societe des Ytaliens', was 
captured by the Germans at Neuss, who `disoient entre eulx que c'estoit l'ennemy 
d'enfer et, de fait, le volrent assommer'. Cristofle escaped and brought safely back to the 
Burgundian camp one of his companions (I, 38-39). Elsewhere, Molinet recounts the 
chilling adventure which happened to the archers that Charles the Bold had left in charge 
of the ramshackle castle of Vaumacourt, near Granson, where Charles had had all the 
defenders hanged after storming the place. The archers feared the revenge that the Swiss 
would take for what Molinet explicitly denounces as Charles' cruelty, and indeed, as the 
Swiss besieged Vaumacourt, they warned the Burgundians that they should expect no 
quarter. Molinet clearly presents the archers as heroes, as he stresses that, despite these 
news, each archer seemed a little Ogier the Dane. The archers managed to escape and, 
39 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 303. 
40 GUILLAUME DE VILLENEUVE, p. 274. 
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after many peregrinations, were able to relate their narrow escape from the hands of the 
Swiss to their comrades (I, 138-139,141-142). Jean d'Auton demonstrates a similar 
interest in the figure of the common soldier as he relates, for instance, the peculiar 
experience of the Gascon archer Fortune: the bowman was in the front line at the assault 
of Forli (December 1499) when, suddenly, he was hit by two arquebus stones. D'Auton 
depicts the torment Fortune had to endure, since `apres grande effusion de sang, se 
trouva debilite du pouvoir et offusque de la veue'. The Gascon `se voua a Nostre Dame 
de Haulte Faye' (in the Perigord region) and, suddenly recovering his sight and strength, 
was able to take part in the end of the assault (I, 132). Jean d'Auton probably 
`interviewed' himself the miraculously cured archer, in the manner of a modem 
journalist. These are of course mere anecdotes, but show that, for Molinet, and 
subsequently the Kings of France's official chroniclers - perhaps following Molinet's 
example - the particular adventures of common soldiers could be as entertaining, perhaps 
even as edifying as the knights' experiences. 
Although they were more prone to insurrection or indiscipline than the knights, 
the common soldiers are often praised for their zeal and loyalty to the King's cause. 
Even Commynes testifies to the increased spirit of cohesion and stoic subordination 
which reigned amongst the King of France's soldiers, as he admiringly declares about 
Charles VIII's return journey: jamais je ne oys homme se plaindre de necessite qu'il 
eust, et si fut le plus penible voyage que je veiz jamais en ma vie, et si en ay veü 
avecques le duc Charles de Bourgongne de bien aspres' (III, 210). Yet, as in the knights' 
case, the common soldiers' ardour was partly motivated by the material benefits they 
might get. De La Vigne related, for instance, with perhaps a hint of irony, how the 
gunners bombarding the Castel Nuovo redoubled their efforts in the hope of some 
reward when the King could see them, and he emphasized the results achieved: 
41 Jean d'Auton, for instance, mentions how an archer `nomme Libourne' rescued the knight Jean Dubois 
before Alexandria (in Piedmont). A few pages later, he mentions the death of one of Louis Xli's 
Landsknechts, `nomme Pietre' (1,57,63). 
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ce dit jour mesme, pource que le roy fut disner en la maison d'un seigneur 
de la ville de Napples, qui estoit aupres du lieu ou l'artillerie avoyt este 
assiegee, apres disner les canonniers et bombardiers saichant le roy ou il 
estoit, et qu'il les pouvoit veoir et adviser, se parforcerent si tres 
depiteusement a tirer et tempester la dicte place du Chasteau Neuf, 
moyennant aussi quelques gracieux dons d'argent que le roy leur envoya 
[... ] , que environ trois heures apres disner, ceulx de dedens [... ] furent 42 contrains de rechief a parlementer. 
The chronicler shows that, in the French army, there was a price for every deed of 
valour, as he often tells us the exact sum of money that different soldiers received for 
particular achievements. Thus, we are told that a gunner who managed to kill with an 
impressively precise shot the leader of the Italian crossbowmen of the Castel dell' Ovo 
was rewarded with 10 gold crowns; a soldier who, on his own initiative, swum from the 
coast to the same fortress, to check for countermines, received 20 gold crowns43. 
Apparently, this concern for precision on de La Vigne's part only applied to the common 
soldiers, perhaps because a sense of aristocratic seemliness prevented knights from 
informing the chronicler of the exact amount they had received. 
Having considered the figures of the knight and of the common soldier - though 
one must stress that the representation of the latter is still sketchy -I wish to move from 
the individual to the group and analyse the portrayal of the army in action, to see how the 
Renaissance French soldiers worked as a body, what their morale was as a group, how 
they were seen as a whole. We shall see that our monarchist chronicles, especially the 
official ones, presented the French army not only as a team, but also as a formidable 
machinery. 
4. Esprit de corps, discipline, fierceness: key-notes of the French army's policy 




In effect, what did the army of the Renaissance Kings of France look like? How 
did it act on the field? Our monarchist chroniclers, especially the official ones, do their 
best to depict an ideal army, strong, united in the face of danger, and, as it were, 
invincible. Firstly, the relationship between the officer and the common soldier was 
changing. In theory, the officer did not scorn the `pietaille' any longer, but worked by 
their side to achieve the best possible results. This is best exemplified in the conduct of 
Louis de La Tremoille during the manhandling of Charles VIII's pieces of ordnance 
across the Appenine paths. To motivate and encourage the landsknechts and the Swiss 
who were to perform this feat, the King's lieutenant general, the victor of Saint-Aubin du 
Cormier during the war of Brittany, did not hesitate to lend a hand. De la Vigne depicts 
La Tremoille carrying `les grosses boulles de fonte, de plomb et de fer qui estoit ung tres 
estrange faiz a porter, pource qu'il les convenoit porter entre les mains et en chappeaux, 
qui n'estoit pas sans grant ennuy et paine merveilleuse'. Thanks to his efforts and 
sollicitude, as La Tremoille did not recoil from distributing drinks and food to cheer the 
landsknechts, the deed was done within a few days. Had La Tremoille treated them with 
disdain, `a grant paine 1'eussent voulu faire les dictz Allemans'44. Similarly, Jean 
d'Auton relates how in 1499, during the siege of Alexandria in Piedmont, Louis XII's 
lieutenant generals, Ligny, Trivulzio and the `grant maistre de France [... ] voluntiers 
donnoyent le vin aux compaignies pour toujours myeulx affuster leurs engins et amorcer 
leurs coullevrines' (I, 63). Such examples are still rare in our chronicles, but do testify to 
a great change taking place. The time was near when Blaise de Monluc would advise 
French captains: `vous devez estre ordinairement parmy voz soldats, afin de les 
cognoistre nom par nom, s'il vous est possible', adding: `Ils sont hommes comme nous, 
4s et non pas bestes; si nous sommes gentils-hommes, ils sont soldats' 
De La Vigne presented the manhandling of Charles' artillery as a splendid deed 
performed by the Swiss and German mercenaries, pointing out how their musicians had 
encouraged them throughout the manoeuvre by playing their tabors and other 
44Ibid, 
p. 278-279. 
45 BLAISE DE MONLUC, Commentaires, 1521-1576, ed. P. COURTEAULT, Paris, Gallimard (Pleiade), 
1964, p. 24,25. 
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instruments; this was one peculiarity of their way of operating. Generally, de La Vigne 
and d'Auton pictured the foreign mercenaries as being surprisingly well integrated with 
the rest of the army; the chroniclers extolled some of their deeds and praised their 
imposing presence during the entries. Occasionally there was friction, mainly when their 
pay was late: d'Auton describes such an instance when the Swiss threatened to side with 
the enemy, because the King's controllers were paying them one month of service when 
more than two months were due. On this occasion, the Swiss captains argued that they 
should remain loyal to the King, because he valued the ardour of the Swiss above that of 
all other peoples, and was constantly enriching their country; the Swiss were then 
appeased (I, 196-197). On the whole, the monarchist chroniclers are sympathetic towards 
foreign mercenaries. Once again, the Burgundian Jean Molinet seems to have led the 
way: referring to the fact that Charles the Bold did employ such forces in his armies, 
Molinet had declared: 
Vegece conseille aux princes que mieulx vault enseignier ses propres 
chevaliers au tres noble mestier d'armes que prendre estrangiers ä 
sauldees. Et le duc, parpayant ses deniers, estoit servi de Lombars et 
d'Englois qui grandement s'employerent; mais, pour ce qu'il estoit cremu 
et redoubte de touttes nations, et que le ciel et la terre lui favorisoyent 
plus que ä nul autre, il avoit ce previlege de trespasser les 
commandemens des philosophes (I, 61-62). 
Beyond the commonplace glorification of the Duke's power, one can see that Molinet 
acknowledged that classical authors were rather opposed to the use of foreign 
mercenaries, but that he ultimately judged the matter very pragmatically: Charles found 
it convenient and necessary to hire mercenaries, therefore it was legitimate for him to do 
so. 
The monarchist chroniclers also present the new French army as being much 
more disciplined than in former days. In accounts of battles and assaults, the King of 
France's host strikes one as formidably efficient. This is exemplified in de La Vigne's 
account of the battle of Fornovo, which appears ideal in the way the French conducted 
themselves: everyone, whether knight, gunner, or footsoldier, had a role to play, and 
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performed it well. The key-note is order. De La Vigne relates how, after the artillery had 
fired some deadly shots, the vanguard advanced steadily `en seure et certaine ordre', 
followed by `l'artillerie [... ] bien acompaignie d'un coste et d'autre de Souysses et 
Allemans', and goes on: `en ceste facon et maniere en ordre de vertueuse et virile 
hardiesse, toute 1'armee entierement marcha avant'. The actual fight was similarly well 
organized. The increased discipline of the French army also applied to the knights, 
whose traditionally reckless behaviour had caused so many traumatic defeats during the 
Hundred Years War. Things had changed since the days of Agincourt: de la Vigne 
explains how at Fornovo the Italians expected an easy victory, 
adjouxtant foy ad ce que par autres foys ilz avoyent ouy dire des 
Francoys: c'est assavoir que les Francoys tenoient aux champs la plus 
mauvaise ordre [... ] du monde. Mais on leur donna bien a congnoistre le 
contraire de leur mauvaise pensee; car jamais meilleure ordre ne fut tenue 
en bataille du monde. 
At Fornovo, the only people who did not behave in an orderly manner were the civilian 
staff, `vivandiers et autres gens non armez'. Despite the efforts displayed by the captain 
in charge of them, they did just what they pleased; de La Vigne emphasizes that they 
were responsible for their own doom46 
The emphasis laid on the improvement of discipline in the French army did not 
hinder our chroniclers from exploiting a theme which was age-old in Italy: the furia 
francese. The chroniclers knew well that the Italians considered the French a fiery 
nation, and reading their works, it becomes quite clear that they accepted and took pride 
in this stereotype. The idea that the French were particularly fierce warriors dated back to 
Livy, was formulated again by Polybius, and would by the 16`h century become 
commonplace in Italian then French literature47. However, the rest of Livy's statement 
on the martial worth of the Gauls, which was well known amongst humanist circles, 
explained that, while the Gauls were to be dreaded more than any other men at the start 
46 ANDRE DE LA VIGNE, p. 283-284. 
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of an enterprise, they were feebler than women on their withdrawal. Philippe de 
Commynes knew this stereotype, but only agreed with its first part, and as far as 
cavalrymen were concerned. As for the second part of this common opinion, our 
reasonable memorialist deemed that `ä la retraicte d'une emprinse, toutes gens du monde 
ont moins cueur que au partir de leurs maisons' (III, 207-208). It seems that the other 
French chroniclers ignored the second part of Livy's statement, taking pride in his 
complimentary comments instead. In his Panegyric of La Tremoille, in the speech that 
Alfonso of Aragon allegedly delivered to the Pope, to warn him against the barbaric 
cruelty of the French, Jean Bouchet clearly delineated the French reputation for being 
formidable at war: 
Les bellicqueux mouvemens des Gaules sont plus terribles que d'autres 
gens, parce qu'ils sont soudains et precipites; et davantage sont si cruels 
qu'ils ne guerroient que pour tout tuer et occire; si ne veulent induces ne 
treuves, permutacions de prisonniers, ne prester 1'oreille ä gens eloquens, 
ä priere, persuasions ne exhortacions. Et, d'autant qu'ils abhorrent [... ] la 
gracieuse coustume de batailler qui est entre les Italiens, nous doyvons 
plus craindre leurs armes et plus prendre de peine a les chasser d'avec 
nous 48. 
Similarly, Jean d'Auton depicts Caterina Sforza pronouncing, from the walls of Forli, a 
speech addressed to the French which is full of rhetorical commonplaces. Catering 
condemns the cruelty of Louis XII's soldiers with words which are at the same time 
flattering, since they acknowledge the overwhelming power of the French: `0 vous, 
bellicqueulx Francoys, qui, a la secousse de vostre dure main, toute la terre des Italles 
faictes plyer et trambler... '. The address ends by begging the French to have mercy on an 
unfortunate widow (I, 134). D'Auton shows that the French ferocity was not merely 
theoretical - though as Guicciardini noted, soon all the nations involved in the Wars of 
Italy would vie in brutality49 - as he depicts, without a word of blame, how the French 
opened the conquest of Milan by brutally slaughtering the garrisons and civilians of La 
47 Cf. Livy, Roman History (Book V, Chapter 39; Book VI, Chapter 42 in particular); Polybius, History 
(Book II, Chapter 35); Machiavelli, Discourses (Book III, Chapter 36). 
48 JEAN BOUCLIET, Le panegyric..., p. 756. 
49 See his History of Italy, Book I, Chapter 9. 
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Rocca d'Arazzo and Annone (I, 21,25). The French usually started their Italian 
campaigns with a few shocking massacres, to scare the garrisons of the country's 
fortresses, so that they might surrender without resisting; this perhaps explains why 
d'Auton did not blame these preliminary cruelties. It is interesting to note that the 
humanist historiographer Robert Gaguin set out to defend the `courageuse ferocite des 
Francoys' against Italian accusations, on the grounds that it was more practical and, 
ultimately, less cruel: `les Italiens escripvains 1'appellent cruaulte, pour ce que les gens 
d'armes de Italie prenans soulde myeulx ayment la despoulle de leurs ennemis que la fin 
de la guerre'50. Gaguin regarded the Italian way of waging war as hypocritical, because 
the condottieri's aim was to enrich themselves by taking prisoners and making wars 
drag. We saw that the clerical chroniclers censured this aspect of the `war of the knights' 
above all. The French were now acting differently: their war was an efficient war, aiming 
to restore peace as quickly as possible. 
The fierce nature of the French also meant that things could get out of control. 
The French army's discipline had improved, but was still far from being ideal. When 
Jean d'Auton depicts the French footsoldiers rebelling against the authority of the 
captains who were trying to keep them from looting Alexandria, the first image that 
springs to our mind is that of a wild beast suddenly breaking loose. D'Auton describes 
Ligny doing his best to control the fury of the footsoldiers who had turned berserk, 
threatening them with hanging: 
leur vint au devant, l'espee au poing, sur eux chargent a tour de bras, en 
leur faisant deffence [... ] que oultre ne missent la marche et que, si nulle 
force ou pillage fasoyent, que la corde telle raison en feroit que nouvelles 
partout en seroient semees. Mais tant mal fut la deffence octorizee et la 
menasse de Loys de Sainct Symon, qui d'une fenestre a eulx parloit, peu 
estimee, que pour tant ne cesserent, mais lascherent ung trect ou deux 
contre le compte de Ligny et ceulx qui leur desordre vouloyent empescher 
(I, 71). 
50 ROBERT GAGUIN, fol. ccxl, r°. 
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D'Auton may have been partisan, but such instances of realism in his chronicle do him 
credit; as one can see, our official chronicler was not systematically oblivious of the 
Renaissance French army's defects, which were still numerous. 
Remaining within the field of the French army in action, I wish to close this 
chapter with some remarks on the military condition at the dawn of the 16th century, as 
illustrated notably in some particularly graphic episodes of Jean d'Auton's narrative of 
Louis XII's campaigns. 
5. Grandeur and servitude of the military condition 
Philippe Contamine has emphasized how the soldier of the late Middle Ages was 
becoming more and more alienated from the rest of society51. We saw that the military 
were turning into professionals, at least those belonging to the compagnies 
d'ordonnance, who, together with the crack corps of the princely guards, and the foreign 
mercenaries, were by now the troops on which the King relied most. Thus, it was quite 
natural that civilians should increasingly consider soldiers as living on the fringe of 
society, while soldiers themselves should, even more than before, see themselves as a 
caste apart. In the 1470s, the Burgundian Molinet had defined in a very explicit manner 
the role of soldiers in society by setting it against the bourgeois' comfortable life, 
picturing two different ways of life which could not be reconciled: 
Pensez ung petit, vous, rices bourgois et aultres hongnars qui murmurez 
sur 1'estat de noblesse, qui vivez en transquilite pacifique et repos 
delitable [... ], pensez ung petit et considerez que les nobles chevalereux 
n'ont pas tout d'avantage [... ]. Le rice tresor de proesce est de sy chier 
coust et digne preciosite que les haulx conquerans du monde y aventurent 
corps et ame et, tres souvent, les plus vaillans y demeurent en la 
poursieute. Et, vous [... ] desprisiez la chose qui vous est la plus propice et 
ceulx par qui et de qui vous vivez et prosperez en felicite mondaine [... ], 
51 CONTAMINE, Guerre, Etat..., p. 526-530. 
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vous vivez en espoir d'augmenter vostre estage et ilz meurent pour vous 
et pour vostre heritage (1,68-69). 
In this tirade, Molinet described the military condition as one of grandeur and servitude: 
it was eminent because the zealous devotees of `proesce' would immortalize their name 
through their deeds, but it was also a servitude, since soldiers had to suffer great 
hardships to protect the state's civilians, their lands and their rights. One could argue that 
Molinet was here referring exclusively to the men who constituted his readership: the 
nobility, whose traditional role was to defend the country. Still, his comments could 
apply to the modern soldier, for they clearly define the essence of the military condition: 
the soldier devotes his life to the service of the state, which he has chosen to serve under 
particularly harsh conditions, but this in turn brings a gratification other men cannot 
experience. 
Jean de Bueil's Jouvencel is particularly helpful to understand better how the 
soldier - at least, the noble one - viewed his condition. In this work, a fictitious 
experienced captain explains to young soldiers that military life may not be comfortable 
or financially rewarding, but is still much more enjoyable and estimable `que Waller A la 
court presser le Roy ne faire 1'ennuyeux apres les seigneurs'. `Mieulx vaut nostre mestier 
et est mieulx convenable', de Bueil adds, `que d'aller baguenaulder ä la court et regarder 
qui a les plus belles pointes, les plus gros bourreletz ou le chappeau le plus pele ä la 
facon de maintenant'52. Jean de Bueil saw the military profession as a manly and 
honourable occupation. It also was the source of sensations which no other profession 
could procure: Vest joyeuse chose que la guerre', as the `Jouvencel' famously 
exclaimed, praising for instance comradeship in arms and the solidarity that existed 
between soldiers in the face of danger: 
11 vient une doulceur au cueur de loyaulte et de pitie de veoir son amy, qui 
si vaillamment expose son corps pour faire et acomplir le commandement 
de nostre Createur. Et puis on se dispose d'aller mourir ou vivre avec luy, 
et pour amour ne l'abandonner point [... ] Pensez-vous que homme qui 
52 JEAN DE BUEIL, I, 42,55. 
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face cela craingne la mort ? Nennil; car il est tant reconforte, il est si ravi 
qu'il ne scet oü il est. Vraiement il n'a paour de rien53 
Admittedly, there was not much novelty in such ideas. Comradeship in arms had been 
extolled by Joinville a century and a half earlier, and the soldierly contempt for the 
fripperies of court life was similarly age-old. And as Contamine has pointed out, the 
professional of war had been existing de facto for centuries54. Still, the essence of the 
military condition, the joy and pain that it brought, were now clearly delineated. 
Huizinga has noted that there was nothing specifically medieval in de Bueil's praises of 
comradeship in arms, of forgetfulness of self in the face of danger; the knight's words 
are still relevant to today's professional soldier 55 
Moreover, at the dawn of the Renaissance, the conditions of war had changed 
drastically. Soldiers were living in an extremely hard environment. At times, their living 
conditions were literally extraordinary, and it is easy to understand why the military were 
regarding themselves more and more as a different sort of people. The monarchist 
chronicles describe with striking vividness some of the worst aspects of what Franco 
Cardini referred to as `la belle vie du militaire', using ironically an expression sanctioned 
by usage56. In the 1490s, artillery was completely reshaping warfare. A couple of 
decades earlier, Jean Molinet had heralded in his Chroniques the new challenges which 
guns and powder were presenting to the Renaissance soldier. In a curious tirade 
addressed to the readers of chivalrous romances, he had declared, in a slightly comical 
tone: 
Vous mettez en compte vos difformez monstres et horribles geans qui se 
confyoient en la grandeur de leur corps, en la ferocite de leurs bras et en 
crudelite de leurs bastons; mais, s'ilz eussent ouyz en leur tempz les 
espoentables tonnoires tempestans et sentu les hydeuses pierres 
fouldroyans dont le duc et les siens ont este pluseurs fois servis et 
53 Ibid., 11, p. 20-21. 
54 CONTAMINE, Guerre, Etat..., p. 542. 
55 HUIZINGA, p. 78. 
56 Cf. Chapter 6 of CARDINI. 
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rencontrez en divers orages, ilz se fussent trouvez perplex, confus, et sur 
le point de renoncier aux armes (I, 59-60). 
The greater the challenge was, the greater the fortitude of the men who could face them, 
the higher their valour and the renown that they would obtain. Amongst our French 
monarchist chroniclers, Jean d'Auton depicts best, using the resources of his rhetorical 
and classical formation, the inhumanity of the new face of warfare, because he is dealing 
with a period where the French were facing much heavier resistance than during Charles 
VIII's excursion. One of his most horrifying passages - reminiscent of First World War 
trench warfare - is his rendering of the shower of fire which was pouring upon the 
French camp as Louis XII's soldiers were besieging Alexandria: 
A l'une foys deux ou troys homes, a l'autre troys ou quatre chevaulx 
estoient mors ou affolles, et a l'autre foys les gros arbres errachiez et 
fouldroyes, tentes et pavillons parmy le camp perces et abbatus, et 
tellement qu'en tout ce cartier n'estoit question. que de faire le chien 
couchant et soy garder, sur la vye, de ne tenir par les Chemins parlement 
(I, 54). 
On the next day, at the break of dawn, the French pieces of ordnance resumed the 
hostilities, thundering `comme si les Furyes Infernales fussent hors de leurs stigies, voire 
et de teile sorte que, au reveil, fut a chascun advys que, sous leurs tantes et pavillons, et 
plus d'une lieue autour, y hust terremote impetueulx' (I, 55). Jean d'Auton demonstrates 
the brutality, suddenness and anonymity with which death could strike in these new 
conditions. At the siege of Imola in 1499, 
ung gentilhomme nomme Adryain de Brymeu, estant au derriere d'une 
chappelle [... ], d'une piece d'artillerye eut sur luy tout le derriere de sa 
brigandine emporte, et fut moult foulle et estonne du coup; toutesfoy ne 
fut gueres blecye. Mais, a touchant de luy, ung sieh varlet du mesme coup 
heut la teste emportee, et ung jeune page [... ] fut de ce coup pareillement 
occiz (I, 125). 
Yet, in d'Auton's narration, the French soldier can take all these hardships. He 
faces the dangers with the fortitude of a Renaissance hero. Jean d'Auton describes for 
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instance how, as a breach had been made into the walls of Alexandria, the soldiers 
flocked by hundreds to throw bundles of firewood into the moats. He marvels at the fact 
that, despite the defender's heavy fire, none of the French soldiers would let themselves 
be distracted from their duty; even the humblest members of the army seemed lion- 
hearted: `voire et plusieurs serviteurs et laquays sur le bort des foussez faysoyent saux et 
gambades, et a coups de main gectoyent pierres en la ville' (I, 64). The chronicler 
contrasts the courageous, exemplary behaviour of the French with the pusillanimity 
allegedly exhibited by Cesare Borgia at the siege of Forli. As the French were crossing 
the moats, which they had filled in with tables, doors and bundles of firewood, to assault 
the castle, Cesare Borgia `ne voulut tant son honneur lesser escarter que a 1'affaire ne se 
preuvast', and started to join the crowd. But in fact this led to further humiliation, for 
deux pas n'eust chemine en avant que en 1'eau ne se trouvast jusques au 
dessus des genoilz; qui moult le refroidist. Aupres de luy, estoit ung des 
gentishommes de la maison du Roy, nomme Castelferrus, qui a ce 
besoing luy fut si propice que, tout le travers de 1'eau, a son coul l'en 
emporta (I, 131). 
Cesare would probably have felt much more in his element at his father's curia, 
intriguing against some Roman noblemen. He seems to have been a particular butt of 
d'Auton, for a few pages later, our chronicler explains that, as the army had gained 
possession of Forli, Cesare, `lequel estoit las', retired to a room to take some rest. Yet, 
he did not enjoy his relaxation for very long, as one his men soon came to warn him that, 
in a room just below his, where a stock of powder kegs was kept, some landsknechts 
were in the process of getting drunk. They had brought torches with them, and Cesare 
was thus in great danger. Shortly after he had left his room, the powder exploded. Some 
of the landsknechts escaped, `de feu et de soulphre les visaiges et les mains tout 
enfumez', and the others died (I, 136-137). Obviously d'Auton did not expect Cesare to 
stay in his room, yet it is quite likely that, by including this anecdote in his narration, 
Jean d'Auton intended to show that the Duke of Valentinois would never find his place 
amongst the soldiers of the French army - albeit Germans in this case -a type of men 
who had no fear and literally played with fire. 
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The Renaissance Kings of France's guerres de magnificence presented French 
soldiers with a host of new challenges which sorely tried their valour, and d'Auton took 
care to record all these trials at length, emphasizing the soldiers' courage, asceticism, 
and strength of mind as they were put through the tests, often successfully, sometimes 
not. `Proesce' took various forms; single combats and traditional `faits d'armes' were 
still - perhaps more than before in France - related with awe57, however tactically 
unimportant most may have been, but on Italian ground, adventures were manifold and 
often unexpected. Sometimes the land itself presented some unusual and exotic 
difficulties, as when the captain Louis d'Ars, sent with forty men-at-arms and one 
hundred archers to Bellinzona by Ligny, had to follow narrow tracks in the mountains 
`pour la passee d'ung seul homme ä la foys; et, au bas de la montaigne, estoit une riviere 
courant, nominee la Treze, royde, tant impetueuse et bruyant qu'il n'y avoit cueur tant 
asseure qui n'eust assez occasion de frayeur' (I, 150). D'Auton also particularly favoured 
stories of small groups of soldiers who, finding themselves isolated, had to cover great 
distances in hostile territories to join the army; this kind of adventures frequently 
happened when Ludovico Sforza was recovering Milan, Louis XII having returned to 
France; the French army then had to act autonomously, facing heavy opposition. 
Sometimes common soldiers were the heroes of such peregrinations: twenty archers who 
were striving to join Louis d'Ars had to cover one hundred Lombard miles without 
eating, with enemies pressing them closely. The challenge was however too great: 
having lost their horses and been forced to travel in disguise by night, all eventually had 
to surrender. Louis d'Ars, who was himself trying to join Ligny with his men, was more 
successful, and d'Auton praised his discipline and commanding skill; after a long 
odyssey through the whole of Lombardy, the captain managed to join the French, leaving 
quantities of dead enemies behind him (I, 171-177). It is probable that d'Auton and his 
readers particularly enjoyed these stories because they featured French soldiers having to 
act like the knight-errants of romances; the main difference was that such adventures 
were not a choice but a necessity. The Renaissance French soldier's valour was 
57 See for instance JEAN D'AUTON, 1,41,57,190. 
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unceasingly put through new tests; he had to be ready to face any challenge, whether of 
an age-old or novel kind. 
9 Conclusion 
I hope I have shown the main features of the representation of the King of 
France's soldier in monarchist historiography at the dawn of the 16th century. Obviously 
every work has its peculiarities; thus the representation of the soldier does differ to a 
certain extent according to different works. Jean de Saint-Gelais, for instance, 
concentrates exclusively on the `Noblesse Francoise'; he hardly tells us anything on 
soldiers others than the King's lieutenant generals, who appear as paragons of chivalry. 
In fact, the warrior about whom Saint-Gelais is the most prolix is Louis of Orleans, who 
is presented as an ideal knight; this does not, however, tell us much about the 
Renaissance French soldier. Guillaume de Villeneuve concentrates almost exclusively on 
knights - and himself in particular, but this enables us to have an insight into the 
character of the Renaissance French knight, in this case a captain. Andre de La Vigne 
and Jean d'Auton, the Kings' official chroniclers, give us the most complete depiction of 
the French soldier; not only do they portray commanders, captains and knights in action, 
but they also offer interesting snapshots of the common soldier, whether archer or 
foreign mercenary. Taken together, all these works support one another, and offer a 
rather finished image of the Renaissance French soldier. 
How did the image of the French soldier evolve, compared to that offered by the 
chivalrous chronicles of the end of the Hundred Years War? As far as the main 
character, the knight, is concerned, one notes that, following the Burgundian example, 
the ideals of chivalry have taken much more importance, and seem to direct his every 
action, despite the fact that the traditional model of chivalrous conduct was de facto even 
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more obsolete than at the beginning of the century. However, the Renaissance French 
knight was no Don Quixote, and one sees that the peculiarities of the French knight of 
the mid-15`h century chivalrous chronicles still hold good. The lessons of the Hundred 
Years War had not been lost. The ideals of chivalry may still be revered, but there has 
been a shift of emphasis, prepared as we saw in the mid-15'h century. Loyalty to the King 
was now primordial, and all other chivalrous virtues were subordinated to it. A new ideal 
also appeared, that of ascetic service to the state: behind the chivalrous prototype, we are 
beginning to see the model of the Roman soldier. As men-at-arms were losing their 
tactical importance, the knight was bound to eventually disappear. Though this was a 
slow process, noblemen would have to relinquish the idea of serving the King as heavy 
cavalrymen. Many would eventually start their military career as infantrymen, and hope 
to become captains, before ending commanders - as Blaise de Monluc did in the 16th 
century. One could say that in our monarchist chronicles, the transformation of the 
`knight' into `private soldier', `captain' or `commander' is illustrated by figures such as 
the Bastard of Amenzay, Louis d'Ars, Trivulzio or La Tremoille. One novelty introduced 
by some monarchist chronicles, however, is that knights are not the only persons extolled 
for their deeds: in de La Vigne and d'Auton's works, the common soldier is also present 
- albeit on a modest scale. Some roturiers are mentioned by name, and their actions are 
occasionally pushed forward. As in the case of the knight, the common soldier's ideal 
seems to be one of obedient, ascetic service to the King and the state. Thus our images of 
the Renaissance soldier are not simply images of knights, or of noblemen. 
Finally, I wish to consider whether our monarchist chronicles present us with 
realistic or idealistic images of the Renaissance French soldier. Obviously their portrayal 
of the French soldier is rather idealistic: with a few exceptions, the soldiers appear 
obedient, disciplined, courageous, valiant, ascetic and zealous. Very seldom, if ever in 
the knights' case, do they seem prey to feelings such as fear, greed, cruelty, rebellion or 
bitterness - which would be justifiable, considering that the soldiers' wages were quite 
low, even those of men-at-arms, that the King only offered pensions to a minority, and 
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that the common soldiers' prospects of advancement were little58. The few depictions 
Commynes made of Charles VIII's soldiers were much more true to nature, though he 
acknowledged that they were more zealous and obedient than the French soldiers of 
former times. Our monarchist chroniclers' rendering of French soldiers is heroic ; in that 
respect, they seem - this is especially striking in the official works - to have followed the 
model offered by Burgundian historiography. Also, de La Vigne and d'Auton, like 
Molinet, and Chastelain at the beginning of his chronicle, magnified the challenges of 
war and the waging of war; like the Burgundian official historiographers, they developed 
the `aesthetics' of war, taking for instance into account the transformations wrought by 
new technologies, such as artillery. The decor being dramatized, war's actors appear 
even more as heroes. Guns, cannonballs and bombardments may be presented as 
horrible, but we feel that the chronicler still viewed them as grand, because they brought 
out the soldiers' valour. Like Chastelain and Molinet, d'Auton and de La Vigne 
`embellished' war and its actors. Obviously the fact that, like the official Burgundian 
chroniclers, de La Vigne and d'Auton wrote in the rhetorical style, accounts partly for 
this similarity. 
And yet, at the same time, there is some realism in our French chroniclers' 
depiction of the French soldier. Villeneuve was no rhetoriqueur, but Jean Jacquart 
deems his narrative very conventional; still, it seems to reflect the mentality of an 
average French captain, obedient and submissive yet confident in his strength, that of the 
King, and in the justness of the King's cause, even in the midst of difficulties. This 
mentality appears to have been the norm among French knights and captains, at the 
beginning of the Wars of Italy, when France was aggressive, powerful and triumphant : 
the letters written by French knights and captains during Charles VIII's campaign 
similarly display a great self-confidence and rather arrogant faith in the King's power 
and the justness of his cause, yet a dutiful and obedient turn of mind59. Similarly, de La 
Vigne and d'Auton's depiction of the King of France's army is accurate in many 
respects, notably in the illustration of the army's organization, of its way of operating, of 
58 See CONTAMINE, Guerre, Etat..., p. 508,528. 
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the relations between the captains and the soldiers, even in some details such as the 
amount of money given by the King to common soldiers as a reward for a fine 
deed. The 
fact that Charles VIII and Louis XII wanted their official historiographers to follow the 
French host in their guerres de magnificence is revealing: they wanted to recognise their 
army when reading these works, so that their deeds, those performed by their chivalry or 
even by the common soldiers, might seem more authentic. One may compare de La 
Vigne and d'Auton's portrayal of the French army with a print inserted in the Mer des 
hystoires of 1503, representing the battle of Fornovo (Fig. 11,12)60. In this print, the 
unfolding of the battle, the different corps of the French army, the knights, the Swiss 
formation and the guns, are depicted with a degree of realism hitherto unseen in French 
iconography. Yet, the French army is clearly idealized: the soldiers, whether knights or 
common soldiers, all appear fearless, avenging and triumphant. In the same way, one 
could say that de La Vigne and d'Auton present us with a very graphic portrayal of the 
French army, but that this depiction clearly promotes an ideal image of the French 
soldier. 
59 These letters appear in Campagne et bulletins... 
60 John Hale has commented at length on a very similar print commemorating the same event, emphasizing 
the iconographical importance of these contemporary depictions of Fornovo. Cf. J. R. HALE, Artists and 
Warfare in the Renaissance, New Haven / London, Yale University Press, 1990, p. 260-261. 
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Conclusion 
Je suis ce Temeraire au soir de la bataille 
Qui respire peut-titre encore sur le pre 
Mais fair et les oiseaux voient dejä ses entrailles 
Pour m'outr il n'est plus que soldats eventres 
[" "l De mon armure noire envahi par le froid 
Pourrai-je murmurer mon histoire farouche 
Louis Aragon, `Le Temeraire" 
According to one of his contemporaries, Louis XII once declared that the 
Greeks had done mediocre deeds in wars, but had great writers to embellish them; the 
Romans had performed great deeds yet wrote of them with dignity; as for the French, 
they had also been admirable in wars, but lacked great writers to tell about it. Louis 
added that he intended to remedy that2. This comment sums up, in a way, the efforts 
made by the Kings of France of the early Renaissance period to promote an official, 
and thus `definitive' writing of their wars, which would take its place in the Geste of 
the French nation; we have seen that this Geste itself was developing and expanding 
at the dawn of the Renaissance (Chapter 2, Sections 3.1 and 4). A chronicler like 
Jean d'Auton may not be our idea of the ideal French chronicler: the modern mind 
tends to value Philippe de Commynes much more highly, because he prized politics 
over war, the workings of the mind over physical prowess. The most celebrated part 
1 LOUIS ARAGON, Le roman inacheve, Paris, Gallimard (Poesie), 1966 (1st ed. 1956), p. 29-34 (p. 
29). 
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of Commynes' Memoires, the first six books, describes how the sly Louis XI, a 
prince `assez craintif de sa propre nature', but `le plus saige pour soy tirer d'un 
mauvais pas', a man who knew how to please `ceulx dont il avoit besoing' (I, 67-70), 
eventually triumphed over the magnificent and bellicose Charles the Bold. The Duke 
of Burgundy took pride in the fact that he had defied the whole power of the Holy 
Roman Empire at Neuss, yet our lucid memorialist deemed Louis XI worthier of 
praise, `car qui a le prouffit de la guerre il en a 1'honneur' (II, 26). In my sixth 
chapter, I contrasted Commynes' narrative of Charles VIII's descent into Italy with 
the heroic version of the monarchist chronicles, highlighting how Commynes had 
stripped the conquest of its magnificence and divested the conquerors of their 
superhuman aura. Commynes' version of the conquest is much more convincing to 
the modern reader than that of de La Vigne, because our memorialist's characters 
have psychological depth, and act as humans. The great novelty of Commynes' 
writing of history, compared with the chivalrous and clerical historiography, is that, 
rather than recount history according to some ideological, moral or aesthetic patterns 
which were more or less pre-established, Commynes searched for the cause of history 
in the psychology of men - and since he personally knew the actors of history, he 
could understand their motives. Yet in his narratives, God always appears as the 
ultimate cause in history; this gives an impressive spiritual and moralizing overtone 
to his historiography, which is otherwise very rational. 
However, the idea that the early Renaissance Kings of France had of the 
official writing of their wars was very different from Commynes' innovative genre of 
historiography. At the time of the Wars of Italy, the Kings of France were carrying 
out a double offensive, one which was both cultural and military3. The French 
sovereigns wanted their wars to be glorified; to ensure this, they turned towards the 
concept of historiography which the magnificent and chivalrous Dukes of Burgundy 
had promoted, and instituted through the appointments of Chastelain, then Molinet as 
their official historiographers. Philip the Good and Charles the Bold had singled out 
chivalry as the line of conduct for their Duchy, partly because of their own taste, and 
partly because this policy fitted their interests: the Dukes deemed the glorification of 
2 Reported in BAUMGARTNER, p. 159. 
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chivalry the best way to appeal to the nobility, and secure its allegiance. Following 
Jean Froissart's example, the official and semi-official historiography of Burgundy 
adopted a chivalrous ideology; it extolled martial and chivalrous virtues, glorified the 
`war of the knights' - war being the ideal business for a nobleman to prove his worth 
- and offered a heroic portrayal of the Dukes' agents in their wars (Chapter 1, A). 
However, Froissart had written for many different patrons (Philippa de Hainaut, Guy 
de Blois, Aubert de Baviere... ), thus his political stance varies throughout his work, 
and if his discourse sometimes appears partisan, it still might be more attributable to 
the beliefs of the men he consulted than to his own convictions. By contrast, the late 
medieval Burgundian chivalrous chronicles adopted a clearly partisan stance, 
propagandistic in the case of the official historiographers. As Paul Zumthor has 
emphasized, the rhetoriqueur's task was to produce a discourse which reflected the 
image the prince had of himself and of his role, and which he wanted to promote4. 
The same could be said about the semi-official Burgundian chroniclers such as Jean 
de Wavrin or Lefevre de Saint-Remy, who were not rhetoriqueurs, but also reflected 
and promoted their prince's ideology. 
The life of a knight or of a nobleman aspiring after knighthood was in theory 
dedicated to the waging of war, and in Burgundian chivalrous chronicles, war was 
either blatantly in the forefront or, depending on political circumstances, at least 
present in the background. The practice of extolling the prince's martial activities led 
to the development of a concept which had apparently originated in France, the 
guerre d'honneur et de magnificence. This kind of war, which drew its inspiration 
from the greatest epic episodes of the French nation's Geste - and, first and foremost, 
the crusades - was, for a prince, a way of earning renown and glory by engaging his 
body, his troops and his might in a remarkable enterprise. Unlike a `common', 
`natural' war, a quarrel between neighbours, the guerre de magnificence was a kind 
of luxury in which the prince could indulge. It demonstrated his magnanimity, his 
natural propensity to achieve great things; it brought the prince honour and fame, 
offering eminence to his state. The magnificent and chivalrous Dukes of Burgundy, 
eager to strengthen the prestige of their young state, made the guerre d'honneur et de 
3 S. HIMMELSBACH, "`Long poeme" et "grand genre": ('elaboration de formes narratives longues au 
debut du XVI` siecle', in Nouvelle Revue du Seizieme Siecle, 15/1 (1997), 27-40 (p. 29). 
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magnificence an important element of their policy. When his state was at peace, 
Philip the Good chose to turn his thoughts to a most noble task, the defence of 
Christendom, and mobilized funds, equipment and troops to that effect (Chapters 3 
and 4). I chose to concentrate on Duke Philip's crusading efforts because of the 
archetypal status of crusading as a guerre de magnificence, yet one could show that 
the chroniclers of the next generation - at least, the official and semi-official ones - 
implicitly presented Charles the Bold's endeavours to expand his state as a guerre de 
magnificence. Jean Molinet and Olivier de La Marche's accounts of Charles the 
Bold's siege of Neuss (1475) - the first stage of a future campaign against the Holy 
Roman Empire, which Charles had undertaken `desirant accroistre sa renommee par 
touttes terres et provinces au decorement de ceste maison tres relucente [the House of 
Burgundy]' - are exemplary in that respect, as both authors praised every striking 
aspect of an action Charles had intended to be daring, splendid, and admirable5. Both 
chroniclers extolled Charles' boldness, as he dared to oppose the formidable might of 
the Empire: according to La Marche, the final confrontation against the Emperor's 
army - which, however, resulted only in a few skirmishes - was `une escolle 
d'honneur [... ] pour apprendre le mestier de la guerre' (I, 137-138). The chroniclers 
were also most impressed by the magnificence of Charles' siege, described at length 
by Molinet6. La Marche explained with some awe that Charles had entertained some 
royal and princely visitors, such as the King of Denmark, while laying siege to Neuss, 
adding: `Et ne croy pas que cent ans avant aist este siege de celle magnificence'. The 
chronicler concluded: `Et est legier a entendre que de grant valeur fut le prince qui 
soustint sy grant fais' (I, 138), emphasizing that the siege of Neuss should be the 
cause of much commendation for Charles (even though, pragmatically speaking, it 
was a notorious failure). Charles' alleged motives for waging this war were 
extremely honourable: the Duke was supporting his cousin Bernard de Baviere, who 
had been driven away from his archbishopric of Cologne, against Bernard's rival the 
Landgrave of Hesse, upheld by the Germans. Molinet stressed that Bernard de 
Baviere had received his archbishopric from the Pope; by taking his defence, Charles 
acted as `vray champion et protecteur chevalereux' of the Holy Church (I, 29-30). 
4 ZUMTHOR, p. 39-77. 
s JEAN MOLINET, Chroniques, 1,28-105 (quotation p. 28); OLIVIER DE LA MARCHE: see especially 
1,136-138. 
6 See my fifth chapter, p. 222. 
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Molinet thus presented Charles' campaign as a fight in the Church's defence - an 
ideal guerre d'honneur et de magnificence. In fact, if we are to believe La Marche, all 
of Charles' wars had the same most honourable aim: `son desir et affection estoit 
d'aller contre les infideles en sa personne, et desiroit de se faire sy grant et sy 
puissant qu'il peust estre conducteur [... ] des autres, car ä nulluy ne vouloit. estre 
subject' (I, 145). According to the chivalrous chroniclers, Charles' dream was thus 
identical with that of Philip: to defend Christendom against the infidels, only that 
Charles was more ambitious than his father - since he wanted no superior to lead him 
in a passagium - less honest and less disinterested. 
At the dawn of the Renaissance, as France was emerging from the traumatic 
Hundred Years War conflict, re-asserting her might and prestige, and turning into one 
of the most powerful nations in Christendom, the Kings of France were increasingly 
concerned with the promotion of an official writing of French history, and, primarily, 
of their wars. This reflected a noticeable trend amongst Western European states: 
between 1437 and 1516, official and semi-official historiographers appeared in 
France, Burgundy, Venice, as well as Naples, Castile or Hungary 7. France was in fact 
a precursor in that respect, since her monarchy designated its official historiographer 
as early as 1437, with the appointment of Jean Chartier. However, the Dukes of 
Burgundy were far more successful in establishing a distinguished official writing of 
their deeds, which celebrated their exploits and extolled their memory in an 
impressive and dignified manner, concentrating on themes most likely to please its 
princely and aristocratic readership's fancy. As the Kings of France launched out into 
their splendid Italian adventures, they chose artists to relate their martial exploits who 
wrote in a manner very similar to that of the magnificent Dukes of Burgundy's 
official chroniclers (Chapter 7, Conclusion). The resemblance is in many respects so 
striking, one is very much inclined to think that the immediate predecessors of the roi 
magnifique, Francis I, wanted to emulate the Dukes of Burgundy by having their 
deeds recorded in a grand, heroic style, and that the chroniclers of Charles VIII and 
Louis XII drew their inspiration from the Burgundian school of historiography, in 
particular from Jean Molinet. Like the official chroniclers of Burgundy, Andre de La 
Vigne and Jean d'Auton - one could also include the rhetoriqueur Jean Marot, author 
303 
of Le Voyage de Genes (1507? ) and Le Voyage de Venise (1509? )8 - unreservedly put 
all their literary skills at their princes' service, recording their deeds in an overtly 
panegyric and propagandistic tone. Jean d'Auton defined his role as such (blending 
service to the prince with the classical notion of the common good) when declaring 
that he had written his Conqueste de Milan `sachant [... ] la plume des poetes disers et 
elegans orateurs d'Athenes et de Romme moings d'ayde n'avoir faict a la chose 
publicque que la lance des hardys combateurs' (I, 3). Like the Burgundian 
historiographers, our monarchist chroniclers gave a heroic portrayal of the prince's 
agents in his wars, concentrating on knights, and shaping their discourse according to 
the ideals of chivalry (Chapter 7, Section 2.1): their prime interest was to explore `la 
riche myne de vertueuse proesse, les incomparables tresors d'honneur immortel et 
heureuse renommee' which the `noble excercice des armes' (I, 1) afforded, and to 
bring all deeds worthy of universal consideration to light. Jean Molinet had been 
present at Neuss; de La Vigne and d'Auton followed their sovereigns in their 
campaigns, thus making their reports of military actions sound more authentic and 
detailed, and offering a graphic depiction of the French army, for example by taking 
some interest in the figure of the common soldier (Chapter 7, Section 3). The French 
monarchist chroniclers also implicitly presented their patrons' Italian campaigns as 
guerres d'honneur et de magnificence, in the same vein as the Burgundian 
chroniclers had presented Philip the Good's crusading efforts and the martial deeds 
of his son. Originally, Charles VIII had conquered Naples with the aim of obtaining 
an appropriate base for waging war against the infidels. The passagium never 
materialized, but Charles' guerre de magnificence was still a success: because the 
King had spectacularly crossed and subdued so many foreign and far-off countries, 
the descent into Italy still earned him everlasting renown according to the monarchist 
chroniclers (Chapter 5). 
Finally, the Burgundian legacy into which the early Renaissance official 
historiography of France had come can also be seen, quite simply, in the French 
chroniclers' language, the `emancipation du signifiant', to use Paul Zumthor's 
GUENEE, p. 342-344. 
8I did not consider Jean Marot in this thesis, only because he was dealing with events that belong to 
the 16 `h century. 
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expression. An elaborate language was the distinctive feature of Burgundy's official 
historiography; it was also an ideal semi-official chroniclers revered: La Marche 
wrote his Memoires hoping that Chastelain or some other distinguished Burgundian 
rhetoriqueur would `coucher [ses souvenirs] ou noble lit pare et embasme de ces 
nobles et riches termes, inventions et fruicts, dont le goust et 1'entendement ne peult 
jamais empirer ne mourir' (I, 185). Recourse to elaborate language was regarded by 
official chroniclers as the most effective means to offer a definitive version of their 
patrons' deeds, "`definitive" parce que rehaussee, ennoblie par fart, et partant 
superieure ä la chronique pure et simple"°. Besides, bridled as they were in their 
opinions, our rhetoriqueurs could only find emancipation in their artistic use of the 
signifiant. De La Vigne and Jean Marot were particularly inventive and sophisticated 
in the composition of their discourse, writing in prose and verse (with a predilection 
for the epic decasyllabic verse) by turns, and choosing the number of verses in their 
stanzas according to the episode related, thus introducing clever dynamics into their 
text'. At the dawn of the 16`" century, the official writing of the Kings of France's 
wars was thus worthy of the high deeds it related. 12 
Despite the presence, in the monarchist chroniclers' accounts, of some 
obvious references to classical antiquity, the official historiographic literature of early 
Renaissance France seems in fact to owe its character mostly to the Burgundian 
chivalrous chronicle. However, despite its professed confidence in the excellence of 
the virtues of chivalry, which governed the grands ducs d'occident's actions, the 
official and semi-official historiography of Burgundy seemed to harbour a complex - 
especially with regard to the Dukes' guerres de magnificence - which grew as time 
went by. We have seen how the Burgundian chroniclers extolled Duke Philip's 
crusading endeavours and emphasized that his efforts and actions in defence of the 
faith had earned him much renown (Chapter 3). Yet, we sense some uneasiness in 
their accounts, due to the fact that Philip's endeavours to revive the old chivalrous 
9 ZUMTHOR, n. 10, p. 102. 
10 HIMMELSBACH, p. 40. 
11 See ibid., p. 35-36. 
12 A woman's initiative greatly accounted for the development of the French historiographical (and, 
more generally, artistic) scene: Anne de Bretagne, successively the spouse of Charles VIII and Louis 
X1I, was the patron of many early Renaissance French literary figures, such as d'Auton and Jean 
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crusading dream were, at the end of the day, not very successful, nor were the results 
of his crusading actions very impressive. Jean de Wavrin involved himself in strange 
contradictions as he presented Walleran's crusade as a guerre de magnificence, yet 
revealed, through his realism, that the expedition had been anything but magnificent 
(Chapter 4). Similarly, Chastelain showed how difficult it was for Philip to 
concretize his crusading dreams when his state was experiencing internal or external 
difficulties (Chapter 3, Section 5). And in his effort to excuse Philip's failure to fulfil 
his much advertised vow, the chronicler ended up restyling his opinions on 
crusading. Both authors thus display some disenchantment with regard to crusading, 
the guerre de magnificence par excellence. 
The results of Philip's crusading endeavours were, pragmatically speaking, 
rather disappointing, yet because of his unquestionable zeal for the defence of 
Christendom, and because, following the Treaty of Arras, Philip generally avoided 
coming into conflict with his European neighbours, his honour was always intact in 
the eyes of our Burgundian chroniclers. Things changed with the advent of Charles 
the Bold. Chastelain was soon alarmed by Charles' thirst for glory: `le duc Charles 
faisoit ä craindre, ä cause de son grand courage, lequel il descouvroit et sembloit 
monstrer par effet, qui de nul ne tenoit compte, ne de roy, ne d'empereur' (V, 455- 
456). As the unreasonable ambitions of Philip's son were drastically damaging 
Burgundy's relations with France and her neighbours, endangering the future of the 
Duchy itself, the Burgundian chroniclers' disenchantment vis-ä-vis chivalry and the 
guerre de magnificence became far more acute. Charles' excellence was somewhat 
called into question, though the King of France's share of blame was even greater, 
because of his notoriously non-chivalrous behaviour. In his old age, Chastelain felt 
increasingly bitter with regard to the Christian princes, whom the historiographer 
severely blamed for prizing their own glory and interests higher than the Christian 
faith (V, 475-477). There is no doubt that Charles was included in his diatribes13. 
Jean Molinet's loyalty towards his Duke never faltered, yet already during the siege 
Marot. See Y. GIRAUD and M. -R. JUNG, La Renaissance, t. 1: 1480-1548 (Litterature francaise, ed. 
C. PICHOIS, t. III, Paris, Arthaud, 1972), p. 27. 
13 On this subject see Chapter 5 (`Les illusions perdues (fin) : les princes et leur entourage, la 
noblesse') in DELCLOS, Le temoignage..., p. 263-289. 
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of Neuss, in the midst of his dithyrambic praises of Charles' deeds, the chronicler felt 
impelled to beg in a perturbed tone: 
O tres puissant duc [... ], aras tu tousjours 1'espee en dextre? [... ] 
Mitigue ton ardent desir, refrene ton hault emprendre, deprime to 
haulte pretente, convertis [... ] to lance en rainsel d'olivier [... ] . Ton 
pere [... ] s'est acquis non [nom] vertueux par bonte pacificque, garde 
toy que tu n'agieres non vicieux par durte terrificque (I, 92-93)14. 
After the disaster of Nancy (1477), Molinet was naturally completely at a loss: his 
world had crumbled, and the chronicler did not know where to turn. He was greatly 
shocked by the behaviour of Louis XI: instead of following the example of `les 
glorieux rois triumphans', his predecessors who `desployerent jadis leur auriflambe 
sur les mescreans [... ] sarrasins et barbarins en exultation de la foy catholicque, dont 
ilz ont acquis honneur de perpetuelle memoire' (I, 213), Louis let his knights loose 
on Burgundy to conquer the Duchy. 
In the last chapters of his chronicle, Chastelain had castigated the nobility of 
France and Burgundy, who were increasingly preoccupied with their own interests, to 
the detriment of morality. Molinet will also blame the Burgundian nobility for 
forsaking the Duchy's princess and going over to the enemy, and extol instead, in the 
manner of a clerical chronicler, the fierce resistance opposed to the French by the 
common people of Burgundy, concluding an account of two admirable deeds 
performed by some Flemish peasants against the French with the words: `Mirez vous 
gentilzhommes, mirez vous en ces paysans et ne deprimez pas trop les laboureurs qui 
vous nourissent et deffendent l'eritage de la pucelle [Mary of Burgundy]' (I, 239- 
241)15. Molinet's faith in chivalry would only be restored through the wedding of 
Maximilian of Habsburg - whom, together with his father, the chronicler considered 
as the saviour of Burgundy - to Mary of Burgundy. 
The official and semi-official historiography written in Valois Burgundy 
during the Duchy's last decades thus bore the stamp of an increasing loss of illusions 
" On the Burgundian chroniclers' views on Charles the Bold see J. DUFOURNET, `Charles le 
Temeraire vu par les historiens bourguignons', in Philippe de Commynes, p. 281-297. 
15 See also JEAN MOLINET, `Le naufrage de la Pucelle', in his Faictz et dictz, 1,77-99. 
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with regard to chivalrous ideals and the Dukes' guerres de magnificence - especially 
those waged by Charles the Bold. By contrast, the official and semi-official 
historiography of France, which, as we saw, took the Burgundian school of 
historiography as a pattern in many respects, appeared increasingly self-confident and 
triumphant in its discourse about the French monarchy and its wars. As Martial 
d'Auvergne had emphasized, France had assimilated the painful lessons of the 
Hundred Years War: the conflict had taught France humility; she had gained much 
experience (Chapter 2, Section 4). Now that France was again in favour with God, 
she could achieve great things. The French monarchist chroniclers stressed that God 
was now protecting the Kingdom, favouring it in its wars 16. It is quite a revealing fact 
that in 1494, the Burgundian Jean Molinet - by now a subject of the Holy Roman 
Emperor - was greatly impressed with Charles VIII's guerre de magnificence, and 
viewed this triumph of chivalry with great enthusiasm. Molinet apparently hoped that 
Charles VIII would perform what the Dukes of Burgundy had not managed to 
achieve: `recouvrer la Terre Sainte et aultrez notables citez occupees des maldis 
Turcqz' (II, 404). However, despite the French chroniclers' repeated claims that 
France was God's most dutiful servant, their tone was, in actual fact, strikingly 
secular. We saw that Commynes' mystical and moralizing account of the conquest 
contrasted with the reports of de La Vigne and other monarchist chroniclers, who 
basically presented the French success as the natural result of Charles' overwhelming 
might. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the crusade had not materialized. Indeed, 
one could say that, although early Renaissance historiography talked of France as 
God's special agent, it almost appears as if God was, to them, an instrument to exalt 
the French monarchy. 
God was allegedly favouring France, but there was also another, most profane 
explanation for the French chroniclers' confident, triumphant and boastful tone when 
relating Charles VIII and Louis XII's guerres de magnificence. At the dawn of the 
16`h century, the Kings of France's army was one of the most modern and powerful 
military forces in Europe. Although, in many respects - such as the emphasis on the 
aesthetics of war, or the glorification of chivalry - the monarchist chroniclers 
modelled the writing of their prince's war on that of Burgundian historiography, their 
16 See also Chapter 5, p. 227. 
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portrayal of the French army reflected this evolution. The early French chivalrous 
chronicle had prepared the ground, with its pragmatic depiction of military actions 
(Chapter 1, C, Section 4). Thus, the French army of the early Renaissance, and the 
French knights in particular, as depicted by the monarchist chroniclers, appear much 
more up-to-date than the Burgundian army, and its knights, in Burgundian 
historiography (though Jean Molinet's chronicle did reflect some changes in the 
Burgundian army, when Charles the Bold was taking the contemporary Kings of 
France's host as a pattern for his reforms). The monarchist chroniclers present us 
with a French army that is united, disciplined, whose members stand together, and 
which is, as a rule, terribly efficient (Chapter 7, Section 4). Also, the chroniclers' 
portrayal of the early Renaissance French knight is not obsolete: though he may cling 
to some of the lore of chivalry, one can see, beyond the figure of the knight, the 
commander, the King's 'officier', or the private, in any case a soldier devoted to his 
prince, and to the `chose publicque' (Chapter 7, Conclusion). Marie-Therese Caron 
has argued that the fall of the great princes of royal blood was due to the fact that the 
princes had failed to secure their nobles' entire support, despite their efforts'7. In the 
military field, the zeal and faithfulness of the Renaissance French knight 
demonstrates that the Kings of France had efficiently recovered the French nobility's 
loyalty to their cause. 
According to Martial d'Auvergne, the experience of the Hundred Years War 
had taught France humility. Yet, at the dawn of the 16th century, the official and 
semi-official historiography of France sang in chorus the French monarchy's 
exploits, exhibiting an arrogant confidence in the Kings of France's power. Only a 
few voices spoke in a different tone. Philippe de Commynes was one, though we saw 
that the prospects of a guerre de magnificence in Italy eventually took his fancy. The 
other voice was that of the few chroniclers who may be regarded as the heirs of the 
clerical chroniclers of the Hundred Years War. With the rise of absolutism, the 
currency of the clerical chronicle had declined. Also, the end of the Hundred Years 
War, and the military reforms of Charles VII, which had greatly reduced the French 
soldiers' exactions on French territory - one of the clerical chroniclers' main 
concerns (Chapter 1, B, Section 2) - had contributed to the relative rarity of the 
17 Cf. CARON, Noblesse et pouvoir..., p. 283-287. 
309 
clerical chronicle. However, many French historiographical works of the late 15th 
century do present a number of the clerical chronicle's features. We saw that Thomas 
Basin's chronicle was fairly typical of the genre, for instance as he criticized the 
ordonnances, on the grounds that they could become an instrument of coercion at the 
King's disposal (Chapter 7, Section 1). Robert Gaguin, regarded as France's first 
humanist historiographer, is also reminiscent of the clerical chroniclers, for instance 
as he praises the `vaillance et prouesse' of the francs-archers who took part in the 
liberation of France 18. The Breton historiographer Alain Bouchart, who wrote for 
Anne de Bretagne, provides us with an interesting and moralizing judgement on 
France's domineering assertiveness in the late 15`" century, in the context of an event 
which took place only a few years before the Wars of Italy: the Brittany campaign. 
Bouchart explains how the Breton barons who had called the powerful French army 
for help bitterly regretted their impulsiveness when they saw the damage wrought by 
the French soldiers upon the country, and realized that the French would grasp the 
opportunity to lay hands on Brittany19. And indeed, shortly after his triumphant 
victory of Saint-Aubin du Cormier, La Trimoille was besieging Rennes. The speech 
delivered by Jacques Bouchart -a member of the Parliament of Brittany, perhaps a 
relative of the chronicler - to La Trimoille's heralds aims to decrease the French's 
arrogance, as Jacques Bouchart urged the French not to let their successes go to their 
heads: `Vous autres, Francoys, ferez assez d'entreprinses de guerres, de batailles tant 
que il vous plaira, mais Celuy qui sans fin regne la suz donne les victoires. Ne vous 
en attribuez pas la gloire: c'est ä Luy que eile appartient'. Eventually, the French 
decided to examine, together with some Breton lawyers, the justness of their claim 
over Brittany, fearing that, should the King emulate `Alexandre de Macedone, Julius 
Cesar et aultres chevetains payens qui sans foy et sans by vivoient et triumphoient 
[... ] Dieu s'en pourroit bien irriter et par vengence donner ung tel heurt au roy et ä 
son armee que ä jamais le royaulme s'en sentiroit'20. The monarchist chroniclers of 
the Wars of Italy also insisted on the need for a prince to verify the justness of his 
claims, and the necessity to give glory to God for the victories He granted, but never 
with such forcefulness, and threatening urgency. The days when France had been at 
19 ROBERT GAGUIN, fol. clxxv, r°. 19 ALAIN BOUCIIART, Grandes croniques de Bretaigne, ed. M L. AUGER and G. JEANNEAU, dir. B. 
GUENEE, 3 vol., Paris, CNRS, 1986-1998,11,473,476,482. 
20 Ibid., II, 497-499. 
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its lowest were not so remote; the dramatic fate of the last grand duc d'occident 
demonstrated that the wheel of fortune could always revolve21. 
Throughout the 15th century, the French historiographical writing of warfare 
thus went through a manifest evolution, from the clerical perspective or the 
unostentatious, pragmatic chivalrous reports prevailing at the beginning of the 
century, to the patriotic and partisan monarchist chronicle. I hope I have shown the 
extent of the Burgundian chivalrous chronicle's influence over French 
historiography, especially the official strand, as regards the writing of the prince's 
wars. At the dawn of the 16`h century, few French chronicles stood aloof from a 
panegyric discourse aiming to glorify the Kings of France's Geste. Yet, despite this 
last flourish which seemed at the time to herald a bright future for the French 
chronicle, the days of the chroniclers were drawing to an end. Commynes' Memoires 
were only published in 1524 (and the relation of the conquest in 1528), but they met 
with tremendous success when eventually divulged; the work's good fortune was to 
the detriment of most other 15`h century historiographers. The Memoires aroused the 
enthusiasm of countless readers: Emperor Charles V, Ronsard, Montaigne, Diane de 
Poitiers, Henry III and Henry IV are amongst the most distinguished. Commynes' 
innovatory type of historiography announced what would become the 16th century's 
most favoured genre: the Memoires d'epee, a writing of wars and history written by 
men who had taken part in the events they related, men who were primarily 
concerned with the unvarnished truth, who wrote in unsophisticated language, plainly 
stating the reflections their observations had suggested to them. Alongside Caesar's 
Commentaries, the acknowledged prototype which, as a model, gave the genre its 
humanist authority, and, to a lesser extent, works such as Joinville's Vie de Saint 
Louis, especially the part relating the French adventures in Egypt, so striking in its 
realism - one should also quote Jean de Bueil's semi-autobiographical manual, Le 
Jouvencel, which described a military career with an authenticity heralding Blaise de 
21 Interestingly, we find echoes of the old clerical outlook in the 16th century Journal dun Bourgeois 
de Paris, in times when fortune no longer seemed to favour the French monarchy. A short while before 
the dramatic defeat of Pavia, for instance, the chronicler described the fear of the Parisians as the 
English, allied to the Empire, and the Burgundian subjects of the Emperor were devastating the north 
of France, and stressed that Francis I seemed too preoccupied with his Italian conquests to care about 
the fate of northern France: `Et est asscavoir que le Roy estoit pour Tors A Lyon, a cause de ses guerres 
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Monluc's Commentaires - Commynes greatly contributed to the shaping of 
16`h 
century historiographical literature, of which Martin du Bellay, the biographer 
Brantöme, Blaise de Monluc or Michel de Castelnau are the most renowned 
representatives22. Jean Dufournet has suggested that Commynes, who himself had 
been a Burgundian subject, might have written his Memoires as a reaction against the 
kind of historiography written by Olivier de La Marche or Chastelain23. This is 
perhaps the case; what is certain is that the Memoires genre invented by Commynes 
eventually brought the sophisticated, heroic and overtly partisan historiography 
promoted by the Dukes of Burgundy, then by the Kings of France, to an end. 
qu'il avoit en sa duche de Milan' (Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris sous le regne de Francois 1"' 
(1515-1536), ed. L. LALANNE for the SHF, Paris, Renouard, 1854, p. 174). 
22 On the fortune of Commynes' Memoires, and their considerable influence on 16th century 
historiography, see J. DUFOURNET, `Les premiers lecteurs de Commynes ou les Memoires au XVI` 
siecle', in Philippe de Commynes, p. 145-191. 
23 See DUFOURNET, `Commynes et l'invention... ', p. 30. 
312 
Bibliography 
1. Primary sources 
1.1. Manuscripts 
Archives departementales du Nord, B 1984, n° 59 234 ;B 2074, n° 65 309. 
1.2. Printed material 
AQUINAS (Saint), THOMAS, `De bello', in Summa Theologiae, vol. 35: 
Consequences of Charity, ed. and trans!. T. R. HEATH, London, Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1972, p. 81-93 (2a2ae, 40). 
313 
Archives curieuses de 1 'histoire de France depuis Louis XI jusqu'ä Louis XVIII, ed. 
M. L. CIMBER (L. LAFAIST) and J. L. DANJOU, 27 vol., Paris / Beauvais, 
1834-1840,16' serie, I. 
AUTON, JEAN D', Chroniques de Louis X11, ed. R. DE MAULDE LA CLAVIERE for 
the SHF, 4 vol., Paris, Renouard, 1889-1895. 
BASIN, THOMAS, Histoire de Charles VII, ed. and transl. C. SAMARAN, 2 vol., 
Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1964-1965 (2"d ed., ls` pub. 1933-1944). 
BONET, HONORS, L'Arbre des batailles, ed. E. NYS, Brussels, Muquardt, 1883. 
BOUCHART, ALAIN, Grandes croniques de Bretaigne, ed. M. L. AUGER and G. 
JEANNEAU, dir. B. GUENEE, 3 vol., Paris, CNRS, 1986-1998. 
BOUCHET, JEAN, Annalles d'Acquitaine, Poitiers, Jacques Bouchet, 1524 ; Le 
Panegyric du seigneur Loys de la Trimoille, in Choix de chroniques et 
Memoires..., p. 727-807. 
BUEIL, JEAN DE, Le Jouvencel, ed. C. FAVRE and L. LECESTRE for the SHF, 2 
vol., Paris, Renouard, 1887-1889. 
BUT, ADRIEN DE, Chronique, in Chroniques relatives a..., I, 211-717. 
CAGNY, PERCEVAL DE, Chroniques, ed. H. MORANVILLE for the SHF, Paris, 
Renouard, 1902. 
Campagne et bulletins de la Grande Armee d'Italie, ed. J. DE LA PILORGERIE, 
Nantes / Paris, Forest et Grimaud / Didier, 1866. 
CHALCOCONDYLES, LAONICOS, L'Histoire de la decadence de /'Empire grec et 
establissement de celuy des Turcs, transl. BLAISE DE VIGENERE, Paris, Abel 
1'Angelier, 1584. 
314 
CHARNY, GEOFFROI DE, The Book of Chivalry, ed. and transl. R. W. KAEUPER 
and E. KENNEDY, Philadelphia, University of Pensylvania Press, 1996. 
CHASTELAIN, GEORGES, cEuvres, ed. J. M. B. C. KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, 8 
vol., Geneva, Slatkine Reprints, 1971 (reprint of the classic edition of Brussels, 
Heussner, 1863-1866) ; Chronique, in cEuvres, I-V; Le livre des fails du bon 
chevalier messire Jacques de Lalaing, in cEuvres, VIII, 1-259. 
CHARTIER, ALAIN, Le Quadrilogue invectif, ed. E. DROZ, Paris, Honore 
Champion, 1950 (2"d ed., 1s` pub. 1923). 
CHARTIER, JEAN, Chronique de Charles VII, ed. A. VALLET DE VIRIVILLE, 3 
vol., Paris, Jannet, 1858 ; Chronique latine [de Charles VII], ed. C. SAMARAN 
(La chronique latine inedite de Jean Chartier (1422-1450)), Paris, Honore 
Champion, 1928 (Bibliotheque du XVe siecle, XXXVI). 
Choix de chroniques et Memoires sur 1'histoire de France, ed. J. A. C. BUCHON, 
Paris, Delagrave, 1886. 
Chronique de 1'abbaye de Floreffe, in Monuments pour servir ä 1'histoire des 
provinces de Namur, de Hainaut et du Luxembourg, ed. F. DE REIFFENBERG 
for the Academie Royale de Belgique, 8 vol., Brussels, Hayez, 1844-1874, 
VIII, 63-198. 
Chronique de la Pucelle, ed. A. VALLET DE VIRIVILLE, Paris, Delahays, 1859. 
La chronique du bon duc Loys de Bourbon, ed. A. -M. CHAZAUD for the SHF, 
Paris, Renouard, 1876. 
Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le regne de Charles VI, de 1380, i 
1422, ed. and trans!. (from Latin) L. -F. BELLAGUET, 3 vol., Paris, 
Editions du 
315 
Comite des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 1994 (reprint of the classic 
edition in 6 vol.: Paris, Crapelet, 1839-1852). 
Chroniques relatives ä 1'histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de 
Bourgogne, ed. J. M. B. C. KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, 3 vol., Brussels, 
Hayez for the Academie Royale de Belgique, 1870-1876. 
CLARI, ROBERT DE, La conquete de Constantinople, in Historiens et 
chroniqueurs..., p. 17-91. 
COCHON, PIERRE, Chronique normande (1408-1430), ed. C. DE ROBILLARD DE 
BEAUREPAIRE for the Societe de 1'Histoire de Normandie, Rouen, Le 
Brument, 1870. 
COMMYNES, PHILIPPE DE, Memoires, ed. J. CALMETTE and G. DURVILLE, 3 
vol., Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1964-1965 (2"d ed., 1St pub. Paris, Honore 
Champion, 1924-1925). 
Le debat des herauts d'armes de France et d'Angleterre, ed. L. PANNIER & P. 
MEYER, Paris, Finnin Didot (SATF), 1877. 
DESREY, PIERRE, `Addition [... ] sur et avecques les croniques du tres fame 
hystoriographe [... ] Robert Gaguin', in ROBERT GAGUIN, fol. ccxvi, v°- 
ccxxxiv, r° ; Relation du voyage de Charles VIII pour la conqueste du royaume 
de Naples, in Archives curieuses, 1e`e serie, I, 199-223. 
DOUKAS, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, trans!. H. J. 
MAGOULIAS, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1975. 
DU CLERCQ, JACQUES, Memoires, 4 vol., in Chroniques d'Enguerrand de 
Monstrelet, t. 12-15, Collection des chroniques nationales francaises, vol. 37- 
40, ed. J. A. C. BUCHON, Paris, Verdiere, 1826-1827. 
316 
ESCOUCHY, MATHIEU D', Chronique, ed. G. DU FRESNE DE BEAUCOURT for the 
SHF, 3 vol., Paris, Ve Renouard, 1863-1864. 
FENIN, PIERRE DE, Memoires (1407-1427), ed. E. DUPONT for the SHF, Paris, 
Renouard, 1837. 
FILLASTRE, GUILLAUME, Le premier volume de la Toison d'or, Troyes, Nicolas le 
Rouge, 1530. 
FROISSART, JEAN, Chroniques, ed. S. LUCE for the SHF, 11 vol., Paris, V° 
Renouard, 1869-1899; Chroniques. Derniere redaction du premier livre. 
Edition du manuscrit de Rome Reg. lat. 869, ed. G. T. DILLER , Paris 
/ 
Geneva, Droz, 1972. 
GAGUIN, ROBERT, Les Grandes croniques, transl. PIERRE DESREY, Paris, Poncet 
le Preux, 1514. 
GRUEL, GUILLAUME, Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont, ed. A. LE VAVASSEUR 
for the SHF, Paris, Renouard, 1890. 
GUICCIARDINI, FRANCESCO, History of Italy and History of Florence, ed. and 
abridged by J. R. HALE, transl. C. GRAYSON, Chalfont St. Giles, Sadler and 
Brown, 1966. 
Historiens et chroniqueurs du Moyen Age, ed. A. PAUPHILET, Paris, Gallimard 
(Pleiade), 1952 (2"d ed., Is` pub. 1938). 
Journal dun Bourgeois de Paris, 1405-1449, ed. A. TUETEY for the Societe de 
1'Histoire de Paris, Paris, Honore Champion, 1881. 
Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris de 1405 a 1449, ed. C. BEAUNE, Paris, Librairie 
Generale Francaise (Le Livre de Poche, collection Lettres Gothiques), 1990. 
317 
Journal dun Bourgeois de Paris sous le regne de Francois 1 e' (1515-1536), ed. L. 
LALANNE for the SHF, Paris, Renouard, 1854. 
LA BROQUIERE, BERTRANDON DE, Le Voyage d'Outremer, ed. C. SCHEFER, 
Paris, Leroux, 1892. 
LA MARCHE, OLIVIER DE, Memoires, ed. H. BEAUNE and J. D'ARBAUMONT for 
the SHF, 4 vol., Paris, Renouard, 1883-1888. 
LANNOY, GHILLEBERT DE, cEuvres, ed. C. POTVIN and J. -C. HOUZEAU, 
Louvain, Lefever, 1878. 
LA VIGNE, ANDRE DE, Le Voyage de Naples, ed. A. SLERCA, Milan, Universitä 
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1981 ; with OCTOVIEN DE SAINT-GELAIS : Le 
Vergier d'honneur, Paris, Antoine Verard, 1500. 
LE BEL, JEAN, Chronique, ed. J. VIARD and E. DEPREZ for the SHF, 2 vol., Paris, 
Laurens, 1904-1905. 
LE BOUVIER, GILLES, also known as LE HERAUT BERRY, Les chroniques du roi 
Charles VII, ed. H. COURTEAULT and L. CELIER for the SHF, Paris, 
Klincksieck, 1979. 
LEFEVRE DE SAINT-REMY, JEAN, Chronique, ed. F. MORAND for the SHF, 2 vol., 
Paris, Renouard, 1876-1881. 
Le livre des trahisons de France envers la Maison de Bourgogne, in Chroniques 
relatives ä .... II, 1-258. 
LUCINGE, RENE DE, La maniere de lire 1'histoire, ed. M. J. HEATH, Geneva, Droz, 
1993. 
318 
Memoire particulier fait par une personne d'esprit et bien instruite des affaires 
touchant Charles VIII, in Archives curieuses, 1e`e serie, I, 159-198. 
Mer des histoires, Paris, Ambroise Girault, 1543. 
Mer des hystoires, 2 vol., Paris, Antoine Verard, 1503. 
MOLINET, JEAN, Chroniques, ed. G. DOUTREPONT and O. JODOGNE, 3 vol., 
Brussels, Palais des Academies, 1935-1937 ; Lesfaictz et dictz, ed. N. DUPIRE, 
3 vol., Paris, SATF, 1936-1939; `La complainte de Grece', in the Faictz et 
dictz, 1,9-26; `Le Voiage de Napples', in the Faictz et dictz, I, 277-283 ; `Le 
naufrage de la Pucelle', in the Faictz et dictz, I, 77-99. 
MONLUC, BLAISE DE, Commentaires, 1521-1576, ed. P. COURTEAULT, Paris, 
Gallimard (Pleiade), 1964. 
MONSTRELET, ENGUERRAN DE, Chronique, ed. L. DOUET D'ARCQ for the SHF, 
6 vol., Paris, V` Renouard, 1857-1862. 
PISAN, CHRISTINE DE, Ditie de Jeanne d'Arc, ed. and trans!. A. J. KENNEDY and 
K. VARTY, Medium Aevum Monographs, New Series IX, Oxford, Society for 
the Study of Mediaeval Languages and Literature, 1977 ; Le livre de la Paix, 
ed. C. C. WILLARD, The Hague, Mouton, 1958. 
Prods de condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc, ed. P. TISSET for the SHF, 3 vol., Paris, 
Klincksieck, 1960-1971. 
Proces de condamnation et de rehabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc dite la Pucelle, ed. J. 
QUICHERAT for the SHF, 5 vol., Paris, Renouard, 1841-1849. 
Proces en nullite de la condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc, ed. P. DUPARC for the SHF, 
5 vol., Paris, Klincksieck, 1977-1989. 
319 
SAINT-GELAIS, JEAN DE, Histoire de Louis X11, Roi de France, Pere du people, ed. 
T. GODEFROY, Paris, Abraham Pacard, 1622. 
SPHRANTZES, GEORGE, The Fall of the Byzantine Empire (1401-1477), transl. M. 
PHILIPPIDES, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1980. 
VENETTE, JEAN DE, Chronicle, transl. (from Latin) J. BIRDSALL, ed. R. A. 
NEWHALL, New York, Columbia University Press, 1953. 
VILLENEUVE, GUILLAUME DE, Memoires, in Choix de chroniques et Memoires..., 
p. 269-293. 
WAVRIN, JEAN DE, Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant 
Bretaigne, ä present nomme Engleterre, ed. W. HARDY and E. L. C. P. 
HARDY, 5 vol., London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1864-1891 (Rerum 
Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores) ; Anchiennes cronicques d'Engleterre. 
Choix de chapitres inedits, ed. E. DUPONT for the SHF, 3 vol., Paris, Ve 
Renouard, 1858-1863. 
2. Secondary sources 
ABULAFIA, D., `Introduction: From Ferrante I to Charles VIII,, in The French 
Descent..., p. 1-25. 
AINSWORTH, P. F., Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and 
Fiction in the Chroniques, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990. 
ALLMAND, C. T., `Changing Views of the Soldier in Late Medieval France ', in 
Guerre et societe..., p. 171-188. 
320 
ANGLO, S., Images of Tudor Kingship, London, Seaby, 1992. 
L'art de la guerre au Moyen Age, Historia Special, 55 (September / October 1998). 
AUTRAND, F., `La deconfiture. La bataille de Poitiers (1356) a travers quelques 
textes francais des We et 15e siecles', in Guerre et societe..., p. 93-121. 
Le Banquet du Faisan. 1454: 1'Occident face au deft de 1'Empire ottoman, Actes du 
colloque tenu ä Lille et a Arras du 21 au 24 juin 1995, ed. M. -T. CARON and 
D. CLAUZEL, Arras, Artois Presses Universite, 1997. 
BARTHES, R., Critique et verite, Paris, Seuil, 1966. 
BAUMGARTNER, F. J., Louis X11, Stroud, Alan Sutton, 1994. 
BLANCHARD, J., Commynes 1'Europeen : l'invention du politique, Geneva, Droz, 
1996. 
CARDINI, F., La culture de la guerre, X XVIII' siecle, trad. A. LEVI, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1992 (first published in Florence, 1982, as Quell'Antica Festa 
Crudele, Guerra et cultura della guerra dall'etä feudale alle Grande 
Rivoluzione). 
CARON, M. T., Noblesse etpouvoir royal en France, 13e-16' siecle, Paris, Armand 
Colin, 1994; Le Banquet du Vwu du Faisan. Fete de cour et prise de 
conscience europeenne, Arras, Universite d'Artois, 1995. 
CHAMBERS, D., `Francesco II Gonzaga, marquis of Mantua, "Liberator of Italy"', in 
The French Descent..., p. 217-229. 
Chivalry in the Renaissance, ed. S. ANGLO, Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 1990. 
321 
CLOULAS, I., Charles VIII et le mirage italien, Paris, Albin Michel, 1986. 
COLLARD, F., Un historien au travail ä la fin du XIS siecle: Robert Gaguin, 
Geneva, Droz, 1996. 
CONTAMINE, P., Guerre, Etat et societe a la fin du Moyen Äge. Etudes sur les 
armies des rois de France. 1337-1494, Paris / The Hague, Mouton / Ecole 
Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1972 ; La guerre au Moyen Age, Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1980 ; `Froissart : Art militaire, pratique et 
conception de la guerre', in Froissart, historian, ed. J. J. N. PALMER, 
Woodbridge (Suffolk), Boydell Press, 1981, p. 132-144 ; La France au XIV et 
XV siecle. Hommes, mentalites, guerre et paix, London, Variorum reprints, 
1981 ; `Points de vue sur la chevalerie en France ä la fin du Moyen Age', in La 
France au XIV et XV siecle, item XI (first published in Francia. Forschungen 
zur westeuropäischen geschichte, 4 (1976), 255-285) ; `L'idee de guerre ä la fin 
du Moyen Age : aspects juridiques et ethiques `, in La France au XIV et XVe 
siecle, item XIII (first published in Comptes rendus des seances de 1'Academie 
des inscriptions et belles-lettres, Paris, 1979, p. 70-86) ; De Jeanne d'Arc aux 
guerres d'Italie. Figures, images et problemes du XV siecle, Orleans / Caen, 
Paradigme, 1994 ; `La theologie de la guerre ä la fin du Moyen Age: la guerre 
de Cent Ans fut-elle une guerre juste? ', in De Jeanne d'Arc aux guerres 
d'Italie, p. 39-51; `La guerre de siege au temps de Jeanne d'Arc', in De Jeanne 
d'Arc aux guerres d'Italie, p. 85-95 ; `Naissance d'une historiographie. Le 
souvenir de Jeanne d'Arc, en France et hors de France, depuis le "proces de son 
innocence" (1455-1456) jusqu'au debut du XVIe siecle', in De Jeanne d'Arc 
aux guerres d'Italie, p. 139-162 . 
COURCELLES, D. DE, `Le roman de Tirant lo Blanc et le Voeu du Faisan: le pouvoir 
de la parole entre politique et litterature', in Le Banquet du Faisan. 1454: 
l'Occident..., p. 173-186. 
DENIS, A., Charles VIII et les Italiens: Histoire et mythe, Geneva, Droz, 1979. 
322 
DELCLOS, J. -C., Le temoignage de Georges Chastellain, historiographe de Philippe 
le Bon et de Charles le Temeraire, Geneva, Droz, 1980 ;" `Les rayons et les 
ombres de la guerre ä la fin du Moyen Age: Georges Chastellain et Philippe de 
Commynes', in La bataille, 1'armee, la gloire. 1745-1871. Actes du colloque 
international de Clermont-Ferrand, ed. P. VIABLANEIX and J. EHRARD, 
Clermont-Ferrand, Association des publications de la faculte de lettres et 
sciences humaines de Clermont-Ferrand, 1985, t. 1, p. 21-34. 
DEVAUX, J., Jean Molinet, indiciaire bourguignon, Paris, Honore Champion, 1996 
(Bibliotheque du X l,, ' siecle, LV) ; `Le Saint Voyage de Turquie: croisade et 
propagande ä la cour de Philippe le Bon (1463-1464)', in `A 1'heure encore de 
mon escrire'. Aspects de la litterature de Bourgogne sous Philippe le Bon et 
Charles le Temeraire, Les Letires romanes, n. s. (1997), 53-70. 
DILLER, G. T., Attitudes chevaleresques et realites politiques chez Froissart, 
Geneve, Droz, 1984. 
DOUTREPONT, G., `A la cour de Philippe le Bon. Le Banquet du Faisan et la 
litterature de Bourgogne', in Revue generale, 35 (1899), 787-806 and 36 
(1900), 99-118. 
DUFOURNET, J., La destruction des mythes dans les `Memoires' de Philippe de 
Commynes, Geneva, Droz, 1966 ; `Retour A Georges Chastelain', in Le Moyen 
Age, 88 (1982), 329-342; Philippe de Commynes. Un historien ä Taube des 
temps modernes, Brussels, De Boeck-Wesmael, 1994 ; `Charles le Temeraire 
vu par les historiens bourguignons', in Philippe de Commynes, p. 281-297 (1S` 
pub. in Cinq centieme anniversaire de la bataille de Nancy (1477), Actes du 
Colloque organise par 1'Institut de recherche regionale en sciences sociales, 
humaines et economiques de 1'Universite de Nancy 11 (22-24 sept. 1977), 
Nancy, Universite de Nancy II, 1978, p. 65-81) ; `Comment lire les Memoires 
de Commynes ? L'entrevue de Peronne et 1'expedition contre Liege', in 
Philippe de Commynes, p. 217-249 (1St pub. in Memoires de la Societe 
d'histoire de Comines-Warneton et de la region, XII, 1982, p. 25-54) ; `Les 
323 
premiers lecteurs de Commynes ou les Memoires au XVIC siecle', in Philippe 
de Commynes, p. 145-191 (1St pub. in Memoires de la Societe d'histoire..., 
XIV, 1984, p. 51-94) ; `Commynes et l'invention d'un nouveau genre 
historique: les Memoires', in Philippe de Commynes, p. 17-33 (1St pub. in 
Memoires de la Societe d'histoire..., XVIII, 1988, p. 57-72) ; `Commynes et 
l'Italie', in Philippe de Commynes, p. 81-112 (1St pub. in Memoires de la 
Societe d'histoire..., XX, 1990, p. 34-62) ; `Commynes, l'Italie et la ligue anti- 
francaise', in Italie 1494, ed. A. C. FIORATO, Paris, Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1994, 
p. 95-120. 
FLORESCU, R., and MC NALLY, R. T., Dracula. A Biography of Had the Impaler, 
New York, Hawthorn Books, 1973. 
FLORI, J., `Dieu, cet eternel alibi', in L'art de la guerre au Moyen Age, 6-11 ; Pierre 
1'Ermite et la premiere croisade, Paris, Artherne Fayard, 1999. 
FOWLER, K., The Age of Plantagenet and Valois, London, Ferndale, 1980. 
The French Descent into Renaissance Italy. 1494-1495. Antecedents and Effects, ed. 
D. ABULAFIA, Aldershot (Hampshire), Variorum, 1995 
FÜGEDI, E., `Two Kinds of Enemies - Two Kinds of Ideology. The Hungarian- 
Turkish Wars in the Fifteenth Century', in War and Peace in the Middle Ages, 
ed. B. MC GUIRE, Reitzel, 1987, p. 146-160. 
GAUCHER, E., `Entre l'histoire et le roman : la biographie chevaleresque', in Ecrire 
1'histoire a la fin du Moyen Age, Revue des Langues Romanes, 97 (1993), 15- 
29. 
GENETTE, G., Figures I, Paris, Seuil, 1966. 
GIRAUD, Y., and JUNG, M. -R., La Renaissance, t. I: 1480-1548 (Litterature 
francaise, ed. C. PICHOIS, t. III, Paris, Arthaud, 1972). 
324 
GREVE, M. DE, Le Vaýu du Faisan et les ecrivains, problemes de reception, in Le 
Banquet du Faisan. 1454.1'Occident..., p. 137-144. 
GUENEE, B., Histoire et culture historique dans l'occident medieval, Paris, Aubier- 
Montaigne, 1980. 
GUERET-LAFERTE, J., `Le livre et la croisade', in Le Banquet du Faisan. 1454: 
V Occident..., p. 107-114. 
Guerre et societe en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne, 14e-15e siecle, ed. P. 
CONTAMINE, C. GIRY-DELOISON, M. H. KEEN, Villeneuve d'Ascq, Presses 
de l'Universite Charles de Gaulle (Lilles III), 1991. 
GUILLEMIN, H., The True History of Joan `of Arc', transl. W. OXFERRY, London, 
Allen & Unwin, 1972 (first published as Jeanne dite `Jeanne d'Arc' in 1970). 
GUNN, S., `Chivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court', in Chivalry in the 
Renaissance, p. 107-128. 
HALE, J. R., War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620, Leicester, 
Leicester University Press / Fontana Paperbacks, 1985 ; Artists and Warfare in 
the Renaissance, New Haven / London, Yale University Press, 1990. 
HEATH, M. J., `Renaissance Scholars and the Origins of the Turks', in Bibliotheque 
d'Humanisme et Renaissance. Travaux et documents, XLI, Geneve, Droz, 
1979, p. 453-471 ; Crusading Commonplaces: La Noue, Lucinge and Rhetoric 
against the Turks, Geneva, Droz, 1986. 
HIBBERT, C., Agincourt, London, Batsford, 1964. 
325 
HIMMELSBACH, S., "`Long poeme" et "grand genre": 1'elaboration de formes 
narratives longues au debut du XVIe siecle', Nouvelle Revue du Seizieme Siecle, 
15 /1 (1997), 27-40. 
Histoire militaire de la France, dir. A. CORVISIER, t. 1: Des origines a 1715, dir. P. 
CONTAMINE, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1992. 
HOUSLEY, N., The Later Crusades, 1274-1580. From Lyons to Alcazar, Oxford, 
University Press, 1992. 
HOWARD, M., War in European History, London / Oxford / NewYork, Oxford 
University Press, 1976. 
HUIZINGA, J. , L'automne 
du Moyen Age, transl. J. BASTIN, Paris, Payot, 1989 (3rd 
Payot ed.; 1s` published in Harlem, 1919, as Herfstij der Middeleeuwen). 
IORGA, N., `Cronica lui Wavrin si Rominii', in Buletinul Comisiei istorice a 
Romäniei, VI, Bucarest, Datina Romaneasca, 1927, p. 59-148 ; `Les aventures 
"sarrazines" des Francais de Bourgogne au XVe siecle', in Melanges d'histoire 
generale, ed. C. MARINESCO, Cluj, Cartea Romäneasca, 1927, p. 7-56. 
JACQUART, J., `De quelques capitaines des guerres d'Italie: de la realite ä l'image', 
in Passer les monts, p. 83-90. 
KEEN, M. H., `Chivalry, Nobility and the Man-at-arms', in War, Literature and 
Politics..., p. 32-45. 
KIPLING, G., The Triumph of Honour. Burgundian Origins of the Elizabethan 
Renaissance, The Hague, Leiden University Press, 1977. 
LACAZE, Y., `Politique "mediterraneenne" et projets de croisade chez Philippe le 
Bon: de la chute de Byzance ä la victoire chretienne de Belgrade (mai 1453- 
326 
juillet 1456)', in Annales de Bourgogne, 41/161 (1969), 5-42 (part 1) ; 41/162 
(1969), 82-132 (part 2). 
LAFORTUNE-MARTEL, A., Fete noble en Bourgogne au Xis siecle. Le Banquet du 
Faisan (1454): Aspects politiques, sociaux et culturels, Montreal / Paris, 
Bellarmin / Vrin, 1984. 
LAURIOUX, B., `Banquets, entremets et cuisine a la cour de Bourgogne', in 
Splendeurs de la cour de Bourgogne, p. 1027-1035. 
LE BRUSQUE, G., `Des chevaliers bourguignons dans les pays du Levant: 
1'expedition de Walleran de Wavrin contre les Turcs ottomans (1444-1445) 
dans les Anchiennes cronicques d'Engleterre de Jean de Wavrin', in Le Moyen 
Age, 106 /2 (2000), 255-275. 
LEWIS, P. S., `War Propaganda and Historiography in 15 `" Century France and 
England', in his Essays in Later Medieval French History, London, Hambledon 
Press, 1985, p. 193-213. 
LIGHTBODY, C. W., The Judgements of Joan: Joan of Arc: a study in cultural 
history, London, Allen and Unwin, 1961. 
MARINESCO, C., `Philippe le Bon, duc de Bourgogne et la croisade: premiere partie: 
1419-1453', in Acies du VI' Congres international d'etudes byzantines, t. 1, 
Paris, Ecole des hautes etudes Sorbonne, 1948, p. 147-168; `deuxieme partie: 
1453-1467', in Bulletin des etudes portugaises de l'Institut francais au 
Portugal, n. s. 13 (1949), 25-32. 
MITCHELL, R. J., The Laurels and the Tiara. Pope Pius H. 1458-1464, London, 
Harvill Press, 1962. 
MOLLAT DU JOURDIN, M., La guerre de Cent Ans vue par ceux qui 1 'ont vecue, 
Paris, Seuil, 1992. 
327 
MOSSE, C., Les Histoires de 1'Histoire, vol. 2: La Pre-Renaissance, Paris, Acropole, 
1982. 
`Le Moyen Age, une periode faussement militaire', interview with P. CONTAMINE, 
in L'art de la guerre au Moyen Age, 110-116. 
PALL, F., `Un moment decisif de l'histoire du Sud-Est Europeen: la croisade de 
Varna (1444)', in Balcania, 7 (1944), 102-120. 
Passer les monts. Francais en Italie - 1'Italie en France (1494-1525), ed. J. 
BALSAMO, Paris / Florence, Honore Champion / Cadmo, 1998. 
PAVIOT, J., La politique navale des ducs de Bourgogne, 1384-1482, Lille, Presses 
Universitaires, 1995. 
PERNOUD, R., Jeanne d'Arc, Paris, Seuil, 1959; Jeanne d'Arc, par elle-meme et ses 
temoins, Paris, Seuil, 1962. 
PLANCHENAULT, R., `La Chronique de la Pucelle', in Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des 
Chartes, 93 (1932), p. 55-104. 
PRESTWICH, M., Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience, 
New Haven / London, Yale University Press, 1996. 
RAYNAUD, C., `L'imaginaire de la guerre dans L'histoire du bon roi Alexandre', in 
her work Images etpouvoirs au Moyen Age, Paris, Le Leopard d'Or, 1992. 
RICHARD, J., `La Bourgogne des Valois, 1'idee de croisade et la defense de 
1'Europe', in Le Banquet du Faisan. 1454: l'Occident..., p. 15-27. 
SAINTE-BEUVE, C. -A., Causeries du Lundi, 3rd ed., 15 vol., Paris, Gamier, 1857- 
1872, I, 240-259 (art. of 7 January 1850). 
328 
SAKELLARIOU, E., `Institutional and Social Continuities in the Kingdom of Naples 
between 1443 and 1528', in The French Descent..., p. 327-353. 
SALLMANN, J. -M., `L'evolution des techniques de guerre pendant les guerres 
d'Italie', in Passer les monts, p. 59-81. 
SAUL, N., `The Vanishing Vision : Late Medieval Crusading', in History Today, 47 
(June 1997), 23-28. 
SCHWOEBEL, R., The Shadow of the Crescent. The Renaissance Image of the Turk 
(1453-1517), Nieuwkoop, de Graaf, 1967. 
SCOTT, W. S., Jeanne d'Arc: Her Life, Her Death, and the Myth, London, Harrap, 
1974. 
SHEARS, F. S., Froissart: Chronicler and Poet, London, Routledge, 1930. 
SLERCA, A., `La Complainte des estatz sur le voyage et guerre de Neaples de Jean 
Bouchet', in Passer les monts, p. 213-236. 
SMALL, G., Georges Chastelain and the Shaping of Valois Burgundy. Political and 
Historical Culture at Court in the 15'h Century, Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 
1997. 
SPENCER, M., Thomas Basin (1412-1490). The History of Charles VII and Louis XI, 
Nieuwkoop, De Graaf, 1997. 
Splendeurs de la tour de Bourgogne. Recits et chroniques, ed. D. REGNIER- 
BOHLER, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1995. 
329 
TAPAREL, H., `Un episode de la politique orientale de Philippe le Bon: les 
Bourguignons en Mer Noire (1444-1446)', in Annales de Bourgogne, 55 
(January-March 1983), 5-29. 
THURLEY, S., The Royal Palaces of Tudor England, Architecture and Court Life, 
London / New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993. 
VALE, M., War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France 
and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages, London, Gerald Duckworth, 
1981. 
VAUGHAN, D. M., Europe and the Turk. A Pattern of Alliances (1350-1700), 
Liverpool, University Press, 1954. 
War, Literature and Politics in the Late Middle Ages, ed. C. T. ALLMAND, 
Liverpool, University Press, 1976. 
WARNER, M., Joan of Arc. The Image of Female Heroism, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1981. 
WRIGHT, N. A. R., `The Tree of Battles of Honore Bouvet and the Laws of War', in 
War, Literature and Politics..., p. 12-31 ; Knights and Peasants. The Hundred 
Years War in the French Countryside, Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 1998. 
ZUMTHOR, P., Le masque et la lumiere. La poetique des grands rhetoriqueurs, 
Paris, Seuil, 1978. 
'0" 
